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Cetywayo And His White Neighbour=
s
By
H. Rider Haggard
Contents
CETYWAYO
AND THE ZULU SETTLEMENT
CHAPTER
I - ITS INHABITANTS, LAWS, AND CUSTOMS.
CHAPTER
II - EVENTS PRECEDING THE ANNEXATION..
CHAPTER
IV - THE TRANSVAAL UNDER BRITISH RULE.
CHAPTER
V - THE BOER REBELLION
CHAPTER
VI - THE RETROCESSION OF THE TRANSVAAL.
The writer on Colonial Affairs is naturally, to
some extent, discouraged by the knowledge that the subject is an unattracti=
ve
one to a large proportion of the reading public. It is difficult to get up
anything beyond a transient interest in the affairs of our Colonial
dependencies; indeed, I believe that the mind of the British public was mor=
e profoundly
moved by the exodus of Jumbo, than it would be were one of them to become t=
he
scene of some startling catastrophe. This is the more curious, inasmuch as,
putting aside all sentimental considerations, which indeed seem to be out of
harmony with the age we live in: the trade done, even with such comparative=
ly
insignificant colonies as our South African possessions, amounts to a value=
of
many millions of pounds sterling per annum. Now, as the preachers of the new
gospel that hails from Birmingham and Northampton have frequently told us,
trade is the life-blood of England, and must be fostered at any price. It i=
s therefore
surprising that, looking on them in the light of a commercial speculation, =
in
which aspect (saith the preacher) they are alone worthy of notice, a keener
interest is not taken in the well-being and development of the Colonies. We
have only to reflect to see how great are the advantages that the Mother
Country derives from the possession of her Colonial Empire; including, as t=
hey
do, a home for her surplus children, a vast and varied market for her
productions, and a wealth of old-fashioned loyalty and deep attachment to t=
he
Old Country--"home," as it is always called--which, even if it is=
out
of date, might prove useful on emergency. It seems therefore, almost a pity
that some Right Honourable Gentlemen and their followers should adopt the t=
one
they do with reference to the Colonies. After all, there is an odd shufflin=
g of
the cards going on now in England; and great as she is, her future looks by=
no
means sunny. Events in these latter days develop themselves very quickly; a=
nd
though the idea may, at the present moment, seem absurd, surely it is possi=
ble
that, what between the rapid spread of Radical ideas, the enmity of Ireland,
the importation of foreign produce, and the competition of foreign trade, to
say nothing of all the unforeseen accidents and risks of the future, the
Englishmen of, say, two generations hence, may not find their country in her
present proud position. Perhaps, and stranger things have happened in the
history of the world, she may by that time be under the protection of those
very Colonies for which their forefathers had such small affection.
The position of South Africa with reference to=
the
Mother Country is somewhat different to that of her sister Colonies, in that
she is regarded, not so much with apathy tinged with dislike, as with downr=
ight
disgust. This feeling has its foundation in the many troubles and expenses =
in
which this country has been recently involved, through local complications =
in
the Cape, Zululand, and the Transvaal: and indeed is little to be wondered =
at.
But, whilst a large portion of the press has united with a powerful party of
politicians in directing a continuous stream of abuse on to the heads of the
white inhabitants of South Africa, whom they do not scruple to accuse of ha=
ving
created the recent disturbances in order to reap a money profit from them: =
it
does not appear to have struck anybody that the real root of this crop of t=
roubles
might, after all, be growing nearer home. The truth of the matter is, that
native and other problems in South Africa have, till quite lately, been lef=
t to
take their chance, and solve themselves as best they might; except when they
have, in a casual manner, been made the corpus vile of some political
experiment. It was during this long period of inaction, when each
difficulty--such as the native question in Natal--was staved off to be dealt
with by the next Government, that the seed was sown of which we are at pres=
ent
reaping the fruit. In addition to this, matters have recently been complica=
ted
by the elevation of South African affairs to the dignity of an English party
question. Thus, the Transvaal Annexation was made use of as a war-cry in th=
e last
general election, a Boer rebellion was thereby encouraged, which resulted i=
n a
complete reversal of our previous policy.
Now, if there is any country dependent on Engl=
and
that requires the application to the conduct of its affairs of a firm,
considered, and consistent policy, that country is South Africa. Boers and
Natives are quite incapable of realising the political necessities of any o=
f our
parties, or of understanding why their true interests should be sacrificed =
in
order to minister to those necessities. It is our wavering and uncertain
policy, as applied to peoples, who look upon every hesitating step as a sig=
n of
fear and failing dominion, that, in conjunction with previous postponement =
and
neglect, has really caused our troubles in South Africa. For so long as the
affairs of that country are influenced by amateurs and sentimentalists, who=
have
no real interest in it, and whose knowledge of its circumstances and condit=
ions
of life is gleaned from a few blue-books, superficially got up to enable the
reader to indite theoretical articles to the "Nineteenth Century,"=
; or
deliver inaccurate speeches in the House of Commons--for so long will those
troubles continue.
If I may venture to make a suggestion, the aff=
airs
of South Africa should be controlled by a Board or Council, like that which
formerly governed India, composed of moderate members of both parties, with=
an admixture
of men possessing practical knowledge of the country. I do not know if any =
such
arrangement would be possible under our constitution, but the present syste=
m of
government, by which the control of savage races fluctuates in obedience of
every variation of English party politics, is most mischievous in its resul=
ts.
The public, however, is somewhat tired of South
Africa, and the reader may, perhaps, wonder why he should be troubled with =
more
literature on the subject. I can assure him that these pages are not writte=
n in
order to give me an opportunity of airing my individual experiences or idea=
s. Their
object is shortly--(1.) To give a true history of the events attendant on t=
he
Annexation of the Transvaal, which act has so frequently been assigned to t=
he
most unworthy motives, and has never yet been fairly described by any one w=
ho
was in a position to know the facts; (2.) To throw as much publicity as
possible on the present disgraceful state of Zululand, resulting from our
recent settlement in that country; (3.) To show all interested in the Kafir
races what has been the character of our recent surrender in the Transvaal,=
and
what its effect will be on our abandoned native subjects living in that cou=
ntry.
It may, perhaps, seem an odd statement,
considering that I have lived in various parts of South Africa for about six
years, and have, perhaps, enjoyed exceptional advantage in forming my opini=
ons,
when I say that my chief fear in publishing the present volume, is lest my
knowledge of my subject in all its bearings should not be really equal to t=
he
task. It is, I know, the fashion to treat South African difficulties as bei=
ng simple
of solution. Thus it only took Sir Garnet Wolseley a few weeks to understand
the whole position of Zulu affairs, and to execute his memorable settlement=
of
that country: whilst eminent writers appear to be able, in scampering from
Durban via Kimberley to Cape Town in a post-cart, to form decided opinions =
upon
every important question in South Africa. The power of thus rapidly
assimilating intricate knowledge, and of seeing straight through a wall whi=
lst
ordinary individuals are still criticising the bricks, is no doubt one of t=
he peculiar
privileges of genius--which is, perhaps fortunately for South Africa--rare.=
To
the common run of mind, however, the difficulty of forming a sound and accu=
rate
judgment on the interlacing problems that disclose themselves to the studen=
t of
the politics of South-Eastern Africa, is exceedingly great and the work of
years.
But although it is by no means perfect, I think
that my knowledge of these problems and of their imminent issues is
sufficiently intimate to justify me in making a prophecy--namely, that unle=
ss
the native and other questions of South-Eastern Africa are treated with more
honest intelligence, and on a more settled plan than it has hitherto been t=
hought
necessary to apply to them, the British taxpayer will find that he has by no
means heard the last of that country and its wars.
There is one more point to which, although it
hardly comes within the scope of this volume, I have made some allusion, and
which I venture to suggest deserves the consideration of thinking Englishme=
n. I
refer to the question of the desirability of allowing the Dutch in South
Africa, who are already numerically the strongest, to continue to advance w=
ith such
rapid strides towards political supremacy. That the object of this party is=
to
reduce Englishmen and English ideas to a subordinate position in the State,=
if
not actually to rid itself of our rule and establish a republic, there is no
manner of doubt. Indeed, there exists a powerful organisation, the Africand=
er
Bond, which has its headquarters in the Cape, and openly devotes its energi=
es
to forwarding these ends, by offering a sturdy opposition to the introducti=
on
of English emigrants and the use of the English language, whilst striving in
every way to excite class prejudices and embitter the already strained
relations between Englishman and Boer. In considering this question, it is =
as
well not to lose sight of the fact that the Dutch are as a body, at heart h=
ostile
to our rule, chiefly because they cannot tolerate our lenient behaviour to =
the
native races. Should they by any chance cease to be the subjects of England,
they will, I believe, become her open enemies. This of itself would be
comparatively unimportant, were it not for the fact that, in the event of t=
he
blocking of the Suez Canal, it would be, to say the least, inconvenient that
the Cape should be in the hands of a hostile population.
In conclusion, I wish to state that this book =
is
not written for any party purpose. I have tried to describe a state of affa=
irs
which has for the most part come under my own observation, and events in wh=
ich
I have been interested, and at times engaged. That the naked truths of such=
a
business as the Transvaal surrender, or of the present condition of Zululan=
d,
are unpleasant reading for an Englishman, there is no doubt; but, so far as
these pages are concerned, they owe none of their ugliness to undue colouri=
ng
or political bias.
Windham Club, St. James' Square, June 1882.
CETYWAYO
AND HIS WHITE NEIGHBOURS
Claim=
s of
affairs of Zululand to attention--Proposed visit of Cetywayo to
England--Chaka--His method of government--His death-- Dingaan--Panda--Battl=
e of
the Tugela--John Dunn--Nomination of Cetywayo--His coronation--His lady
advocates--Their attacks on officials--Was Cetywayo bloodthirsty?--Cause of=
the
Zulu war--Zulu military system--States of feeling amongst the Zulus previou=
s to
the war--Cetywayo's position--His enemies--His intentions on the Transvaal-=
-Their
frustration by Sir T. Shepstone--Cetywayo's interview with Mr. Fynney--His
opinion of the Boers--The annexation in connection with the Zulu war--The N=
atal
colonists and the Zulu war--Sir Bartle Frere--The Zulu war--Cetywayo's
half-heartedness--Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement--Careless selection of
chiefs--The Sitimela plot--Chief John Dunn--Appointment of Mr. Osborn as
British Resident--His difficult position--Folly and cruelty of our
settlement--Disappointment of the Zulus--Object and result of
settlement--Slaughter in Zululand--Cetywayo's son--Necessity of proper
settlement of Zululand--Should Cetywayo be restored?
Zululand and the Zulu settlement still continu=
e to
receive some attention from the home public, partly because those responsib=
le
for the conduct of affairs are not quite at ease about it, and partly becau=
se
of the agitation in this country for the restoration of Cetywayo.
There is no doubt that the present state of
affairs in Zululand is a subject worthy of close consideration, not only by
those officially connected with them, but by the public at large. Nobody,
either at home or in the colonies, wishes to see another Zulu war, or anyth=
ing approaching
to it. Unless, however, the affairs of Zululand receive a little more
attention, and are superintended with a little more humanity and intelligen=
ce
than they are at present, the public will sooner or later be startled by so=
me
fresh catastrophe. Then will follow the usual outcry, and the disturbance w=
ill
be attributed to every cause under the sun except the right one--want of co=
mmon
precautions.
The Zulu question is a very large one, and I o=
nly
propose discussing so much of it as necessary to the proper consideration of
the proposed restoration of Cetywayo to his throne.
The king is now coming to England,[*] where he
will doubtless make a very good impression, since his appearance is dignifi=
ed,
and his manners, as is common among Zulus of high rank, are those of a
gentleman. It is probable that his visit will lead to a popular agitation in
his favour, and very possibly to an attempt on the part of the English
Government to reinstate him in his kingdom. Already Lady Florence Dixie wav=
es
his banner, and informs the public through the columns of the newspapers how
good, how big, and how beautiful he is, and "F. W. G. X." describ=
es
in enthusiastic terms his pearl-like teeth. But as there are interests invo=
lved
in the question of his reinstatement which are, I think, more important than
Cetywayo's personal proportions of mind or body, and as the results of such=
a
step would necessarily be very marked and far-reaching, it is as well to try
and understand the matter in all its bearing before anything is done.
[=
*]
Since the above was written the Government have at the last moment decided to postpone Cety=
wayo's
visit to this country, chiefly=
on
account of the political capital which was being made out of the event by
agitators in Zululand. The pro=
ject
of bringing the king to England does not, however, appear to have been abandon=
ed.
There has been a great deal of special pleading
about Cetywayo. Some writers, swayed by sentiment, and that spirit of
partisanship that the sight of royalty in distress always excites, whitewash
him in such a persistent manner that their readers are left under the
impression that the ex-king is a model of injured innocence and virtue. Oth=
ers
again, for political reasons, paint him very black, and predict that his
restoration would result in the destruction, or at the least, disorganisati=
on,
of our South African empire. The truth in this, as in the majority of polit=
ical
controversies, lies somewhere between these two extremes, though it is
difficult to say exactly where.
To understand the position of Cetywayo both wi=
th
reference to his subjects and the English Government, it will be necessary =
to
touch, though briefly, on the history of Zululand since it became a nation,=
and
also on the principal events of the ex-king's reign.
Chaka, Cetywayo's great uncle, was the first Z=
ulu
king, and doubtless one of the most remarkable men that has ever filled a
throne since the days of the Pharaohs. When he came to his chieftainship, a=
bout
1813, the Zulu people consisted of a single small tribe; when his throne be=
came
vacant in 1828, their name had become a living terror, and they were the
greatest Black power in South Africa. The invincible armies of this African
Attila had swept north and south, east and west, had slaughtered more than a
million human beings, and added vast tracts of country to his dominions.
Wherever his warriors went, the blood of men, women, and children was poured
out without stay or stint; indeed he reigned like a visible Death, the
presiding genius of a saturnalia of slaughter.
His methods of government and warfare were
peculiar and somewhat drastic, but most effective. As he conquered a tribe,=
he
enrolled its remnants in his army, so that they might in their turn help to
conquer others. He armed his regiments with the short stabbing assegai, ins=
tead
of the throwing assegai which they had been accustomed to use, and kept them
subject to an iron discipline. If a man was observed to show the slightest
hesitation about coming to close quarters with the enemy, he was executed as
soon as the fight was over. If a regiment had the misfortune to be defeated,
whether by its own fault or not, it would on its return to headquarters find
that a goodly proportion of the wives and children belonging to it had been
beaten to death by Chaka's orders, and that he was waiting their arrival to
complete his vengeance by dashing out their brains. The result was, that th=
ough
Chaka's armies were occasionally annihilated, they were rarely defeated, and
they never ran away. I will not enter in the history of his numerous cruelt=
ies,
and indeed they are not edifying. Amongst other things, like Nero, he kille=
d his
own mother, and then caused several persons to be executed because they did=
not
show sufficient sorrow at her death.
At length, in 1828, he too suffered the fate he
had meted out to so many, and was killed by his brothers, Dingaan and
Umhlangan, by the hands of one Umbopa. He was murdered in his hut, and as h=
is
life passed out of him he is reported to have addressed these words to his
brothers, who were watching his end: "What! do you stab me, my brother=
s,
dogs of mine own house, whom I have fed? You hope to be kings; but though y=
ou
do kill me, think not that your line shall reign for long. I tell you that I
hear the sound of the feet of the great white people, and that this land sh=
all
be trodden by them." He then expired, but his last words have always b=
een
looked upon as a prophecy by the Zulus, and indeed they have been partly
fulfilled.
Having in his turn killed Umhlangan, his broth=
er
by blood and in crime, Dingaan took possession of the throne. He was less
pronounced than Chaka in his foreign policy, though he seems to have kept up
the family reputation as regards domestic affairs. It was he who, influence=
d, perhaps,
by Chaka's dying prophecy about white men, massacred Retief, the Boer leade=
r,
and his fifty followers, in the most treacherous manner, and then falling on
the emigrant Boers in Natal, murdered men, women, and children to the numbe=
r of
nearly six hundred. There seems, however, to have been but little love lost
between any of the sons of Usengangacona (the father of Chaka, Dingaan,
Umhlangan, and Panda), for in due course Panda, his brother, conspired with=
the
Boers against Dingaan, and overthrew him with their assistance. Dingaan fle=
d,
and was shortly afterwards murdered in Swaziland, and Panda ascended the th=
rone
in 1840.
Panda was a man of different character to the
remainder of his race, and seems to have been well content to reign in peac=
e,
only killing enough people to keep up his authority. Two of his sons, Umbel=
azi
and Cetywayo, of whom Umbelazi was the elder and Panda's favourite, began, =
as
their father grew old, to quarrel about the succession to the crown. On the=
question
being referred to Panda, he is reported to have remarked that when two young
cocks quarrelled the best thing they could do was to fight it out. Acting on
this hint, each prince collected his forces, Panda sending down one of his
favourite regiments to help Umbelazi. The fight took place in 1856 on the b=
anks
of the Tugela. A friend of the writer, happening to be on the Natal side of=
the
river the day before the battle, and knowing it was going to take place, sw=
am
his horse across in the darkness, taking his chance of the alligators, and =
hid
in some bush on a hillock commanding the battlefield. It was a hazardous pr=
oceeding,
but the sight repaid the risk, though he describes it as very awful, more
especially when the regiment of veterans sent by Panda joined in the fray. =
It
came up at the charge, between two and three thousand strong, and was met n=
ear
his hiding-place by one of Cetywayo's young regiments. The noise of the cla=
sh
of their shields was like the roar of the sea, but the old regiment, after a
struggle in which men fell thick and fast, annihilated the other, and passe=
d on
with thinned ranks. Another of Cetywayo's regiments took the place of the o=
ne
that had been destroyed, and this time the combat was fierce and long, till=
victory
again declared for the veterans' spears. But they had brought it dear, and =
were
in no position to continue their charge; so the leaders of that brave batta=
lion
formed its remnants into a ring, and, like the Scotch at Flodden--
"The stubborn spearmen still made good The dark, impenetrable wood; Each stepping where his comrade stoo= d The instant that he fell,"<= o:p>
till there were none left to fall. The ground
around them was piled with dead.
But this gallant charge availed Umbelazi but
little, and by degrees Cetywayo's forces pressed his men back to the banks =
of
the Tugela, and finally into it. Thousands fell upon the field and thousands
perished in the river. When my friend swam back that night, he had nothing =
to fear
from the alligators: they were too well fed. Umbelazi died on the battlefie=
ld
of a broken heart, at least it is said that no wound could be found on his
person. He probably expired in a fit brought on by anxiety of mind and fati=
gue.
A curious story is told of Cetywayo with reference to his brother's death.
After the battle was over a Zulu from one of his own regiments presented
himself before him with many salutations, saying, "O prince! now canst
thou sleep in peace, for Umbelazi is dead." "How knowest thou tha=
t he
is dead?" said Cetywayo. "Because I slew him with my own hand,&qu=
ot;
replied the Zulu. "Thou dog!" said the prince, "thou hast da=
red
to lift thy hand against the blood royal, and now thou makest it a matter of
boasting. Wast thou not afraid? By Chaka's head thou shalt have thy reward.
Lead him away." And the Zulu, who was but lying after all, having
possessed himself of the bracelets off the dead prince's body, was instantly
executed. The probability is that Cetywayo acted thus more from motives of
policy than from affection to his brother, whom indeed he hoped to destroy.=
It
did not do to make too light of the death of an important prince: Umbelazi'=
s fate
to-day might be Cetywayo's fate to-morrow. This story bears a really remark=
able
resemblance to that of the young man who slew Saul, the Lord's anointed, and
suffered death on account thereof at the hands of David.
This battle is also memorable as being the
occasion of the first public appearance of Mr. John Dunn, now the most
important chief in Zululand, and, be it understood, the unknown quantity in=
all
future transactions in that country. At that time Dunn was a retainer of
Umbelazi's, and fought on his side in the Tugela battle. After the fight,
however, he went over to Cetywayo and became his man. From that time till t=
he outbreak
of the Zulu war he remained in Zululand as adviser to Cetywayo, agent for t=
he
Natal Government, and purveyor of firearms to the nation at large. As soon =
as
Cetywayo got into trouble with the Imperial Government, Dunn, like a prudent
man, deserted him and came over to us. In reward Sir Garnet Wolseley advanc=
ed
him to the most important chieftainship in Zululand, which he hopes to make=
a
stepping-stone to the vacant throne. His advice was largely followed by Sir
Garnet in the bestowal of the other chieftainships, and was naturally not q=
uite
disinterested. He has already publicly announced his intention of resisting=
the
return of the king, his old master, by force of arms, should the Government
attempt to reinstate him.
A period of sixteen years elapsed before Cetyw=
ayo
reaped the fruits of the battle of the Tugela by succeeding to the throne on
the death of his father, Panda, the only Zulu monarch who has as yet come to
his end by natural causes.
In 1861, however, Cetywayo was, at the instanc=
e of
the Natal Government, formally nominated heir to the throne by Mr. Shepston=
e,
it being thought better that a fixed succession should be established with =
the concurrence
of the Natal Government than that matters should be left to take their chan=
ce
on Panda's death. Mr. Shepstone accomplished his mission successfully, thou=
gh
at great personal risk. For some unknown reason, Cetywayo, who was blown up
with pride, was at first adverse to being thus nominated, and came down to =
the
royal kraal with three thousand armed followers, meaning, it would see, to =
kill
Mr. Shepstone, whom he had never before met. Panda, the old king, had an
inkling of what was to happen, but was powerless to control his son, so he
confined himself to addressing the assembled multitude in what I have heard=
Sir
Theophilus Shepstone say was the most eloquent and touching speech he ever
listened to, the subject being the duties of hospitality. He did not at the
time know how nearly the speech concerned him, or that its object was to
preserve his life. This, however, soon became manifest when, exception being
taken to some breech of etiquette by one of his servants, he was surrounded=
by
a mob of shouting savages, whose evident object was to put an end to him and
those with him. For two hours he remained sitting there, expecting that eve=
ry
moment would be his last, but showing not the slightest emotion, till at le=
ngth
he got an opportunity of speaking, when he rose and said, "I know that=
you
mean to kill me; it is an easy thing to do; but I tell you Zulus, that for
every drop of my blood that falls to the ground, a hundred men will come ou=
t of
the sea yonder, from the country of which Natal is one of the cattle-kraals,
and will bitterly avenge me." As he spoke he turned and pointed towards
the ocean, and so intense was the excitement that animated it, that the who=
le
great multitude turned with him and stared towards the horizon, as though t=
hey
expected to see the long lines of avengers creeping across the plains. Sile=
nce
followed his speech; his imperturbability and his well-timed address had sa=
ved
his life. From that day his name was a power in the land.[*]
[=
*] A
very good description of this scene was published in the London Quarterly Review in 1878.=
The
following is an extract:
"In the centre of those infuriated savages he (Mr. Shepstone) sat for more than two hou=
rs
outwardly calm, giving confide=
nce to
his solitary European companion by his own quietness, only once saying, 'Wh=
y,
Jem, you're afraid,' and impos=
ing
restraint on his native attendants. Then, when they had shouted, as Cetywayo himsel=
f said
in our hearing, 'till their th=
roats
were so sore that they could shout no more,' they departed. But Sompseu (M=
r.
Shepstone) had conquered. Cety=
wayo,
in describing the scene to us and our companion on a visit to him a short =
time
afterwards, said, 'Sompseu is a
great man: no man but he could have come through that day alive.' Similar tes=
timony
we have had from some of the Z=
ulu
assailants, from the native attendants, and the companion above mentioned. Next
morning Cetywayo humbly begged=
an
interview, which was not granted but on terms of unqualified submission. From that day
Cetywayo has submitted to Brit=
ish
control in the measure in which it has been exercised, and has been profuse in h=
is
expressions of respect and
submission to Mr. T. Shepstone; but in his heart, as occasional acts and speech=
es
show, he writhes under the
restraint, and bitterly hates the man who imposed it."
It was on this occasion that a curious incident
occurred which afterwards became of importance. Among the Zulus there exist=
s a
certain salute, "Bayete," which it is the peculiar and exclusive
privilege of Zulu royalty to receive. The word means, or is supposed to mea=
n,
"Let us bring tribute." On Mr. Shepstone's visit the point was ra=
ised
by the Zulu lawyers as to what salute he should receive. It was not consist=
ent with
their ideas that the nominator of their future king should be greeted with =
any
salute inferior to the Bayete, and this, as plain Mr. Shepstone, it was
impossible to give him. The difficulty was obvious, but the Zulu mind proved
equal to it. He was solemnly announced to be a Zulu king, and to stand in t=
he
place of the great founder of their nation, Chaka. Who was so fit to procla=
im
the successor to the throne as the great predecessor of the prince proclaim=
ed?
To us this seems a strange, not to say ludicrous, way of settling a difficu=
lty,
but there was nothing in it repugnant to Zulu ideas. Odd as it was, it inve=
sted
Mr. Shepstone with all the attributes of a Zulu king, such as the power to =
make
laws, order executions, &c., and those attributes in the eyes of Zulus =
he
still retains.
In 1873 messengers came down from Zululand to =
the
Natal Government, bringing with them the "king's head," that is, a
complimentary present of oxen, announcing the death of Panda. "The
nation," they said, "was wandering; it wanders and wanders, and
wanders again;" the spirit of the king had departed from them; his wor=
ds
had ceased, and "none but children were left." The message ended =
with
a request that Mr. Shepstone, as Cetywayo's "father," should come=
and
instal him on the throne. A month or two afterwards there came another mess=
age,
again requesting his attendance; and on the request being refused by the Li=
eutenant-Governor
of Natal, there came a third message, to which the Natal Government returne=
d a
favourable answer.
Accordingly Mr. Shepstone proceeded to Zululan=
d,
and on the 3rd September 1873 proclaimed Cetywayo king with all due pomp and
ceremony. It was on this occasion that, in the presence of, and with the en=
thusiastic
assent of, both king and people, Mr. Shepstone, "standing in the place=
of
Cetywayo's father, and so representing the nation," enunciated the four
following articles, with a view to putting an end to the continual slaughter
that darkens the history of Zululand:--
1. That the indiscriminate shedding of blood s=
hall
cease in the land.
2. That no Zulu shall be condemned without open
trial, and the public examination of witnesses for and against, and that he
shall have a right to appeal to the king.
3. That no Zulu's life shall be taken without =
the
previous knowledge and consent of the king, after such trial has taken plac=
e,
and the right of appeal has been allowed to be exercised.
4. That for minor crimes the loss of property,=
all
or a portion, shall be substituted for the punishment of death.
Nobody will deny that these were admirable
regulations, and that they were received as such at the time by the Zulu ki=
ng
and people. But there is no doubt that their ready acceptance by the king w=
as a
sacrifice to his desire to please "his father Sompseu" (Mr.
Shepstone) and the Natal Government, with both of which he was particularly
anxious to be on good terms. He has never adhered to these coronation
regulations, or promises, as they have been called, and the probability is =
that
he never intended to adhere to them. However this may be, I must say that p=
ersonally
I have been unable to share the views of those who see in the breach of the=
se
so-called promises a justification of the Zulu war. After all, what do they
amount to, and what guarantee was there for their fulfilment? They merely
represent a very laudable attempt on the part of the Natal Government to ke=
ep a
restraining hand on Zulu cruelty, and to draw the bonds of friendship as ti=
ght
as the idiosyncrasies of a savage state would allow. The Government of Natal
had no right to dictate the terms to a Zulu king on which he was to hold his
throne. The Zulu nation was an independent nation, and had never been conqu=
ered
or annexed by Natal. If the Government of that colony was able by friendly =
negotiation
to put a stop to Zulu slaughter, it was a matter for congratulation on
humanitarian grounds; but it is difficult to follow the argument that becau=
se
it was not able, or was only partially able, to do so, therefore England was
justified in making war on the Zulus. On the other hand, it is perfectly
ludicrous to observe the way in which Cetywayo's advocates overshoot the ma=
rk
in arguing this and similar points; especially his lady advocates, whose
writings upon these subjects bear about the same resemblance to the truth t=
hat
the speech to the jury by the counsel for the defence in a hopeless murder =
case
does to the summing up of the judge. Having demonstrated that the engagemen=
ts entered
into by Cetywayo meant nothing, they will proceed to show that, even if they
did, cold-blooded murder, when perpetrated by a black paragon like Cetywayo,
does not amount to a great offence. In the mouths of these gentle apologists
for slaughter, massacre masquerades under the name of "executions,&quo=
t;
and is excused on the plea of being, "after all," only the
enforcement of "an old custom." Again, the employment of such
phrases, in a solemn answer to a remonstrance from the Lieutenant-Governor =
of
Natal, as "I do kill; but do not consider that I have done anything ye=
t in
the way of killing. . . . I have not yet begun; I have yet to kill," a=
re
shown to mean nothing at all, and to be "nothing more than the mere
irritation of the moment."[*] Perhaps those of Cetywayo's subjects who
suffered on account of this mere momentary irritation took a more serious v=
iew
of it. It is but fair to the particular authority from whom I quote (Miss
Colenso's "History of the Zulu War," pp. 230-231) to state that s=
he
considers this reply from the "usually courteous and respectful king&q=
uot;
as "no doubt petulant and wanting in due respect." Considering th=
at
the message in question (which can be read in the footnote) was a point-bla=
nk
defiance of Sir Henry Bulwer, admitting that there had been slaughter, but =
that
it was nothing compared to what was coming, most people will not think Miss
Colenso's description of it too strong.
[=
*] The
following is the text of the message:--
"Did I ever tell Mr. Shepstone I would not kill? Did he tell the white people that I made such an
arrangement? Because if he did=
he
has deceived them. I do kill; but do not consider that I have done anything yet in the=
way
of killing. Why do the white p=
eople
start at nothing? I have not yet begun; I have yet to kill; it is the custom o=
f our
nation, and I shall not depart=
from
it. Why does the Governor of Natal speak to me about my laws? Do I go t=
o Natal
and dictate to him about his l=
aws? I
shall not agree to any laws or rules from Natal, and by doing so throw the
large kraal which I govern int=
o the
water. My people will not listen unless they are killed; and while wishing to be =
friends
with the English, I do not agr=
ee to
give my people over to be gove=
rned
by laws sent to me by them. Have I not asked the English to allow me to wash my spears
since the death of my father
'Umpandi,' and they have kept playing with me all this time, treating me like a child?=
Go
back and tell the English that=
I
shall now act on my own account, and if they wish me to agree to their laws, I sh=
all
leave and become a wanderer; b=
ut
before I go it will be seen, as I shall not go without having acted. Go back and te=
ll the
white men this, and let them h=
ear it
well. The Governor of Natal and I are equal; he is Governor of Natal, and =
I am
Governor here."
To admit that the Zulu king has the right to k=
ill
as many of his subjects as he chooses, so long as they will tolerate being
killed, is one thing, but it is certainly surprising to find educated Europ=
eans
adopting a line of defence of these proceedings on his behalf that amounts =
to a
virtual expression of approval, or at least of easy toleration. Has
philanthropy a deadening effect on the moral sense, that the people who
constitute themselves champions for the unfortunate Zulu king and the oppre=
ssed
Boers cannot get on to their hobbies without becoming blind to the differen=
ce
between right and wrong? Really an examination of the utterances of these
champions of oppressed innocence would almost lead one to that conclusion. =
On
the one hand they suppress and explain away facts, and on the other supply
their want of argument by reckless accusations and vicious attacks on the
probity of such of their fellow-Englishmen, especially if in office, as have
had the misfortune to pursue a course of action or to express opinions not =
pleasing
to them or their proteges. For instance, an innocent and unenlightened read=
er
of the very interesting work from which I have just quoted probably lays it
down with the conviction that both Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Theophilus
Shepstone are very wicked men and full of bad motives, and will wonder how a
civilised Government could employ such monsters of bloodthirsty duplicity. =
As
he proceeds he will also find that there is not much to be said for the
characters of either Sir Garnet Wolseley or Lord Chelmsford; whilst as rega=
rds
such small fry as Mr. John Shepstone, the present Secretary of Native Affai=
rs
in Natal, after passing through Miss Colenso's mill their reputations come =
out literally
in rags and tatters. He will be shocked to find that not only did one and a=
ll
of these gentlemen make gross errors of judgment, but, trusted and
distinguished servants of their country as they are, they were one and all
actuated by dark personal motives that will not bear examination.
Heaven help the members of the Shepstone family
when they fall into the hands of the gentler but more enthusiastic sex, for
Miss Colenso is not their only foe. In a recent publication called a
"Defence of Zululand and its Kings," Lady Florence Dixie gibbets =
Mr.
Henrique Shepstone, and points him out to be execrated by a Cetywayo-worshi=
pping
public, because the ex-king is to be sent to England in his charge; when,
according to Lady Dixie, he will certainly be scoundrel enough to misinterp=
ret
all that Cetywayo says for his own ends, and will thereby inflict a "c=
ruel
wrong" upon him, and render his visit to England "perfectly meani=
ngless."
Perhaps it has never occurred to Lady Dixie that this is a very serious cha=
rge
to bring against an honourable man, whose reputation is probably as dear to=
him
as the advancement of Cetywayo's cause is to her. It is all very well to be
enthusiastic, but ladies should remember that there are other people in the
world to be considered beside Cetywayo.
As regards the question of Cetywayo's
bloodthirstiness, which is so strenuously denied by his apologists, I cannot
say that a careful study of the blue books bearing on the subject brings me=
to
the same conclusion. It is true that there is not much information on the
point, for the obvious reason that the history of slaughters in Zululand in=
the
vast majority of cases only reached Natal in the form of rumours, which nob=
ody
thought it worth while to report. There were no newspaper correspondents in
Zululand. There is not, however, any doubt that Cetywayo was in the habit of
killing large numbers of people; indeed it was a matter of the commonest
notoriety; nor, as will be seen from the message I have transcribed, did he
himself deny it, when, being angry, he spoke the truth. At the same time th=
at
this message was sent, we find Mr. Osborn, then resident magistrate at
Newcastle in Natal, who is certainly not given to exaggeration, writing to =
the
Secretary for Native Affairs thus:--"From all I have been able to lear=
n,
Cetywayo's conduct has been, and continues to be, disgraceful. He is putting
people to death in a shameful manner, especially girls. The dead bodies are=
placed
by his order in the principal paths, especially where the paths intersect e=
ach
other (cross roads). A few of the parents of the young people so killed bur=
ied
the bodies, and thus brought Cetywayo's wrath on themselves, resulting not =
only
on their own death, but destruction of the whole family. . . . It is really
terrible that such horrible savagery could take place on our own borders. .=
. .
Uhamu reproved Cetywayo the other day, reminded him of his promises to Mr.
Shepstone, and begged him to spare the people. This advice, as could be
expected, was not relished."
Again, Mr. Fynney, in his report of his visit =
to
Zululand in 1877, states that though the king and his "indunas"
(councillors) denied that men were killed without trial, the people told a =
very
different tale. Thus he says, "In every instance, where I had so far
gained the confidence of the Zulus as to cause them to speak freely, was I
assured of the truthfulness of the statement that the king, Cetywayo, caused
his people to be put to death in great numbers; and when I remarked that of=
course
he did so after a fair and proper trial, in some cases my remark was greeted
with a suppressed laugh or a smile. Some remarked, 'Yes, a trial of bullets=
;'
others, 'Yes, we get a trial, but that means surrounding the kraal at daybr=
eak
and shooting us down like cattle.' One asked me what the Government in Natal
intended doing, or what was thought in Natal about the killing, saying, 'It=
was
not in the night that Sompseu spoke, but in the sunshine; the king was not
alone, but his people were around him, and the ears of all Zululand heard t=
hese
words, and the hearts of all Zulus were joyful, and in gladness they lifted=
up their
hands saying: The mouth of our white father has spoken good words; he has
cautioned his child in the presence of his people, and a good sun has risen
this day over Zululand! How is it now? Has the king listened? Does he hold =
fast
those words? No! not one. The promises he made are all broken. What does
Sompseu say to this? You should dine at my kraal yonder for a few days, and=
see
the izizi (cattle and other property of people who have been killed) pass, =
and
you would then see with your own eyes how a case is tried.'" Farther on
Mr. Fynney says, "When a charge is made against a Zulu, the question is
generally asked, 'Has he any cattle?' and if answered in the affirmative, t=
here
is little chance of escape. Instances of killing occurred while I was in
Zululand, and to my knowledge no trial was allowed. An armed party was
despatched on the morning I left Ondine, and, as I was informed, to kill.&q=
uot;
There is no reason to suppose that Mr. Fynney =
was
in any way prejudiced in making these remarks; on the contrary, he was simp=
ly
carrying out an official mission, and reporting for the general information=
of
the Governments of Natal and the Transvaal. It is, however, noticeable that=
neither
these nor similar passages are ever alluded to by Cetywayo's advocates, who=
se
object seems to be rather to suppress the truth than to put it fairly before
the public, if by such suppression they think they can advance the cause of=
the
ex-king.
The whole matter of Cetywayo's private policy,
however, appears to me to be very much beside the question. Whether or no h=
e slaughtered
his oppressed subjects in bygone years, which there is no doubt he did, is =
not
our affair, since we were not then, as we are now, responsible for the good
government of Zululand; and seeing the amount of slaughter that goes on und=
er
our protectorate, it ill becomes us to rake up these things against Cetyway=
o.
What we have to consider is his foreign policy, not the domestic details of=
his
government.[*]
[=
*] A
gentleman, who has recently returned from travelling in Zululand, relates the following s=
tory
as nearly as possible in the w=
ords
in which it was told to him by a well- known hunter in Zululand, Piet Hogg =
by
name, now residing near Dundee=
on
the Zulu border. The story is a curious one as illustrative of Zulu character, a=
nd
scarcely represents Cetywayo i=
n as
amiable a light as one might wish. Piet Hogg and my informant were one day talking
about the king when the former=
said,
"I was hunting and trading in Zululand, and was at a military kraal occupied by
Cetywayo, where I saw a Basuto=
who
had been engaged by the king to instruct his people in building houses, that were=
to be
square instead of circular (as=
are
all Zulu buildings), for which his pay was to be thirty head of cattle. The
Basuto came to Cetywayo in my
presence, and said that the square buildings were made; he now wished to have his thir=
ty
head of cattle and to depart.
Cetywayo having obtained what he required, began to think the man overpaid, so said, 'I =
have
observed that you like ---- (a=
Zulu
woman belonging to the kraal); suppose you take her instead of the thirty head =
of
cattle.' Now this was a very b=
ad
bargain for the Basuto, as the woman was not worth more, in Zulu estimation, than=
ten
head of cattle; but the Basuto,
knowing with whom he had to deal, thought it might be better to comply with the
suggestion rather than insist =
upon
his rights, and asked to be allowed till the next morning to consider the proposa=
l.
After he had been dismissed on=
this
understanding, Cetywayo sent for the woman, and accused her of misconduct=
with
the Basuto, the punishment of =
which,
if proved, would be death. She denied this vehemently, with protestations =
and
tears. He insisted, but, looki=
ng up
at a tree almost denuded of leaves which grew close by, said, significantly, =
'Take
care that not a leaf remains o=
n that
tree by the morning.' The woman understood the metaphor, and in an h=
our or
two, aided by other strapping =
Zulu
females, attacked the unfortunate Basuto and killed him with clubs. But
Cetywayo having thus, like the
monkey in the fable, employed a cat's paw to do his dirty work, began to think the Basut=
o's
untimely death might have an u=
gly
appearance in my eyes, so gave orders in my presence that, as a punishment, six =
of the
women who had killed the Basuto
should also be put to death. This was too much for me, knowing as I did, all t=
hat
had passed. I reproached Cetyw=
ayo
for his cruelty, and declared I would leave Zululand without trading there=
, and
without making him the present=
he
expected. I also said I should take care the great English 'Inkose' (the Governor=
of
Natal) should hear of his cond=
uct
and the reason of my return. Cetywayo was then on friendly terms with the Engl=
ish,
and being impressed by my thre=
ats,
he reconsidered his orders, and spared the lives of the women."
I do not propose to follow out all the details=
of
the boundary dispute between Cetywayo and the Transvaal, or to comment on t=
he
different opinions held on the point by the various authorities, English an=
d Zulu.
The question has been, for the moment, settled by the Transvaal Convention,=
and
is besides a most uninteresting one to the general reader.
Nor shall I enter into a discussion concerning=
the
outrages on which Sir Bartle Frere based his ultimatum previous to the Zulu
war. They were after all insignificant, although sufficient to serve as a c=
asus
belli to a statesman determined to fight. The Zulu war was, in the opinion =
of Sir
B. Frere, necessary in self-defence, which is the first principle of existe=
nce.
If it admits of justification, it is on the ground that the Zulu army was a=
menace
to the white population of South Africa, and that it was therefore necessar=
y to
destroy it, lest at some future time it should destroy the whites. It is
ridiculous to say that the capture of two Zulu women in Natal and their
subsequent murder, or the expulsion on political grounds of a few missionar=
ies,
justified us in breaking up a kingdom and slaughtering ten thousand men. Sir
Bartle Frere declared war upon the Zulus because he was afraid, and had good
reason to be afraid, that if he did not, Cetywayo would before long sweep
either the Transvaal or Natal; whilst, on the other hand, the Zulus fought =
us because
our policy was too philanthropic to allow them to fight anybody else. This
statement may appear strange, but a little examination into Zulu character =
and
circumstances will, I think, show it to be correct.
It must be remembered that for some years befo=
re
Panda's death the Zulus had not been engaged in any foreign war. When Cetyw=
ayo
ascended the throne, it was the general hope and expectation of the army, a=
nd therefore
of the nation, that this period of inaction would come to an end, and that =
the
new king would inaugurate an active foreign policy. They did not greatly ca=
re
in what direction the activity developed itself, provided it did develop. I=
t must
also be borne in mind that every able-bodied man in the Zulu country was a
member of a regiment, even the lads being attached to regiments as carriers,
and the women being similarly enrolled, though they did not fight. The Zulu
military system was the universal-service system of Germany brought to an a=
bsolute
perfection, obtained by subordinating all the ties and duties of civil life=
to
military ends. Thus, for instance, marriage could not be contracted at will,
but only by the permission of the king, which was generally delayed until a
regiment was well advanced in years, when a number of girls were handed ove=
r to
it to take to wife. This regulation came into force because it was found th=
at
men without home ties were more ferocious and made better soldiers, and the
result of these harsh rules was that the Zulu warrior, living as he did und=
er
the shadow of a savage discipline, for any breach of which there was but one
punishment, death, can hardly be said to have led a life of domestic comfor=
t,
such as men of all times and nations have thought their common right. But e=
ven
a Zulu must have some object in life, some shrine at which to worship, some
mistress of his affections. Home he had none, religion he had none, mistres=
s he
had none, but in their stead he had his career as a warrior, and his hope of
honour and riches to be gained by the assegai. His home was on the war-track
with his regiment, his religion the fierce denunciation of the isanusi,[*] =
and
his affections were fixed on the sudden rush of battle, the red slaughter, =
and
the spoils of the slain. "War," says Sir T. Shepstone, in a very
remarkable despatch written about a year before the outbreak of the Zulu wa=
r,
"is the universal cry among the soldiers, who are anxious to live up to
their traditions, . . . . and the idea is gaining ground among the people t=
hat their
nation has outlived the object of its existence." Again he says, "=
;The
engine (the Zulu military organisation) has not ceased to exist or to gener=
ate
its forces, although the reason or excuse for its existence has died away:
these forces have continued to accumulate and are daily accumulating without
safety-valve or outlet."
[=
*]
Witch-doctor. These persons are largely employed in Zululand to smell out witches who are
supposed to have bewitched oth=
ers,
and are of course very useful as political agents. Any person denounced by them=
is at
once executed. A friend of the
writer's was once present at a political smelling-out on a large scale, and
describes it as a very curious=
and
unpleasant scene. The men, of whom there were some thousands, were seated in a cir=
cle,
as pale with terror as Zulus c=
an be.
Within the circle were several witch doctors; one of whom amidst his or h=
er
incantations would now and again step forward and touch =
some
unfortunate man with a forked =
stick.
The victim was instantly led away a few paces and his neck twisted. The circ=
le
awaited each denunciation in
breathless expectation, for not a man among them knew whose turn it might be nex=
t. On
another occasion, an unfortuna=
te
wretch who had been similarly condemned by an isanusi rushed up to the same gentle=
man's
waggon and besought shelter. H=
e was
hidden under some blankets, but presently his pursuers arrived, and
insisted upon his being handed=
over.
All possible resistance was made, until the executioners announced that they wou=
ld
search the waggon and kill him
there. It was then covenanted that he should have a start in the race for life. He was,
however, overtaken and killed.=
These
instances will show how dark and terrible is the Zulu superstition connected with
witchcraft, and what a formida=
ble
weapon it becomes in the hands of the king or chief.
Desirable as such a state of feeling may be in=
an
army just leaving for the battlefield, it is obvious that for some fifty
thousand men, comprising the whole manhood of the nation, to be continually=
on
the boil with sanguinary animosity against the human race in general, is an=
awkward
element to fit into the peaceable government of a state.
Yet this was doubtless the state of affairs wi=
th
which Cetywayo had to contend during the latter years of his reign. He found
himself surrounded by a great army, in a high state of efficiency and warli=
ke preparation,
proclaiming itself wearied with camp life, and clamouring to be led against=
an
enemy, that it might justify its traditions and find employment for its spe=
ars.
Often and often he must have been sorely puzzled to find excuses wherewitha=
l to
put it off. Indeed his position was both awkward and dangerous: on the one =
hand
was Scylla in the shape of the English Government, and on the other the sto=
rmy
and uncertain Charybdis of his clamouring regiments. Slowly the idea must h=
ave
began to dawn upon him that unless he found employment for the army, which,=
besides
being disgusted with his inactivity, was somewhat wearied with his crueltie=
s,
for domestic slaughter had ceased to divert and had begun to irritate: the =
army,
or some enterprising members of it, might put it beyond his power ever to f=
ind
employment for it at all, and bring one of his brothers to rule in his stea=
d.
And yet who was he to fight, if fight he must?
There were three possible enemies--1. The Swazis; 2. The Transvaal Boers; 3.
The English.
Although the English may have held a place on
Cetywayo's list as possible foes, there is no ground for supposing that, un=
til
shortly before the war, he had any wish to fight with us. Indeed, whereas t=
heir
hatred of the Boers was pronounced, and openly expressed, both the Zulu king
and people always professed great respect for Englishmen, and even a certain
amount of liking and regard.
Therefore, when Cetywayo had to settle on an e=
nemy
to attack, it was not the English that he chose, but the Swazis, whose
territory adjoined his own, lying along the borders of the Transvaal towards
Delagoa Bay. The Swazis are themselves Zulus, and Cetywayo claimed certain
sovereign rights over them, which, however, they refused to recognise. They=
are
a powerful tribe, and can turn out about 10,000 fighting men, quite enough =
for
Cetywayo's young warriors to try their mettle on. Still the king does not
appear to have wished to undertake the war without first obtaining the appr=
oval
of the Natal Government, to whom he applied several times for permission
"to wash his spears," saying that he was but half a king until he=
had
done so. The Natal Government, however, invariably replied that he was on no
account to do anything of the sort. This shows the inconveniences of posses=
sing
a complimentary feudal hold over a savage potentate, the shadow of power
without the reality. The Governor of Natal could not in decency sanction su=
ch a
proceeding as a war of extermination against the Swazis, but if it had occu=
rred
without his sanction, the Swazis would have suffered no doubt, but the Zulu=
spears
would have been satisfactorily washed, and there would have been no Zulu wa=
r.
As it is, Englishmen have been killed instead of Swazis.
Thwarted in his designs on the Swazis, Cetywayo
next turned his attention to the Transvaal Boers. The Zulus and the Boers h=
ad
never been good friends since the days of the massacre of Retief, and of la=
te years
their mutual animosity had been greatly increased owing to their quarrels a=
bout
the boundary question previously alluded to. This animosity reached blood-h=
eat
when the Boer Government, acting with the arrogance it always displayed tow=
ards
natives, began to lay its commands upon Cetywayo about his relations with t=
he
Amaswazi, the alleged trespassing on Boer territory, and other matters. The
arrogance was all the more offensive because it was impotent. The Boers were
not in a position to undertake the chastisement of the Zulus. But the king =
and council
of Zululand now determined to try conclusions with the Transvaal on the fir=
st
convenient opportunity, and this time without consulting the Government of
Natal. The opportunity soon occurred. Secocoeni, the powerful chief of the
Bapedi, one of the tribes whose territories border on the Transvaal, came t=
o a
difference with the Boers over another border question. There is good ground
for supposing that Cetywayo incited him to withstand the Boer demands; it is
certain that during the course of the war that followed he assisted him with
advice, and more substantially still, with Zulu volunteers.
To be brief, the Secocoeni war resulted in the
discomfiture of the Transvaal forces. Another result of this struggle was to
throw the whole state into the most utter confusion, of which the Dutch
burghers, always glad of an opportunity to defy the law, took advantage to
refuse to pay taxes. National bankruptcy ensued, and confusion grew worse
confounded.
Cetywayo took note of all this, and saw that n=
ow
was his opportunity to attack. The Boers had suffered both in morale and
prestige from their defeat by Secocoeni, who was still in arms against them;
whilst the natives were proportionately elated by their success over the
dreaded white men. There was, he knew well, but little chance of a rapid co=
ncentration
to resist a sudden raid, especially when made by such a powerful army, or
rather chain of armies, as he could set in motion. Everything favoured the
undertaking; indeed, humanly speaking, it is difficult to see what could ha=
ve
saved the greater part of the population of the Transvaal from sudden
extinction, if a kind Providence had not just then put it into the head of =
Lord
Carnarvon to send out Sir T. Shepstone as Special Commissioner to their
country. When Cetywayo heard that his father Sompseu (Sir T. Shepstone) was
going up to the Transvaal, he held his hand, sent out spies, and awaited the
course of events. The following incident will show with what interest he wa=
s watching
what took place. At the Vaal River a party of Boers met the Special
Commissioner and fired salutes to welcome him. It was immediately reported =
to
Cetywayo by his spies that the Boers had fired over Sir T. Shepstone's wagg=
on.
Shortly afterwards a message arrived at Pretoria from Cetywayo to inquire i=
nto
the truth of the story, coolly announcing his intention of sweeping the
Transvaal if it were true that "his father" had been fired at. In=
a
conversation with Mr. Fynney after the Annexation Cetywayo alludes to his
intentions in these words:--
"I heard that the Boers were not treating=
him
(Sompseu) properly, and that they intended to put him in a corner. If they =
had
done so I should not have waited for anything more. Had but one shot been
fired, I should have said, 'What more do I wait for? they have touched my f=
ather.'
I should have poured my men over the land, and I can tell you, son of Mr.
Fynney, the land would have burned with fire." This will show how eage=
rly
Cetywayo was searching for an excuse to commence his attack on the Transvaa=
l.
When the hope of finding a pretext in the supposed firing at Sir T. Shepsto=
ne
or any incident of a similar nature faded away, he appears to have determin=
ed
to carry out his plans without any immediate pretext, and to make a casus b=
elli
of his previous differences with the Government of the Republic. Accordingl=
y he
massed his impis (army corps) at different points along the Transvaal borde=
r, where
they awaited the signal to advance and sweep the country. Information of
Cetywayo's doings and of his secret plans reached Pretoria shortly before t=
he
Annexation, and confirmed the mind of the Special Commissioner as to the
absolute necessity of that measure to save the citizens of the Republic from
coming to a violent end, and South Africa from being plunged into a native =
war
of unexampled magnitude. The day before the Annexation took place, when it =
was
quite certain that it would take place, a message was sent to Cetywayo by S=
ir T.
Shepstone telling him of what was about to happen, and telling him too in t=
he
sternest and most straightforward language, that the Transvaal had become t=
he
Queen's land like Natal, and that he must no more think of attacking it tha=
n he
would of attacking Natal. Cetywayo on receiving the message at once disband=
ed
his armies and sent them to their kraals. "Kabuna," he said to the
messenger, "my impis were gathered; now at my father's (Sir T.
Shepstone's) bidding I send them back to their homes."
This fact, namely, that at the bidding of his =
old
mentor Sir T. Shepstone, Cetywayo abandoned his long-cherished plans, and h=
is undoubted
opportunity of paying off old scores with the Boers in a most effectual man=
ner,
and gave up a policy that had so many charms for him, must be held by every
unprejudiced man to speak volumes in his favour. It must be remembered that=
it
was not merely to oblige his "father Sompseu" that he did this, b=
ut
to meet the wishes of the English Government, and the act shows how anxious=
he
was to retain the friendship and fall in with the views of that Government.
Evidently Cetywayo had no animosity against us in April 1877.
In his interview with Mr. Fynney, Cetywayo spe=
aks
out quite frankly as to what his intentions had been; he says, "I know=
all
about the soldiers being on their way up, but I would have asked Sompseu to
allow the soldiers to stand on one side for just a little while, only a lit=
tle,
and see what my men could do. It would have been unnecessary for the Queen's
people to trouble. My men were all ready, and how big must that stone have
been, with my father Sompseu digging at one side and myself at the other, t=
hat
would not have toppled over? Even though the size of that mountain (pointin=
g to
a mountain range), we could put it on its back. Again I say I am glad to kn=
ow
the Transvaal is English ground; perhaps now there may be rest."
This and other passages show beyond all doubt =
from
what an awful catastrophe the Transvaal was saved by the Annexation. That
Cetywayo personally detested the Boers is made clear by his words to Mr.
Fynney. "'The Boers,' he says, 'are a nation of liars; they are a bad =
people,
bad altogether. I do not want them near my people; they lie and claim what =
is
not theirs, and ill-use my people. Where is Thomas?' (President Burgers). I
informed him that Mr. Burgers had left the Transvaal. 'Then let them pack up
and follow Thomas,' said he. 'Let them go. The Queen does not want such peo=
ple
as those about her land. What can the Queen make of them or do with them? T=
heir
evil ways puzzled both Thomas and Rudolph, Landdrost of Utrecht; they will =
not
be quiet.'"
It is very clear that if Cetywayo had been lef=
t to
work his will, a great many of the Boers would have found it necessary to
"pack up and follow Thomas," whilst many more would have never ne=
eded
to pack again.
I am aware that attempts have been made to put
another explanation on Cetywayo's warlike preparations against the Boers. It
has been said that the Zulu army was called up by Sir T. Shepstone to coerce
the Transvaal. It is satisfactory to be able, from intimate personal knowle=
dge,
to give unqualified denial to that statement, which is a pure invention, as=
indeed
is easily proved by clear evidence, which I have entered into in another pa=
rt
of this book. Cetywayo played for his own hand all along, and received neit=
her
commands nor hints from the Special Commissioner to get his army together.
Indeed, when Sir T. Shepstone discovered what was going on, he suffered gre=
at
anxiety lest some catastrophe should occur before he was in a position to
prevent it. Nothing short of the Annexation could have saved the Transvaal =
at
that moment, and the conduct of the Boers after the danger had been taken o=
n to
the shoulders of the Imperial Government is a startling instance of nationa=
l ingratitude.
Here again the Zulu king was brought face to f=
ace
with the ubiquitous British Government, and that too at a particularly
aggravating moment. He was about to commence his attack when he was met wit=
h a
polite, "Hands off; this is British territory." No wonder that we
find him in despair renewing his prayer that Sompseu will allow him to make
"one little raid only, one small swoop," and saying that "it=
is
the custom of our country, when a new king is placed over the nation, to wa=
sh their
spears, and it has been done in the case of all former kings of Zululand. I=
am
no king, but sit in a heap. I cannot be a king till I have washed my
assegais." All of which is doubtless very savage and very wrong, but s=
uch
is the depravity of human nature, that there is something taking about it f=
or
all that.
It was at this period of the history of South
Africa that many people think we made our crowning mistake. We annexed the
Transvaal, say they, six months too soon. As things have turned out, it wou=
ld
have been wiser to have left Zulus and Transvaal Boers to try conclusions, =
and
done our best to guard our own frontiers. There is no doubt that such a con=
summation
of affairs would have cleared the political atmosphere wonderfully; the Zul=
us
would have got enough fighting to last them some time, and the remainder of=
the
Boers would have entreated our protection and become contented British
subjects; there would have been no Isandhlwana and no Majuba Hill. But to t=
hese
I say who could foresee the future, and who, in the then state of kindly
feeling towards the Boers, could wish to leave them, and all the English mi=
xed
up with them, to undergo, unprepared as they were, the terrible experience =
of a
Zulu invasion? Besides, what guarantee was there that the slaughter would s=
top
in the Transvaal, or that the combat would not have developed into a war of
races throughout South Africa? Even looking at the matter in the light of a=
fter
events, it is difficult to regret that humanity was on this occasion allowe=
d to
take precedence of a more cold-blooded policy. If the opponents of the
Annexation, or even the members of the Transvaal Independence Committee, kn=
ew
what a Zulu invasion meant, they would scarcely have been so bitter about t=
hat
act.
From the time of the Annexation it was a mere
matter of opinion as to which direction the Zulu explosion would take. The
safety-valves were loaded whilst the pressure daily increased, and all
acquainted with the people knew that it must come sooner or later.
Shortly after the Transvaal became British
territory the old Zulu boundary question came to the fore again and was made
more complicated than ever by Sir T. Shepstone, who had hitherto favoured t=
he
Zulu claims, taking the Boer side of the controversy, after examination of =
the
locality and of persons acquainted with the details of the matter. There was
nothing wonderful in this change of opinion, though of course it was attrib=
uted
to various motives by advocates of the Zulu claims, and there is no doubt t=
hat
Cetywayo himself did not at all like it, and, excited thereto by vexation a=
nd
the outcry of his regiments, adopted a very different and aggressive tone in
his communications with the English authorities. Indeed his irritation agai=
nst
the Boers and everybody connected with them was very great. Probably if he =
had
been left alone he would in time have carried out his old programme, and at=
tacked
the Transvaal. But, fortunately for the Transvaal, which, like sailors and
drunken men, always seems to have had a special Providence taking care of i=
t:
at this juncture Sir Bartle Frere appeared upon the scene, and after a few
preliminaries and the presentation of a strong ultimatum, which was quite
impracticable so far as Cetywayo was concerned, since it demanded what it w=
as
almost impossible for him to concede--the disbandment of his army--invaded
Zululand.
It is generally supposed that the Natal coloni=
sts
had a great deal to do with making the Zulu war, but this is not the case. =
It
is quite true that they were rejoiced at the prospect of the break-up of
Cetywayo's power, because they were very much afraid of him and of his
"celibate man-slaying machine," which, under all the circumstance=
s,
is not wonderful. But the war was a distinctly Imperial war, made by an Imp=
erial
officer, without consultation with Colonial authorities, on Imperial ground=
s,
viz., because Cetywayo menaced Her Majesty's power in South Africa. Of cour=
se,
if there had been no colonies there would have been no war, but in that way
only are they responsible for it. Natal, however, has not grudged to pay
250,000 pounds towards its expenses, which is a great deal more than it can
afford, and, considering that the foolish settlement made by Sir Garnet
Wolseley is almost sure to involve the colony in trouble, quite as much as
should be asked.
The fact of the matter was, that Sir Bartle Fr=
ere
was a statesman who had the courage of his convictions; he saw that a Zulu
disturbance of one kind or another was inevitable, so he boldly took the
initiative. If things had gone right with him, as he supposed they would,
praise would have been lavished on him by the Home authorities, and he would
have been made a peer, and perhaps Governor-General of India to boot; but h=
e reckoned
without his Lord Chelmsford, and the element of success which was necessary=
to
gild his policy in the eyes of the home public was conspicuous by its absen=
ce.
As it was, no language was considered to be too bad to apply to this
"imperious proconsul" who had taken upon himself to declare a war=
. If
it is any consolation to him, he has at any rate the gratitude of the South
African Colonies, not so much for what he has done, for that is being caref=
ully
nullified by the subsequent action of the Home Government, but because,
believing his policy to be right, he had the boldness to carry it out at the
risk of his official reputation. Sir Bartle Frere took a larger view of the
duties of the governor of a great dependency than to constitute himself the
flickering shadow of the Secretary of State in Downing Street, who, knowing
little of the real interests of the colony, is himself only the reflection =
of
those that hold the balance of power, to whom the subject is one of entire
indifference, provided that there is nothing to pay.
The details of the Zulu war are matters of
melancholy history, which it is useless to recapitulate here. With the
exception of the affair at Rorke's Drift, there is nothing to be proud of in
connection with it, and a great deal to be ashamed of, more especially its
final settlement. There is, however, one point that I wish to submit to the
consideration of my readers, and that is, that Cetywayo was never thoroughl=
y in
earnest about the war. If he had been in earnest, if he had been determined=
to
put out his full strength, he would certainly have swept Natal from end to =
end
after his victory at Isandhlwana. There was no force to prevent his doing s=
o:
on the contrary, it is probable that if he had advanced a strong army over =
the
border, a great number of the Natal natives would have declared in his favo=
ur
through fear of his vengeance, or at the least would have remained neutral.=
He
had ample time at his disposal to have executed the manoeuvre twice over be=
fore
the arrival of the reinforcements, of which the results must have been very
dreadful, and yet he never destroyed a single family. The reason he has him=
self
given for this conduct is that he did not wish to irritate the white man; t=
hat
he had not made the war, and was only anxious to defend his country.
When the fighting came to an end after the bat=
tle
of Ulundi, there were two apparent courses open to us to take. One was to t=
ake
over the country and rule it for the benefit of the Zulus, and the other to=
enforce
the demands in Sir Bartle Frere's ultimatum, and, taking such guarantees as
circumstances would admit of, leave Cetywayo on the throne. Instead of acti=
ng
on either of these plans, however, Sir Garnet Wolseley proceeded, in the fa=
ce
of an extraordinary consensus of adverse opinion, which he treated with calm
contempt, to execute what has proved to be a very cruel settlement. Sir Gar=
net
Wolseley has the reputation of being an extremely able man, and it is only =
fair
to him to suppose that he was not the sole parent of this political monster=
, by
which all the blood and treasure expended on the Zulu war were made of no
account, but that it was partially dictated to him by authorities at home, =
who
were anxious to gratify English opinion, and partly ignorant, partly carele=
ss
of the consequences. At the same time, it is clear that he is responsible f=
or
the details of the scheme, since immediately after the capture of Cetywayo =
he
writes a despatch about them which was considered so important, that a memb=
er
of his staff was sent to England in charge of it. In this document he infor=
ms
the Secretary of State that Cetywayo's rule was resolutely built up
"without any of the ordinary and lawful foundations of authority, and =
by
the mere vigour and vitality of an individual character." It is diffic=
ult
to understand what Sir Garnet means in this passage. If the fact of being t=
he
rightful and generally accepted occupant of the throne is not an "ordi=
nary
and lawful foundation of authority," what is? As regards Cetywayo havi=
ng
built up his rule by the "mere vigour and vitality of an individual
character," he is surely in error. Cetywayo's position was not differe=
nt
to that of his immediate predecessors. If Sir Garnet had applied the remark=
to Chaka,
the first king, to the vigour and vitality of whose individual character
Zululand owes its existence as a nation, it would have been more appropriat=
e.
The despatch goes on to announce that he has made up his mind to divide the
country into thirteen portions, in order to prevent the "possibility of
any reunion of its inhabitants under one rule," and ends in these word=
s:
"I have laboured with the great aim of establishing for Her Majesty's
subjects in South Africa, both white and coloured, as well as for this spir=
ited
people against whom unhappily we have been involved in war, the enduring
foundations of peace, happiness and prosperity." The spirited people w=
ere
no doubt vastly thankful, but the white man, reading such a passage as this,
and knowing the facts of the case, will only recognise Sir Garnet Wolseley's
admirable talent for ironical writing.
Sir Garnet entered into an agreement with each=
of
his kinglets, who, amongst other things, promised that they would not make =
war
without the sanction of the British Government. He also issued a paper of i=
nstructions
to the gentleman who was first appointed British Resident (who, by the way,
very soon threw up his post in despair). From this document we learn that a=
ll
the ex-king's brothers are to "be under the eye of the chief John
Dunn," but it is chiefly remarkable for the hostility it evinces to all
missionary enterprise. The Resident is instructed to "be careful to ho=
ld
yourself entirely aloof from all missionary or proselytising enterprises,&q=
uot;
and that "grants of land by former kings to missionaries cannot be
recognised by the British Government," although Sir Garnet will allow
missionaries to live in the country if the chief of the district does not
object. These instructions created some adverse comment in England, with the
result that, in the supplementary instructions issued on the occasion of Mr.
Osborn's appointment as Resident, they were somewhat modified. In the despa=
tch to
the Secretary of State in which he announces the new appointment, Sir Garnet
says that Mr. Osborn is to be the "councillor, guide, and friend"=
of
the native chiefs, and that to his "moral influence" "we sho=
uld look
I think for the spread of civilisation and the propagation of the Gospel.&q=
uot;
What a conglomeration of duties,--at once "prophet, priest, and king!&=
quot;
Poor Mr. Osborn!
Of the chiefs appointed under this unfortunate
settlement, some were so carelessly chosen that they have no authority
whatsoever over the districts to which they were appointed, their nominal
subjects preferring to remain under the leadership of their hereditary chie=
f. Several
of Sir Garnet's little kings cannot turn out an hundred men, whilst the
hereditary chief, who has no official authority, can bring up three or four
thousand. Thus, for instance, a territory was given to a chief called
Infaneulela. The retainers of this gentleman live in a kraal of five or six
huts on the battlefield of Ulundi. A chief called Dilligane, to whom the
district should have been given, is practically head man of the district, a=
nd
takes every possible opportunity of defying the nominee chief, Infaneulela,=
who
is not acknowledged by the people. Another case is that of Umgitchwa, to wh=
om a
territory was given. In this instance there are two brothers, Umgitchwa and
Somhlolo, born of different mothers. Umgitchwa is the elder, but Somhlolo is
the son of a daughter of the king, and therefore, according to Zulu custom,=
entitled
to succeed to the chieftainship. Somhlolo was disinherited by Sir Garnet on
account of his youth (he is about twenty-five and has many wives). But an
ancient custom is not to be thus abrogated by a stroke of the pen, and Somh=
lolo
is practically chief of the district. Fighting is imminent between the two
brothers.
A third case is that of Hlubi, who, though bei=
ng a
good, well-meaning man, is a Basuto, and being a foreigner, has no influence
over the Zulus under him.
A fourth instance is that of Umlandela, an old=
and
infirm Zulu, who was made chief over a large proportion of the Umtetwa trib=
e on
the coast of Zululand. His appointment was a fatal mistake, and has already=
led
to much bloodshed under the following curious circumstances, which are not =
without
interest, as showing the intricacy of Zulu plots.
The Umtetwas were in the days of Chaka a very
powerful tribe, but suffered the same fate at his hands as did every other =
that
ventured to cross spears with him. They were partially annihilated, and whi=
lst
some of the survivors, of whom the Umtetwas in Zululand are the descendants=
, were
embodied in the Zulu regiments, others were scattered far and wide. Branche=
s of
this important tribe exist as far off as the Cape Colony. Dingiswayo, who w=
as
the chief of the Umtetwas when Chaka conquered the tribe, fled after his de=
feat
into Basutoland, and is supposed to have died there. After the Zulu war Sir=
G.
Wolseley divided the Umtetwa into two districts, appointing an Umtetwa chief
named Somkeli ruler over one, and Umlandela over the other.
Umlandela, being a Zulu and worn with age, has
never had any authority over his nominal subjects, and has been anxious to =
rid
himself of the danger and responsibility of his chieftainship by transferri=
ng
it on to the shoulders of Mr. John Dunn, whose territory adjoins his own, a=
nd who
would be, needless to say, nothing loth to avail himself of the opportunity=
of
increasing his taxable area. Whilst this intrigue was in progress all Zulul=
and
was convulsed with the news of our defeat by the Boers and the consequent
surrender of the Transvaal. It was commonly rumoured that our forces were u=
tterly
destroyed, and that the Boers were now the dominant Power. Following on the
heels of this intelligence was a rumour to the effect that Cetywayo was com=
ing
back. These two reports, both of which had a foundation of truth, had a very
bad effect on the vulgar mind in Zululand, and resulted in the setting in
motion of a variety of plots, of which the following was the most important=
.
The Umtetwa tribe is among those who are not
anxious for the return of Cetywayo, but see in the present state of affairs=
an opportunity
of regaining the power they possessed before the days of Chaka. If they wer=
e to
have a king over Zululand they determined that it should be an Umtetwa king,
and Somkeli, one of the chiefs appointed by Sir Garnet, was the man who aim=
ed
at the throne. He was not, however, anxious to put out his hand at first
further than he could draw it back, so he adopted a very ingenious expedien=
t.
It will be remembered that the old Chief Dingiswayo fled to Basutoland, whe=
re
he is reported to have married. It occurred to Somkeli that if he could pro=
duce
a descendant or a pseudo-descendant of Dingiswayo he would have no difficul=
ty
in beginning operations by dispossessing Umlandela of his territory in favo=
ur
of the supposed lawful heir. In fact he wanted a cat to pull the chestnuts =
out
of the fire for him, who could easily be got rid of afterwards. Accordingly=
one
Sitimela was produced who is supposed to be an escaped convict from Natal, =
who
gave out that he was a grandson of Dingiswayo by a Basuto woman, and a great
medicine-man, able to kill everybody by a glance of his eye.
To this impostor adherents flocked from all pa=
rts
of Zululand, and Umlandela flying for his life into John Dunn's territory,
Sitimela seized upon the chieftainship. The Resident thereupon ordered him =
to appear
before him, but he, as might be expected, refused to come. As it was positi=
vely
necessary to put an end to the plot by some means, since its further
development would have endangered and perhaps destroyed the weak-knee'd Zulu
settlement, Mr. Osborn determined to proceed to the scene of action. Mahomet
would not go to the mountain, so the mountain had to go to Mahomet. On arri=
val
he pitched his tents half way between the camps of Sitimela and John Dunn, =
who
had Umlandela under his charge, and summoned Somkeli, the author of the plo=
t,
to appear before him. Ten days elapsed before the summons was obeyed. During
this time, and indeed until they finally escaped, the Resident and his
companion could not even venture to the spring, which was close at hand, to
wash, for fear of being assassinated. All day long they could see lines of
armed men swarming over the hills round them, and hear them yelling their w=
ar-songs.
At length Somkeli appeared, accompanied by over a thousand armed warriors. =
He
was ordered to withdraw his forces from Sitimela's army and go home. He went
home, but did not withdraw his forces. The next day Sitimela himself appear=
ed
before the Resident. He was ordered to come with ten men: he came with two
thousand all armed, wild with excitement and "moutied" (medicined=
).
To make this medicine they had killed and pounded up a little cripple boy a=
nd
several of Umlandela's wives. It afterwards transpired that the only reason
Sitimela did not then and there kill the Resident was that he (Mr. Osborn) =
had
with him several chiefs who were secretly favourable to Sitimela's cause, a=
nd
if he had killed him he would, according to Zulu custom, have had to kill t=
hem
too. Mr. Osborn ordered Sitimela to disperse his forces or take the
consequences, and waited a few days for him to do so; but seeing no signs of
his compliance, he then ordered the neighbouring chiefs to fall on him, and=
at
length withdrew from his encampment,--none too soon. That very night a part=
y of
Sitimela's men came down to kill him, and finding the tent in which he and =
his
companions had slept standing, stabbed at its supposed occupants through the
canvas.
Sitimela was defeated by the forces ordered ou=
t by
the Resident with a loss of about 500 men. It is, however, worthy of note, =
and
shows how widespread was the conspiracy, that out of all the thousands
promised, Mr. Osborn was only able to call out two thousand men.
The appointment, however, that has occasioned =
the
most criticism is that of John Dunn, who got the Benjamin share of Zululand=
in
preference to his brother chiefs. The converting of an Englishman into a Zu=
lu
chief is such a very odd proceeding that it is difficult to know what to th=
ink
of it. John Dunn is an ambitious man, and most probably has designs on the =
throne;
he is also a man who understands the value of money, of which he makes a gr=
eat
deal out of his chieftainship. At the same time, it is clear that, so far a=
s it
goes, his rule is better than that of the other chiefs; he has a uniform tax
fixed, and has even done something in the way of starting schools and making
roads. From all that I have been able to gather, his popularity and influen=
ce
with the Zulus are overrated, though he has lived amongst them so many year=
s,
and taken so many of their women to wife. His appointment was a hazardous
experiment, and in the long run is likely to prove a mischievous one, since=
any
attempted amendment of the settlement will be violently resisted by him on =
the ground
of vested interests. Also, if white men are set over Zulus at all, they sho=
uld
be gentlemen in the position of government officers, not successful
adventurers.
Perhaps the only wise thing done in connection
with the settlement was the appointment of Mr. Osborn, C.M.G., as British
Resident. It is not easy to find a man fitted for that difficult and danger=
ous
position, for the proper filling of which many qualifications are required.
Possessed of an intimate knowledge of the Zulus, their language, and their =
mode
of thought and life, and being besides a very able and energetic officer, M=
r.
Osborn would have saved the settlement from breaking down if anybody could =
have
saved it. As it is, by the exercise of ceaseless energy and at great person=
al
risk, he has preserved it from total collapse. Of the dangers and anxieties=
to
which he is exposed, the account I have given of the Sitimela incident is a
sufficient example. He is, in fact, nothing but a shadow, for he has no for=
ce
at his command to ensure obedience to his decisions, or to prevent civil wa=
r;
and in Zululand, oddly enough, force is a remedy. Should one chief threaten=
the
peace of the country, he can only deal with him by calling on another chief=
for
aid, a position that is neither dignified nor right. What is worst of all is
that the Zulus are beginning to discover what a shadow he is, and with this
weakened position he has to pit his single brains against all the thousand =
and
one plots which are being woven throughout Zululand. The whole country teems
with plots. Mnyamane, the late Prime Minister, and one of the ablest, and
perhaps the most influential man in Zululand, is plotting for the return of
Cetywayo. Bishop Colenso, again, is as usual working his own wires, and
creating agitations to forward his ends, whatever they may be at the moment.
John Dunn, on the other hand, is plotting to succeed Cetywayo, and so on ad
infinitum. Such is the state of affairs with which our unfortunate Resident=
has
to contend. Invested with large imaginary powers, he has in reality nothing=
but
his personal influence and his own wits to help him. He has no white man to
assist him, but living alone in a broken-down tent and some mud huts built =
by
his son's hands (for the Government have never kept their promise to put hi=
m up
a house), in the midst of thousands of restless and scheming savages, amidst
plots against the peace and against his authority, he has to do the best he=
can
to carry out an impracticable settlement, and to maintain the character of
English justice and the honour of the English name. Were Mr. Osborn to thro=
w up
his post or to be assassinated, the authorities would find it difficult to =
keep
the whole settlement from collapsing like a card castle.
Nobody who understood Zulu character and
aspirations could ever have executed such a settlement as Sir Garnet
Wolseley's, unless he did it in obedience to some motive or instructions th=
at
it was not advisable to publish. It is true that Sir Garnet's experience of=
the
Zulus was extremely small, and that he put aside the advice of those who did
know them with that contempt with which he is wont to treat colonists and t=
heir
opinions. Sir Garnet Wolseley does not like colonial people, possibly becau=
se
they have signally failed to appreciate heaven-born genius in his person, or
his slap-dash drumhead sort of way of settling the fate of countries, and a=
re,
indeed, so rude as to openly say, that, in their opinion, he did more misch=
ief
in Africa in a few months, than it would take an ordinary official a lifeti=
me
to accomplish.
However this may be, stop his ears as much as =
he
might, Sir Garnet cannot have been entirely blind to the import of what he =
was
doing, and the only explanation of his action is that he entered on it more
with the idea of flattering and gratifying English public opinion, than of =
doing
his best for the Zulus or the white Colonists on their borders. A great out=
cry
had been raised at home, where, in common with most South African affairs, =
the
matter was not thoroughly understood, against the supposed intended annexat=
ion
of Zululand for the benefit of "greedy colonists." It was argued =
that
colonists were anxious for the annexation in order that they might get the =
land
to speculate with, and doubtless this was, in individual instances, true. I
fully agree with those who think that it would be unwise to throw open Zulu=
land
to the European settler, not on account of the Zulus, who would benefit by =
the
change, but because the result would be a state of affairs similar to that =
in Natal,
where there are a few white men surrounded by an ever-growing mass of Kafir=
s.
But there is a vast difference between Annexation proper and the Protectora=
te
it was our duty to establish over the natives. Such an arrangement would ha=
ve
presented few difficulties, and have brought with it many advantages. White=
men
could have been forbidden to settle in the country. A small hut-tax, such as
the Zulus would have cheerfully paid, would have brought in forty or fifty
thousand a year, an ample sum to defray the expenses of the Resident and
sub-Residents: the maintenance of an adequate native force to keep order: a=
nd
even the execution of necessary public works. It is impossible to overrate =
the advantages
that must have resulted both to the Zulus and their white neighbours from t=
he
adoption of this obvious plan, among them being lasting peace and security =
to
life and property; or to understand the folly and cruelty that dictated the
present arrangement, or rather want of arrangement. Not for many years has
England missed such an opportunity of doing good, not only at no cost, but =
with
positive advantage to herself. Did we owe nothing to this people whose king=
dom
we had broken up, and whom we had been shooting down by thousands? They may
well ask, as they do continually, what they have done that we should treat =
them
as we have and are doing?
It cannot be too clearly understood, that, when
the Zulus laid down their arms they did so, hoping and believing that they
would be taken over by the English Government, which, having been fairly be=
aten
by it, they now looked on as their head or king, and be ruled like their br=
ethren
in Natal. They expected to have to pay taxes and to have white magistrates
placed over them, and they or the bulk of them looked forward to the change
with pleasure. It must be remembered that when once they have found their
master, there exists no more law-abiding people in the world than the Zulus,
provided they are ruled firmly, and above all justly. Believing that such a
rule would fall to their lot they surrendered when they did. How great, the=
n,
must their surprise have been when they found, that without their wishes be=
ing
consulted in the matter, their own hereditary king was to be sent away, and
thirteen little kings set up in his place, with, strangest of all, a white =
man
as chief little king, whilst the British Government contented itself with p=
lacing
a Resident in the country, to watch the troubles that must ensue.
Such a settlement as this could only have one
object and one result, neither of which is at all creditable to the English
people. The Zulus were parcelled out among thirteen chiefs, in order that t=
heir
strength might be kept down by internecine war and mutual distrust and
jealousy: and, as though it were intended to render this result more certai=
n, territories
were chucked about in the careless way I have described, whilst central
authority was abolished, and the vacant throne is dangled before all eyes
labelled "the prize of the strongest." Of course Sir Garnet's pap=
er
agreements with the chiefs were for the most part disregarded from the firs=
t.
For instance, every chief has his army and uses it too. In Zululand bloodsh=
ed
is now a thing of every-day occurrence, and the whole country is torn by fe=
ar,
uncertainly, and consequent want.[*] The settlement is bearing its legitima=
te
fruit; some thousands of Zulus have already been killed in direct consequen=
ce
of it, and more will doubtless follow. And this is the outcome of all the b=
lood
and treasure spent over the Zulu war! Well, we have settled Zululand on the
most approved principles, and thank Heaven, British influence has not been
extended!
[=
*] A
severe famine is said to be imminent in Zululand.
To show that I am not singular in my opinion a=
s to
the present state of Zululand, I may be allowed to quote a few short extrac=
ts
taken at random, from half-a-dozen numbers of the "Natal Mercury."
Talking of the Zulu settlement terms as dictated by Sir G. Wolseley, the
leading article of the issue 21st November 1881 says:--"It will at onc=
e be
apparent that these terms have in several cases been flagrantly violated,
especially as regards clauses of 2, 3, 4, and 6. This last will assuredly be
broken again and yet again, so long as the British Resident occupies the
position of an official mollusc. The chiefs themselves perceive and admit t=
he
evils that must arise out of the absence of any effective central authority.
These evils are so obvious, they were so generally recognised at the outset=
as
being inherent in the scheme, that we might almost suppose their occurrence=
had
been deliberately anticipated as a desired outcome of the settlement. The m=
orality
of such a line of policy would be precisely on a par with that which is
involved in the proposal to reinstate Cetywayo as a means of dealing with t=
he
Boers. The creation of thirteen kinglets in order that they might destroy e=
ach
other, is as humane and high-minded an effort of statesmanship as would be =
the
restoration of a banished king in order that he might eat up a people to wh=
om
the same power has just given back their independence. To the simple coloni=
al
mind such deep designs of Machiavellian statecraft are as hateful as they a=
re
inhuman and dishonest."
A correspondent of the "Mercury" in
Zululand writes under date of 13th October:--
"I send a line at the last moment to say =
that
things are going from bad to worse at railway speed. Up to the arrival of S=
ir
Evelyn Wood, the chiefs did not fully realise that they were really indepen=
dent
at all. Now they do, and if I mistake not, like a beggar on horseback will =
ride
to the devil sharp. Oham has begun by killing a large number of the Amagalu=
si
people. My information is derived from native sources, and may be somewhat
exaggerated. It is that the killed at Isandhlwana were few compared with th=
ose
killed by Uhamu a few days ago. Usibebu also and Undabuka are, I am told, on
the point of coming to blows; and if they do that it will be worse still, f=
or
Undabuka will find supporters throughout the length and breadth of Zululand.
Undabuka, the full brother of the ex-king, is the protege of the Bishop of
Natal. The Bishop, I find, has again sent one of his agents (Amajuba by nam=
e) calling
for another deputation. The deputation is now on its way to Natal, and that=
, I
understand, against the express refusal of the Resident to allow it." =
In
the issue of 14th November is published a letter from Mr. Nunn, a gentleman
well known in Zululand, from which, as it is too long to quote in its entir=
ety,
I give a few extracts:--"Oham's Camp, Oct.15.--The Zulus cannot compre=
hend
the Transvaal affair, and it has been industriously circulated among them t=
hat
the English have been beaten and forced to give back the Transvaal. They do=
not
understand gracious acts of restoration after we have been beaten. Four tim=
es
this year has Umnyamana called his army together and menaced Oham, who has
several times had to have parties of his followers sleeping around his kraa=
l in
the hills adjacent, so as to give him timely notice to fly. When Oham left =
his
kraal for the purpose of attending the meeting at Inslasatye, the same day =
the
whole of the Maquilisini Tribe came on to the hills adjacent to Oham's kraa=
l,
the 'Injamin,' and threatened that district. This has been the case on two =
or
three former occasions, and simultaneously Umnyamana's tribe and Undabuka's
followers always flew to arms, thus threatening on all sides. . . . Trading=
is
and has been for months entirely suspended in this district. The fields are
unplanted, no ploughs or Kafir-picks at work--all are in a state of excitem=
ent,
not knowing the moment a collision may take place. Hunger will stare many in
the face next year, and all the men yelling to their chiefs to be let loose=
and
put an end to this state of uncertainty."
Mr. Nunn encloses an account by an eye-witness=
of
a battle which took place on the 2d October 1881 between Oham's army and the
Maquilisini Tribe. The following is an extract:--"On the 2nd there was=
a
heavy mist, and on moving forward the mounted party found themselves in the
midst of the enemy (the Maquilisini), and on hearing a cry to stab the hors=
es, they
rode through them with no casualty (except one horse slightly wounded with a
bullet). The army, moving in a half circle, now became generally engaged in=
a
hand-to-hand fight, and our men were checked and annoyed by a number of the
enemy armed with guns, who were in a stone-kraal and kept up a constant fir=
e.
Amatonga, now at the head of the mounted party, charged and drove the enemy=
out
of the kraal, from which they three several times charged the enemy on the
flank, assisted by a small infantry party, and cut paths through their rank=
s.
The fight, which had now lasted nearly an hour, commenced to flag, and Oham=
's
army making a sudden rush entirely routed the enemy, and the carnage lasted=
to
the Bevan river, the boundary of the Transvaal. No women or children were
killed, but out of an army of about 1500 of the enemy but few escaped"
(sic) . . . . "The men, as they were being killed, repeatedly exclaime=
d,
'We are dying through Umnyamana and Umlabaku.'"
In the "Natal Mercury" of the 13th M=
arch
occurs the following:--
"Zulu Country.--As to the state of the co=
untry
it is something we cannot describe; everything is upside down, and the chie=
fs
appointed by the government are mere nobodies, and have not any power over
their own people. Even the Resident is in a false position, and seems perfe=
ctly
powerless to act either way. We had one row, just arriving at a kraal in ti=
me
to save it from being eaten up. Witchcraft and killing, one of the pretence=
s on
which the English made war, are of every-day occurrence, and fifty times wo=
rse
than they were before the war. Oham and Tibysio (?) keep their men continua=
lly
in the field, consequently those districts are at present in a state of
famine."
Sir Garnet Wolseley executed the Zulu settleme=
nt
on the 1st September 1879. The above extracts will suffice to show the stat=
e of
the country after it has been working for little more than two years. They =
will
also, I believe, suffice to convince any just and impartial mind that I do =
not
exaggerate when I say that it is an abomination and a disgrace to England. =
The
language may be strong, but when one hears of 1500 unfortunates (nearly twi=
ce
as many as we lost at Isandhlwana) being slaughtered in a single intertribal
broil, it is time to use strong language. It is not as though this were an
unexpected or an unavoidable development of events, every man who knew the
Zulus predicted the misery that must result from such a settlement, but tho=
se
who directed their destinies turned a deaf ear to all warnings. They did not
wish to hear.
And now we are told that civil war is imminent
between the Cetywayo or anti-settlement party, and what I must, for want of=
a
better name, call the John Dunn party, or those who have acquired interests
under the settlement, and who for various reasons wish to see Cetywayo's fa=
ce
no more. If this occurs, and it will occur unless the Government makes up i=
ts
mind to do something before long, the slaughter, not only of men but also of
women and children, will be enormous; fugitives will pour into Natal, follo=
wed
perhaps by their pursuers, and for aught we know the war may spread into our
own dominions. We are a philanthropic people, very, when Bulgarians are
concerned, or when the subject is one that piques the morbid curiosity, or =
is
the rage of the moment, and the subject of addresses from great and eloquent
speakers. But we can sit still, and let such massacres as these take place,
when we have but to hold up our hand to stop them. When occasionally the ve=
il
is lifted a little, and the public hears of "fresh fighting in
Zululand;" a question is asked in the House; Mr. Courtney, as usual, h=
as
no information, but generally discredits the report, and it is put aside as
"probably not true." I am well aware that of the few who read the=
se
words, many will discredit them, or say that they are written for some obje=
ct,
or for party purposes. But it is not the case; they are written in the inte=
rest
of the truth, and in the somewhat faint hope that they may awaken a portion=
of
the public, however small, to a knowledge of our responsibilities to the
unfortunate Zulus. For try to get rid of it as we may, those responsibiliti=
es
rest upon our shoulders. When we conquered the Zulu nation and sent away the
Zulu king, we undertook, morally at any rate, to provide for the future good
government of the country; otherwise, the Zulu war was unjust indeed. If we
continue to fail, as we have hitherto, to carry out our responsibilities as=
a
humane and Christian nation ought to do, our lapse from what is right will
certainly recoil upon our own heads, and, in the stern lessons of future
troubles and disasters, we shall learn that Providence with the nation, as =
with
the individual, makes a neglected duty its own avenger. We have sown the wi=
nd,
let us be careful lest we reap the whirlwind.
It is very clear that things cannot remain in
their present condition. If they do, it is probable that the Resident will
sooner or later be assassinated; not from any personal motives, but as a
political necessity, and some second Chaka will rise up and found a new Zul=
u dynasty,
sweeping away our artificial chiefs and divisions like cobwebs. This idea s=
eems
to have penetrated into Lord Kimberley's official mind, since in his despat=
ch
of instructions to Sir H. Bulwer, written in February last, he says,
"Probably if the chiefs are left to themselves after a period more or =
less
prolonged of war and anarchy, some man will raise himself to the position of
supreme chief." The prospect of war and anarchy in Zululand does not,
however, trouble Lord Kimberley at all; in fact, the whole despatch is typi=
cal
to a degree of the Liberal Colonial policy. Lord Kimberley admits that what
little quiet the country has enjoyed under the settlement, "was due to=
a
mistaken belief on the part of the Zulus that the British Government was ru=
ling
them, or would rule them through the Resident." He evidently clearly s=
ees
all the evils and bloodshed that are resulting and that must result from the
present state of affairs; indeed he recapitulates them, and then ends up by
even refusing to allow such slight measures of relief as the appointment of=
sub-Residents
to be carried out, although begged for by the chiefs, on the ground that it
might extend British influence. Of the interests of the Zulus himself he is
quite careless. The whole despatch can be summed up thus: "If you can =
find
any method to improve the state of affairs which will not subject us to the
smallest cost, risk, or responsibility, you can employ it; if not, let them
fight it out." Perhaps Lord Kimberley may live (officially) long enoug=
h to
find out that meanness and selfishness do not always pay, and that it is not
always desirable, thus to sacrifice the respect, and crush the legitimate
aspirations of a generous people.
Unless something is done before long, it is
possible that John Dunn may succeed after a bloody war in securing the thro=
ne;
but this would not prove a permanent arrangement, since he is now getting o=
n in
life and has no son to carry on the dynasty. Another possibility, and one t=
hat
is not generally known, at any rate in this country, though it is perhaps t=
he
most probable of all, is this. Cetywayo has left a son in Zululand, who is
being carefully educated under the care of Mnyamane, the late King's Prime
Minister. The boy is now about 16 years of age, and is reported to possess =
very
good abilities, and is the trump card that Mnyamane will play as soon as the
time is ripe. This young man is the hereditary heir to the Zulu crown, and =
it
is more than probable that if he is proclaimed king the vast majority of the
nation will rally round him and establish him firmly on his throne. There is
little use in keeping Cetywayo confined whilst his son is at large. The lad
should have been brought to England and educated, so that he might at some =
future
time have assisted in the civilisation of his country: as it is, he is grow=
ing
up in a bad school.
And now I come to the root of the whole matter,
the question whether or no, under all these circumstances, it is right or
desirable to re-establish Cetywayo on the throne of Zululand. In considering
this question, I think that Cetywayo's individuality ought to be out on one=
side,
however much we may sympathise with his position, as I confess I do to some
extent myself. After all, Cetywayo is only one man, whereas the happiness,
security, and perhaps the lives of many thousands are involved in the issue=
of
the question. In coming to any conclusion in the matter it is necessary to =
keep
in view the intentions of the Government as regards our future connection w=
ith
Zululand. If the Government intends to do its duty and rule Zululand as it =
ought
to be ruled, by the appointment of proper magistrates, the establishment of=
an adequate
force, and the imposition of the necessary taxes; then it would be the heig=
ht
of folly to permit Cetywayo to return, since his presence would defeat the
scheme. It must be remembered that there is as yet nothing whatsoever to
prevent this plan being carried out. It would be welcomed with joy by the l=
arge
majority of both Zulus and Colonists. It would also solve the problem of the
increase of the native population of Natal, which is assuming the most alar=
ming
proportions, since Zululand, being very much underpopulated, it would be ea=
sy,
were that country once quietly settled, to draft the majority of the Natal
Zulus back into it. This is undoubtedly the best course, and indeed the only
right course; but it does not at all follow that it will be taken, since
governments are unfortunately more concerned at the prospect of losing votes
than with the genuine interests of their dependencies. The proper settlemen=
t of
Zululand would not be popular amongst a large class in this country, and
therefore it is not likely to be carried out, however right and necessary it
may be.
If nothing is going to be done, then it become=
s a
question whether or no Cetywayo should be sent back.
The large majority of the Natalians consider t=
hat
his restoration would be an act of suicidal folly, and their opinion is
certainly entitled to great weight, since they are after all the people
principally concerned. The issue of the experiment would be a matter of
comparative indifference to people living 7000 miles away, but is naturally
regarded with some anxiety by those who have their homes on the borders of =
Zululand.
It is very well to sympathise with savage royalty in distress, but it must =
be
borne in mind that there are others to be considered besides the captive ki=
ng.
Many of the Zulus, for instance, are by no means anxious to see him again,
since they look forward with just apprehension to the line of action he may
take with those who have not shown sufficient anxiety for his return, or ha=
ve
in other ways incurred his resentment. One thing is clear, to send the king
back to Zululand is to restore the status in quo as it was before the war.
There can be no half measures about it, no more worthless paper stipulation=
s; a
Zulu king must either be allowed to rule in his own fashion or not at all. =
The
war would go for nothing, and would doubtless have to be fought over again =
with
one of Cetywayo's successors.
Also it must be remembered that it is one thin=
g to
talk of restoring Cetywayo, and another to carry his restoration into effec=
t.
It would not simply be a question of turning him down on the borders of
Zululand, and letting him find his own way back to his throne, for such a
proceeding would be the signal for the outbreak of civil war. It is not to =
be supposed
that John Dunn, and those whose interests are identical with Dunn's, would
allow the ex-king to reseat himself on the throne without a struggle; indeed
the former has openly declared his intention of resisting the attempt by fo=
rce
of arms if necessary. He is by no means anxious to give up the 15,000 pound=
s a
year his hut-tax brings in, and all the contingent profits and advantages of
his chieftainship. If we wish to restore Cetywayo we must first depose Dunn=
; in
fact, we must be ready to support his restoration by force of arms.
As regards Cetywayo himself, I cannot share the
opinion of those who think that he would be personally dangerous. He has le=
arnt
his lesson, and would not be anxious to try conclusions with the English ag=
ain;
indeed, I believe he would prove a staunch ally. But supposing him re-estab=
lished
on the throne, how long would it be before a revolution, or the hand of the
assassin, to say nothing of the ordinary chances of nature, put an end to h=
im,
and how do we know that his successor in power would share his views?
Cetywayo's rule, bad as it was, was perhaps
preferable to the reign of terror that we have established, under the name =
of a
settlement. But that we can still remedy if we choose to do so, whereas, if=
we
once restore Cetywayo, all power over the Zulus passes out of our hands.
We have many interests to consider in South
Africa, all of which will be more or less affected by our action in this
matter. On the whole, I am of opinion that the Government that replaces
Cetywayo on the throne of his fathers will undertake a very grave
responsibility, and must be prepared to deal with many resulting complicati=
ons,
not the least of which will be the utter exasperation of the white inhabita=
nts
of Natal.
NATAL AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT
Natal--Causes of increase of the native
population--Happy condition of the Natal Zulus--Polygamy--Its results on
population--The impossibility of eradicating it--Relations between a Zulu a=
nd
his wives--Connection between polygamy and native law--Missionary work amon=
gst
the Zulus--Its failure--Reasons of its failure--Early days of Natal--Growth=
of
the native question--Coming struggle between white and black over the land
question--Difficulty of civilising the Zulu--Natal as a black settlement--T=
he
constitution of Natal--Request for responsible government--Its refusal--The
request renewed and granted--Terms and reason of Lord Kimberley's
offer--Infatuation of responsible government party in Natal--Systematic abu=
se
of colonists in England--Colonial speculators--Grievances against the Imper=
ial
Government--Sir Henry Bulwer--Uncertain future of Natal--Its available
force--Exterior dangers--The defence question shirked by the "party of
progress"-- The confederation question--The difficulty of obtaining
desirable immigrants--The only real key to the Natal native question--Folly=
of accepting
self-government till it is solved.
Natal has an area of about 18,000 square miles,
and its present population is, roughly, 25,000 whites and 400,000 natives of
the Zulu race. When, in 1843, it first became a British colony, the number =
of natives
living within its borders was very small, and they were for the most part
wanderers, fragmentary remnants of the tribes that Chaka had destroyed. I s=
hall
probably be under, rather than over the mark, if I say, that the Zulu
population of the colony has multiplied itself by ten during the last thirty
years. Two causes have combined to bring about this extraordinary increase;
firstly, wholesale immigration from the surrounding territories; and second=
ly,
the practice of polygamy.
This immigration has been due to a great want =
of
foresight, or want of knowledge, on the part of the Home authorities, who h=
ave
allowed it to go on without check or hindrance till it has, in conjunction =
with
its twin evil polygamy, produced the state of affairs it is my object to de=
scribe.
Ever since its first establishment as a colony Natal has been turned into a
city of refuge for the native inhabitants of Zululand, the
Transvaal, Swaziland, and elsewhere. If news c=
ame
to a Zulu chief that his king purposed to eat him up, he at once fled across
the Tugela with his wives and followers and settled in Natal. If the Boers =
or
Swazis destroyed a tribe, the remnant found its way to Natal.
That country, indeed, is to the South African
native a modern Isles of the Blest. Once across the border line, and, whate=
ver
his crime, he is in a position to defy his worst enemy, and can rest secure=
in
the protection of the Home and local Governments, and of the enactments spe=
cially
passed to protect him and his privileges. The Government allots him land, o=
r if
it does not he squats on private land: bringing with him his own peculiar a=
nd
barbarous customs. In all the world I do not know a race more favoured by
circumstances than the Natal Zulus. They live on the produce of the fields =
that
their wives cultivate, or rather scratch, doing little or no work, and havi=
ng
no occasion to do any. They are very rich, and their taxes are a mere trifl=
e,
fifteen shillings per annum for each hut. They bear no share of the curse t=
hat comes
to all other men as a birthright; they need not labour. Protected by a powe=
rful
Government, they do not fear attack from without, or internal disorder. What
all men desire, riches and women, are theirs in abundance, and even their
children, the objects of so much expense and sore perplexity to civilised
parents, are to them a source of wealth. Their needs are few; a straw hut, =
corn
for food, and the bright sun. They are not even troubled with the thought o=
f a
future life, but, like the animals, live through their healthy, happy days,=
and
at last, in extreme old age, meet a death which for them has no terrors,
because it simply means extinction. When compared to that of civilised race=
s,
or even of their own brethren in the interior, their lot is indeed a happy =
one.
But the stream of immigration, continuous thou=
gh
it has been, would not by itself have sufficed to bring up the native
population to its present enormous total, without the assistance of the
polygamous customs of the immigrants.
I believe that inquirers have ascertained, tha=
t,
as a general rule, the practice of polygamy has not the effect of bringing
about an abnormal growth of population. However this may be elsewhere, in
Natal, owing in great measure to the healthy customs of the Zulu race,[*] t=
he
rate of increase is unprecedented. Many writers and other authorities consi=
der polygamy
as an institution, to be at once wicked and disgusting. As to its morality,=
it
is a point upon which it is difficult to express any opinion, nor, indeed, =
does
the question enter into the scope of what I have to say; but it must be
remembered that in the case of the Zulu his whole law and existence is mixe=
d up
with the institution, and that it is necessary to him to repair the gaps ma=
de
in his ranks by war. Violent anti-polygamists in this country always make a
strong point of the cruelty it is supposed to involve to the women, and talk
about the "violation of their holiest feelings." As a matter of f=
act,
sad as it may appear, the Zulu women are much attached to the custom, nor w=
ould
they, as a general rule, consent to marry a man who only purposed taking one
wife. There are various reasons for this: for instance, the first wife is a
person of importance, and takes precedence of all the others, a fact as much
appreciated by the Zulu woman as by the London lady. Again, the more wives
there are, the more wealth it brings into the family, since in the ordinary
course of nature more wives mean more female children, who, when they come =
to a
marriageable age, mean in their turn at least ten cows each (the Government
price for a wife). The amount thus obtained is placed to the credit of the
estate of the mother of the girl married, and for this reason all Zulu women
are extremely anxious to have children, especially female children. Finally,
the liking of Zulu women for the custom is bred in them. It has been going =
on
for countless generations, and it is probable that it will go on for so lon=
g as
the race endures. Nations do not change such habits unless the change is fo=
rced
on them, with the alternative of extermination.
[=
*] As
soon as a Zulu woman is discovered to be pregnant, her husband ceases to cohabit with h=
er,
nor does he live with her again
until the child is weaned, eighteen months, and sometimes two years, after its b=
irth.
Polygamy will never be eradicated by moral
persuasion, because, even if a native could be brought to think it wrong, w=
hich
is in itself impossible, its abolition would affect his interests irredeema=
bly.
A Zulu's wives are also his servants; they plough his land and husband his =
grain,
in addition to bearing his children. Had he but one wife most of her time w=
ould
be taken up with the latter occupation, and then the mealie-planting and
gathering would necessarily fall to the lot of the husband, a state of affa=
irs
he would never consent to. Again, if monogamy were established, girls would
lose their value, and a great source of wealth would be destroyed. It must,
however, be understood that Zulu girls are not exactly sold; the cows recei=
ved
by the parents are by a legal fiction supposed to be a gift presented, not a
price paid. Should the wife subsequently run away, they are, I believe, ret=
urnable.
On these subjects, as is not to be wondered at
when so many interests are concerned, the Zulu law is a little intricate. T=
he
cleverest counsel in the Temple could not give an opinion on such a case as=
the
following:--
A. has four wives and children by Nos. 1 and 3=
. On
his death his brother, B., a rich man, takes over his wives and property, a=
nd
has children by each of the four women. He has also children by other wives=
. On
his death, in extreme old age, how should the property be divided amongst t=
he
descendants of the various marriages?
It is clear that if such a case as this is to =
be
dealt with at all it must be under native law, and this is one of the great
dangers of polygamy. Once rooted in a state it necessitates a double system=
of laws,
since civilised law is quite unable to cope with the cases daily arising fr=
om
its practice. It is sometimes argued that the law employed is a matter of
indifference, provided that substantial justice is done, according to the i=
deas
of people concerned, and this is doubtless very true if it is accepted as a
fact that the Zulu population of Natal is always to remain in its present
condition of barbarism. To continue to administer their law is to give it t=
he
sanction of the white man's authority, and every day that it is so administ=
ered
makes it more impossible to do away with it. I say "more impossible&qu=
ot;
advisedly, because I believe its abrogation is already impossible. There is=
no satisfactory
way out of the difficulty, because it has its roots in, and draws its exist=
ence
from, the principle of polygamy, which I believe will last while the people
last.
Some rely on the Missionary to effect this
stupendous change, and turn a polygamous people into monogamists. But it is=
a
well-known fact that the missionaries produce no more permanent effect on t=
he
Zulu mind than a child does on the granite rock which he chips at with a
chisel. How many real Christians are there in Zululand and Natal, and of th=
at
select and saintly band how many practise monogamy? But very few, and among=
those
few there is a large proportion of bad characters, men who have adopted
Christianity as a last resource. I mean no disrespect to the missionaries, =
many
of whom are good men, doing their best under the most unpromising condition=
s,
though some are simply traders and political agitators. But the fact remains
the same. Christianity makes no appreciable progress amongst the Zulu nativ=
es,
whilst, on the other hand, no one having any experience in the country will=
, if
he can avoid it, have a so-called Christian Kafir in his house, because the
term is but too frequently synonymous with that of drunkard and thief. I do=
not
wish it to be understood that it is the fact of his Christianity that so de=
grades
the Zulu, because I do not think it has anything to do with it. It is only =
that
the novice, standing on the threshold of civilisation, as a rule finds the
vices of the white man more congenial than his virtues.
The Zulus are as difficult to convince of the
truths of Christianity as were the Jews, whom they so much resemble in their
customs. They have a natural disinclination to believe that which they cann=
ot
see, and, being constitutionally very clever and casuistical, are prepared =
to
argue each individual point with an ability very trying to missionaries. It=
was
one of these Zulus, known as the Intelligent Zulu, but in reality no more i=
ntelligent
than his fellows, whose shrewd remarks first caused doubts to arise in the =
mind
of Bishop Colenso, and through him in those of thousands of others.
Another difficulty in the way of the Missionary
is, that he is obliged to insist on the putting away of surplus wives, and =
thus
to place himself out of court at the outset. It is quite conceivable that in
the opinion of wild and savage men, it is preferable to let the new teachin=
g alone,
rather than to adopt it at the cost of such a radical change in their domes=
tic
arrangements. As a case in point I may quote that of Hlubi, the Basutu
appointed chief of one of the divisions of Zululand, by Sir G. Wolseley. Hl=
ubi
is at heart a Christian, and a good man, and anxious to be baptized. The
missionaries, however, refuse to baptize him, because he has two wives. Hlu=
bi
therefore remains a heathen, saying, not unnaturally, that he feels it woul=
d be
impossible for him to put away a woman with whom he has lived for so many
years.
Whilst polygamy endures Christianity will adva=
nce
with but small strides. It seems to me that we are beginning at the wrong e=
nd.
We must civilise first and Christianise afterwards. As well try to sow corn=
among
rocks and look to gather a full crop, as expect the words of Grace and Divi=
ne
love to bear fruit in the hearts of a people whose forefathers have for
countless generations been men of blood, whose prized traditions are one lo=
ng
story of slaughter, and who, if they are now at peace are, as it were, only
gathering strength for a surer spring. First, the soil must be prepared bef=
ore
the seed is sown.
To do this there is but one way. Abolish native
customs and laws, especially polygamy, and bring our Zulu subjects within t=
he
pale of our own law. Deprive them of their troops of servants in the shape =
of
wives, and thus force them to betake themselves to honest labour like the r=
est of
mankind.
There is only one objection in the way of the
realisation of this scheme, which would, doubtless, bring about, in the cou=
rse
of a generation, a much better state of things, and gather many thousand co=
nverts
into the fold of the Church; and that is, the opportunity has, so far as Na=
tal
is concerned, been missed--the time has gone by when it could have been car=
ried
out. To young countries, as to young men, there come sometimes opportunitie=
s of
controlling their future destinies which, if not seized at the moment, pass
away for ever, or only to return after long and troubled years. Natal has h=
ad
her chance, and it has gone away from her, though through no fault of her o=
wn.
If, when the colony was first settled, the few natives who then lived there=
had
been forced to conform to the usages of civilised life or to quit its borde=
rs;
if refugees had been refused admission save on the same terms, it would not
occupy the very serious position it does at the present moment.
To understand the situation into which Natal h=
as
drifted with reference to its native inhabitants, it is necessary to premise
that that country has hitherto had practically no control over its own affa=
irs,
more especially as regards native legislation.
In its early days it was a happy, quiet place,=
a
favoured clime, where the traveller or settler could find good shooting, ch=
eap
labour, and cheap living. No enemy threatened its rest, and the natives wer=
e respectful
and peaceful in their behaviour. But it was in those days that the native
difficulty, that Upas tree that now overshadows and poisons the whole land,
took root; for slowly, from all parts, all through that quiet time, by ones=
, by
tens, by hundreds, refugees were flowing in, and asking and receiving land =
to
settle on from the Government.
It is not, however, to be supposed that the lo=
cal
officials did not perceive the gathering danger, since it has again and aga=
in
been pointed out to different Secretaries of State, and again and again bee=
n ignored
by them, or put off for the consideration of their successors. Hand-to-mouth
legislation has always been the characteristic of our rule in South Africa.=
On
one occasion Sir Theophilus, then Mr. Shepstone, went so far as to offer to
personally draw off a large portion of the native population, and settle th=
em
on some vacant territory bordering on the Cape Colony, but the suggestion w=
as
not acceded to, for fear lest the execution of the scheme should excite
disturbances amongst the natives of the Cape. Thus year after year has pass=
ed
away--plan after plan has been put aside,--and nothing has been done.
In the colony a great deal of abuse is poured =
out
on the head of Sir T. Shepstone, to whom the present native situation is
unjustly attributed by a certain party of politicians. Sir T. Shepstone was=
for
very many years Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, but until he came to=
England,
shortly before the termination of his official career, he was personally
unknown to the Colonial Office, and had no influence there. It was totally =
out
of his power to control the policy of the Home Government with reference to=
the
Natal natives; he could only take things as he found them, and make the bes=
t of
such materials as came to his hand. As he could not keep the natives out of=
the
colony or prevent polygamy, he did what he could towards making them loyal =
and
contented subjects. How well he succeeded, and with what consummate tact an=
d knowledge
he must have exercised his authority, is shown by the fact that in all these
years there has been but one native disturbance, namely that of Langalibale=
le,
and by the further fact that the loyalty of the Natal Zulus stood the strai=
n of
the Zulu war. Also, there never has been, and probably never will be, anoth=
er
white man so universally beloved and reverenced by the natives throughout t=
he
length and breadth of South Africa.
But Sir T. Shepstone's influence for good will
pass away, as all purely personal influence must, and meanwhile, what is the
situation? On the one hand, there is a very slowly increasing, scattered, a=
nd
mixed population of about 25,000 whites, capable, at the outside, of puttin=
g a force
of 4000 men in the field. On the other, there is a warlike native populatio=
n,
united by the ties of race and common interests, numbering at the present
moment between 400,000 and 500,000, and increasing by leaps and bounds: cap=
able
of putting quite 80,000 warriors into the field, and possessing, besides,
numerous strongholds called locations. At present these two rival populatio=
ns
live side by side in peace and amity, though at heart neither loves the oth=
er.
The two races are so totally distinct that it is quite impossible for them =
to
have much community of feeling; they can never mingle; their ideas are
different, their objects are different, and in Natal their very law is
different. Kafirs respect and like individual Englishmen, but I doubt wheth=
er
they are particularly fond of us as a race, though they much prefer us to a=
ny other
white men, and are devoted to our rule, so long as it is necessary to them.=
The
average white man, on the other hand, detests the Kafir, and looks on him a=
s a
lazy good-for-nothing, who ought to work for him and will not work for him,
whilst he is quite incapable of appreciating his many good points. It is an=
odd
trait about Zulus that only gentlemen, in the true sense of the word, can w=
in
their regard, or get anything out of them.
It is obvious that, sooner or later, these two
races must come into contact, the question being how long the present calm =
will
last. To this question I will venture to suggest an answer,--I believe the
right one. It will last until the native gets so cramped for room that he h=
as
no place left to settle on, except the white man's lands. The white man will
then try to turn him off, whereupon the native will fall back on the primary
resource of killing him, and possessing himself of the land by force. This
plan, simultaneously carried out on a large scale, would place the colony at
the mercy of its native inhabitants.
Nor is the time so very far distant when
Englishmen and Zulus will stand face to face over this land question. In the
early days of the colony, locations were established in the mountainous
districts, because they were comparatively worthless, and the natives were
settled in them by tribes. Of what goes on in these locations very little is
known, except that they are crowded, and that the inhabitants are as entire=
ly
wedded to their savage customs as their forefathers were before them. As th=
ere is
no more room in the locations, many thousands of Kafirs have settled upon
private lands, sometimes with and sometimes without the leave of the owners.
But, for many reasons, this is a state of affairs that cannot go on for eve=
r.
In a few years, the private lands will be filled up, as well as the locatio=
ns,
and what then?
Zulus are a people who require a very large
quantity of land, since they possess great numbers of cattle which must have
grazing room. Also their cultivation being of the most primitive order, and
consisting as it does of picking out the very richest patches of land, and
cropping them till they are exhausted, all ordinary land being rejected as =
too
much trouble to work, the possession, or the right of usor, of several hund=
red
acres is necessary to the support of a single family. Nor, if we may judge =
from
precedent, and its well-marked characteristics, is it to be supposed that t=
his
race will at the pinch suit itself to circumstances, take up less land, and
work harder. Zulus would rather fight to the last than discard a cherished =
and
an ancient custom. Savages they are, and savages they will remain, and in t=
he
struggle between them and civilisation it is possible that they may be
conquered, but I do not believe that they will be converted. The Zulu Kafir=
is
incompatible with civilisation.
It will be seen, from what I have said, that N=
atal
might more properly be called a Black settlement than an English colony.
Looking at it from the former point of view, it is a very interesting
experiment. For the first time probably since their race came into existenc=
e,
Zulu natives have got a chance given them of increasing and multiplying wit=
hout
being periodically decimated by the accidents of war, whilst at the same ti=
me enjoying
the protection of a strong and a just government. It remains to be seen what
use they will make of their opportunity. That they will avail themselves of=
it
for the purposes of civilising themselves I do not believe; but it seems to=
me
possible that they will learn from the white man the advantages of combinat=
ion,
and aim at developing themselves into a powerful and united black nation.
It is in the face of this state of things that
Lord Kimberley now proposes to grant responsible government to the white
inhabitants of Natal, should they be willing to accept it, providing that i=
t is
to carry with it the responsibility of ruling the natives, and further, of =
defending
the colony from the attacks of its neighbours, whether white or coloured.
Natal has hitherto been ruled under a hybrid
constitution, which, whilst allowing the Legislative Assembly of the colony=
to
pass laws, &c., reserves all real authority to the Crown. There has,
however, been for some years past a growing agitation amongst a proportion =
of
its inhabitants, instituted with the object of inducing the Home Government=
to
concede practical independence to the colony, Her Majesty having on several
occasions been petitioned on the subject by the Legislative Council. On the
13th February 1880, Sir G. Wolseley, who was at the time Governor of Natal,
wrote what I can only call, a very intemperate despatch to the Secretary of
State, commenting on the prayer for responsible government, which he strong=
ly
condemned. He also took the opportunity to make a series of somewhat vicious
attacks on the colonists in general, whose object in asking for independence
was, he implied, to bring the black man in relations of "appropriate s=
ervitude
to his white superior." It would appear, however, from words used by h=
im towards
the end of his despatch, that the real reason of his violence was, that he
feared, that one of the first acts of the Natal Parliament would be to put =
an
end to his settlement in Zululand, which was and is the laughing-stock of t=
he
colony. He was probably right in this supposition. The various charges he
brings against the colonists are admirably and conclusively refuted in a mi=
nute
adopted by the Legislative Council of Natal, dated 20th December 1880.
In a despatch, dated 15th March 1881, Lord
Kimberley refuses to accede to the request for the grant of Responsible
Government.
On the 28th of December, the Legislative Counc=
il
again petitioned the Crown on the subject, and forward to Lord Kimberley a
report of a Select committee appointed to consider the matter, in which the
following words occur:--
"Your committee hold that while the colony
may well be held responsible for its defence from such aggression as may be
caused by the acts or policy of a responsible government, it cannot justly =
be
saddled with the obligation to meet acts of aggression from bordering
territories that have arisen out of the circumstances or measures over which
such government have had no control; although, as a matter of fact, the bru=
nt of
defence (must be borne?) in the first instance by the colonists. The Counci=
l,
therefore, neither exercises, nor desires to exercise, any control over
territories adjacent to or bordering on the colony; for the preservation of=
its
own internal peace and order the colony is prepared to provide. The duty of
protecting the colony from external foes, whether by sea or land, devolves =
on
the Empire as a whole, otherwise to be a section of that Empire constitutes=
no
real privilege."
To this report, somewhat to the surprise of the
Natalians, Lord Kimberley returned, in a despatch addressed to Sir H. Bulwe=
r,
on the occasion of his departure to take up the Governorship of Natal, and =
dated
2d February 1882, a most favourable reply. In fact, he is so obliging as to=
far
exceed the wishes of the Natalians, as expressed in the passage just quoted,
and to tell them that Her Majesty's Government is not only ready to give th=
em
responsible government, but that it will expect them to defend their own
frontiers, independently of any assistance from the Imperial Government. He
further informs them that the Imperial troops will be withdrawn, and that t=
he
only responsibility Her Majesty's Government will retain with reference to =
the
colony will be that of its defence against aggression by foreign powers.
This sudden change of face on the part of the
Imperial Government, which had up till now flatly refused to grant any meas=
ure
of self-government to Natal, may at first seem rather odd, but on examinati=
on
it will be found to be quite in accordance with the recently developed Sout=
h African
policy of Mr. Gladstone's Government. There is little doubt that it is an
article of faith among the Liberal party that the less the mother-country h=
as
to do with her colonies, and more especially her South African colonies, the
better. A grand step was made in the direction of the abandonment of our So=
uth
African Empire when we surrendered the Transvaal to the Boers, and it is cl=
ear
that if our troops can be withdrawn from Natal and all responsibility for t=
he
safety of that colony put an end to, the triumph of self-effacement will be=
still
more complete. But there is another and more immediate reason for Lord
Kimberley's generous offer. He knows, no one better, that the policy pursue=
d in
South Africa, both as regards the Transvaal and Zululand, must produce its
legitimate fruit--bloodshed--before very long. He, or rather his Government=
, is
consequently anxious to cut the connection before anything of the sort occu=
rs,
when they will be able to attribute the trouble, whatever it is, to the
ill-advised action of the Colonial Legislature.
What is still more strange, however, is that t=
he
colonists, having regard to the position they occupy with reference to the
Kafirs that surround them, to whom they bear the same relative proportion t=
hat
the oases do in the desert, or the islands of an archipelago to the ocean t=
hat
washes their shores, should wish for such a dangerous boon as that of
self-government, if indeed they really do wish it. When I lived in Natal, I
often heard the subject discussed, and watched the Legislative Council pass=
its
periodical resolutions about it, but I confess I always looked on the matte=
r as
being more or less of a farce. There exists, however, in Natal a knot of
politicians who are doubtless desirous of the change, partly because they t=
hink
that it would be really beneficial, and partly because they are possessed b=
y a
laudable ambition to fill the high positions of Prime Minister, Treasurer,
&c., in the future Parliament. But these gentlemen for the most part li=
ve
in towns, where they are comparatively safe should a native rising occur. I
have not noticed the same enthusiasm for responsible government among those=
Natalians
who live up country in the neighbourhood of the locations.
Still there does exist a considerable party who
are in favour of the change, a party that has recently sprung into existenc=
e.
Many things have occurred within the last few years to irritate and even
exasperate people in Natal with the Imperial Government, and generally with=
the
treatment that they have received at our hands. For instance, colonists are
proverbially sensitive, and it is therefore rather hard that every newspaper
correspondent or itinerant bookmaker who comes to their shores, should at o=
nce
proceed to print endless letters and books abusing them without mercy. The =
fact
of the matter is that these gentlemen come, and put up at the hotels and
pot-shops, where they meet all the loafers and bad characters in the countr=
y,
whom they take to be specimens of the best class of colonists, whom they
describe accordingly as the "riddlings of society." Into the quie=
t,
respectable, and happy homes that really give the tone to the colony they do
not enter.
It is also a favourite accusation to bring aga=
inst
the people of Natal that they make the South African wars in order to make
money out of them. For instance, in a leading article of one of the princip=
al
English journals, it was stated not long ago, that the murmurs of the colon=
ists
at being forced to eat the bread of humiliation in the Transvaal matter, ar=
ose
from no patriotic feeling, but from sorrow at the early termination of a war
out of which they hoped to suck no small advantage. This statement is quite
untrue.
No doubt a great deal of money has been made o=
ut
of the wars by a few colonial speculators, some of it, maybe, dishonestly; =
but
this is not an unusual occurrence in a foreign war. Was no money made
dishonestly by English speculators and contractors in the Crimean War? Cann=
ot Manchester
boast manufacturers ready to supply our enemies,--for cash payments,--with =
guns
to shoot us with, or any other material of war?
It is not to be supposed that because a few
speculators made fortunes out of the Commissariat that the whole colony
participated in the spoils of the various wars. On the contrary, the marjor=
ity
of its inhabitants have suffered very largely. Not only have they run
considerable personal risk, but since, and owing to, the Zulu and Boer wars=
the
cost of living has almost, if not quite doubled, which, needless to say, has
not been the case with their incomes. It is therefore particularly cruel th=
at Natal
should be gibbeted as the abode of scoundrels of the worst sort, men prepar=
ed
to bring about bloodshed in order to profit by it. Sir Garnet Wolseley,
however, found in this report of colonial dishonesty a convenient point of
vantage from which to attack the colonists generally, and in his despatch a=
bout
responsible government we may be sure he did not spare them. The Legislative
Council thus comments on his remarks: "To colonists a war means the
spreading among them of distress, alarm, and confusion, peril to life and
property in outlying districts, the arrest of progress, and general
disorganisation. . . . The Council regard with pain and indignation the
uncalled-for and cruel stigma thus cast upon the colonists by Sir Garnet
Wolseley."
At first sight these accusations may not appea=
r to
have much to do with the question of whether or no the colonists should acc=
ept
responsible government, but in reality they have, inasmuch as they create a=
feeling
of soreness that inclines the Natalians to get rid of Imperial interference=
and
the attendant criticism at any price.
More substantial grievances against the English
Government are the present condition of the native problem, which the colon=
ists
justly attribute to Imperial mismanagement, and that triumph of genius, Sir=
Garnet
Wolseley's settlement in Zululand. They see these evils, which they know we=
re
preventable, growing more formidable day by day, and they imagine, or some =
of
them do, that if they had free institutions it would still be in their powe=
r to
stop that growth.
The whole question has now been referred to the
colony, which is to elect a fresh Legislative Assembly on the issue of
responsible government. The struggle between "the party of progress,&q=
uot;
i.e., the responsible government section, and the reactionists, or those wh=
o are
prepared to dispense with "freedom," provided they can be sure of=
safety,
is being carried on keenly, and at present it is doubtful which side will h=
ave
a majority. I do not, however, believe that the majority of any Council
returned will consent to accept Lord Kimberley's proposal as it stands; to =
walk
into a parlour in which the spider is so very obvious, and to deliberately
undertake the guardianship of all the Imperial interests in South-Eastern
Africa. If they do, they will, in my opinion, deserve all they will get.[*]=
[=
*]
Since this chapter was written the Natal constituencies have, as I thought probable, declared
against the acceptance of Lord
Kimberley's offer in its present form, by returning a majority of anti-responsible Gover=
nment
men. It is, however, probable =
that
the new Legislative Council will try to re-open negotiations on a differe=
nt,
or, at any rate, a modified ba=
sis.
The Natalians are fortunate at the present cri=
sis
in having, by dint of vigorous agitation against the appointment of Mr.
Sendall, a gentleman selected by Lord Kimberley to govern them, obtained the
reappointment of their former Governor, Sir Henry Bulwer. Sir Henry, during=
his
first tenure of office, lost credit with the South African colonists on acc=
ount
of his lukewarmness with reference to the Zulu war, but the course of events
has gone far towards justifying his views. He is one of the most hard-worki=
ng
and careful Governors that Natal has ever had, and, perhaps, the most
judicious. Of a temperate and a cautious mind, he may be more safely truste=
d to
pilot a country so surrounded with difficulties and dangers as Natal is, th=
an
most men, and it is to be hoped that the application to the questions of the
day, of the strong common sense that he possesses in such an eminent degree,
may have a cooling effect on the hot heads and excited imaginations of the
"party of progress."
In considering the pros and cons of the
responsible government question, it must be steadily kept in sight that Nat=
al
is not likely to be a country with a peaceful future. To begin with, she ha=
s her
native inhabitants to deal with. To-day they number, say 450,000, fifteen o=
r twenty
years hence they will number a million, or perhaps more. These men are no
longer the docile overgrown children they were twenty years ago. The lesson=
s of
our performances in the Zulu and Boer wars, more especially the latter, have
not been lost upon them, and they are beginning to think that the white man,
instead of being the unconquerable demigod they thought him, is somewhat of=
a
humbug. Pharaoh, we know, grew afraid of the Israelites; Natal, with a much=
weaker
power at command than that of Pharaoh, has got to cope with a still more
dangerous element, and one that cannot be induced to depart into the
wilderness.
And after all what does the power of Natal amo=
unt
to? Let us be liberal, and say six thousand men, it is the outside. In the
event of a native rising, or any other serious war, I believe that of this
number, at least two thousand would make themselves scarce. There exists in=
all
colonies a floating element of individuals who have drifted there for the
purpose of making money, but who have no real affection for the (temporary)
country of their adoption. Their capital is, as a rule, small and easily
realised, and the very last thing that they would think of doing, would be =
to
engage in a deadly life or death struggle, on behalf of a land that they on=
ly
look on as a milch cow, out of which their object is to draw as much as
possible. On the contrary, they would promptly seek another cow, leaving the
old one to the tender mercies of the butcher.
Their defection would leave some 4000 men to c=
ope
with the difficulty, whatever it was, of which number at least 1000 would be
ineffective from age and various other causes, whilst of the remainder, qui=
te
1000 would be obliged to remain where they were to protect women and childr=
en
in outlying districts. This would leave a total effective force of 2000 men,
or, deducting 500 for garrison purposes, of 1500 ready to take the field. B=
ut
it would take some time to collect, arm, and equip even this number, and in=
the
meanwhile, in the case of a sudden and preconcerted native rising, half the
inhabitants of the colony would be murdered in detail.
But Natalians have got other dangers to fear
besides those arising from the presence of this vast mass of barbarism in t=
heir
midst. After a period of anarchy a new king may possess himself of the thro=
ne
of Zululand, and it is even possible that he might, under circumstances that
will arise hereafter, lead his armies into Natal, and create a difficulty w=
ith
which the 1500 available white men would find it difficult to cope. Or the
Boers of the Orange Free State and Transvaal may get tired of paying customs
dues at Durban, and march 5000 men down to take possession of the port! Per=
haps
Natal might provide herself with an effective force by enrolling an army of
10,000 or 20,000 Kafirs, but it seems to me that the proceeding would be bo=
th
uncertain and expensive, and, should the army take it into its head to muti=
ny,
very dangerous to boot.
It is a noticeable fact that those who so arde=
ntly
advocate the acceptance of Lord Kimberley's offer, in all their speeches,
addresses, and articles, almost entirely shirk this question of defence, wh=
ich is,
after all, the root of the matter. I have formed my estimate of the number =
of
men forthcoming in time of danger, on the supposition that a burgher law wa=
s in
force in Natal, that is, that every man remaining in the country should be
obliged to take a part in its defence. But they do not even hint at a burgh=
er
law--in fact, they repudiate the idea, because they know that it would not =
be
tolerated. The universal service system is not the Natalian's idea of
happiness. They simply avoid the question, calling it the "defence
bugbear," and assume that it will all be arranged in some unforeseen w=
ay.
The only suggestion that I have yet seen as
regards the arrangements for the future defence of the colony should it bec=
ome
independent, is a somewhat ominous one, namely:--that Natal should enter in=
to a
close alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Transvaal and the Orange =
Free
State. But, as the advocates of "freedom" would soon find, the Or=
ange
Free State (for even if willing to help them, the Transvaal will for some y=
ears
have enough to do with its own affairs) will not come forward for nothing.
There would first have to be a few business formalities with reference to t=
he
customs dues collected in Durban, on goods passing through to the interior,
which yield the bulk of the Natal revenue: and possibly, some concessions to
Boer public opinion as regards the English mode of dealing with the Natal
natives. I incline to the opinion that in relying on the assistance of the
Boers in time of trouble the inhabitants of Natal would be leaning on a bro=
ken
reed. They are more likely to find them in arms against them than fighting =
on
their side.
The party of progress also talks much about the
prospects of confederation with the Cape, if once they get responsible
government. Most people, however, will think that the fact of their being i=
ndependent,
and therefore responsible for their own defence, will hardly prove an
inducement to the Cape to offer to share those responsibilities. The only
confederation possible to Natal as a self-governing community will be a Boer
confederation, to which it may be admitted--on certain terms. Another cry is
that the moment responsible government is established immigrants will flow =
into
the country, and thus restore the balance of races. I take the liberty to d=
oubt
the truth of this supposition. The intending emigrant from Europe does not,=
it
is true, understand the ins and outs of the Natal native question, but he d=
oes
now that it is a place where there are wars and rumours of wars, and where =
he
might possibly be killed, and the result is that he wisely goes to some oth=
er
colony, that has equal advantages to offer and no Kafirs. To suppose that t=
he
emigrant would go to Natal when he came to understand that it was an
independent settlement of a few white men, living in the midst of a mass of
warlike Kafirs, when Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States,=
are
all holding out their arms to him, is to suppose him a bigger fool than he =
is. At
the best of times Natal is not likely to attract many desirable emigrants:
under a responsible government I do not believe that it will attract any.
It seems to me, that there is only one conditi=
on
of affairs under which it would be at all possible for the Natalians to ass=
ume
the responsibilities of self-government with any safety, and that is when t=
he
great bulk of the native population has been removed back to whence it
came--Zululand. Causes of a diametrically opposite nature to those that have
been at work among the natives of Natal, have been in operation amongst the=
ir
brethren in Zululand. In Natal, peace, polygamy, plenty and immigration have
bred up an enormous native population. In Zululand, war, private slaughter =
by
the king's order, and the severe restrictions put upon marriage, have kept =
down
the increase of the race; also an enormous number of individuals have fled =
from
the one country into the other. I do not suppose that the population of
Zululand amounts, at the present moment, to much more than half that of Nat=
al.
In this state of affairs lies the only real ke=
y to
the Natal native difficulty. Let Zululand be converted into a black colony
under English control, and its present inhabitants be established in suitab=
le locations;
then let all the natives of Natal, with the exception of those who choose to
become monogamists and be subject to civilised law, be moved into Zululand,=
and
also established in locations. There would be plenty of room for them all. =
Of
course there would be difficulties in the way of the realisation of this
scheme, but I do not think that they would prove insuperable. It is probabl=
e,
however, that it would require a show of force before the Natal natives wou=
ld
consent to budge. Indeed, it is absurd to suppose, that anything would indu=
ce
them to leave peaceful Natal, and plunge into the seething cauldron of
bloodshed, extortion, and political plots that we have cooked up in Zululand
under the name of a settlement. Proper provisions must first be made for the
government of the country, and security to life and property made certain. =
Till
this is done, no natives in their senses will return to Zululand.
Till this is done, too, or till some other pla=
n is
discovered by means of which the native difficulty can be effectively dealt
with, the Natalians will indeed be foolish if they discard the protection o=
f England,
and accept the fatal boon of self-government. If they do, their future care=
er
may be brilliant; but I believe that it will be brief.
It is no answer to urge that at present the
natives seem quite quiet, and that there is no indication of disturbance.
History tells us that before the destruction of
doomed Pompeii, Vesuvius was very still; only day by day the dark cloud han=
ging
over the mountain's summit grew denser and blacker. We know what happened t=
o Pompeii.
I do not wish to suggest anything unpleasant, =
far
from it; but sometimes, I cannot help thinking, that it is perhaps a matter
worth the consideration of the Natalians, whether it might not be as well,
instead of talking about responsible government: to improve upon the exampl=
e of
the inhabitants of Pompeii, and take to their ships before the volcano begi=
ns
to work.
It seems to me that there is an ugly cloud
gathering on the political horizon in Natal.
Invasion by Mosilikatze--Arrival of the emigra=
nt Boers--Establishment
of the South African republic--The Sand River convention--Growth of the
territory of the republic--The native tribes surrounding it--Capabilities of
the country--Its climate--Its inhabitants--The Boers--Their peculiarities a=
nd
mode of life--Their abhorrence of settled government and payment of taxes--=
The
Dutch patriotic party--Form of government previous to the annexation--Court=
s of
law--The commando system--Revenue arrangements--Native races in the Transva=
al.
The Transvaal is a country without a history. =
Its
very existence was hardly known of until about fifty years ago. Of its past=
we
know nothing. The generations who peopled its great plains have passed utte=
rly
out of the memory and even the traditions of man, leaving no monument to ma=
rk
that they have existed, not even a tomb.
During the reign of Chaka, 1813-1828, whose
history has been sketched in a previous chapter, one of his most famous
generals, Mosilikatze, surnamed the Lion, seceded from him with a large num=
ber
of his soldiers, and striking up in a north-westerly direction, settled in =
or
about what is now the Morico district of the Transvaal. The country through
which Mosilikatze passed was at that time thickly populated with natives of=
the
Basutu or Macatee race, whom the Zulus look upon with great contempt.
Mosilikatze expressed the feelings of his tribe in a practical manner, by
massacring every living soul of them that came within his reach. That the
numbers slaughtered were very great, the numerous ruins of Basutu kraals all
over the country testify.
It was Chaka's intention to follow up Mosilika=
tze
and destroy him, but he was himself assassinated before he could do so.
Dingaan, his successor, however, carried out his brother's design, and
despatched a large force to punish him. This army, after marching over 300
miles, burst upon Mosilikatze, drove him back with slaughter, and returned =
home
triumphant. The invasion is important, because the Zulus claim the greater =
part
of the Transvaal territory by virtue of it.
About the time that Mosilikatze was conquered,
1835-1840, the discontented Boers were leaving the Cape Colony exasperated =
at
the emancipation of the slaves by the Imperial authorities. First they made=
their
way to Natal, but being followed thither by the English flag they travelled
further inland over the Vaal River and founded the town of Mooi River Dorp =
or
Potchefstroom. Here they were joined by other malcontents from the Orange
Sovereignty, which, although afterwards abandoned, was at that time a Briti=
sh
possession. Acting upon
T=
he
good old rule, the simple plan Of
let him take who has the power, And
let him keep who can,
the Boers now proceeded to possess themselves =
of
as much territory as they wanted. Nor was this a difficult task. The countr=
y was,
as I have said, peopled by Macatees, who are a poor-spirited race as compar=
ed
to the Zulus, and had had what little courage they possessed crushed out of=
them
by the rough handling they had received at the hands of Mosilikatze and
Dingaan. The Boers, they argued, could not treat them worse than the Zulus =
had
done. Occasionally a Chief, bolder than the rest, would hold out, and then =
such
an example was made of him and his people that few cared to follow in his
footsteps.
As soon as the Boers were fairly settled in th=
eir
new home, they began to think about setting up a Government. First they tri=
ed a
system of Commandants, with a Commandant-general, but this does not seem to
have answered. Next, those of their number who lived in Lydenburg district =
(where
the gold fields now are) set up a Republic, with a President and Volksraad,=
or
popular assembly. This example was followed by the other white inhabitants =
of
the country, who formed another Republic and elected another President, with
Pretoria for their capital. The two republics were subsequently incorporate=
d.
In 1852 the Imperial authorities, having regar=
d to
the expense of maintaining an effective government over an unwilling people=
in
an undeveloped and half-conquered country, concluded a convention with the =
emigrant
Boers "beyond the Vaal River." The following were the principal s=
tipulations
of this convention, drawn up between Major Hogg and Mr. Owen, Her Majesty's
Assistant-Commissioners for the settling and adjusting of the affairs of the
eastern and north-eastern boundaries of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope=
on
the one part, and a deputation representative of the emigrant farmers north=
of
the Vaal River on the other. It was guaranteed "in the fullest manner =
on
the part of the British Government to the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal
River the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves accor=
ding
to their own laws, without any interference on the part of the British
Government, and that no encroachment shall be made by the said Government on
the territory beyond to the north of the Vaal River, with the further assur=
ance
that the warmest wish of the British Government is to promote peace, free
trade, and friendly intercourse with the emigrant farmers now inhabiting, or
who hereafter may inhabit that country, it being understood that this syste=
m of
non-interference is binding on both parties."
Next were disclaimed, on behalf of the British
Government, "all alliances whatever and with whomsoever of the coloured
nations to the north of the Vaal River."
It was also agreed "that no slavery is or
shall be permitted or practised in the country to the north of the Vaal Riv=
er
by the emigrant farmers."
It was further agreed "that no objection
shall be made by any British authority against the emigrant Boers purchasing
their supplies of ammunition in any of the British colonies and possessions=
of
South Africa; it being mutually understood that all trade in ammunition wit=
h the
native tribes is prohibited both by the British Government and the emigrant
farmers on both sides of the Vaal River."
These were the terms of this famous convention,
which is as slipshod in its diction as it is vague in its meaning. What, for
instance, is meant by the territory to the north of the Vaal River? Accordi=
ng
to the letter of the agreement, Messrs. Hogg and Owen ceded all the territo=
ry
between the Vaal and Egypt. This historical document was the Charta of the =
new-born
South African Republic. Under its provisions, the Boers, now safe from
interference on the part of the British, established their own Government a=
nd
promulgated their "Grond Wet," or Constitution.
The history of the Republic between 1852 and 1=
876
is not very interesting, and is besides too wearisome to enter into here. I=
t consists
of an oft-told tale of civil broils, attacks on native tribes, and encroach=
ment
on native territories. Until shortly before the Annexation, every burgher w=
as,
on coming of age, entitled to receive from the Government 6000 acres of lan=
d.
As these rights were in the early days of the Republic frequently sold to
speculators for such trifles as a bottle of brandy or half a dozen of beer,=
and
as the seller still required his 6000 acres: for a Boer considers it beneath
his dignity to settle on less, it is obvious that it required a very large =
country
to satisfy all demands. To meet these demands, the territories of the Repub=
lic
had to be stretched like an elastic band, and they were stretched
accordingly,--at the expense of the natives. The stretching process was an
ingenious one, and is very well described in a minute written by Mr. Osborn,
the late Magistrate at Newcastle, dated 22d September, 1876, in these words=
:--
"The Boers, as they have done in other ca=
ses
and are still doing, encroached by degrees on native territory, commencing =
by
obtaining permission to graze stock upon portions of it at certain seasons =
of
the year, followed by individual graziers obtaining from native headmen a s=
ort
of right or license to squat upon certain defined portions, ostensibly in o=
rder
to keep other Boer squatters away from the same land. These licenses,
temporarily intended as friendly or neighbourly acts by unauthorised headme=
n,
after a few seasons of occupation by the Boer, are construed by him as titl=
e,
and his permanent occupation ensues. Damage for trespass is levied by him f=
rom
the very man from whom he obtained the right to squat, to which the natives
submit out of fear of the matter reaching the ears of the paramount chief, =
who
would in all probability severely punish them for opening the door to
encroachment by the Boer. After a while, however, the matter comes to a cri=
sis
in consequence of the incessant disputes between the Boers and the natives;=
one
or other of the disputants lays the case before the paramount chief, who, w=
hen
hearing both parties, is literally frightened with violence and threats by =
the
Boer into granting him the land. Upon this the usual plan followed by the B=
oer
is at once to collect a few neighbouring Boers, including a field cornet, or
even an acting provisional field cornet, appointed by the field cornet or
provisional cornet, the latter to represent the Government, although without
instructions authorising him to act in the matter. A few cattle are collect=
ed
among themselves, which the party takes to the chief, and his signature is
obtained to a written document alienating to the Republican Boers a large s=
lice
of all his territory. The contents of this document are, as far as I can ma=
ke out,
never clearly or intelligibly explained to the chief who signs and accepts =
of
the cattle under the impression that it is all in settlement of hire for the
grazing licenses granted by his headmen. This, I have no hesitation in sayi=
ng,
is the usual method by which the Boers obtain what they call cessions to th=
em
of territories by native chiefs. In Secocoeni's case they allege that his
father Sequati cedes to them the whole of his territory (hundreds of square
miles) for a hundred head of cattle."
So rapidly did this progress go on that the li=
ttle
Republic to the "North of the Vaal River," had at the time of the
Annexation grown into a country of the size of France. Its boundaries had o=
nly
been clearly defined where they abutted on neighbouring White Communities, =
or
on the territories of great native powers, on which the Government had not =
dared
to infringe to any marked degree, such as those of Lo Bengula's people in t=
he
north. But wheresoever on the State's borders there had been no white Power=
to
limit its advances, or where the native tribes had found themselves too
isolated or too weak to resist aggressions, there the Republic had by degre=
es
encroached and extended the shadow, if not the substance, of its authority.=
The Transvaal has a boundary line of over 1,600
miles in circumference, and of this a large portion is disputed by different
native tribes. Speaking generally, the territory lies between the 22 and 28
degrees of South Latitude and the 25 and 32 degrees of East Longitude, or
between the Orange Free State, Natal and Griqualand West on the south, and =
the Limpopo
River on the north; and between the Lebombo mountains on the east, and the
Kalihari desert on the west. On the north of its territory live three great
tribes, the Makalaka, the Matabele (descendants of the Zulus who deserted C=
haka
under Mosilikatze) and the Matyana. These tribes are all warlike. On the we=
st,
following the line down to the Diamond Field territory, are the Sicheli, the
Bangoaketsi, the Baralong and the Koranna tribes. Passing round by Griquala=
nd
West, the Free State, and Natal, we reach Zululand on the south-east corner;
then come the Lebombo mountains on the east, separating the Transvaal from =
Amatonga
land, and from the so-called Portuguese possessions, which are entirely in =
the
hands of native tribes, most of them subject to the great Zulu chief, Umzei=
la,
who has his stronghold in the north-east.
It will be observed that the country is almost
surrounded by native tribes. Besides these there are about one million nati=
ve
inhabitants living within its borders. In one district alone, Zoutpansberg,=
it is
computed that there are 364,250 natives, as compared to about 750 whites.
If a beautiful and fertile country were alone
necessary to make a state and its inhabitants happy and prosperous, happine=
ss
and prosperity would rain upon the Transvaal and the Dutch Boers. The
capabilities of this favoured land are vast and various. Within its borders=
are
to be found highlands and lowlands, vast stretches of rolling veldt like
gigantic sheep downs, hundreds of miles of swelling bushland, huge tracts o=
f mountainous
country, and even little glades spotted with timber that remind one of an
English park. There is every possible variety of soil and scenery. Some
districts will grow all tropical produce, whilst others are well suited for
breeding sheep, cattle and horses. Most of the districts will produce wheat=
and
all other cereals in greater perfection and abundance than any of the other
South African colonies. Two crops of cereals may be obtained from the soil
every year, and both the vine and tobacco are cultivated with great success.
Coffee, sugar-cane and cotton have been grown with profit in the northern p=
arts
of the State. Also the undeveloped mineral wealth of the country is very gr=
eat.
Its known minerals are gold, copper, lead, cobalt, iron, coal, tin and
plumbago: copper and iron having long been worked by the natives. Altogether
there is little doubt that the Transvaal is the richest of all the South
African states, and had it remained under English rule it would, with the a=
id
of English enterprise and capital, have become a very wealthy and prosperous
country. However there is little chance of that now.
Perhaps the greatest charm of the Transvaal li=
es
in its climate, which is among the best in the world, and in all the southe=
rn
districts very healthy. During the winter months, that is from April to
October, little or no rain falls, and the climate is cold and bracing. In
summer it is rather warm, but not overpoweringly hot, the thermometer at
Pretoria averaging from 65 to 73 degrees, and in the winter from 59 to 56 d=
egrees.
The population of the Transvaal is estimated at about 40,000 whites, mostly=
of
Dutch origin, consisting of about thirty vast families: and one million
natives. There are several towns, the largest of which are Pretoria and
Potchefstroom.
Such is the country that we annexed in 1877, a=
nd
were drummed out of in 1881. Now let us turn to its inhabitants. It has been
the fashion to talk of the Transvaal as though nobody but Boers lived in it=
. In
reality the inhabitants were divided into three classes: 1. Natives; 2. Boe=
rs; 3.
English. I say were divided, because the English class can now hardly be sa=
id
to exist, the country having been made too hot to hold it, since the war. T=
he
natives stand in the proportion of nearly twenty to one to the whites. The
Boers were in their turn much more numerous than the English, but the latter
owned nearly all the trading establishments in the country, and also a very
large amount of property.
The Transvaal Boers have been very much praise=
d up
by members of the Government in England, and others who are anxious to adva=
nce
their interests, as against English interests. Mr. Gladstone, indeed, can h=
ardly
find words strong enough to express his admiration of their leaders, those
"able men," since they inflicted a national humiliation on us; and
doubtless they are a people with many good points. That they are not devoid=
of
sagacity can be seen by the way they have dealt with the English Government=
.
The Boers are certainly a peculiar people, tho=
ugh
they can hardly be said to be "zealous of good works." They are v=
ery
religious, but their religion takes it colour from the darkest portions of =
the
Old Testament; lessons of mercy and gentleness are not at all to their liki=
ng,
and they seldom care to read the Gospels. What they delight in are the stor=
ies
of wholesale butchery by the Israelites of old; and in their own position t=
hey
find a reproduction of that of the first settlers in the Holy Land. Like th=
em
they think they are entrusted by the Almighty with the task of exterminating
the heathen native tribes around them, and are always ready with a scriptur=
al
precedent for slaughter and robbery. The name of the Divinity is continuall=
y on
their lips, sometimes in connection with very doubtful statements. They are
divided into three sects, none of which care much for the other two. These =
are
the Doppers, who number about half the population, the Orthodox Reform, and=
the
Liberal Reform, which is the least numerous. Of these three sects, the Dopp=
ers
are by far the most uncompromising and difficult to deal with. They much re=
semble
the puritans of Charles the First's time, of the extreme Hew-Agag-in-pieces
stamp.
It is difficult to agree with those who call t=
he
Boers cowards, an accusation which the whole of their history belies. A Boer
does not like fighting if he can avoid it, because he sets a high value on =
his
own life; but if he is cornered, he will fight as well as anybody else. The=
Boers
fought well enough, in the late war, though that, it is true, is no great
criterion of courage, since they were throughout flushed with victory, and,
owing to the poor shooting of the British troop, in but little personal dan=
ger.
One very unpleasant characteristic they have, and that is an absence of reg=
ard
for the truth, especially where land is concerned. Indeed the national
characteristic is crystallised into a proverb, "I am no slave to my
word." It has several times happened to me, to see one set of highly
respectable witnesses in a land case, go into the box and swear distinctly =
that
they saw a beacon placed on a certain spot, whilst an equal number on the o=
ther
side will swear that they saw it placed a mile away. Filled as they are wit=
h a
land hunger, to which that of the Irish peasant is a weak and colourless
sentiment, there is little that they will not do to gratify their taste. It=
is the
subject of constant litigation amongst them, and it is by no means uncommon=
for
a Boer to spend several thousand pounds in lawsuits over a piece of land not
worth as many hundreds.
Personally Boers are fine men, but as a rule u=
gly.
Their women-folk are good-looking in early life, but get very stout as they
grow older. They, in common with most of their sex, understand how to use t=
heir
tongues; indeed, it is said, that it was the women who caused the rising ag=
ainst
the English Government. None of the refinements of civilisation enter into =
the
life of an ordinary Boer. He lives in a way that would shock an English
labourer at twenty-five shillings the week, although he is very probably wo=
rthy
fifteen or twenty thousand pounds. His home is but too frequently squalid a=
nd
filthy to an extraordinary degree. He himself has no education, and does not
care that his children should receive any. He lives by himself in the middl=
e of
a great plot of land, his nearest neighbour being perhaps ten or twelve mil=
es
away, caring but little for the news of the outside world, and nothing for =
its
opinions, doing very little work, but growing daily richer through the incr=
ease
of his flocks and herds. His expenses are almost nothing, and as he gets ol=
der,
wealth increases upon him. The events in his life consist of an occasional =
trip
on "commando," against some native tribe, attending a few politic=
al meetings,
and the journeys he makes with his family to the nearest town, some four ti=
mes a
year, in order to be present at "Nachtmaal" or communion. Foreign=
ers,
especially Englishmen, he detests, but he is kindly and hospitable to his o=
wn
people. Living isolated as he does, the lord of a little kingdom, he natura=
lly
comes to have a great idea of himself, and a corresponding contempt for all=
the
rest of mankind. Laws and taxes are things distasteful to him, and he looks
upon it as an impertinence that any court should venture to call him to acc=
ount
for his doings. He is rich and prosperous, and the cares of poverty, and al=
l the
other troubles that fall to the lot of civilised men, do not affect him. He=
has
no romance in him, nor any of the higher feelings and aspirations that are
found in almost every other race; in short, unlike the Zulu he despises, th=
ere
is little of the gentleman in his composition, though he is at times capabl=
e of
acts of kindness and even generosity. His happiness is to live alone in the
great wilderness, with his children, his men-servants and his maid-servants,
his flocks and his herds, the monarch of all he surveys. If civilisation
presses him too closely, his remedy is a simple one. He sells his farm, pac=
ks
up his goods and cash in his waggon, and starts for regions more congeniall=
y wild.
Such are some of the leading characteristics of that remarkable product of
South Africa, the Transvaal Boer, who resembles no other white man in the
world.
Perhaps, however, the most striking of all his
oddities is his abhorrence of all government, more especially if that
government be carried out according to English principles. The Boers have
always been more or less in rebellion; they rebelled against the rule of the
Company when the Cape belonged to Holland, they rebelled against the Englis=
h Government
in the Cape, they were always in a state of semi-rebellion against their own
government in the Transvaal, and now they have for the second time, with the
most complete success, rebelled against the English Government. The fact of=
the
matter is that the bulk of their number hate all Governments, because
Governments enforce law and order, and they hate the English Government wor=
st
of all, because it enforces law and order most of all. It is not liberty th=
ey
long for, but license. The "sturdy independence" of the Boer reso=
lves
itself into a determination not to have his affairs interfered with by any
superior power whatsoever, and not to pay taxes if he can possibly avoid it=
. But
he has also a specific cause of complaint against the English Government, w=
hich
would alone cause him to do his utmost to get rid of it, and that is its mo=
de
of dealing with natives, which is radically opposite to his own. This is the
secret of Boer patriotism. To understand it, it must be remembered that the
Englishman and the Boer look at natives from a different point of view. The
Englishman, though he may not be very fond of him, at any rate regards the
Kafir as a fellow human being with feelings like his own. The average Boer =
does
not. He looks upon the "black creature" as having been delivered =
into
his hand by the "Lord" for his own purposes, that is, to shoot an=
d enslave.
He must not be blamed too harshly for this, for, besides being naturally of=
a
somewhat hard disposition, hatred of the native is hereditary, and is partly
induced by the history of many a bloody struggle. Also the native hates the
Boer fully as much as the Boer hates the native, though with better reason.=
Now
native labour is a necessity to the Boer, because he will not as a rule do =
hard
manual labour himself, and there must be some one to plant and garner the
crops, and herd the cattle. On the other hand, the natives are not anxious =
to
serve the Boers, which means little or no pay and plenty of thick stick, an=
d sometimes
worse. The result of this state of affairs is that the Boer often has to re=
ly
on forced labour to a very great extent. But this is a thing that an English
Government will not tolerate, and the consequence is that under its rule he
cannot get the labour that is necessary to him.
Then there is the tax question. If he lives un=
der
the English flag the money has to be paid regularly, but under his own
Government he pays or not as he likes. It was this habit of his of refusing
payment of taxes that brought the Republic into difficulties in 1877, and t=
hat
will ere long bring it into trouble again. He cannot understand that cash i=
s necessary
to carry on a Government, and looks upon a tax as though it were so much mo=
ney
stolen from him. These things are the real springs of the "sturdy
independence" and the patriotism of the ordinary Transvaal farmer.
Doubtless, there are some who are really patriotic; for instance, one of th=
eir
leaders, Paul Kruger. But with the majority, patriotism is only another word
for unbounded license and forced labour.
These remarks must not be taken to apply to the
Cape Boers, who are a superior class of men, since they, living under a set=
tled
and civilised Government, have been steadily improving, whilst their cousin=
s, living
every man for his own hand, have been deteriorating. The old Voortrekkers, =
the
fathers and grandfathers of the Transvaal Boer of to-day, were, without dou=
bt,
a very fine set of men, and occasionally you may in the Transvaal meet
individuals of the same stamp whom it is a pleasure to know. But these are
generally men of a certain age with some experience of the world; the young=
er
men are very objectionable in their manners.
The real Dutch Patriotic party is not to be fo=
und
in the Transvaal, but in the Cape Colony. Their object, which, as affairs n=
ow
are, is well within the bounds of possibility, is by fair means or foul to
swamp the English element in South Africa, and to establish a great Dutch R=
epublic.
It was this party, which consists of clever and well educated men, who rais=
ed
the outcry against the Transvaal Annexation, because it meant an enormous
extension of English influence, and who had the wit, by means of their
emissaries and newspapers, to work upon the feeling of the ignorant Transva=
al
farmers until they persuaded them to rebel; and finally, to avail themselve=
s of
the yearnings of English radicalism for the disruption of the Empire and the
minimisation of British authority, to get the Annexation cancelled. All thr=
ough
this business the Boers have more or less danced in obedience to strings pu=
lled
at Cape Town, and it is now said that one of the chief wire-pullers, Mr.
Hofmeyer, is to be asked to become President of the Republic. These men are=
the
real patriots of South Africa, and very clever ones too, not the Transvaal =
Boers,
who vapour about their blood and their country and the accursed Englishman =
to
order, and are in reality influenced by very small motives, such as the des=
ire
to avoid payment of taxes, or to hunt away a neighbouring Englishman, whose
civilisation and refinement are as offensive as his farm is desirable. Such=
are
the Dutch inhabitants of the Transvaal. I will now give a short sketch of t=
heir
institutions as they were before the Annexation, and to which the community=
has
reverted since its recision, with, I believe, but few alterations.
The form of government is republican, and to a=
ll
intents and purposes, manhood suffrage prevails, supreme power resting in t=
he
people. The executive power of the State centres in a President elected by =
the people
to hold office for a term of five years, every voter having a voice in his
election. He is assisted in the execution of his duties by an Executive
Council, consisting of the State Secretary and such other three members as =
are
selected for that purpose by the legislative body, the Volksraad. The State
Secretary holds office for four years, and is elected by the Volksraad. The
members of the Executive all have seats in the Volksraad, but have no votes.
The Volksraad is the legislative body of the State, and consists of forty-t=
wo
members. The country is divided into twelve electoral districts, each of wh=
ich
has the right to return three members; the Gold Fields have also the right =
of
electing two members, and the four principal towns, one member each. There =
is no
power in the State competent to either prorogue or dissolve the Volksraad
except that body itself, so that an appeal to the country on a given subjec=
t or
policy is impossible without its concurrence. Members are elected for four
years, but half retire by rotation every two years, the vacancies being fil=
led
by re-elections. Members must have been voters for three years, and be not =
less
than thirty years of age, must belong to a Protestant Church, be resident in
the country, and owners of immovable property therein. A father and son can=
not
sit in the same Raad, neither can seats be occupied by coloured persons,
bastards, or officials.
For each electoral district there is a magistr=
ate
or Landdrost whose duties are similar to those of a Civil Commissioner. The=
se
districts are again subdivided into wards presided over by field cornets, w=
ho
exercise judicial powers in minor matters, and in times of war have
considerable authority. The Roman Dutch law is the common law of the countr=
y,
as it is of the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, and of the Ora=
nge Free
State.
Prior to the Annexation justice was administer=
ed
in a very primitive fashion. First, there was the Landdrosts' Court, from w=
hich
an appeal lay to a court consisting of the Landdrost and six councillors
elected by the public. This was a court of first instance as well as a cour=
t of
appeal. Then there was a Supreme Court, consisting of three Landdrosts from
three different districts, and a jury of twelve selected from the burghers =
of
the State. There was no appeal from this court, but cases have sometimes be=
en
brought under the consideration of the Volksraad as the supreme power. It is
easy to imagine what the administration of justice was like when the presid=
ents
of all the law courts in the country were elected by the mob, not on accoun=
t of
their knowledge of the law, but because they were popular. Suitors before t=
he
old Transvaal courts found the law surprisingly uncertain. A High Court of
Justice was, however, established after the Annexation, and has been contin=
ued by
the Volksraad, but an agitation is being got up against it, and it will
possibly be abolished in favour of the old system.
In such a community as that of the Transvaal
Boers, the question of public defence was evidently of the first importance.
This is provided for under what is known as the Commando system. The Presid=
ent,
with the concurrence of the Executive Council, has the right of declaring w=
ar, and
of calling up a Commando, in which the burghers are placed under the field
cornets and commandants. These last are chosen by the field cornets for each
district, and a Commandant-general is chosen by the whole laager or force, =
but
the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the army. All the inhabitants of=
the
state between sixteen and sixty, with a few exceptions, are liable for serv=
ice.
Young men under eighteen, and men over fifty, are only called out under
circumstances of emergency. Members of the Volksraad, officials, clergymen,=
and
school-teachers are exempt from personal service, unless martial law is
proclaimed, but must contribute an amount not exceeding 15 pounds towards t=
he
expense of the war. All legal proceedings in civil cases are suspended agai=
nst
persons on commando, no summonses can be made out, and as soon as martial l=
aw
is proclaimed no legal execution can be prosecuted, the pounds are closed, =
and
transfer dues payments are suspended, until after thirty days from the reca=
ll
of the proclamation of martial law. Owners of land residing beyond the bord=
ers
of the Republic are also liable, in addition to the ordinary war tax, to pl=
ace
a fit and proper substitute at the disposal of the Government, or otherwise=
to
pay a fine of 15 pounds. The first levy of the burghers is, of men from
eighteen to thirty-four years of age; the second, thirty-four to fifty; and=
the
third, from sixteen to eighteen, and from fifty to sixty years. Every man is
bound to provide himself with clothing, a gun, and ammunition, and there mu=
st
be enough waggons and oxen found between them to suffice for their joint us=
e.
Of the booty taken, one quarter goes to Government and the rest to the
burghers. The most disagreeable part of the commandeering system is, howeve=
r,
yet to come; personal service is not all that the resident in the Transvaal=
Republic
has to endure. The right is vested in field cornets to commandeer articles =
as
well as individuals, and to call upon inhabitants to furnish requisites for=
the
commando. As may be imagined, it goes very hard on these occasions with the
property of any individual whom the field cornet may not happen to like.
Each ward is expected to turn out its continge=
nt
ready and equipped for war, and this can only be done by seizing goods right
and left. One unfortunate will have to find a waggon, another to deliver his
favourite span of trek oxen, another his riding-horse, or some slaughter ca=
ttle,
and so on. Even when the officer making the levy is desirous of doing his d=
uty
as fairly as he can, it is obvious that very great hardships must be inflic=
ted
under such a system. Requisitions are made more with regard to what is want=
ed,
than with a view to an equitable distribution of demands; and like the Jews=
in
the time of the Crusades, he who has got most must pay most, or take the
consequences, which may be unpleasant. Articles which are not perishable, s=
uch
as waggons, are supposed to be returned, but if they come back at all they =
are
generally worthless.
In case of war, the native tribes living within
the borders of the State are also expected to furnish contingents, and it i=
s on
them that most of the hard work of the campaign generally falls. They are p=
ut
in the front of the battle, and have to do the hand-to-hand fighting, which,
however, if of the Zulu race, they do not object to.
The revenue of the State is so arranged that t=
he
burden of it should fall as much as possible on the trading community and as
little as possible on the farmer. It is chiefly derived from licenses on
trades, professions, and callings, 30s. per annum quit-rent on farms, trans=
fer dues
and stamps, auction dues, court fees, and contributions from such native tr=
ibes
as can be made to pay them. Since we have given up the country, the Volksra=
ad
has put a very heavy tax on all imported goods, hoping thereby to beguile t=
he
Boers into paying taxes without knowing it, and at the same time strike a b=
low
at the trading community, which is English in its proclivities. The result =
has
been to paralyse what little trade there was left in the country, and to ca=
use
great dissatisfaction amongst the farmers, who cannot understand why, now t=
hat the
English are gone, they should have to pay twice as much for their sugar and
coffee as they have been accustomed to do.
I will
conclude this chapter with a few words about the natives, who swarm in and
around the Transvaal. They can be roughly divided into two great races, the
Amazulu and their offshoots, and the Macatee or Basutu tribes. All those of
Zulu blood, including the Swazies, Mapock's Kafirs, the Matabele, the
Knobnodes, and others are very warlike in disposition, and men of fine
physique. The Basutus (who must not be confounded with the Cape Basutus),
however, differ from these tribes in every respect, including their languag=
e,
which is called Sisutu, the only mutual feeling between the two races being
their common detestation of the Boers. They do not love war; in fact, they =
are
timid and cowardly by nature, and only fight when they are obliged to. Unli=
ke
the Zulus, they are much addicted to the arts of peace, show considerable
capacities for civilisation, and are even willing to become Christians. The=
re
would have been a far better field for the Missionary in the Transvaal than=
in Zululand
and Natal. Indeed, the most successful mission station I have seen in Afric=
a is
near Middelburg, under the control of Mr. Merensky. In person the Basutus a=
re
thin and weakly when compared to the stalwart Zulu, and it is their
consciousness of inferiority both to the white men, and their black brethre=
n,
that, together with their natural timidity, makes them submit as easily as =
they
do to the yoke of the Boer.
Mr. Burgers elected president--His character a=
nd
aspirations--His pension from the English Government--His visit to England-=
-The
railway loan--Relations of the republic with native tribes--The pass laws--=
Its quarrel
with Cetywayo--Confiscation of native territory by the Keate award--Treaty =
with
the Swazi king--The Secocoeni war--Capture of Johannes' stronghold by the S=
wazi
allies--Attack on Secocoeni's mountain--Defeat and dispersion of the
Boers--Elation of the natives--Von Schlickmann's volunteers--Cruelties
perpetrated--Abel Erasmus--Treatment of natives by Boers--Public meeting at
Potchefstroom in 1768--The slavery question--Some evidence on the
subject--Pecuniary position of the Transvaal prior to the annexation--Inter=
nal troubles--Divisions
amongst the Boers--Hopeless condition of the country.
In or about the year 1872, the burghers of the
Republic elected Mr. Burgers their President. This remarkable man was a nat=
ive
of the Cape Colony, and passed the first sixteen or seventeen years of his
life, he once informed me, on a farm herding sheep. He afterwards became a
clergyman noted for the eloquence of his preaching, but his ideas proving t=
oo
broad for his congregation, he resigned his cure, and in an evil moment for
himself took to politics.
President Burgers was a man of striking presen=
ce
and striking talents, especially as regards his oratory, which was really o=
f a
very high class, and would have commanded attention in our own House of
Commons. He possessed, however, a mind of that peculiarly volatile order, t=
hat
is sometimes met with in conjunction with great talents, and which seems to=
be
entirely without ballast. His intellect was of a balloon-like nature, and as
incapable of being steered. He was always soaring in the clouds, and, as is
natural to one in that elevated position, taking a very different and more
sanguine view of affairs to that which men of a more lowly, and perhaps a m=
ore
practical, turn of mind would do.
But notwithstanding his fly-away ideas, Presid=
ent
Burgers was undoubtedly a true patriot, labouring night and day for the wel=
fare
of the state of which he had to undertake the guidance: but his patriotism =
was
too exalted for his surroundings. He wished to elevate to the rank of a nat=
ion
a people who had not got the desire to be elevated; with this view he
contracted railway loans, made wars, minted gold, &c., and then suddenly
discovered that the country refused to support him. In short, he was made o=
f a
very different clay to that of the people he had to do with. He dreamt of a
great Dutch Republic "with eight millions of inhabitants," doing a
vast trade with the interior through the Delagoa Bay Railway. They, on the
other hand, cared nothing about republics or railways, but fixed their
affections on forced labour and getting rid of the necessity of paying
taxes--and so between them the Republic came to grief. But it must be borne=
in
mind that President Burgers was throughout actuated by good motives; he did=
his
best by a stubborn and stiff-necked people; and if he failed, as fail he di=
d,
it was more their fault than his. As regards the pension he received from t=
he
English Government, which has so often been brought up against him, it was =
after
all no more than his due after five years of arduous work. If the Republic =
had
continued to exist, it is to be presumed that they would have made some
provision for their old President, more especially as he seems to have
exhausted his private means in paying the debts of the country. Whatever ma=
y be
said of some of the other officials of the Republic, its President was, I
believe, an honest man.
In 1875, Mr. Burgers proceeded to Europe, havi=
ng,
he says in a posthumous document recently published, been empowered by the
Volksraad "to carry out my plans for the development of the country, by
opening up a direct communication for it, free from the trammels of British
ports and influence." According to this document, during his absence, =
two powerful
parties, viz., "the faction of unprincipled fortune-hunters, rascals, =
and
runaways on the one hand, and the faction of the extreme orthodox party in a
certain branch of the Dutch Reform Church on the other, began to co-operate
against the Government of the Republic and me personally. . . . . . Ill as I
was, and contrary to the advice of my medical men, I proceeded to Europe, in
the beginning of 1875, to carry out my project, and no sooner was my back
turned on the Transvaal, than the conspiring elements began to act. The new
coat of arms and flag adopted in the Raad by an almost unanimous vote were
abolished. The laws for a free and secular education were tampered with, an=
d my
resistance to a reckless inspection and disposal of Government lands, still=
occupied
by natives, was openly defied. The Raad, filled up to a large extent with m=
en
of ill repute, who, under the cloak of progress and favour to the Government
view, obtained their seats, was too weak to cope with the skill of the
conspirators, and granted leave to the acting President to carry out measur=
es
diametrically opposed to my policy. Native lands were inspected and given o=
ut
to a few speculators, who held large numbers of claims to lands which were
destined for citizens, and so a war was prepared for me, on my return from
Europe, which I could not avert." This extract is interesting, as show=
ing
the state of feeling existing between the President and his officers previo=
us
to the outbreak of the Secocoeni war. It also shows how entirely he was out=
of sympathy
with the citizens, seeing that as soon as his back was turned, they, with M=
r.
Joubert and Paul Kruger at their head, at once undid all the little good he=
had
done.
When Mr. Burgers got to England, he found that
city capitalists would have nothing whatever to say to his railway scheme. =
In
Holland, however, he succeeded in getting 90,000 pounds of the 300,000 poun=
ds
he wished to borrow at a high rate of interest, and by passing a bond on fi=
ve
hundred government farms. This money was immediately invested in a railway =
plant,
which, when it arrived at Delagoa Bay, had to be mortgaged to pay the freig=
ht
on it, and that was the end of the Delagoa Bay railway scheme, except that =
the
90,000 pounds is, I believe, still owing to the confiding shareholders in
Holland.
On his return to the Transvaal the President w=
as
well received, and for a month or so all went smoothly. But the relations of
the Republic with the surrounding native tribes had by this time become so =
bad
that an explosion was imminent somewhere. In the year 1874 the Volksraad ra=
ised
the price of passes under the iniquitous pass law, by which every native tr=
avelling
through the territory was made to pay from 1 pound to five pounds. In case =
of
non-payment the native was made subject to a fine of from 1 pound to 10 pou=
nds,
and to a beating of from "ten to twenty-five lashes." He was also=
to
go into service for three months, and have a certificate thereof, for which=
he
must pay five shillings; the avowed object of the law being to obtain a sup=
ply
of Kafir labour. This was done in spite of the earnest protest of the
President, who gave the Raad distinctly to understand that by accepting this
law they would, in point of fact, annul treaties concluded with the chiefs =
on
the south-western borders. It was not clear, however, if this amended pass =
law
ever came into force. It is to be hoped it did not, for even under the old =
law natives
were shamefully treated by the Boers, who would pretend that they were
authorised by the Government to collect the tax; the result being that the
unfortunate Kafir was frequently obliged to pay twice over. Natives had suc=
h a
horror of the pass laws of the country, that when travelling to the Diamond
Fields to work they would frequently go round some hundreds of miles rather
than pass through the Transvaal.
That the Volksraad should have thought it
necessary to enact such a law in order that the farmers should obtain a sup=
ply
of Kafir labour in a territory that had nearly a million of native inhabita=
nts,
who, unlike the Zulus, are willing to work if only they meet with decent
treatment, is in itself an instructive commentary on the feelings existing
between the Boer master and Kafir servant.
But besides the general quarrel with the Kafir
race in its entirety, which the Boers always have on hand, they had just th=
en
several individual differences, in each of which there lurked the possibili=
ties
of disturbance.
To begin with, their relations with Cetywayo w=
ere
by no means amicable. During Mr. Burgers' absence the Boer Government, then
under the leadership of P. J. Joubert, sent Cetywayo a very stern message--=
a message
that gives the reader the idea that Mr. Joubert was ready to enforce it with
ten thousand men. After making various statements and demands with referenc=
e to
the Amaswazi tribe, the disputed boundary line, &c., it ends thus:--
"Although the Government of the South Afr=
ican
Republic has never wished, and does not now desire, that serious disaffecti=
on
and animosities should exist between you and them, yet it is not the less of
the greatest consequence and importance for you earnestly to weigh these ma=
tters
and risks, and to satisfy them; the more so, if you on your side also wish =
that
peace and friendship shall be maintained between you and us."
The Secretary for Native Affairs for Natal
comments on this message in these words: "The tone of this message to
Cetywayo is not very friendly, it has the look of an ultimatum, and if the
Government of the Transvaal were in circumstances different to what it is, =
the
message would suggest an intention to coerce if the demands it conveys are =
not
at once complied with; but I am inclined to the opinion that no such intent=
ion exists,
and that the transmission of a copy of the message to the Natal Government =
is
intended as a notification that the Transvaal Government has proclaimed the
territory hitherto in dispute between it and the Zulus to be Republican
territory, and that the Republic intends to occupy it."
In the territories marked out by a decision kn=
own
as the Keate Award, in which Lieutenant-Governor Keate of Natal, at the req=
uest
of both parties, laid down the boundary line between the Boers and certain =
native
tribes, the Boer Government carried it with a yet higher hand, insomuch as =
the
natives of those districts, being comparatively unwarlike, were less likely=
to
resist.
On the 18th August 1875, Acting President Joub=
ert
issued a proclamation by which a line was laid down far to the southward of
that marked out by Mr. Keate, and consequently included more territory with=
in
the elastic boundaries of the Republic. A Government notice of the same date
invites all claiming lands now declared to belong to the Republic, to send =
in their
claims to be settled by a land commission.
On the 6th March 1876, another chief in the sa=
me
neighbourhood (Montsoia) writes to the Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand We=
st
in these terms:--
"My Friend,--I wish to acquaint you with =
the
doings of some people connected with the Boers. A man-servant of mine has b=
een
severely injured in the head by one of the Boers' servants, which has prove=
d fatal.
Another of my people has been cruelly treated by a Boer tying a rein about =
his
neck, and then mounting his horse and dragging him about the place. My brot=
her
Molema, who is the bearer of this, will give you full particulars."
Molema explains the assaults thus: "The
assaulted man is not dead; his skull was fractured. The assault was committ=
ed
by a Boer named Wessels Badenhorst, who shamefully ill-treated the man, beat
him till he fainted, and, on his revival, fastened a rim around his neck, a=
nd made
him run to the homestead by the side of his (Badenhorst's) horse cantering.=
At
the homestead he tied him to the waggon-wheel, and flogged him again till M=
rs.
Badenhorst stopped her husband."
Though it will be seen that the Boers were on =
good
terms neither with the Zulus nor the Keate Award natives, they still had one
Kafir ally, namely, Umbandeni, the Amaswazi king. This alliance was conclud=
ed under
circumstances so peculiar that they are worthy of a brief recapitulation. It
appears that in the winter of the year 1875 Mr. Rudolph, the Landdrost of
Utrecht, went to Swazieland, and, imitating the example of the Natal Govern=
ment
with Cetywayo, crowned Umbandeni king, on behalf of the Boer Government. He
further made a treaty of alliance with him, and promised him a commando to =
help
him in case of his being attacked by the Zulus. Now comes the curious part =
of
the story. On the 18th May 1876, a message came from this same Umbandeni to=
Sir
H. Bulwer, of which the following is an extract:--"We are sent by our =
king
to thank the Government of Natal for the information sent to him last winte=
r by
that Government, and conveyed by Mr. Rudolph, of the intended attack on his
people by the Zulus. We are further instructed by the king to thank the Nat=
al
Government for the influence it used to stop the intended raid, and for
instructing a Boer commando to go to his country to render him assistance in
case of need; and further for appointing Mr. Randolph at the head of the
commando to place him (Umbandeni) as king over the Amaswazi, and to make a
treaty with him and his people on behalf of the Natal Government. . . . . .=
The
Transvaal Government has asked Umbandeni to acknowledge himself a subject of
the Republic, but he has distinctly refused to do so." In a minute wri=
tten
on this subject, the Secretary for Native Affairs for Natal says, "No =
explanation
or assurance was sufficient to convince them (Umbandeni's messengers) that =
they
had on that occasion made themselves subjects of the South African Republic;
they declared it was not their wish or intention to do so, and that they wo=
uld
refuse to acknowledge a position into which they had been unwittingly
betrayed." I must conclude this episode by quoting the last paragraph =
of
Sir H. Bulwer's covering despatch, because it concerns larger issues than t=
he
supposed treaty: "It will not be necessary that I should at present add
any remarks to those contained in the minute for the Secretary for Native
Affairs, but I would observe that the situation arising out of the relation=
s of
the Government of the South African Republic with the neighbouring states i=
s so
complicated, and presents so many elements of confusion and of danger to the
peace of this portion of South Africa, that I trust some way may be found t=
o an
early settlement of questions that ought not, in my opinion, to be left alo=
ne,
as so many have been left, to take the chance of the future."
And now I come to the last and most imminent
native difficulty that at the time faced the Republic. On the borders of
Lydenburg district there lived a powerful chief named Secocoeni. Between th=
is
chief and the Transvaal Government difficulties arose in the beginning of 1=
876
on the usual subject--land. The Boers declared that they had bought the lan=
d from
the Swazies, who had conquered portions of the country, and that the Swazies
offered to make it "clean from brambles," i.e., kill everybody li=
ving
on it; but that they (the Boers) said that they were to let them be, that t=
hey
might be their servants. The Basutus, on the other hand, said that no such =
sale
ever took place, and, even if it did take place, it was invalid, because the
Swazies were not in occupation of the land, and therefore could not sell it=
. It
was a Christian Kafir called Johannes, a brother of Secocoeni, who was the
immediate cause of the war. This Johannes used to live at a place called
Botsobelo, the mission-station of Mr. Merensky, but moved to a stronghold on
the Spekboom river, in the disputed territory. The Boers sent to him to com=
e back,
but he refused, and warned the Boers off his land. Secocoeni was then appea=
led
to, but declared that the land belonged to his tribe, and would be occupied=
by
Johannes. He also told the Boers "that he did not wish to fight, but t=
hat
he was quite ready to do so if they preferred it." Thereupon the Trans=
vaal
Government declared war, although it does not appear that the natives commi=
tted
any outrage or acts of hostility before the declaration. As regards the Boe=
rs'
right to Secocoeni's country, Sir H. Barkly sums up the question thus, in a
despatch addressed to President Burgers, dated 28th Nov. 1876:--"On the
whole, it seems perfectly clear, and I feel bound to repeat it, that Sikuku=
ni was
neither de jure or de facto a subject of the Republic when your Honour decl=
ared
war against him in June last." As soon as war had been declared, the
clumsy commando system was set working, and about 2500 white men collected;=
the
Swazies also were applied to to send a contingent, which they did, being on=
ly
too glad of the opportunity of slaughter.
At first all went well, and the President, who
accompanied the commando in person, succeeded in reducing a mountain
stronghold, which, in his high-flown way, he called a "glorious
victory" over a "Kafir Gibraltar."
On the 14th July another engagement took place,
when the Boers and Swazies attacked Johannes' stronghold. The place was tak=
en
with circumstances of great barbarity by the Swazies, for when the signal w=
as
given to advance the Boers did not move. Nearly all the women were killed, =
and
the brains of the children were dashed out against the stones; in one insta=
nce,
before the captive mother's face. Johannes was badly wounded, and died two =
days
afterwards. When he was dying he said to his brother, "I am going to d=
ie.
I am thankful I do not die by the hands of these cowardly Boers, but by the
hand of a black and courageous nation like myself . . ." He then took
leave of his people, told his brother to read the Bible, and expired. The
Swazies were so infuriated at the cowardice displayed by the Boers on this
occasion that they returned home in great dudgeon.
On the 2nd of August Secocoeni's mountain, whi=
ch
is a very strong fortification, was attacked in two columns, or rather an
attempt was made to attack it, for when it came to the pinch only about for=
ty
men, mostly English and Germans, would advance. Thereupon the whole command=
o retreated
with great haste, the greater part of it going straight home. In vain the
President entreated them to shoot him rather than desert him; they had had
enough of Secocoeni and his stronghold, and home they went. The President t=
hen
retreated with what few men he had left to Steelport, where he built a fort,
and from thence returned to Pretoria. The news of the collapse of the comma=
ndo
was received throughout the Transvaal, and indeed the whole of South Africa,
with the greatest dismay. For the first time in the history of that country=
the
white man had been completely worsted by a native tribe, and that tribe
wretched Basutus, people whom the Zulus call their "dogs." It was
glad tidings to every native from the Zambesi to the Cape, who learnt there=
by
that the white man was not so invincible as he used to be. Meanwhile the in=
habitants
of Lydenburg were filled with alarm, and again and again petitioned the
Governors of the Cape and Natal for assistance. Their fears were, however, =
to a
great extent groundless, for, with the exception of occasional cattle-lifti=
ng,
Secocoeni did not follow up his victory.
On the 4th September the President opened the
special sitting of the Volksraad, and presented to that body a scheme for t=
he
establishment of a border force to take the place of the commando system,
announcing that he had appointed a certain Captain Von Schlickmann to comma=
nd
it. He also requested the Raad to make some provision for the expenses of t=
he expedition,
which they had omitted to do in their former sitting.
Captain Von Schlickmann determined to carry on=
the
war upon a different system. He got together a band of very rough character=
s on
the Diamond Fields, and occupied the fort built by the President, from when=
ce
he would sally out from time to time and destroy kraals. He seems, if we may
believe the reports in the blue books and the stories of eye-witnesses, to =
have
carried on his proceedings in a somewhat savage way. The following is an
extract from a private letter written by one of his volunteers:--
"About daylight we came across four Kafir=
s.
Saw them first, and charged in front of them to cut off their retreat. Saw =
they
were women, and called out not to fire. In spite of that, one of the poor
things got her head blown off (a d----d shame). . . . Afterwards two women =
and
a baby were brought to the camp prisoners. The same night they were taken o=
ut by
our Kafirs and murdered in cold blood by the order of ----. Mr. ---- and my=
self
strongly protested against it, but without avail. I never heard such a cowa=
rdly
piece of business in my life. No good will come of it, you may depend. . . .
---- says he would cut all the women and children's throats he catches. Told
him distinctly he was a d----d coward."
Schlickmann was, however, a mild-mannered man =
when
compared to a certain Abel Erasmus, afterwards denounced at a public dinner=
by
Sir Garnet Wolseley as a "fiend in human form." This gentleman, in
the month of October, attacked a friendly kraal of Kafirs. The incident is
described thus in a correspondent's letter:--
"The people of the kraals, taken quite by
surprise, fled when they saw their foes, and most of them took shelter in t=
he
neighbouring bush. Two or three men were distinctly seen in their flight fr=
om
the kraal, and one of them is known to have been wounded. According to my
informant the remainder were women and children, who were pursued into the
bush, and there, all shivering and shrieking, were put to death by the Boer=
s' Kafirs,
some being shot, but the majority stabbed with assegais. After the massacre=
he
counted thirteen women and three children, but he says he did not see the b=
ody
of a single man. Another Kafir said, pointing to a place in the road where =
the
stones were thickly strewn, 'the bodies of the women and children lay like
these stones.' The Boer before mentioned, who has been stationed outside, h=
as
told one of his own friends, whom he thought would not mention it, that the
shrieks were fearful to hear."
Several accounts of, or allusion to, this atro=
city
can be found in the blue books, and I may add that it, in common with other=
s of
the same stamp, was the talk of the country at the time.
I do not relate these horrors out of any wish =
to
rake up old stories to the prejudice of the Boers, but because I am describ=
ing
the state of the country before the Annexation, in which they form an
interesting and important item. Also, it is as well that people in England
should know into what hands they have delivered over the native tribes who
trusted in their protection. What happened in 1876 is probably happening ag=
ain now,
and will certainly happen again and again. The character of the Transvaal B=
oer
and his sentiments towards the native races have not modified during the la=
st
five years, but, on the contrary, a large amount of energy, which has been
accumulating during the period of British protection, will now be expended =
on
their devoted heads.
As regards the truth of these atrocities, the
majority of them are beyond the possibility of doubt; indeed, to the best o=
f my
knowledge, no serious attempt has ever been made to refute such of them as =
have
come into public notice, except in a general way, for party purposes. As, h=
owever,
they may be doubted, I will quote the following extract from a despatch wri=
tten
by Sir H. Barkly to Lord Carnarvon, dated 18th December 1876:--
"As Von Schlickmann has since fallen figh=
ting
bravely, it is not without reluctance that I join in affixing this dark sta=
in
on his memory, but truth compels me to add the following extract from a let=
ter
which I have since received from one whose name (which I communicate to your
Lordship privately) forbids disbelief: 'There is no longer the slightest do=
ubt as
to the murder of the two women and the child at Steelport by the direct ord=
er
of Schlickmann, and in the attack on the kraal near which these women were
captured (or some attack about that period) he ordered his men to cut the
throats of all the wounded! This is no mere report; it is positively
true.'" He concludes by expressing a hope that the course of events wi=
ll
enable Her Majesty's Government to take such steps "as will terminate =
this
wanton and useless bloodshed, and prevent the recurrence of the scenes of
injustice, cruelty, and rapine which abundant evidence is every day forthco=
ming
to prove have rarely ceased to disgrace the Republics beyond the Vaal ever
since they first sprang into existence."[*]
[=
*] The
italics are my own.--Author.
These are strong words, but none too strong for
the facts of the case. Injustice, cruelty, and rapine have always been the
watchwords of the Transvaal Boers. The stories of wholesale slaughter in the
earlier days of the Republic are very numerous. One of the best known of th=
ose shocking
occurrences took place in the Zoutpansberg war in 1865. On this occasion a
large number of Kafirs took refuge in caves, where the Boers smoked them to
death. Some years afterwards Dr. Wangeman, whose account is, I believe,
thoroughly reliable, describes the scene of their operations in these words=
:--
"The roof of the first cave was black with
smoke; the remains of the logs which were burnt lay at the entrance. The fl=
oor
was strewn with hundreds of skulls and skeletons. In confused heaps lay
karosses, kerries, assegais, pots, spoons, snuff-boxes, and the bones of me=
n, giving
one the impression that this was the grave of a whole people. Some estimate=
the
number of those who perished here from twenty to thirty thousand. This is, I
believe, too high. In the one chamber there were from two hundred to three
hundred skeletons; the other chambers I did not visit."
In 1868 a public meeting was held at Potchefst=
room
to consider the war then going on with the Zoutpansberg natives. According =
to
the report of the proceedings, the Rev. Mr. Ludorf said that "on a
particular occasion a number of native children, who were too young to be
removed, had been collected in a heap, covered with long grass, and burned
alive. Other atrocities had also been committed, but these were too horribl=
e to
relate." When called upon to produce his authority for this statement,=
Mr.
Ludorf named his authority "in a solemn declaration to the State Attor=
ney."
At this same meeting Mr. J. G. Steyn, who had been Landdrost of Potchefstro=
om,
said "there now was innocent blood on our hands which had not yet been
avenged, and the curse of God rested on the land in consequence." Mr.
Rosalt remarked that "it was a singular circumstance that in the diffe=
rent
colonial Kafir wars, as also in the Basutu wars, one did not hear of destit=
ute
children being found by the commandoes, and asked how it was that every pet=
ty
commando that took the field in this Republic invariably found numbers of
destitute children. He gave it as his opinion that the present system of
apprenticeship was an essential cause of our frequent hostilities with the
natives." Mr. Jan Talyard said, "Children were forcibly taken from
their parents, and were then called destitute and apprenticed." Mr. Da=
niel
Van Nooren was heard to say, "If they had to clear the country, and co=
uld
not have the children they found, he would shoot them." Mr. Field-Corn=
et
Furstenburg stated "that when he was at Zoutpansberg with his burghers,
the chief Katse-Kats was told to come down from the mountains; that he sent=
one
of his subordinates as a proof of amity; that whilst a delay of five days w=
as
guaranteed by Commandant Paul Kruger, who was then in command, orders were
given at the same time to attack the natives at break of day, which was
accordingly done, but which resulted in total failure." Truly, this mu=
st
have been an interesting meeting.
Before leaving these unsavoury subjects, I must
touch on the question of slavery. It has been again and again denied, on be=
half
of the Transvaal Boers, that slavery existed in the Republic. Now, this is,
strictly speaking, true; slavery did not exist, but apprenticeship did--the
rose was called by another name, that is all. The poor destitute children w=
ho were
picked up by kindhearted Boers, after the extermination of their parents, w=
ere
apprenticed to farmers till they came of age. It is a remarkable fact that
these children never attained their majority. You might meet oldish men in =
the
Transvaal who were not, according to their masters' reckoning, twenty-one y=
ears
of age. The assertion that slavery did not exist in the Transvaal is only m=
ade
to hoodwink the English public. I have known men who have owned slaves, and=
who
have seen whole waggon-loads of "black ivory," as they were calle=
d,
sold for about 15 pounds a-piece. I have at this moment a tenant, Carolus by
name, on some land I own in Natal, now a well-to-do man, who was for many y=
ears--about
twenty, if I remember right--a Boer slave. During those years, he told me, =
he
worked from morning till night, and the only reward he received was two cal=
ves.
He finally escaped into Natal.
If other evidence is needed it is not difficul=
t to
find, so I will quote a little. On the 22d August 1876 we find Khama, king =
of
the Bamangwato, one of the most worthy chiefs in South Africa, sending a
message to "Victoria, the great Queen of the English people," in
these words:--
"I write to you, Sir Henry, in order that
your Queen may preserve for me my country, it being in her hands. The Boers=
are
coming into it, and I do not like them. Their actions are cruel among us bl=
ack
people. We are like money, they sell us and our children. I ask Her Majesty=
to
pity me, and to hear that which I write quickly. I wish to hear upon what c=
onditions
Her Majesty will receive me, and my country and my people, under her
protection. I am weary with fighting. I do not like war, and I ask Her Maje=
sty
to give me peace. I am very much distressed that my people are being destro=
yed
by war, and I wish them to obtain peace. I ask Her Majesty to defend me, as=
she
defends all her people. There are three things which distress me very
much--war, selling people, and drink. All these things I shall find in the
Boers, and it is these things which destroy people to make an end of them in
the country. The custom of the Boers has always been to cause people to be
sold, and to-day they are still selling people. Last year I saw them pass w=
ith two
waggons full of people whom they had bought at the river at Tanane" (L=
ake
Ngate).
The Special Correspondence of the "Cape
Argus," a highly respectable journal, writes thus on the 28th November
1876:--"The Boer from whom this information was gleaned has furnished
besides some facts which may not be uninteresting, as a commentary on the
repeated denials by Mr. Burgers of the existence of slavery. During the last
week slaves have been offered for sale on his farm. The captives have been
taken from Secocoeni's country by Mapoch's people, and are being exchanged =
at
the rate of a child for a heifer. He also assures us that the whole of the =
Highveld
is bring replenished with Kafir children, whom the Boers have been lately
purchasing from the Swazies at the rate of a horse for a child. I should li=
ke
to see this man and his father as witnesses before an Imperial Commission. =
He
let fall one or two incidents of the past which were brought to mind by the
occurrences of the present. In 1864, he says, 'The Swazies accompanied the
Boers against Males. The Boers did nothing but stand by and witness the fea=
rful
massacre. The men and women were also murdered. One poor woman sat clutching
her baby of eight days old. The Swazies stabbed her through the body, and w=
hen
she found that she could not live, she wrung the baby's neck with her own h=
ands
to save it from future misery. On the return of that Commando the children =
who became
too weary to continue the journey were killed on the road. The survivors we=
re
sold as slaves to the farmers.'"
The same gentleman writes in the issue of the =
12th
December as follows:--"The whole world may know it, for it is true, an=
d investigation
will only bring out the horrible details, that through the whole course of =
this
Republic's existence it has acted in contravention of the Sand River Treaty;
and slavery has occurred not only here and there in isolated cases, but as =
an
unbroken practice, and has been one of the peculiar institutions of the
country, mixed up with all its social and political life. It has been at the
root of most of its wars. It has been carried on regularly even in times of
peace. It has been characterised by all those circumstances which have so o=
ften
roused the British nation to an indignant protest, and to repeated efforts =
to banish
the slave trade from the world. The Boers have not only fallen on unsuspect=
ing
kraals simply for the purpose of obtaining the women and children and cattl=
e,
but they have carried on a traffic through natives who have kidnapped the
children of their weaker neighbours, and sold them to the white man. Again,=
the
Boers have sold and exchanged their victims among themselves. Waggon-loads =
of
slaves have been conveyed from one end of the country to the other for sale,
and that with the cognisance of, and for the direct advantage of, the highe=
st
officials of the land. The writer has himself seen in a town, situated in t=
he
south of the Republic, the children who had been brought down from a remote=
northern
district. One fine morning, in walking through the streets, he was struck w=
ith
the number of little black strangers standing about certain houses, and
wondered where they could have come from. He learnt a few hours later that =
they
were part of loads which were disposed of on the outskirts of the town the =
day
before. The circumstances connected with some of these kidnapping excursions
are appalling, and the barbarities practised by cruel masters upon some of
these defenceless creatures during the course of their servitude are scarce=
ly
less horrible than those reported from Turkey. It is no disgrace in this co=
untry
for an official to ride a fine horse which was got for two Kafir children, =
to
procure whom the father and mother were shot. No reproach is inherited by t=
he
mistress who, day after day, tied up her female servant in an agonising
posture, and had her beaten until there was no sound part in her body, secu=
ring
her in the stocks during the intervals of torture. That man did not lose ca=
ste
who tied up another woman and had her thrashed until she brought forth at t=
he
whipping-post. These are merely examples of thousands of cases which could =
be
proved were an Imperial Commission to sit, and could the wretched victims o=
f a prolonged
oppression recover sufficiently from the dread of their old tyrants to give=
a
truthful report."
To come to some evidence more recently adduced=
. On
the 9th May 1881, an affidavit was sworn to by the Rev. John Thorne, curate=
of
St. John the Evangelist, Lydenburg, Transvaal, and presented to the Royal
Commission appointed to settle Transvaal affairs, in which he
states:--"That I was appointed to the charge of a congregation in
Potchefstroom, about thirteen years ago, when the Republic was under the
presidency of Mr. Pretorius.[*] I remember noticing one morning, as I walked
through the streets, a number of young natives, whom I knew to be strangers=
. I
inquired where they came from. I was told that they had just been brought f=
rom
Zoutpansberg. This was the locality from which slaves were chiefly brought =
at
that time, and were traded for under the name of 'Black Ivory.' One of these
natives belonged to Mr. Munich, the State Attorney. It was a matter of comm=
on
remark at that time, that the President of the Republic was himself one of =
the
greatest dealers in slaves." In the fourth paragraph of the same affid=
avit
Mr. Thorne says, "That the Rev. Doctor Nachtigal, of the Berlin Missio=
nary
Society, was the interpreter for Shatane's people in the private office of =
Mr.
Roth, and, at the close of the interview, told me what had occurred. On my =
expressing
surprise, he went on to relate that he had information on native matters wh=
ich
would surprise me more. He then produced the copy of a register, kept in the
landdrost's office, of men, women, and children, to the number of four hund=
red
and eighty (480), who had been disposed of by one Boer to another for a
consideration. In one case an ox was given in exchange, in another goats, i=
n a
third a blanket, and so forth. Many of these natives he (Mr. Nachtigal) knew
personally. The copy was certified as true and correct by an official of the
Republic, and I would mention his name now, only that I am persuaded that it
would cost the man his life if his act became known to the Boers."
[=
*] One
of the famous Triumvirate.
On the 16th May 1881, a native, named Frederick
Molepo, was examined by the Royal Commission. The following are extracts fr=
om
his examination:--
"(Sir E. Wood.) Are you a Christian?--Yes=
.
"(Sir H. de Villiers.) How long were you a
slave?--Half a year.
"How do you know that you were a slave? M=
ight
you not have been an apprentice?--No, I was not apprenticed.
"How do you know?--They got me from my
parents, and ill-treated me.
"(Sir E. Wood.) How many times did you get
the stick?--Every day.
"(Sir H. de Villiers.) What did the Boers=
do
with you when they caught you?--They sold me.
"How much did they sell you for?--One cow=
and
a big pot."
On the 28th May 1881, amongst the other docume=
nts
handed in for the consideration of the Royal Commission, is the statement o=
f a
headman, whose name it has been considered advisable to omit in the blue bo=
ok
for fear the Boers should take vengeance on him. He says, "I say, that=
if the
English Government dies I shall die too; I would rather die than be under t=
he
Boer Government. I am the man who helped to make bricks for the church you =
see
now standing in the square here (Pretoria), as a slave without payment. As a
representative of my people I am still obedient to the English Government, =
and
willing to obey all commands from them, even to die for their cause in this
country, rather than submit to the Boers.
"I was under Shambok, my chief, who fought
the Boers formerly, but he left us, and we were put up to auction and sold
among the Boers. I want to state this myself to the Royal Commission in
Newcastle. I was bought by Fritz Botha and sold by Frederick Botha, who was
then veld cornet (justice of the peace) of the Boers."[*]
[=
*] I
have taken the liberty to quote all these extracts exactly as they stand in the origina=
l,
instead of weaving their subst=
ance
into my narrative, in order that I may not be accused, as so often happens to a=
uthors
who write upon this subject, of
having presented a garbled version of the truth. The original of every extract=
is to
be found in blue books present=
ed to
Parliament. I have thought it best to confine myself to these, and avoid
repeating stories of cruelties=
and
slavery, however well authenticated, that have come to my knowledge privately, such
stories being always more or l=
ess open
to suspicion.
It would be easy to find more reports of the
slave-trading practices of the Boers, but as the above are fair samples it =
will
not be necessary to do so. My readers will be able from them to form some
opinion as to whether or not slavery or apprenticeship existed in the
Transvaal. If they come to the conclusion that it did, it must be borne in =
mind
that what existed in the past will certainly exist again in the future. Nat=
ives
are not now any fonder of working for Boers than they were a few years back,
and Boers must get labour somehow. If, on the other hand, it did not exist,
then the Boers are a grossly slandered people, and all writers on the subje=
ct,
from Livingstone down, have combined to take away their character.
Leaving native questions for the present, we m=
ust
now return to the general affairs of the country. When President Burgers op=
ened
the special sitting of the Volksraad, on the 4th September, he appealed, it
will be remembered, to that body for pecuniary aid to liquidate the expense=
s of
the war. This appeal was responded to by the passing of a war tax, under wh=
ich
every owner of a farm was to pay 10 pounds, the owner of half a farm 5 poun=
ds,
and so on. The tax was not a very just one, since it fell with equal weight=
on
the rich man, who held twenty farms, and the poor man, who held but one. Its
justice or injustice was, however, to a great extent immaterial, since the =
free
and independent burghers, including some of the members of the Volksraad who
had imposed it, promptly refused to pay it, or indeed, whilst they were abo=
ut
it, any other tax. As the Treasury was already empty, and creditors were pr=
essing,
this refusal was most ill-timed, and things began to look very black indeed.
Meanwhile, in addition to the ordinary expenditure, and the interest payabl=
e on
debts, money had to be found to pay Von Schlickmann's volunteers. As there =
was
no cash in the country, this was done by issuing Government promissory note=
s,
known as "goodfors," or vulgarly as "good for nothings,"
and by promising them all booty, and to each man a farm of two thousand acr=
es,
lying east and north-east of the Loolu mountains; in other words, in
Secocoeni's territory, which did not belong to the Government to give away.=
The
officials were the next to suffer, and for six months before the Annexation
these unfortunate individuals lived as best they could, for they certainly =
got
no salary, except in the case of a postmaster, who was told to help himself=
to
his pay in stamps. The Government issued large numbers of bills, but the ba=
nks
refused to discount them, and in some cases the neighbouring Colonies had to
advance money to the Transvaal post-cart contractors, who were carrying the
mails, as a matter of charity. The Government even mortgaged the great salt=
-pan
near Pretoria for the paltry sum of 400 pounds, whilst the leading official=
s of
the Government were driven to pledging their own private credit in order to
obtain the smallest article necessary to its continuance. In fact, to such a
pass did things come that when the country was annexed a single threepenny =
bit
(which had doubtless been overlooked) was found in the Treasury chest, toge=
ther
with acknowledgments of debts to the extent of nearly 300,000 pounds.
Nor was the refusal to pay taxes, which they w=
ere
powerless to enforce, the only difficulty with which the Government had to
contend. Want of money is as bad and painful a thing to a State as to an
individual, but there are perhaps worse things than want of money, one of w=
hich
is to be deserted by your own friends and household. This was the position =
of
the Government of the Republic; no sooner was it involved in overwhelming d=
ifficulties
than its own subjects commenced to bait it, more especially the English por=
tion
of its subjects. They complained to the English authorities about the
commandeering of members of their family or goods; they petitioned the Brit=
ish
Government to interfere, and generally made themselves as unpleasant as
possible to the local Authorities. Such a course of action was perhaps natu=
ral,
but it can hardly be said to be either quite logical or just. The Transvaal
Government had never asked them to come and live in the country, and if they
did so, it must be remembered that many of the agitators had accumulated
property, to leave which would mean ruin; and they saw that, unless somethi=
ng
was done, its value would be destroyed.
Under the pressure of all these troubles the B=
oers
themselves split up into factions, as they are always ready to do. The Dopp=
er
party declared that they had had enough progress, and proposed the extremel=
y conservative
Paul Kruger as President, Burgers' time having nearly expired. Paul Kruger
accepted the candidature, although he had previously promised his support to
Burgers, and distrust of each other was added to the other difficulties of =
the
Executive, the Transvaal becoming a house very much divided against itself.
Natives, Doppers, Progressionists, Officials, English, were all pulling
different ways, and each striving for his own advantage. Anything more hope=
less
than the position of the country on the 1st January 1877 it is impossible t=
o conceive.
Enemies surrounded it; on every border there was the prospect of a serious =
war.
In the exchequer there was nothing but piles of overdue bills. The President
was helpless, and mistrustful of his officers, and the officers were caball=
ing
against the President. All the ordinary functions of Government had ceased,=
and
trade was paralysed. Now and then wild proposals were made to relieve the S=
tate
of its burdens, some of which partook of the nature of repudiation, but the=
se were
the exception; the majority of the inhabitants, who would neither fight nor=
pay
taxes, sat still and awaited the catastrophe, utterly careless of all
consequences.
Anxiety of Lord Carnarvon--Despatch of Sir T.
Shepstone as Special Commissioner to the Transvaal--Sir T. Shepstone, his g=
reat
experience and ability--His progress to Pretoria and reception there--Feeli=
ngs excited
by the arrival of the mission--The annexation not a foregone conclusion--Ch=
arge
brought against Sir T. Shepstone of having called up the Zulu army to sweep=
the
Transvaal--Its complete falsehood--Cetywayo's message to Sir T.
Shepstone--Evidence on the matter summed up--General desire of the natives =
for
English rule--Habitual disregard of their interests--Assembly of the
Volksraad--Rejection of Lord Carnarvon's Confederation Bill and of President
Burgers' new constitution-- President Burgers' speeches to the Raad--His
posthumous statement --Communication to the Raad of Sir T. Shepstone's
intention to annex the country--Despatch of Commission to inquire into the
alleged peace with Secocoeni--Its fraudulent character discovered--Progress=
of
affairs in the Transvaal--Paul Kruger and his party--Restlessness of native=
s--Arrangements
for the annexation--The annexation proclamation.
The state of affairs described in the previous
chapter was one that filled the Secretary of State for the Colonies with al=
arm.
During his tenure of office, Lord Carnarvon evidently had the permanent wel=
fare
of South Africa much at heart, and he saw with apprehension that the troubl=
es
that were brewing in the Transvaal were of a nature likely to involve the C=
ape
and Natal in a native war. Though there is a broad line of demarcation betw=
een
Dutch and English, it is not so broad but that a victorious nation like the
Zulus might cross it, and beginning by fighting the Boer, might end by figh=
ting
the white man irrespective of race. When the reader reflects how terrible w=
ould
be the consequences of a combination of native tribes against the Whites, a=
nd
how easily such a combination might at that time have been brought about in=
the
first flush of native successes, he will understand the anxiety with which =
all thinking
men watched the course of events in the Transvaal in 1876.
At last they took such a serious turn that the
Home Government saw that some action must be taken if the catastrophe was t=
o be
averted, and determined to despatch Sir Theophilus Shepstone as Special
Commissioner to the Transvaal, with powers, should it be necessary, to annex
the country to Her Majesty's dominions, "in order to secure the peace =
and safety
of Our said colonies and of Our subjects elsewhere."
The terms of his Commission were unusually lar=
ge,
leaving a great deal to his discretionary power. In choosing that officer f=
or
the execution of a most difficult and delicate mission, the Government,
doubtless, made a very wise selection. Sir Theophilus Shepstone is a man of=
remarkable
tact and ability, combined with great openness and simplicity of mind, and =
one
whose name will always have a leading place in South African history. Durin=
g a
long official lifetime he has had to do with most of the native races in So=
uth
Africa, and certainly knows them and their ways better than any living man;
whilst he is by them all regarded with a peculiar and affectionate reverenc=
e.
He is par excellence their great white chief and "father," and a =
word
from him, even now that he has retired from active life, still carries more
weight than the formal remonstrances of any governor in South Africa.
With the Boers he is almost equally well
acquainted, having known many of them personally for years. He possesses,
moreover, the rare power of winning the regard and affection, as well as the
respect, of those about him in such a marked degree that those who have ser=
ved
him once would go far to serve him again. Sir T. Shepstone, however, has
enemies like other people, and is commonly reported among them to be a disc=
iple
of Machiavelli, and to have his mind steeped in all the darker wiles of Kaf=
ir
policy. The Annexation of the Transvaal is by them attributed to a successf=
ul
and vigorous use of those arts that distinguished the diplomacy of two
centuries ago. Falsehood and bribery are supposed to have been the great le=
vers
used to effect the change, together with threats of extinction at the hands=
of
a savage and unfriendly nation.
That the Annexation was a triumph of mind over
matter is quite true, but whether or not that triumph was unworthily obtain=
ed,
I will leave those who read this short chronicle of the events connected wi=
th
it to judge. I saw it somewhat darkly remarked in a newspaper the other day
that the history of the Annexation had evidently yet to be written; and I f=
ear that
the remark represents the feeling of most people about the event; implying =
as
it did, that it was carried out, by means certainly mysterious, and presuma=
bly
doubtful. I am afraid that those who think thus will be disappointed in wha=
t I
have to say about the matter, since I know that the means employed to bring=
the
Boers--
"Fracti bello, fatisque repulsi"--
under her Majesty's authority were throughout =
as
fair and honest as the Annexation itself was, in my opinion, right and
necessary.
To return to Sir T. Shepstone. He undoubtedly =
had
faults as a ruler, one of the most prominent of which was that his natural
mildness of character would never allow him to act with severity even when
severity was necessary. The very criminals condemned to death ran a good ch=
ance
of reprieve when he had to sign their death-warrants. He had also that wors=
t of
faults (so called), in one fitted by nature to become great--want of ambiti=
on,
a failing that in such a man marks him the possessor of an even and a
philosophic mind. It was no seeking of his own that raised him out of
obscurity, and when his work was done to comparative obscurity he elected to
return, though whether a man of his ability and experience in South African
affairs should, at the present crisis, be allowed to remain there, is anoth=
er
question.
On the 20th December 1876, Sir T. Shepstone wr=
ote
to President Burgers, informing him of his approaching visit to the Transva=
al,
to secure, if possible, the adjustment of the existing troubles, and the
adoption of such measures as might be best calculated to prevent their
recurrence in the future.
On his road to Pretoria, Sir Theophilus receiv=
ed a
hearty welcome from the Boer as well as the English inhabitants of the coun=
try.
One of these addresses to him says: "Be assured, high honourable Sir, =
that
we burghers, now assembled together, entertain the most friendly feeling to=
wards
your Government, and that we shall agree with anything you may do in
conjunction with our Government for the progress of our State, the strength=
ening
against our native enemies, and for the general welfare of all the inhabita=
nts
of the whole of South Africa. Welcome in Heidelberg, and welcome in the
Transvaal."
At Pretoria the reception of the Special
Commissioner was positively enthusiastic; the whole town came out to meet h=
im,
and the horses having been taken out of the carriage, he was dragged in tri=
umph
through the streets. In his reply to the address presented to him, Sir
Theophilus shadowed forth the objects of his mission in these words:
"Recent events in this country have shown to all thinking men the abso=
lute
necessity for closer union and more oneness of purpose among the Christian =
Governments
of the southern portion of this Continent: the best interests of the native
races, no less than the peace and prosperity of the white, imperatively dem=
and
it, and I rely upon you and upon your Government to co-operate with me in
endeavouring to achieve the great and glorious end of inscribing on a gener=
al
South African banner the appropriate motto--'Eendragt maakt magt' (Unity ma=
kes
strength)."
A few days after his arrival a commission was
appointed, consisting of Messrs. Henderson and Osborn, on behalf of the Spe=
cial
Commissioner, and Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen, on behalf of the Transvaal
Government, to discuss the state of the country. This commission came to
nothing, and was on both sides nothing more than a bit of by-play.
The arrival of the mission was necessarily
regarded with mixed feelings by the inhabitants of the Transvaal. By one pa=
rty
it was eagerly greeted, viz., the English section of the population, who
devoutly hoped that it had come to annex the country. With the exception of=
the
Hollander element, the officials also were glad of its arrival, and secretly
hoped that the country would be taken over, when there would be more chance=
of
their getting their arrear pay. The better educated Boers also were for the
most part satisfied that there was no hope for the country unless England
helped it in some way, though they did not like having to accept the help. =
But
the more bigoted and narrow-minded among them were undoubtedly opposed to
English interference, and under their leader, Paul Kruger, who was at the t=
ime
running for the President's chair, did their best to be rid of it. They fou=
nd
ready allies in the Hollander clientele, with which Mr. Burgers had surroun=
ded
himself, headed by the famous Dr. Jorissen, who was, like most of the ruler=
s of
this singular State, an ex-clergyman, but now an Attorney-general, not lear=
ned
in the law. These men were for the most part entirely unfit for the positio=
ns
they held, and feared that in the event of the country changing hands they
might be ejected from them; and also, they did all Englishmen the favour to
regard them, with that particularly virulent and general hatred which is a =
part
of the secret creed of many foreigners, more especially of such as are under
our protection. As may easily be imagined, what between all these different
parties and the presence of the Special Commissioner, there were certainly
plenty of intrigues going on in Pretoria during the first few months of 187=
7, and
the political excitement was very great. Nobody knew how far Sir T. Shepsto=
ne
was prepared to go, and everybody was afraid of putting out his hand further
than he could pull it back, and trying to make himself comfortable on two
stools at once. Members of the Volksraad and other prominent individuals in=
the
country who had during the day been denouncing the Commissioner in no measu=
red
terms, and even proposing that he and his staff should be shot as a warning=
to
the English Government, might be seen arriving at his house under cover of =
the shades
of evening, to have a little talk with him, and express the earnest hope th=
at
it was his intention to annex the country as soon as possible. It is necess=
ary
to assist at a peaceable annexation to learn the depth of meanness human na=
ture
is capable of.
In Pretoria, at any rate, the ladies were of g=
reat
service to the cause of the mission, since they were nearly all in favour o=
f a
change of government, and, that being the case, they naturally soon brought
their husbands, brothers, and lovers to look at things from the same point =
of
view. It was a wise man who said that in any matter where it is necessary to
obtain the goodwill of a population you should win over the women; that don=
e,
you need not trouble yourself about the men.
Though the country was thus overflowing with
political intrigues, nothing of the kind went on in the Commissioner's camp=
. It
was not he
who made the plots to catch the Transvaalers; =
on
the contrary, they made the plots to catch him. For several months all that=
he
did was to sit still and let the rival passions work their way, fighting wh=
at
the Zulus afterwards called the "fight of sit down." When anybody
came to see him he was very glad to meet them, pointed out the desperate
condition of the country, and asked them if they could suggest a remedy. And
that was about all he did do, beyond informing himself very carefully as to=
all
that was going on in the country, and the movements of the natives within a=
nd
outside its borders. There was no money spent on bribery, as has been state=
d,
though it is impossible to imagine a state of affairs in which it would have
been more easy to bribe, or in which it could have been done with greater
effect; unless indeed the promise that some pension should be paid to Presi=
dent
Burgers can be called a bribe, which it was certainly never intended to be,=
but
simply a guarantee that after having spent all his private means on behalf =
of
the State he should not be left destitute. The statement that the Annexation
was effected under a threat that if the Government did not give its consent=
Sir
T. Shepstone would let loose the Zulus on the country is also a wicked and =
malicious
invention, but with this I shall deal more at length further on.
It must not, however, be understood that the
Annexation was a foregone conclusion, or that Sir T. Shepstone came up to t=
he
Transvaal with the fixed intention of annexing the country without referenc=
e to
its position, merely with a view of extending British influence, or, as has
been absurdly stated, in order to benefit Natal. He had no fixed purpose,
whether it were necessary or no, of exercising the full powers given to him=
by
his commission; on the contrary, he was all along most anxious to find some
internal resources within the State by means of which Annexation could be
averted, and of this fact his various letters and despatches give full proo=
f.
Thus, in his letter to President Burgers, of the 9th April 1877, in which he
announces his intention of annexing the country, he says: "I have more
than once assured your Honour that if I could think of any plan by which the
independence of the State could be maintained by its own internal resources=
I
would most certainly not conceal that plan from you." It is also
incidentally remarkably confirmed by a passage in Mr. Burgers' posthumous
defence, in which he says: "Hence I met Shepstone alone in my house, a=
nd
opened up the subject of his mission. With a candour that astonished me, he
avowed that his purpose was to annex the country, as he had sufficient grou=
nds for
it, unless I could so alter as to satisfy his Government. My plan of a new
constitution, modelled after that of America, of a standing police force of=
two
hundred mounted men, was then proposed. He promised to give me time to call=
the
Volksraad together, and to abandon his design if the Volksraad would adopt
these measures, and the country be willing to submit to them, and to carry =
them
out." Further on he says: "In justice to Shepstone I must say tha=
t I
would not consider an officer of my Government to have acted faithfully if =
he
had not done what Shepstone did."
It has also been frequently alleged in England,
and always seems to be taken as the groundwork of argument in the matter of=
the
Annexation, that the Special Commissioner represented that the majority of =
the inhabitants
wished for the Annexation, and that it was sanctioned on that ground. This
statement shows the great ignorance that exists in this country of South
African affairs, an ignorance which in this case has been carefully fostere=
d by
Mr. Gladstone's Government for party purposes, they having found it necessa=
ry
to assume, in order to make their position in the matter tenable, that Sir =
T.
Shepstone and other Officials had been guilty of misrepresentation.
Unfortunately, the Government and its supporters have been more intent upon
making out their case than upon ascertaining the truth of their statements.=
If
they had taken the trouble to refer to Sir T. Shepstone's despatches, they =
would
have found that the ground on which the Transvaal was annexed was, not beca=
use
the majority of the inhabitants wished for it, but because the State was
drifting into anarchy, was bankrupt, and was about to be destroyed by native
tribes. They would further have found that Sir T. Shepstone never represent=
ed
that the majority of the Boers were in favour of Annexation. What he did say
was that most thinking men in the country saw no other way out of the
difficulty; but what proportion of the Boers can be called "thinking
men?" He also said, in the fifteenth paragraph of his despatch to Lord
Carnarvon of 6th March 1877, that petitions signed by 2500 people, represen=
ting
every class of the community, out of a total adult population of 8000, had =
been
presented to the Government of the Republic, setting forth its difficulties=
and
dangers, and praying it "to treat with me for their amelioration or re=
moval."
He also stated, and with perfect truth, that many more would have signed ha=
d it
not been for the terrorism that was exercised, and that all the towns and
villages in the country desired the change, which was a patent fact.
This is the foundation on which the charge of
misrepresentation is built--a charge which has been manipulated so skilfull=
y,
and with such a charming disregard for the truth, that the British public h=
as
been duped into believing it. When it is examined into, it vanishes into th=
in
air.
But a darker charge has been brought against t=
he
Special Commissioner--a charge affecting his honour as a gentleman and his
character as a Christian; and, strange to say, has gained a considerable
credence, especially amongst a certain party in England. I allude to the
statement that he called up the Zulu army with the intention of sweeping th=
e Transvaal
if the Annexation was objected to. I may state, from my own personal knowle=
dge,
that the report is a complete falsehood, and that no such threat was ever m=
ade,
either by Sir T. Shepstone or by anybody connected with him, and I will bri=
efly
prove what I say.
When the mission first arrived at Pretoria, a
message came from Cetywayo to the effect that he had heard that the Boers h=
ad
fired at "Sompseu" (Sir T. Shepstone), and announcing his intenti=
on
of attacking the Transvaal if "his father" was touched. About the
middle of March alarming rumours began to spread as to the intended action =
of
Cetywayo with reference to the Transvaal; but as Sir T. Shepstone did not t=
hink
that the king would be likely to make any hostile movement whilst he was in=
the
country, he took no steps in the matter. Neither did the Transvaal Governme=
nt
ask his advice and assistance. Indeed, a remarkable trait in the Boers is t=
heir
supreme self-conceit, which makes them believe that they are capable of
subduing all the natives in Africa, and of thrashing the whole British army=
if
necessary. Unfortunately, the recent course of events has tended to confirm
them in their opinion as regards their white enemies. To return: towards the
second week in April, or the week before the proclamation of annexation was
issued, things began to look very serious; indeed, rumours that could hardl=
y be
discredited reached the Special Commissioner that the whole of the Zulu army
was collected in a chain of Impis or battalions, with the intention of burs=
ting
into the Transvaal and sweeping the country. Knowing how terrible would be =
the
catastrophe if this were to happen, Sir T. Shepstone was much alarmed about=
the
matter, and at a meeting with the Executive Council of the Transvaal Govern=
ment
he pointed out to them the great danger in which the country was placed. Th=
is
was done in the presence of several officers of his Staff, and it was on th=
is
friendly exposition of the state of affairs that the charge that he had thr=
eatened
the country with invasion by the Zulus was based. On the 11th of April, or =
the
day before the Annexation, a message was despatched to Cetywayo, telling hi=
m of
the reports that had reached Pretoria, and stating that if they were true he
must forthwith give up all such intentions, as the Transvaal would at once =
be
placed under the sovereignty of Her Majesty, and that if he had assembled a=
ny
armies for purposes of aggression they must be disbanded at once. Sir T. Sh=
epstone's
message reached Zululand not a day too soon. Had the Annexation of the
Transvaal been delayed by a few weeks even--and this is a point which I
earnestly beg Englishmen to remember in connection with that act--Cetywayo's
armies would have entered the Transvaal, carrying death before them, and
leaving a wilderness behind them.
Cetywayo's answer to the Special Commissioner's
message will sufficiently show, to use Sir Theophilus' own words in his
despatch on the subject, "the pinnacle of peril which the Republic and
South Africa generally had reached at the moment when the Annexation took
place." He says, "I thank my Father Sompseu (Sir T. Shepstone) for
his message. I am glad that he has sent it, because the Dutch have tired me
out, and I intended to fight them once and once only, and to drive them ove=
r the
Vaal. Kabana (name of messenger), you see my Impis (armies) are gathered. It
was to fight the Dutch I called them together; now I will send them back to
their homes. Is it well that two men ('amadoda-amabili') should be made
'iziula' (fools)? In the reign of my father Umpanda the Boers were constant=
ly
moving their boundary further into my country. Since his death the same thi=
ng
has been done. I had therefore determined to end it once for all!" The
message then goes on to other matters, and ends with a request to be allowe=
d to
fight the Amaswazi, because "they fight together and kill one another.
This," says Cetywayo naively, "is wrong, and I want to chastise t=
hem
for it."
This quotation will suffice to convince all
reasonable men, putting aside all other matters, from what imminent danger =
the
Transvaal was delivered by the much-abused Annexation.
Some months after that event, however, it occu=
rred
to the ingenious mind of some malicious individual in Natal that, properly
used, much political capital might be made out of this Zulu incident, and t=
he
story that Cetywayo's army had been called up by Sir Theophilus himself to
overawe, and, if necessary, subdue the Transvaal, was accordingly invented =
and
industriously circulated. Although Sir T. Shepstone at once caused it to be
authoritatively contradicted, such an astonishing slander naturally took fi=
rm
root, and on the 12th April 1879 we have Mr. M. W. Pretorius, one of the Bo=
er
leaders, publicly stating at a meeting of the farmers that "previous to
the Annexation Sir T. Shepstone had threatened the Transvaal with an attack
from the Zulus as an argument for advancing the Annexation." Under suc=
h an
imputation the Government could no longer keep silence, and accordingly Sir
Owen Lanyon, who was then Administrator of the Transvaal, caused the matter=
to
be officially investigated, with these results, which are summed up by him =
in a
letter to Mr. Pretorius, dated 1st May 1879:--
1. The records of the Republican Executive Cou=
ncil
contained no allusion to any such statement.
2. Two members of that Council filed statement=
s in
which they unreservedly denied that Sir T. Shepstone used the words or thre=
ats imputed
to him.
3. Two officers of Sir T. Shepstone's staff, w=
ho
were always present with him at interviews with the Executive Council, filed
statements to the same effect.
"I have no doubt," adds Sir Owen Lan=
yon,
"that the report has been originated and circulated by some evil-dispo=
sed
persons."
In addition to this evidence we have a letter
written to the Colonial Office by Sir T. Shepstone, dated London, August 12,
1879, in which he points out that Mr. Pretorius was not even present at any=
of
the interviews with the Executive Council on which occasion he accuses him =
of
having made use of the threats. He further shows that the use of such a thr=
eat
on his part would have been the depth of folly, and "knowingly to court
the instant and ignominious failure of my mission," because the Boers =
were
so persuaded of their own prowess that they could not be convinced that they
stood in any danger from native sources, and also because "such play w=
ith
such keen-edged tools as the excited passions of savages are, and especially
such savages as I knew the Zulus to be, is not what an experience of forty-=
two
years in managing them inclined me to." And yet, in the face of all th=
is
accumulated evidence, this report continues to be believed, that is, by tho=
se
who wished to believe it.
Such are the accusations that have been brought
against the manner of the Annexation and the Officer who carried it out, and
never were accusations more groundless. Indeed both for party purposes, and
from personal animus, every means, fair or foul, has been used to discredit=
it
and all connected with it. To take a single instance, one author (Miss Cole=
nso,
p. 134, "History of the Zulu War") actually goes the length of
putting a portion of a speech made by President Burgers into the mouth of S=
ir
T. Shepstone, and then abusing him for his incredible profanity. Surely this
exceeds the limits of fair criticism.
Before I go on to the actual history of the
Annexation there is one point I wish to submit to my reader. In England the
change of Government has always been talked of as though it only affected t=
he
forty thousand white inhabitants of the country, whilst everybody seems to
forget that this same land had about a million human beings living on it, i=
ts original
owners, and only, unfortunately for themselves, possessing a black skin, and
therefore entitled to little consideration,--even at the hands of the most
philanthropic Government in the world. It never seems to have occurred to t=
hose
who have raised so much outcry on behalf of the forty thousand Boers, to
inquire what was thought of the matter by the million natives. If they were=
to
be allowed a voice in their own disposal, the country was certainly annexed=
by
the wish of a very large majority of its inhabitants. It is true that
Secocoeni, instigated thereto by the Boers, afterwards continued the war
against us, but, with the exception of this one chief, the advent of our ru=
le
was hailed with joy by every native in the Transvaal, and even he was glad =
of
it at the time. During our period of rule in the Transvaal the natives have
had, as they foresaw, more peace than at any time since the white man set f=
oot
in the land. They have paid their taxes gladly, and there has been no fight=
ing
among themselves; but since we have given up the country we hear a very
different tale. It is this million of men, women, and children who,
notwithstanding their black skins, live and feel, and have intelligence as =
much
as ourselves, who are the principal, because the most numerous sufferers fr=
om
Mr. Gladstone's conjuring tricks, that can turn a Sovereign into a Suzerain=
as
airily as the professor of magic brings a litter of guinea-pigs out of a top
hat. It is our falsehood and treachery to them whom we took over "for
ever," as we told them, and whom we have now handed back to their natu=
ral
enemies to be paid off for their loyalty to the Englishman, that is the
blackest stain in all this black business, and that has destroyed our prest=
ige,
and caused us to be looked on amongst them, for they do not hide their opin=
ion,
as "cowards and liars."
But very little attention, however, seems to h=
ave
been paid to native views or claims at any time in the Transvaal; indeed th=
ey
have all along been treated as serfs of the soil, to be sold with it, if
necessary, to a new master. It is true that the Government, acting under
pressure from the Aborigines Protection Society, made, on the occasion of t=
he Surrender,
a feeble effort to secure the independence of some of the native tribes; but
when the Boer leaders told them shortly that they would have nothing of the
sort, and that, if they were not careful, they would reoccupy Laing's Nek, =
the
proposal was at once dropped, with many assurances that no offence was
intended. The worst of the matter is that this treatment of our native subj=
ects
and allies will assuredly recoil on the heads of future innocent Government=
s.
Shortly after the appointment of the Joint-Com=
mission
alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, President Burgers, who was now=
in
possession of the Special Commissioner's intentions, should he be unable to
carry out reforms sufficiently drastic to satisfy the English Government, t=
hought
it best to call together the Volksraad. In the meantime, it had been announ=
ced
that the "rebel" Secocoeni had sued for peace and signed a treaty
declaring himself a subject of the Republic. I shall have to enter into the
question of this treaty a little further on, so I will at present only say =
that
it was the first business laid before the Raad, and, after some discussion,
ratified. Next in order to the Secocoeni peace came the question of
Confederation, as laid down in Lord Carnarvon's Permissive Bill. This propo=
sal
was laid before them in an earnest and eloquent speech by their President, =
who
entreated them to consider the dangerous position of the Republic, and to f=
ace
their difficulties like men. The question was referred to a committee, and =
an
adverse report being brought up, was rejected without further consideration=
. It
is just possible that intimidation had something to do with the summary
treatment of so important a matter, seeing that whilst it was being argued a
large mob of Boers, looking very formidable with their sea-cow hide whips,
watched every move of their representatives through the windows of the
Volksraad Hall. It was Mr. Chamberlain's caucus system in practical and vis=
ible
operation.
A few days after the rejection of the
Confederation Bill, President Burgers, who had frequently alluded to the
desperate condition of the Republic, and stated that either some radical re=
form
must be effected or the country must come under the British flag, laid befo=
re
the Raad a brand new constitution of a very remarkable nature, asserting th=
at
they must either accept it or lose their independence.
The first part of this strange document dealt =
with
the people and their rights, which remained much as they were before, with =
the
exception that the secrecy of all letters entrusted to the post was to be
inviolable. The recognition of this right is an amusing incident in the his=
tory
of a free Republic. Under following articles the Volksraad was entrusted wi=
th the
charge of the native inhabitants of the State, the provision for the admini=
stration
of justice, the conduct of education, the regulation of money-bills, &c=
. It
is in the fourth chapter, however, that we come to the real gist of the Bil=
l,
which was the endowment of the State President with the authority of a dict=
ator.
Mr. Burgers thought to save the State by making himself an absolute monarch=
. He
was to be elected for a period of seven years instead of five years, and to=
be
eligible for re-election. In him was vested the power of making all
appointments without reference to the legislature. All laws were to be draw=
n up
by him, and he was to have the right of veto on Volksraad resolutions, which
body he could summon and dissolve at will. Finally, his Executive Council w=
as
to consist of heads of departments appointed by himself, and of one member =
of
the Volksraad. The Volksraad treated this Bill in much the same way as they=
had
dealt with the Permissive Confederation Bill, gave it a casual consideratio=
n,
and threw it out.
The President, meanwhile, was doing his best t=
o convince
the Raad of the danger of the country; that the treasury was empty, whilst =
duns
were pressing, that enemies were threatening on every side, and, finally, t=
hat
Her Majesty's Special Commissioner was encamped within a thousand yards of
them, watching their deliberations with some interest. He showed them that =
it
was impossible at once to scorn reform and reject friendly offers, that it =
was
doubtful if anything could save them, but that if they took no steps they w=
ere
certainly lost as a nation. The "Fathers of the land," however,
declined to dance to the President's piping. Then he took a bolder line. He
told them that a guilty nation never can evade the judgment that follows its
steps. He asked them "conscientiously to advise the people not obstina=
tely
to refuse a union with a powerful Government. He could not advise them to
refuse such a union. . . . He did not believe that a new constitution would
save them; for as little as the old constitution had brought them to ruin, =
so little
would a new constitution bring salvation. . . . If the citizens of England =
had
behaved towards the Crown as the burghers of this State had behaved to their
Government, England would never have stood so long as she had." He poi=
nted
out to them their hopeless financial position. "To-day," he said,
"a bill for 1100 pounds was laid before me for signature; but I would
sooner have cut off my right hand than sign that paper--(cheers)--for I have
not the slightest ground to expect that, when that bill becomes due, there =
will
be a penny to pay it with." And finally, he exhorted them thus: "=
Let
them make the best of the situation, and get the best terms they possibly
could; let them agree to join their hands to those of their brethren in the
south, and then from the Cape to the Zambesi there would be one great peopl=
e.
Yes, there was something grand in that, grander even than their idea of a
Republic, something which ministered to their national feeling--(cheers)--a=
nd would
this be so miserable? Yes, this would be miserable for those who would not =
be
under the law, for the rebel and the revolutionist, but welfare and prosper=
ity
for the men of law and order."
These powerful words form a strong indictment
against the Republic, and from them there can be little doubt that President
Burgers was thoroughly convinced of the necessity and wisdom of the Annexat=
ion.
It is interesting to compare them, and many other utterances of his made at=
this
period, with the opinions he expresses in the posthumous document recently
published, in which he speaks somewhat jubilantly of the lessons taught us =
on
Laing's Nek and Majuba by such "an inherently weak people as the
Boers," and points to them as striking instances of retribution. In th=
is
document he attributes the Annexation to the desire to advance English
supremacy in South Africa, and to lay hold of the way to Central South Afri=
ca.
It is, however, noticeable that he does not in any way indicate how it could
have been averted, and the State continue to exist; and he seems all along =
to
feel that his case is a weak one, for in explaining, or attempting to expla=
in,
why he had never defended himself from the charges brought against him in
connection with the Annexation, he says: "Had I not endured in silence,
had I not borne patiently all the accusations, but out of selfishness or fe=
ar
told the plain truth of the case, the Transvaal would never have had the co=
nsideration
it has now received from Great Britain. However unjust the Annexation was, =
my
self-justification would have exposed the Boers to such an extent, and the
state of the country in such a way, that it would have deprived them both of
the sympathy of the world and the consideration of the English
politicians." In other words, "If I had told the truth about thin=
gs
as I should have been obliged to do to justify myself, there would have bee=
n no
more outcry about the Annexation, because the whole world, even the English
Radicals, would have recognised how necessary it was, and what a fearful st=
ate
the country was in."
But to let that pass, it is evident that Presi=
dent
Burgers did not take the same view of the Annexation in 1877 as he did in 1=
881,
and indeed his speeches to the Volksraad would read rather oddly printed in=
parallel
columns with his posthumous statement. The reader would be forced to one of=
two
conclusions, either on one of the two occasions he is saying what he does n=
ot
mean, or he must have changed his mind. As I believe him to have been an ho=
nest
man, I incline to the latter supposition; nor do I consider it so very hard=
to
account for, taking into consideration his natural Dutch proclivities. In 1=
877
Burgers is the despairing head of a State driving rapidly to ruin, if not to
actual extinction, when the strong hand of the English Government is held o=
ut to
him. What wonder that he accepts it gladly on behalf of his country, which =
is
by its help brought into a state of greater prosperity than it has ever bef=
ore
known? In 1881 the wheel has gone round, and great events have come about
whilst he lies dying. The enemies of the Boers have been destroyed, the pow=
ers
of the Zulus and Secocoeni are no more; the country has prospered under a
healthy rule, and its finances have been restored. More,--glad tidings have
come from Mid-Lothian, to the "rebel and the revolutionist," whose
hopes were flagging, and eloquent words have been spoken by the new English
Dictator that have aroused a great rebellion. And, to crown all, English tr=
oops
have suffered one massacre and three defeats, and England sues for peace fr=
om
the South African peasant, heedless of honour or her broken word, so that t=
he prayer
be granted. With such events before him, that dying man may well have found
cause to change his opinion. Doubtless the Annexation was wrong, since Engl=
and
disowns her acts; and may not that dream about the great South African Repu=
blic
come true after all? Has not the pre-eminence of the Englishman received a =
blow
from which it can never recover, and is not his control over Boers and nati=
ves
irredeemably weakened? And must he,--Burgers,--go down to posterity as a
Dutchman who tried to forward the interests of the English party? No, doubt=
less
the Annexation was wrong; but it has done good, for it has brought about th=
e downfall
of the English: and we will end the argument in the very words of his last
public utterance, with which he ends his statement: "South Africa gain=
ed
more from this, and has made a larger step forward in the march of freedom =
than
most people can conceive."
Who shall say that he is wrong? the words of d=
ying
men are sometimes prophetic! South Africa has made a great advance towards =
the
"freedom" of a Dutch Republic.
This has been a digression, but I hope not an
uninteresting one. To return--on the 1st March, Sir T. Shepstone met the
Executive Council, and told them that in his opinion there was now but one
remedy to be adopted, and that was that the Transvaal should be united with
English Colonies of South Africa under one head, namely the Queen, saying at
the same time that the only thing now left to the Republic was to make the =
best
arrangements it could for the future benefit of its inhabitants, and to sub=
mit
to that which he saw to be, and every thinking man saw to be, inevitable. So
soon as this information was officially communicated to the Raad, for a good
proportion of its members were already acquainted with it unofficially, it =
flew
from a state of listless indifference into vigorous and hasty action. The
President was censured, and a Committee was appointed to consider and report
upon the situation, which reported in favour of the adoption of Burgers' new
constitution. Accordingly, the greatest part of this measure, which had bee=
n contemptuously
rejected a few days before, was adopted almost without question, and Mr. Pa=
ul
Kruger was appointed Vice-President. On the following day, a very drastic
treason law was passed, borrowed from the Statute book of the Orange Free
State, which made all public expression of opinion, if adverse to the
Government, or in any way supporting the Annexation party, high treason. Th=
is
done, the Assembly prorogued itself until--October 1881.
During and after the sitting of the Raad, rumo=
urs
arose that the Chief Secocoeni's signature to the treaty of peace, ratified=
by
that body, had been obtained by misrepresentation. As ratified, this treaty
consisted of three articles, according to which Secocoeni consented, first =
to become
a subject of the Republic, and obey the laws of the country; secondly, to a=
gree
to a certain restricted boundary line and, thirdly, to pay 2000 head of cat=
tle;
which, considering he had captured quite 5000 head, was not exorbitant.
Towards the end of February a written message =
was
received from Secocoeni by Sir T. Shepstone, dated after the signing of the
supposed treaty. The original, which was written in Sisutu, was a great cur=
iosity.
The following is a correct translation:--
"=
;For
Myn Heer Sheepstone,--I beg you, Chief, come help me, the Boers are killing=
me,
and I don't know the reasons why they should be angry with me; Chief, I beg=
you
come with Myn Heer Merensky.--I am Sikukuni."
This =
message
was accompanied by a letter from Mr. Merensky, a well-known and successful
missionary, who had been for many years resident in Secocoeni's country, in
which he stated that he heard on very good authority that Secocoeni had
distinctly refused to agree to that article of the treaty by which he becam=
e a
subject of the State. He adds that he cannot remain "silent while such
tricks are played."
Upon this information, Sir T. Shepstone wrote =
to
President Burgers, stating that "if the officer in whom you have placed
confidence has withheld any portion of the truth from you, especially so
serious a portion of it, he is guilty of a wrong towards you personally, as=
well
as towards the Government, because he has caused you to assume an untenable
position," and suggesting that a joint commission should be despatched=
to
Secocoeni, to thoroughly sift the question in the interest of all concerned.
This suggestion was after some delay agreed to, and a commission was appoin=
ted,
consisting of Mr. Van Gorkom, a Hollander, and Mr. Holtshausen, a member of=
the
Executive Council, on behalf of the Transvaal Government, and Mr. Osborn, R=
.M.,
and Captain Clarke, R.A., on behalf of the Commissioner, whom I accompanied=
as
Secretary.
At Middelburg the native Gideon who acted as i=
nterpreter
between Commandant Ferreira, C.M.G. (the officer who negotiated the treaty =
on behalf
of the Boer Government), and Secocoeni was examined, and also two natives,
Petros and Jeremiah, who were with him, but did not actually interpret. All
these men persisted that Secocoeni had positively refused to become a subje=
ct
of the Republic, and only consented to sign the treaty on the representatio=
ns
of Commandant Ferreira that it would only be binding, as regards to the two
articles about the cattle and the boundary line.
The Commission then proceeded to Secocoeni's t=
own,
accompanied by a fresh set of interpreters, and had a long interview with
Secocoeni. The chief's Prime Minister or "mouth," Makurupiji,
speaking in his presence, and on his behalf and making use of the pronoun
"I" before all the assembled headmen of the tribe, gave an accoun=
t of
the interview between Commandant Ferreira in the presence of that gentleman,
who accompanied the commission and Secocoeni, in almost the same words as h=
ad
been used by the interpreters at Middelburg. He distinctly denied having
consented to become a subject of the Republic or to stand under the law, and
added that he feared he "had touched the feather to" (signed) thi=
ngs
that he did not know of in the treaty. Commandant Ferreira then put some qu=
estions,
but entirely failed to shake the evidence; on the contrary, he admitted by =
his
questions that Secocoeni had not consented to become a subject of the Repub=
lic.
Secocoeni had evidently signed the piece of paper under the impression that=
he
was acknowledging his liability to pay 2000 head of cattle, and fixing a
certain portion of his boundary line, and on the distinct understanding tha=
t he
was not to become a subject of the State.
Now it was the Secocoeni war that had brought =
the
English Mission into the country, and if it could be shown that the Secocoe=
ni
war had come to a successful termination, it would go far towards helping t=
he
Mission out again. To this end, it was necessary that the Chief should decl=
are himself
a subject of the State, and thereby, by implication acknowledge himself to =
have
been a rebel, and admit his defeat. All that was required was a signature, =
and
that once obtained the treaty was published and submitted to the Raad for
confirmation, without a whisper being heard of the conditions under which t=
his
ignorant Basutu was induced to sign. Had no Commission visited Secocoeni, t=
his
treaty would afterwards have been produced against him in its entirety.
Altogether, the history of the Secocoeni Peace Treaty does not reassure one=
as to
the genuineness of the treaties which the Boers are continually producing,
purporting to have been signed by native chiefs, and as a general rule
presenting the State with great tracts of country in exchange for a horse o=
r a
few oxen. However fond the natives may be of their Boer neighbours, such
liberality can scarcely be genuine. On the other hand, it is so easy to ind=
uce
a savage to sign a paper, or even, if he is reticent, to make a cross for h=
im,
and once made, as we all know, litera scripa manet, and becomes title to the
lands.
During the Secocoeni investigation, affairs in=
the
Transvaal were steadily drifting towards anarchy. The air was filled with
rumours; now it was reported that an outbreak was imminent amongst the Engl=
ish population
at the Gold Fields, who had never forgotten Von Schlickmann's kind suggesti=
on
that they should be "subdued;" now it was said that Cetywayo had
crossed the border, and might shortly be expected at Pretoria; now that a l=
arge
body of Boers were on their road to shoot the Special Commissioner, his
twenty-five policemen and Englishmen generally, and so on.
Meanwhile, Paul Kruger and his party were not
letting the grass grow under their feet, but worked public feeling with gre=
at
vigour, with the double object of getting Paul made President and ridding
themselves of the English. Articles in his support were printed in the
well-known Dutch paper "Die Patriot," published in the Cape Colon=
y,
which are so typical of the Boers and of the only literature that has the
slightest influence over them, that I will quote a few extracts from one of
them.
After drawing a very vivid picture of the wret=
ched
condition of the country as compared to what it was when the Kafirs had &qu=
ot;a
proper respect" for the Boers, before Burgers came into power, the art=
icle
proceeds to give the cause of this state of affairs. "God's word,"=
; it
says, "gives us the solution. Look at Israel, while the people have a =
godly
king, everything is prosperous, but under a godless prince the land
retrogrades, and the whole of the people must suffer. Read Leviticus, chapt=
er
26, with attention, &c. In the day of the Voortrekkers (pioneers), a
handful of men chased a thousand Kafirs and made them run; so also in the F=
ree
State War (Deut. xxxii. 30; Jos. xxiii. 10; Lev. xxvi. 8). But mark, now wh=
en
Burgers became President, he knows no Sabbath, he rides through the land in=
and
out of town on Sunday, he knows not the church and God's service (Lev. xxvi.
2-3) to the scandal of pious people. And he formerly was a priest too. And =
what
is the consequence? No harvest (Lev. xxvi. 16), an army of 6,000 men runs
because one man falls (Lev. xxvi. 17, &c.) What is now the remedy?"
The remedy proves to be Paul Kruger, "because there is no other candid=
ate.
Because our Lord clearly points him out to be the man, for why is there no
other candidate? Who arranged it this way?" Then follows a rather odd
argument in favour of Paul's election, "Because he himself (P. Kruger)
acknowledges in his own reply that he is incompetent, but that all his abil=
ity
is from our Lord. Because he is a warrior. Because he is a Boer." Then
Paul Kruger, the warrior and the Boer, is compared to Joan of Arc, "a
simple Boer girl who came from behind the sheep." The Burghers of
Transvaal are exhorted to acknowledge the hand of the Lord, and elect Paul
Kruger, or look for still heavier punishment. (Lev. xxvi. 18 et seq.) Next =
the
"Patriot" proceeds to give a bit of advice to "our candidate,
Paul Kruger." He is to deliver the land from the Kafirs. "The Lord
has given you the heart of a warrior, arise and drive them," a bit of
advice quite suited to his well-known character. But this chosen vessel was=
not
to get all the loaves and fishes; on the contrary, as soon as he had fulfil=
led
his mission of "driving" the Kafirs, he was to hand over his offi=
ce
to a "good" president. The article ends thus: "If the Lord w=
ills
to use you now to deliver this land from its enemies, and a day of peace and
prosperity arises again, and you see that you are not exactly the statesman=
to
further govern the Republic, then it will be your greatest honour to say,
'Citizens, I have delivered you from the enemy, I am no statesman, but now =
you
have peace and time to choose and elect a good President.'"
An article such as the above is instructive reading as showing the low calibre of the minds that are influenced by it. = Yet such writings and sermons have more power among the Boers than any other arguments, appealing as they do to the fanaticism and vanity of their natur= e, which causes them to believe that the Divinity is continually interfering o= n their behalf at the cost of other people. It will be noticed that the references given are all to the Old Testament, and nearly all refer to acts of blood.<= o:p>
These doctrines were not, however, at all
acceptable to Burgers' party, or the more enlightened members of the commun=
ity,
and so bitter did the struggle of rival opinions become that there is very
little doubt that had the country not been annexed, civil war would have be=
en
added to its other calamities. Meanwhile the natives were from day to day
becoming more restless, and messengers were constantly arriving at the Spec=
ial Commissioner's
camp, begging that their tribe might be put under the Queen, and stating th=
at
they would fight rather than submit any longer to the Boers.
At length on the 9th April, Sir T. Shepstone
informed the Government of the Republic that he was about to declare the
Transvaal British territory. He told them that he had considered and
reconsidered his determination, but that he could see no possible means wit=
hin
the State by which it could free itself from the burdens that were sinking =
it to
destruction, adding that if he could have found such means he would certain=
ly
not have hidden them from the Government. This intimation was received in
silence, though all the later proceedings with reference to the Annexation =
were
in reality carried out in concert with the Authorities of the Republic. Thu=
s on
the 13th March the Government submitted a paper of ten questions to Sir T.
Shepstone as regards the future condition of the Transvaal under English ru=
le,
whether the debts of the State would be guaranteed, &c. To these questi=
ons
replies were given which were on the whole satisfactory to the Government. =
As
these replies formed the basis of the proclamation guarantees, it is not ne=
cessary
to enter into them.
It was further arranged by the Republican
Government that a formal protest should be entered against the Annexation,
which was accordingly prepared and privately shown to the Special Commissio=
ner.
The annexation proclamation was also shown to President Burgers, and a
paragraph eliminated at his suggestion. In fact, the Special Commissioner a=
nd
the President, together with most of his Executive, were quite at one as re=
gards
the necessity of the proclamation being issued, their joint endeavours being
directed to the prevention of any disturbance, and to secure a good recepti=
on
for the change.
At length, after three months of inquiry and
negotiation, the proclamation of annexation was on the 12th of April 1877 r=
ead
by Mr. Osborn, accompanied by some other gentlemen of Sir T. Shepstone's st=
aff.
It was an anxious moment for all concerned. To use the words of the Special
Commissioner in his despatch home on the subject, "Every effort had be=
en
made during the previous fortnight by, it is said, educated Hollanders, and=
who
had but lately arrived in the country to rouse the fanaticism of the Boers =
and
induce them to offer 'bloody' resistance to what it was known I intended to=
do.
The Boers were appealed to in the most inflammatory language by printed
manifestoes and memorials; . . . it was urged that I had but a small escort
which could easily be overpowered." In a country so full of desperadoes
and fanatical haters of anything English, it was more than possible than th=
ough
such an act would have been condemned by the general sense of the country, a
number of men could easily be found who would think they were doing a right=
eous
act in greeting the "annexationists" with an ovation of bullets. =
I do
not mean that the anxiety was personal, because I do not think the members =
of
that small party set any higher value on their lives than other people, but=
it
was absolutely necessary for the success of the act itself, and for the saf=
ety
of the country, that not a single shot should be fired. Had that happened i=
t is
probable that the whole country would have been involved in confusion and
bloodshed, the Zulus would have broken in, and the Kafirs would have risen;=
in
fact, to use Cetywayo's words, "the land would have burned with
fire."
It will therefore be easily understood what an
anxious hour that was both for the Special Commissioner sitting up at
Government House, and for his Staff down on the Market Square, and how than=
kful
they were when the proclamation was received with hearty cheers by the crow=
d.
Mr. Burgers' protest, which was read immediately afterwards, was received i=
n respectful
silence.
And thus the Transvaal Territory passed for a
while into the great family of the English Colonies. I believe that the
greatest political opponent of the act will bear tribute to the very remark=
able
ability with which it was carried out. When the variety and number of the v=
arious
interests that had to be conciliated, the obstinate nature of the individua=
ls
who had to be convinced, as well as the innate hatred of the English name a=
nd
ways which had to be overcome to carry out this act successfully, are taken
into consideration: together with a thousand other matters, the neglect of =
any
one of which would have sufficed to make failure certain, it will be seen w=
hat
tact and skill, and knowledge of human nature were required to execute so
difficult a task. It must be remembered that no force was used, and that th=
ere
never was any threat of force. The few troops that were to enter the Transv=
aal
were four weeks' march from Pretoria at the time. There was nothing whatsoe=
ver to
prevent the Boers putting a summary stop to the proceedings of the Commissi=
oner
if they had thought fit.
That Sir Theophilus played a bold and hazardous
game nobody will deny, but, like most players who combine boldness with
coolness of head and justice of cause, he won; and, without shedding a sing=
le
drop of blood, or even confiscating an acre of land, and at no cost, annexe=
d a
great country, and averted a very serious war. That same country four years=
later
cost us a million of money, the loss of nearly a thousand men killed and
wounded, and the ruin of many more confiding thousands, to surrender. It is
true, however, that nobody can accuse the retrocession of having been condu=
cted
with judgment or ability--very much the contrary.
There can be no more ample justification of the
necessity of the issue of the annexation proclamation than the proclamation
itself--
First, it touches on the Sand River Convention=
of
1852, by which independence was granted to the State, and shows that the
"evident objects and inciting motives" in granting such guarantee
were to promote peace, free-trade and friendly intercourse, in the hope and
belief that the Republic "would become a flourishing and self-sustaini=
ng
State, a source of strength and security to neighbouring European communiti=
es, and
a point from which Christianity and civilisation might rapidly spread toward
Central Africa." It goes on to show how these hopes have been
disappointed, and how that "increasing weakness in the State itself on=
the
one side, and more than corresponding growth of real strength and confidence
among the native tribes on the other have produced their natural and inevit=
able
consequence . . . that after more or less of irritating conflict with
aboriginal tribes to the north, there commenced about the year 1867 gradual
abandonment to the natives in that direction of territory, settled by burgh=
ers
of the Transvaal in well-built towns and villages and on granted farms.&quo=
t;
It goes on to show that "this decay of po=
wer
and ebb of authority in the north, is being followed by similar processes in
the south under yet more dangerous circumstances. People of this State resi=
ding
in that direction have been compelled within the last three months, at the =
bidding
of native chiefs and at a moment's notice, to leave their farms and homes,
their standing crops . . . all to be taken possession of by natives, but th=
at
the Government is more powerless than ever to vindicate its assumed rights =
or
to resist the declension that is threatening its existence." It then
recites how all the other colonies and communities of South Africa have lost
confidence in the State, how it is in a condition of hopeless bankruptcy, a=
nd
its commerce annihilated whilst the inhabitants are divided into factions, =
and
the Government has fallen into "helpless paralysis." How also the
prospect of the election of a new President, instead of being looked forwar=
d to
with hope, would, in the opinion of all parties, be the signal for civil wa=
r,
anarchy, and bloodshed. How that this state of things affords the very
strongest temptation to the great neighbouring native powers to attack the
country, a temptation that they were only too ready and anxious to yield to,
and that the State was in far too feeble a condition to repel such attacks,
from which it had hitherto only been saved by the repeated representations =
of
the Government of Natal. The next paragraphs I will quote as they stand, for
they sum up the reasons for the Annexation.
"That the Secocoeni war, which would have
produced but little effect on a healthy constitution, has not only proved
suddenly fatal to the resources and reputation of the Republic, but has sho=
wn
itself to be a culminating point in the history of South Africa, in that a
Makatee or Basutu tribe, unwarlike and of no account in Zulu estimation, su=
ccessfully
withstood the strength of the State, and disclosed for the first time to the
native powers outside the Republic, from the Zambesi to the Cape, the great
change that had taken place in the relative strength of the white and black
races, that this disclosure at once shook the prestige of the white man in
South Africa, and placed every European community in peril, that this common
danger has caused universal anxiety, has given to all concerned the right to
investigate its cause, and to protect themselves from its consequences, and=
has
imposed the duty upon those who have the power to shield enfeebled civilisa=
tion
from the encroachments of barbarism and inhumanity." It proceeds to po=
int
out that the Transvaal will be the first to suffer from the results of its =
own
policy, and that it is for every reason perfectly impossible for Her Majest=
y's
Government to stand by and see a friendly white State ravaged, knowing that=
its
own possessions will be the next to suffer. That H. M. Government, being
persuaded that the only means to prevent such a catastrophe would be by the
annexation of the country, and, knowing that this was the wish of a large
proportion of the inhabitants of the Transvaal, the step must be taken. Next
follows the formal annexation.
Together with the proclamation, an address was
issued by Sir T. Shepstone to the burghers of the State, laying the facts
before them in a friendly manner, more suited to their mode of thought than=
it
was possible to do in a formal proclamation. This document, the issue of wh=
ich
was one of those touches that ensured the success of the Annexation, was a
powerful summing up in colloquial language of the arguments used in the
proclamation strengthened by quotations from the speeches of the President.=
It
ends with these words: "It remains only for me to beg of you to consid=
er
and weigh what I have said calmly and without undue prejudice. Let not mere
feeling or sentiment prevail over your judgment. Accept what Her Majesty's
Government intends shall be, and what you will soon find from experience, i=
s a
blessing not only to you and your children, but to the whole of South Africa
through you, and I believe that I speak these words to you as a friend from=
my
heart."
Two other proclamations were also issued, one
notifying the assumption of the office of Administrator of the Government by
Sir T. Shepstone, and the other repealing the war-tax, which was doubtless =
an
unequal and oppressive impost.
I have in the preceding pages stated all the
principal grounds of the Annexation and briefly sketched the history of that
event. In the next chapter I propose to follow the fortunes of the Transvaal
under British Rule.
Reception of the annexation--Major Clarke and =
the
Volunteers-- Effect of the annexation on credit and commerce--Hoisting of t=
he
Union Jack--Ratification of the annexation by Parliament--Messrs. Kruger an=
d Jorissen's
mission to England--Agitation against the annexation in the Cape Colony--Si=
r T.
Shepstone's tour--Causes of the growth of discontent among the Boers--Retur=
n of
Messrs. Jorissen and Kruger--The Government dispenses with their services--=
Despatch
of a second deputation to England--Outbreak of war with Secocoeni--Major
Clarke, R.A.--The Gunn of Gunn plot--Mission of Captain Paterson and Mr.
Sergeaunt to Matabeleland--Its melancholy termination--The Isandhlwana disa=
ster--Departure
of Sir T. Shepstone for England--Another Boer meeting--The Pretoria
Horse--Advance of the Boers on Pretoria--Arrival of Sir B. Frere at Pretoria
and dispersion of the Boers--Arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley--His
proclamation--The Secocoeni expedition--Proceedings of the Boers--Mr.
Pretorius--Mr. Gladstone's Mid-Lothian speeches, their effect--Sir G.
Wolseley's speech at Pretoria, its good results--Influx of Englishmen and
cessation of agitation--Financial position of the country after three years=
of
British rule--Letter of the Boer leaders to Mr. Courtney.
The news of the Annexation was received all ov=
er
the country with a sigh of relief, and in many parts of it with great
rejoicings. At the Gold Fields, for instance, special thanksgiving services
were held, and "God save the Queen" was sung in church. Nowhere w=
as
there the slightest disturbance, but, on the contrary, addresses of
congratulation and thanks literally poured in by every mail, many of them
signed by Boers who have since been conspicuous for their bitter opposition=
to
English rule. At first, there was some doubt as to what would be the course=
taken
under the circumstances by the volunteers enlisted by the late Republic. Ma=
jor
Clarke, R.A., was sent to convey the news, and to take command of them, una=
ccompanied
save by his Kafir servant. On arrival at the principal fort, he at once ord=
ered
the Republican flag to be hauled down and the Union Jack run up, and his or=
ders
were promptly obeyed. A few days afterwards some members of the force thoug=
ht
better of it, and having made up their minds to kill him, came to the tent
where he was sitting to carry out their purpose. On learning their kind
intentions, Major Clarke fixed his eye-glass in his eye, and, after steadily
glaring at them through it for some time, said, "You are all drunk, go
back to your tents." The volunteers, quite overcome by his coolness an=
d the
fixity of his gaze, at once slipped off, and there was no further trouble.
About three weeks after the Annexation, the 1-13th Regiment arrived at Pret=
oria,
having been very well received all along the road by the Boers, who came fr=
om
miles round to hear the band play. Its entry into Pretoria was quite a sigh=
t;
the whole population turned out to meet it; indeed the feeling of rejoicing=
and
relief was so profound that when the band began to play "God save the
Queen" some of the women burst into tears.
Meanwhile the effect of the Annexation on the
country was perfectly magical. Credit and commerce were at once restored; t=
he
railway bonds that were down to nothing in Holland rose with one bound to p=
ar,
and the value of landed property nearly doubled. Indeed it would have been =
possible
for any one, knowing what was going to happen, to have realised large sums =
of
money by buying land in the beginning of 1877, and selling it shortly after=
the
Annexation.
On the 24th May, being Her Majesty's birthday,=
all
the native chiefs who were anywhere within reach, were summoned to attend t=
he
first formal hoisting of the English flag. The day was a general festival, =
and
the ceremony was attended by a large number of Boers and natives in additio=
n to
all the English. At mid-day, amidst the cheers of the crowd, the salute of
artillery, and the strains of "God save the Queen," the Union Jack
was run up a lofty flagstaff, and the Transvaal was formally announced to be
British soil. The flag was hoisted by Colonel Brooke, R.E., and the present
writer. Speaking for myself, I may say that it was one of the proudest mome=
nts
of my life. Could I have foreseen that I should live to see that same flag,
then hoisted with so much joyous ceremony, within a few years shamefully and
dishonourably hauled down and buried,[*] I think it would have been the most
miserable.
[=
*] The
English flag was during the signing of the Convention at Pretoria formally buri=
ed by
a large crowd of Englishmen and
loyal natives.
The Annexation was as well received in England=
as
it was in the Transvaal. Lord Carnarvon wrote to Sir T. Shepstone to convey
"the Queen's entire approval of your conduct since you received Her
Majesty's commission, with a renewal of my own thanks on behalf of the
Government for the admirable prudence and discretion with which you have
discharged a great and unwonted responsibility." It was also accepted =
by
Parliament with very few dissentient voices, since it was not till afterwar=
ds,
when the subject became useful as an electioneering howl, that the Liberal =
party,
headed by our "powerful popular minister," discovered the deep in=
iquity
that had been perpetrated in South Africa. So satisfied were the Transvaal
Boers with the change that Messrs. Kruger, Jorissen, and Bok, who formed the
deputation to proceed to England and present President Burgers' formal prot=
est
against the Annexation, found great difficulty in raising one-half of the
necessary expenses--something under one thousand pounds--towards the cost of
the undertaking. The thirst for independence cannot have been very great wh=
en
all the wealthy burghers in the Transvaal put together would not subscribe a
thousand pounds towards retaining it. Indeed, at this time the members of t=
he deputation
themselves seem to have looked upon their undertaking as being both doubtful
and undesirable, since they informed Sir T. Shepstone that they were going =
to
Europe to discharge an obligation which had been imposed upon them, and if =
the
mission failed, they would have done their duty. Mr. Kruger said that if th=
ey
did fail, he would be found to be as faithful a subject under the new form =
of
government as he had been under the old; and Dr. Jorissen admitted with equ=
al
frankness that "the change was inevitable, and expressed his belief th=
at
the cancellation of it would be calamitous."
Whilst the Annexation was thus well received in
the country immediately interested, a lively agitation was commenced in the
Western Province of the Cape Colony, a thousand miles away, with a view of
inducing the Home Government to repudiate Sir T. Shepstone's act. The reaso=
n of
this movement was that the Cape Dutch party, caring little or nothing for t=
he
real interests of the Transvaal, did care a great deal about their scheme to
turn all the white communities of South Africa into a great Dutch Republic,=
to
which they thought the Annexation would be a deathblow. As I have said
elsewhere, it must be borne in mind that the strings of the anti-annexation
agitation have all along been pulled in the Western Province, whilst the
Transvaal Boers have played the parts of puppets. The instruments used by t=
he
leaders of the movement in the Cape were, for the most part, the discontent=
ed
and unprincipled Hollander element, a newspaper of an extremely abusive nat=
ure
called the "Volkstem," and another in Natal known as the "Na=
tal
Witness," lately edited by the notorious Aylward, which has an almost
equally unenviable reputation.
On the arrival of Messrs. Jorissen and Kruger =
in
England, they were received with great civility by Lord Carnarvon, who was,
however, careful to explain to them that the Annexation was irrevocable. In
this decision they cheerfully acquiesced, assuring his lordship of their de=
termination
to do all they could to induce the Boers to accept the new state of things,=
and
expressing their desire to be allowed to serve under the new Government.
Whilst these gentlemen were thus satisfactorily
arranging matters with Lord Carnarvon, Sir T. Shepstone was making a tour r=
ound
the country which resembled a triumphal progress more than anything else. He
was everywhere greeted with enthusiasm by all classes of the community, Boe=
rs,
English, and natives, and numerous addresses were presented to him couched =
in
the warmest language, not only by Englishmen but also by Boers.
It is very difficult to reconcile the enthusia=
sm
of a great number of the inhabitants of the Transvaal for English rule, and=
the
quite acquiescence of the remainder, at this time, with the decidedly antag=
onistic
attitude assumed later on. It appears to me, however, that there are several
reasons that go far towards accounting for it. The Transvaal, when we annex=
ed
it, was in the position of a man with a knife at his throat, who is suddenly
rescued by some one stronger than he, on certain conditions which at the ti=
me
he gladly accepts, but afterwards, when the danger is passed, wishes to
repudiate. In the same way the inhabitants of the South African Republic, w=
ere
in the time of need very thankful for our aid, but after a while, when the
recollection of their difficulties had grown faint, when their debts had be=
en
paid and their enemies defeated, they began to think that they would like to
get rid of us again, and start fresh on their own account, with a clean she=
et.
What fostered agitation more than anything else, however, was the perfect i=
mpunity
in which it was allowed to be carried on. Had only a little firmness and
decision been shown in the first instance there would have been no further
trouble. We might have been obliged to confiscate half-a-dozen farms, and
perhaps imprison as many free burghers for a few months, and there it would
have ended. Neither Boers or natives understand our namby-pamby way of play=
ing
at government; they put it down to fear. What they want, and what they expe=
ct,
is to be governed with a just but a firm hand. Thus when the Boers found th=
at
they could agitate with impunity, they naturally enough continued to agitat=
e. Anybody
who knows them will understand that it was very pleasant to them to find
themselves in possession of that delightful thing, a grievance, and, instea=
d of
stopping quietly at home on their farms, to feel obliged to proceed, full of
importance and long words, to a distant meeting, there to spout and listen =
to
the spouting of others. It is so much easier to talk politics than to sow
mealies. Some attribute the discontent among the Boers to the postponement =
of
the carrying out of the annexation proclamation promises with reference to =
the
free institutions to be granted to the country, but in my opinion it had li=
ttle
or nothing to do with it. The Boers never understood the question of
responsible government, and never wanted that institution; what they did wa=
nt
was to be free of all English control, and this they said twenty times in t=
he
most outspoken language. I think there is little doubt the causes I have
indicated are the real sources of the agitation, though there must be added=
to
them their detestation of our mode of dealing with natives, and of being fo=
rced
to pay taxes regularly, and also the ceaseless agitation of the Cape
wire-pullers, through their agents the Hollanders, and their organs in the
press.
On the return of Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen to
the Transvaal, the latter gentleman resumed his duties as Attorney-General,=
on
which occasion, if I remember aright, I myself had the honour of administer=
ing to
him the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty, that he afterwards kept so well.=
The
former reported the proceedings of the deputation to a Boer meeting, when he
took a very different tone to that in which he addressed Lord Carnarvon,
announcing that if there existed a majority of the people in favour of
independence, he still was Vice-President of the country.
Both these gentlemen remained for some time in=
the
pay of the British Government, Mr. Jorissen as Attorney-General, and Mr. Kr=
uger
as member of the Executive Council. The Government, however, at length foun=
d it
desirable to dispense with their services, though on different grounds. Mr.
Jorissen had, like several other members of the Republican Government, been=
a
clergyman, and was quite unfit to hold the post of Attorney-General in an
important colony like the Transvaal, where legal questions were constantly =
arising
requiring all the attention of a trained mind; and after he had on several
occasions been publicly admonished from the bench, the Government retired h=
im
on liberal terms. Needless to say, his opposition to English rule then beca=
me
very bitter. Mr. Kruger's appointment expired by law in November 1877, and =
the Government
did not think it advisable to re-employ him. The terms of his letter of
dismissal can be found on page 135 of Blue Book (c. 144), and involving as =
they
do a serious charge of misrepresentation in money matters, are not very
creditable to him. After this event he also pursued the cause of independen=
ce
with increased vigour.
During the last months of 1877 and the first p=
art
of 1878 agitation against British rule went on unchecked, and at last grew =
to
alarming proportions, so much so that Sir T. Shepstone, on his return from =
the Zulu
border in March 1878, where he had been for some months discussing the vexed
and dangerous question of the boundary line with the Zulus, found it necess=
ary
to issue a stringent proclamation warning the agitators that their proceedi=
ngs
and meetings were illegal, and would be punished according to law. This
document which was at the time vulgarly known as the "Hold-your-jaw&qu=
ot;
proclamation, not being followed by action, produced but little effect.
On the 4th April 1878 another Boer meeting was
convened, at which it was decided to send a second deputation to England, to
consist this time of Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, with Mr. Bok as secretary.
This deputation proved as abortive as the first, Sir M. Hicks Beach assuring
it, in a letter dated 6th August 1878, that it is "impossible, for many
reasons, . . . . that the Queen's sovereignty should now be withdrawn."=
;
Whilst the Government was thus hampered by
internal disaffection, it had also many other difficulties on its hands. Fi=
rst,
there was the Zulu boundary question, which was constantly developing new
dangers to the country. Indeed, it was impossible to say what might happen =
in
that direction from one week to another. Nor were its relations with Secoco=
eni
satisfactory. It will be remembered that just before the Annexation this ch=
ief
had expressed his earnest wish to become a British subject, and even paid o=
ver
part of the fine demanded from him by the Boer Government to the Civil
Commissioner, Major Clarke. In March 1878, however, his conduct towards the
Government underwent a sudden change, and he practically declared war. It
afterwards appeared, from Secocoeni's own statement, that he was instigated=
to
this step by a Boer, Abel Erasmus by name--the same man who was concerned in
the atrocities in the first Secocoeni war--who constantly encouraged him to=
continue
the struggle. I do not propose to minutely follow the course of this long w=
ar,
which, commencing in the beginning of 1878, did not come to an end till aft=
er
the Zulu war: when Sir Garnet Wolseley attacked Secocoeni's stronghold with=
a
large force of troops, volunteers, and Swazi allies, and took it with great
slaughter. The losses on our side were not very heavy, so far as white men =
were
concerned, but the Swazies are reported to have lost 400 killed and 500
wounded.
The struggle was, during the long period prece=
ding
the final attack, carried on with great courage and ability by Major Clarke,
R.A., C.M.G., whose force, at the best of times, only consisted of 200
volunteers and 100 Zulus. With this small body of men he contrived, however=
, to
keep Secocoeni in check, and to take some important strongholds. It was mar=
ked
also by some striking acts of individual bravery, of which one, performed by
Major Clarke himself, whose reputation for cool courage and presence of min=
d in
danger is unsurpassed in South Africa, is worthy of notice; and which, had
public attention been more concentrated on the Secocoeni war, would doubtle=
ss
have won him the Victoria Cross. On one occasion, on visiting one of the
outlying forts, he found that a party of hostile natives, who were coming d=
own
to the fort on the previous day with a flag of truce, had been accidentally
fired upon, and had at once retreated. As his system in native warfare was
always to try and inspire his enemy with perfect faith in the honour of
Englishmen, and their contempt of all tricks and treachery even towards a f=
oe,
he was very angry at this occurrence, and at once, unarmed and unattended s=
ave
by his native servant, rode up into the mountains to the kraal from which t=
he
white flag party had come on the previous day, and apologised to the Chief =
for
what had happened. When I consider how very anxious Secocoeni's natives wer=
e to
kill or capture Clarke, whom they held in great dread, and how terrible the=
end
of so great a captain would in all probability have been had he taken alive=
by
these masters of refined torture, I confess that I think this act of
gentlemanly courage is one of the most astonishing things I ever heard of. =
When
he rode up those hills he must have known that he was probably going to meet
his death at the hands of justly incensed savages. When Secocoeni heard of =
what
Major Clarke had done he was so pleased that he shortly afterwards released=
a
volunteer whom he had taken prisoner, and who would otherwise, in all proba=
bility,
have been tortured to death. I must add that Major Clarke himself never
reported to or alluded to this incident, but an account of it can be found =
in a
despatch written by Sir O. Lanyon to the Secretary of State, dated 2d Febru=
ary
1880.
Concurrently with, though entirely distinct fr=
om,
the political agitation that was being carried on among the Boers having for
object the restoration of independence, a private agitation was set on foot=
by
a few disaffected persons against Sir T. Shepstone, with the view of obtain=
ing
his removal from office in favour of a certain Colonel Weatherley. The deta=
ils
of this impudent plot are so interesting, and the plot itself so typical of=
the
state of affairs with which Sir T. Shepstone had to deal, that I will give a
short account of it.
After the Annexation had taken place, there we=
re
naturally enough a good many individuals who found themselves disappointed =
in
the results so far as they personally were concerned; I mean that they did =
not
get so much out of it as they expected. Among these was a gentleman called
Colonel Weatherley, who had come to the Transvaal as manager of a gold-mini=
ng company,
but getting tired of that had taken a prominent part in the Annexation, and
who, being subsequently disappointed about an appointment, became a bitter
enemy of the Administrator. I may say at once that Colonel Weatherley seems=
to
me to have been throughout the dupe of the other conspirators.
The next personage was a good-looking desperad=
o,
who called himself Captain Gunn of Gunn, and who was locally somewhat
irreverently known as the very Gunn of very Gunn. This gentleman, whose for=
mer
career had been of a most remarkable order, was, on the annexation of the
country, found in the public prison charged with having committed various
offences, but on Colonel Weatherley's interesting himself strongly on his
behalf, he was eventually released without trial. On his release, he reques=
ted
the Administrator to publish a Government notice declaring him innocent of =
the
charges brought against him. This Sir T. Shepstone declined to do, and so, =
to
use his own words, in a despatch to the High Commissioner on the subject, C=
aptain
Gunn of Gunn at once became "what in this country is called a
patriot."
The third person concerned was a lawyer, who h=
ad
got into trouble on the Diamond Fields, and who felt himself injured because
the rules of the High Court did not allow him to practise as an advocate. T=
he
quartet was made up by Mr. Celliers, the editor of the patriotic organ, the=
"Volkstem,"
who, since he had lost the Government printing contract, found that no lang=
uage
could be too strong to apply to the personnel of the Government, more
especially its head. Of course, there was a lady in it; what plot would be
complete without? She was Mrs. Weatherley, now, I believe, Mrs. Gunn of Gun=
n.
These gentlemen began operations by drawing up a long petition to Sir Bartle
Frere as High Commissioner, setting forth a string of supposed grievances, =
and
winding up with a request that the Administrator might be "promoted to
some other sphere of political usefulness." This memorial was forwarde=
d by
the "committee," as they called themselves, to various parts of t=
he
country for signature, but without the slightest success, the fact of the
matter being that it was not the Annexor but the Annexation that the Boers =
objected
to.
At this stage in the proceedings Colonel
Weatherley went to try and forward the good cause with Sir Bartle Frere at =
the
Cape. His letters to Mrs. Weatherley from thence, afterwards put into Court=
in
the celebrated divorce case, contained many interesting accounts of his
attempts in that direction. I do not think, however, that he was cognisant =
of
what was being concocted by his allies in Pretoria, but being a very vain, =
weak
man, was easily deceived by them. With all his faults he was a gentleman. As
soon as he was gone a second petition was drawn up by the "committee,&=
quot;
showing "the advisability of immediately suspending our present
Administrator, and temporarily appointing and recommending for Her Majesty's
royal and favourable consideration an English gentleman of high integrity a=
nd
honour, in whom the country at large has respect and confidence."
The English gentleman of high integrity and ho=
nour
of course proves to be Colonel Weatherley, whose appointment is, further on,
"respectfully but earnestly requested," since he had "thorou=
ghly
gained the affections, confidence, and respect of Boers, English, and other=
Europeans
in this country." But whilst it is comparatively easy to write petitio=
ns,
there is sometimes a difficulty in getting people to sign them, as proved t=
o be
the case with reference to the documents under consideration. When the
"committee" and the employes in the office of the
"Volkstem" had affixed their valuable signatures it was found to =
be
impossible to induce anybody else to follow their example. Now, a petition =
with
some half dozen signatures attached would not, it was obvious, carry much
weight with the Imperial Government, and no more could be obtained.
But really great minds rise superior to such
difficulties, and so did the "committee," or some of them, or one=
of
them. If they could not get genuine signatures to their petitions, they cou=
ld
at any rate manufacture them. This great idea once hit out, so vigorously w=
as
it prosecuted that they, or some of them, or one of them, produced in a very
little while no less than 3883 signatures, of which sixteen were proved to =
be
genuine, five were doubtful, and all the rest fictitious. But the gentleman,
whoever he was, who was the working partner in the scheme--and I may state,=
by
way of parenthesis, that when Gunn of Gunn was subsequently arrested, petit=
ions
in process of signature were found under the mattress of his bed--calculated
without his host. He either did not know, or had forgotten, that on receipt=
of
such documents by a superior officer, they are at once sent to the officer
accused to report upon. This course was followed in the present case, and t=
he
petitions were discovered to be gross impostures. The ingenuity exercised by
their author or authors was really very remarkable, for it must be remember=
ed that
not one of the signatures was forged; they were all invented, and had, of
course, to be written in a great variety of hands. The plan generally pursu=
ed
was to put down the names of people living in the country, with slight
variations. Thus "De Villiers" became "De Williers," and
"Van Zyl" "Van Zul." I remember that my own name appear=
ed
on one of the petitions with some slight alteration. Some of the names were
evidently meant to be facetious. Thus there was a "Jan Verneuker,"
which means "John the Cheat."
Of the persons directly or indirectly concerne=
d in
this rascally plot, the unfortunate Colonel Weatherly subsequently apologis=
ed
to Sir T. Shepstone for his share in the agitation, and shortly afterwards =
died
fighting bravely on Kambula. Captain Gunn of Gunn and Mrs. Weatherley, after
having given rise to the most remarkable divorce case I ever heard,--it took
fourteen days to try--were, on the death of Colonel Weatherley, united in t=
he
bonds of holy matrimony, and are, I believe, still in Pretoria. The lawyer
vanished I know not where, whilst Mr. Celliers still continues to edit that
admirably conducted journal the "Volkstem;" nor, if I may judge f=
rom
the report of a speech made by him recently at a Boer festival, which, by t=
he
way, was graced by the presence of our representative, Mr. Hudson, the Brit=
ish
Resident: has his right hand forgotten its cunning, or rather his tongue lo=
st
the use of those peculiar and recherche epithets that used to adorn the col=
umns
of the "Volkstem." I see that he, on this occasion, denounced the=
English
element as being "poisonous and dangerous" to a State, and stated,
amidst loud cheers, that "he despised" it. Mr. Cellier's lines ha=
ve
fallen in pleasant places; in any other country he would long ago have fall=
en a
victim to the stern laws of libel. I recommend him to the notice of
enterprising Irish newspapers. Such is the freshness and vigour of his style
that I am confident he would make the fortune of any Hibernian journal.
Some little time after the Gunn of Gunn frauds=
a
very sad incident happened in connection with the Government of the Transva=
al.
Shortly after the Annexation, the Home Government sent out Mr. Sergeaunt, C=
.M.G.,
one of the Crown Agents for the Colonies, to report on the financial condit=
ion
of the country. He was accompanied, in an unofficial capacity, amongst other
gentlemen, by Captain Patterson and his son, Mr. J Sergeaunt; and when he
returned to England, these two gentlemen remained behind to go on a shooting
expedition. About this time Sir Bartle Frere was anxious to send a friendly
mission to Lo Bengula, king of the Matabele, a branch of the Zulu tribe, li=
ving
up towards the Zambesi. This chief had been making himself unpleasant by
causing traders to be robbed, and it was thought desirable to establish
friendly relations with him, so it was suggested to Captain Patterson and M=
r. Sergeaunt
that they should combine business with pleasure, and go on a mission to Lo
Bengula, an offer which they accepted, and shortly afterwards started for
Matabeleland with an interpreter and a few servants. They reached their des=
tination
in safety; and having concluded their business with the king, started on a
visit to the Zambesi Falls on foot, leaving the interpreter with the wagon.=
The
falls were about twelve days' walk from the king's kraal, and they were
accompanied thither by young Mr. Thomas, the son of the local missionary, t=
wo
Kafir servants, and twenty native bearers supplied by Lo Bengula. The next =
thing
that was heard of them was that they had all died through drinking poisoned
water, full details of the manner of their deaths being sent down by Lo
Bengula.
In the first shock and confusion of such news =
it
was not very closely examined, at any rate by the friends of the dead men, =
but,
on reflection, there were several things about it that appeared strange. For
instance, it was well known that Captain Patterson had a habit, for which
indeed, we had often laughed at him, of, however thirsty he might be, always
having his water boiled when he was travelling, in order to destroy impurit=
ies:
and it seemed odd, that he should on this one occasion, have neglected the
precaution. Also, it was curious that the majority of Lo Bengula's bearers
appeared to have escaped, whereas all the others were, without exception,
killed; nor even in that district is it usual to find water so bad that it =
will
kill with the rapidity it had been supposed to do in this case, unless inde=
ed
it had been designedly poisoned. These doubts of the poisoning-by-water-sto=
ry
resolved themselves into certainty when the waggon returned in charge of th=
e interpreter,
when, by putting two and two together, we were able to piece out the real
history of the diabolical murder of our poor friends with considerable
accuracy, a story which shows what bloodthirsty wickedness a savage is capa=
ble
of when he fancies his interests are threatened.
It appeared that, when Captain Patterson first
interviewed Lo Bengula, he was not at all well received by him. I must, by =
way
of explanation, state that there exists a Pretender to his throne, Kruman by
name, who, as far as I can make out, is the real heir to the kingdom. This =
man had,
for some cause or other, fled the country, and for a time acted as gardener=
to
Sir T. Shepstone in Natal. At the date of Messrs. Patterson and Sergeaunt's
mission to Matabeleland he was living, I believe, in the Transvaal. Captain
Patterson, on finding himself so ill received by the king, and not being
sufficiently acquainted with the character of savage chiefs, most
unfortunately, either by accident or design, dropped some hint in the cours=
e of
conversation about this Kruman. From that moment, Lo Bengula's conduct towa=
rds
the mission entirely changed, and, dropping his former tone, he became
profusely civil; and from that moment, too, he doubtless determined to kill
them, probably fearing that they might forward some scheme to oust him and
place Kruman, on whose claim a large portion of his people looked favourabl=
y,
on the throne.
When their business was done, and Captain
Patterson told the king that they were anxious, before returning, to visit =
the
Zambesi Falls, he readily fell in with their wish, but, in the first instan=
ce,
refused permission to young Thomas, the son of the missionary, to accompany=
them,
only allowing him to do so on the urgent representation of Captain Patterso=
n.
The reason for this was, no doubt, that he had kindly feelings towards the =
lad,
and did not wish to include him in the slaughter.
Captain Patterson was a man of extremely
methodical habits, and, amongst other things, was in the habit of making no=
tes
of all that he did. His note-book had been taken off his body, and sent dow=
n to
Pretoria with the other things. In it we found entries of his preparations =
for
the trip, including the number and names of the bearers provided by Lo Beng=
ula.
We also found the chronicle of the first three days' journey, and that of t=
he
morning of the fourth day, but there the record stopped. The last entry was
probably made a few minutes before he was killed; and it is to be observed =
that
there was no entry of the party having been for several days without water,=
as
stated by the messengers, and then finding the poisoned water.
This evidence by itself would not have amounte=
d to
much, but now comes the curious part of the story, showing the truth of the=
old
adage, "Murder will out." It appears that when the waggon was com=
ing
down to Pretoria in charge of the interpreter, it was outspanned one day
outside the borders of Lo Bengula's country, when some Kafirs--Bechuanas, I=
think--came
up, asked for some tobacco, and fell into conversation with the driver, rem=
arking
that he had come up with a full waggon, and now he went down with an empty =
one.
The driver replied by lamenting the death by poisoned water of his masters,
whereupon one of the Kafirs told him the following story:--He said that a
brother of his was out hunting, a little while back, in the desert for
ostriches, with a party of other Kafirs, when hearing shots fired some way =
off,
they made for the spot, thinking that white men were out shooting, and that
they would be able to beg meat. On reaching the spot, which was by a pool of
water, they saw the bodies of three white men lying on the ground, and also
those of a Hottentot and a Kafir, surrounded by an armed party of Kafirs. T=
hey at
once asked the Kafirs what they had been doing killing the white men, and w=
ere
told to be still, for it was by "order of the king." They then
learned the whole story. It appeared that the white men had made a mid-day =
halt
by the water, when one of the bearers, who had gone to the edge of the pool,
suddenly shouted to them to come and look at a great snake in the water.
Captain Patterson ran up, and, as he leaned over the edge, was instantly ki=
lled
by a blow with an axe; the others were then shot and assegaied. The Kafir
further described the clothes that his brother had seen on the bodies, and =
also
some articles that had been given to his party by the murderers, that left
little doubt as to the veracity of his story. And so ended the mission to
Matabeleland.
No public notice was taken of the matter, for =
the
obvious reason that it was impossible to get at Lo Bengula to punish him; n=
or
would it have been easy to come by legal evidence to disprove the ingenious
story of the poisoned water, since anybody trying to reach the spot of the =
massacre
would probably fall a victim to some similar accident before he got back ag=
ain.
It is devoutly to be hoped that the punishment he deserves will sooner or l=
ater
overtake the author of this devilish and wholesale murder.
The beginning of 1879 was signalised by the
commencement of operations in Zululand and by the news of the terrible disa=
ster
at Isandhlwana, which fell on Pretoria like a thunderclap. It was not, howe=
ver,
any surprise to those who were acquainted with Zulu tactics and with the pl=
an
of attack adopted by the English commanders. In fact, I know that one solemn
warning of what would certainly happen to him, if he persisted in his plan =
of
advance, was addressed to Lord Chelmsford, through the officer in command at
Pretoria, by a gentlemen whose position and long experience of the Zulus and
their mode of attack should have carried some weight. If it ever reached hi=
m,
he took, to the best of my recollection, no notice of it whatever.
But though some such disaster was daily expect=
ed
by a few, the majority of both soldiers and civilians never dreamed of anyt=
hing
of the sort, the general idea being that the conquest of Cetywayo was a very
easy undertaking: and the shock produced by the news of Isandhlwana was pro=
portionally
great, especially as it reached Pretoria in a much exaggerated form. I shall
never forget the appearance of the town that morning; business was entirely
suspended, and the streets were filled with knots of men talking, with scar=
ed
faces, as well they might: for there was scarcely anybody but had lost a
friend, and many thought that their sons or brothers were among the dead on
that bloody field. Among others, Sir T. Shepstone lost one son, and thought=
for
some time that he had lost three.
Shortly after this event Sir T. Shepstone went=
to
England to confer with the Secretary of State on various matters connected =
with
the Transvaal, carrying with him the affection and respect of all who knew =
him,
not excepting the majority of the malcontent Boers. He was succeeded by Col=
onel,
now Sir Owen Lanyon, who was appointed to administer the Government during =
the
absence of Sir T. Shepstone.
By the Boers, however, the news of our disaster
was received with great and unconcealed rejoicing, or at least by the
irreconcilable portion of that people. England's necessity was their opport=
unity,
and one of which they certainly meant to avail themselves. Accordingly, not=
ices
were sent out summoning the burghers of the Transvaal to attend a mass meet=
ing
on the 18th March, at a place about thirty miles from Pretoria. Emissaries =
were
also sent to native chiefs, to excite them to follow Cetywayo's example, and
massacre all the English within reach, of whom a man called Solomon Prinsloo
was one of the most active. The natives, however, notwithstanding the threa=
ts
used towards them, one and all declined the invitation.
It must not be supposed that all the Boers who
attended these meetings did so of their own free will; on the contrary, a v=
ery
large number came under compulsion, since they found that the English
authorities were powerless to give them protection. The recalcitrants were
threatened with all sorts of pains and penalties if they did not attend, a =
favourite
menace being that they should be made "biltong" of when the count=
ry
was given back (i.e., be cut into strips and hung in the sun to dry). Few,
luckily for themselves, were brave enough to tempt fortune by refusing to c=
ome,
but those who did, have had to leave the country since the war. Whatever we=
re
the means employed, the result was an armed meeting of about 3000 Boers, who
evidently meant mischief.
Just about this time a corps had been raised in
Pretoria, composed, for the most part, of gentlemen, and known as the Preto=
ria
Horse; for the purpose of proceeding to the Zulu border, where cavalry,
especially cavalry acquainted with the country, was earnestly needed. In th=
e emergency
of the times officials were allowed to join this corps, a permission of whi=
ch I
availed myself, and was elected one of the lieutenants.[*] The corps was no=
t,
after all, allowed to go to Zululand on account of the threatening aspect
adopted by the Boers, against whom it was retained for service. In my capac=
ity
as an officer of the corps I was sent out with a small body of picked men, =
all
good riders and light weights, to keep up a constant communication between =
the
Boer camp and the Administrator, and found the work both interesting and
exciting. My head-quarters were at an inn about twenty-five miles from
Pretoria, to which our agents in the meeting used to come every evening and
report how matters were proceeding, whereupon, if the road was clear, I
despatched a letter to head-quarters; or, if I feared that the messengers w=
ould
be caught en route by Boer patrols and searched, I substituted different
coloured ribbons according to what I wished to convey. There was a relief
hidden in the trees or rocks every six miles, all day and most of the night,
whose business it was to take the despatch or ribbon and gallop on with it =
to
the next station, in which way we used to get the despatches into town in a=
bout
an hour and a quarter.
[=
*] It
is customary in South African volunteer forces to allow the members to elect their own
officers, provided the men ele=
cted
are such as the Government approves. This is done, so that the corps may not afte=
rwards
be able to declare that they h=
ave no
confidence in their officers in action, or to grumble at their treat=
ment
by them.
On one or two occasions the Boers came to the =
inn
and threatened to shoot us, but as our orders were to do nothing unless our
lives were actually in danger, we took no notice. The officer who came out =
to relieve
me had not, however, been there more than a day or two before he and all his
troopers, were hunted back into Pretoria by a large mob of armed Boers whom
they only escaped by very hard riding.
Meanwhile the Boers were by degrees drawing ne=
arer
and nearer to the town, till at last they pitched their laagers within six
miles, and practically besieged it. All business was stopped, the houses we=
re loopholed
and fortified, and advantageous positions were occupied by the military and=
the
various volunteer corps. The building, normally in the occupation of the
Government mules, fell to the lot of the Pretoria Horse, and, though it was
undoubtedly a post of honour, I honestly declare that I have no wish to sle=
ep
for another month in a mule stable that has not been cleaned out for several
years. However, by sinking a well, and erecting bastions and a staging for
sharp-shooters, we converted it into an excellent fortress, though it would=
not
have been of much use against artillery. Our patrols used to be out all nig=
ht, since
we chiefly feared a night attack, and generally every preparation was made =
to
resist the onset that was hourly expected, and I believe that it was that s=
tate
of preparedness that alone prevented it.
Whilst this meeting was going on, and when mat=
ters
had come to a point that seemed to render war inevitable, Sir B. Frere arri=
ved
at Pretoria and had several interviews with the Boer leaders, at which they=
persisted
in demanding their independence, and nothing short of it. After a great dea=
l of
talk the meeting finally broke up without any actual appeal to arms, though=
it
had, during its continuance, assumed many of the rights of government, such=
as
stopping post-carts and individuals, and sending armed patrols about the
country. The principal reason of its break-up was that the Zulu war was now
drawing to a close, and the leaders saw that there would soon be plenty of
troops available to suppress any attempt at revolt, but they also saw to wh=
at
lengths they could go with impunity. They had for a period of nearly two mo=
nths
been allowed to throw the whole country into confusion, to openly violate t=
he
laws, and to intimidate and threaten Her Majesty's loyal subjects with war =
and
death. The lesson was not lost on them; but they postponed action till a mo=
re
favourable opportunity offered.
Sir Bartle Frere before his departure took an
opportunity at a public dinner given him at Potchefstroom of assuring the l=
oyal
inhabitants of the country that the Transvaal would never be given back.
Meanwhile a new Pharaoh had arisen in Egypt, in
the shape of Sir G. Wolseley, and on the 29th June 1879 we find him
communicating the fact to Sir O. Lanyon in very plain language, telling him
that he disapproved of his course of action with regard to Secocoeni, and t=
hat
"in future you will please take orders only from me."
As soon as Sir Garnet had completed his
arrangements for the pacification of Zululand, he proceeded to Pretoria, and
having caused himself to be sworn in as Governor, set vigorously to work. I
must say that in his dealings with the Transvaal he showed great judgment a=
nd a
keen appreciation of what the country needed, namely, strong government; the
fact of the matter being, I suppose, that being very popular with the Home
authorities he felt that he could more or less command their support in wha=
t he
did, a satisfaction not given to most governors, who never know but that th=
ey
may be thrown overboard in emergency, in lighten the ship.
One of his first acts was to issue a proclamat=
ion,
stating that "Whereas it appears that, notwithstanding repeated assura=
nces
of the contrary given by Her Majesty's representatives in this territory,
uncertainty or misapprehension exists amongst some of Her Majesty's subject=
s as
to the intention of Her Majesty's Government regarding the maintenance of B=
ritish
rule and sovereignty over the territory of the Transvaal: and whereas it is
expedient that all grounds for such uncertainty or misapprehension should be
removed once and for all beyond doubt or question: now therefore I do hereby
proclaim and make known, in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen,
that it is the will and determination of Her Majesty's Government that this
Transvaal territory shall be, and shall continue to be for ever, an integral
portion of Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa."
Alas! Sir G. Wolseley's estimate of the value =
of a
solemn pledge thus made in the name of Her Majesty, whose word has hitherto
been held to be sacred, differed greatly to that of Mr. Gladstone and his
Government.
Sir Garnet Wolseley's operations against Secoc=
oeni
proved eminently successful, and were the best arranged bit of native warfa=
re
that I have yet heard of in South Africa. One blow was struck, and only one,
but that was crushing. Of course the secret of his success lay in the fact =
that
he had an abundance of force; but it was not ensured by that alone, good
management being very requisite in an affair of the sort, especially where
native allies have to be dealt with. The cost of the expedition, not counti=
ng
other Secocoeni war expenditure, amounted to over 300,000 pounds, all of wh=
ich
is now lost to this country.
Another step in the right direction undertaken=
by
Sir Garnet was the establishment of an Executive Council and also of a
Legislative Council, for the establishment of which Letters Patent were sent
from Downing Street in November 1880.
Meanwhile the Boers, paying no attention to the
latter proclamation, for they guessed that it, like other proclamations in =
the
Transvaal, would be a mere brutum fulmen, had assembled for another mass
meeting, at which they went forward a step, and declared a Government which=
was
to treat with the English authorities. They had now learnt that they could =
do
what they liked with perfect impunity, provided they did not take the extre=
me
course of massacring the English. They had yet to learn that they might eve=
n do
that. At the termination of this meeting, a vote of thanks was passed to
"Mr. Leonard Courtney of London, and other members of the British
Parliament." It was wise of the Boer leaders to cultivate Mr. Courtney=
of
London. As a result of this meeting, Pretorius, one of the principal leader=
s,
and Bok, the secretary, were arrested on a charge of treason, and underwent=
a
preliminary examination; but as the Secretary of State, Sir M. Hicks Beach,
looked rather timidly on the proceeding, and the local authorities were
doubtful of securing a verdict, the prosecution was abandoned, and necessar=
ily
did more harm than good, being looked upon as another proof of the impotenc=
e of
the Government.
Shortly afterwards, Sir G. Wolseley changed his
tactics, and, instead of attempting to imprison Pretorius, offered him a se=
at
on the Executive Council, with a salary attached. This was a much more sens=
ible
way of dealing with him, and he at once rose to the bait, stating his willi=
ngness
to join the Government after a while, but that he could not publicly do so =
at
the moment lest he should lose his influence with those who were to be brou=
ght
round through him. It does not, however, appear that Mr. Pretorius ever did
actually join the Executive, probably because he found public opinion too
strong to allow him to do so.
In December 1879, a new light broke upon the
Boers, for, in the previous month Mr. Gladstone had been delivering his not=
ed
attack on the policy of the Conservative Government. Those Mid-Lothian spee=
ches
did harm, it is said, in many parts of the world; but I venture to think th=
at
they have proved more mischievous in South Africa than anywhere else; at an=
y rate,
they have borne fruit sooner. It is not to be supposed that Mr. Gladstone
really cared anything about the Transvaal or its independence when he was
denouncing the hideous outrage that had been perpetrated by the Conservative
Government in annexing it. On the contrary, as he acquiesced in the Annexat=
ion
at the time (when Lord Kimberley stated that it was evidently unavoidable),=
and
declined to rescind it when he came into power, it is to be supposed that he
really approved of it, or at the least looked on it as a necessary evil.
However this may be, any stick will do to beat a dog with, and the Transvaal
was a convenient point on which to attack the Government. He probably neith=
er
knew nor cared what effect his reckless words might have on ignorant Boers =
thousands
of miles away; and yet, humanly speaking, many a man would have been alive =
and
strong to-day, whose bones now whiten the African Veldt, had those words ne=
ver
been spoken. Then, for the first time, the Boers learnt that, if they played
their cards properly and put on sufficient pressure, they would, in the eve=
nt
of the Liberal party coming to office, have little difficulty in coercing i=
t as
they wished.
There was a fair chance at the time of the utt=
erance
of the Mid-Lothian speeches that the agitation would, by degrees, die away;=
Sir
G. Wolseley had succeeded in winning over Pretorius, and the Boers in gener=
al were
sick of mass meetings. Indeed, a memorial was addressed to Sir G. Wolseley =
by a
number of Boers in the Potchefstroom district, protesting against the
maintenance of the movement against Her Majesty's rule, which, considering =
the
great amount of intimidation exercised by the malcontents, may be looked up=
on
as a favourable sign.
But when it slowly came to be understood among=
the
Boers that a great English Minister had openly espoused their cause, and th=
at
he would perhaps soon be all-powerful, the moral gain to them was incalcula=
ble.
They could now go to the doubting ones and say,--we must be right about the
matter, because, putting our own feelings out of the question, the great
Gladstone says we are. We find the committee of the Boer malcontents, at th=
eir
meeting in March 1880, reading a letter to Mr. Gladstone, "in which he=
was
thanked for the great sympathy shown to their fate," and a hope expres=
sed
that, if he succeeded in getting power, he would not forget them. In fact, a
charming unanimity prevailed between our great Minister and the Boer rebels,
for their interests were the same, the overthrow of the Conservative
Government. If, however, every leader of the Opposition were to intrigue, or
countenance intrigues with those who are seeking to undermine the authority=
of
Her Majesty, whether they be Boers or Irishmen, in order to help himself to=
power,
the country might suffer in the long run.
But whatever feelings may have prompted Her
Majesty's opposition, the Home Government, and their agent, Sir Garnet
Wolseley, blew no uncertain blast, if we may judge from their words and
actions. Thus we find Sir Garnet speaking as follows at a banquet given in =
his
honour at Pretoria:--
"I am told that these men (the Boers) are
told to keep on agitating in this way, for a change of Government in England
may give them again the old order of things. Nothing can show greater ignor=
ance
of English politics than such an idea; I tell you that there is no Governme=
nt,
Whig or Tory, Liberal, Conservative, or Radical, who would dare under any c=
ircumstances
to give back this country. They would not dare, because the English people
would not allow them. To give back the country, what would it mean? To give=
it
back to external danger, to the danger of attack by hostile tribes on its
frontier, and who, if the English Government were removed for one day, would
make themselves felt the next. Not an official of Government paid for month=
s;
it would mean national bankruptcy. No taxes being paid, the same thing
recurring again which had existed before would mean danger without, anarchy=
and
civil war within, every possible misery; the strangulation of trade, and th=
e destruction
of property."
It is very amusing to read this passage by the
light of after events. On other occasions Sir Garnet Wolseley will probably=
not
be quite so confident as to the future when it is to be controlled by a Rad=
ical
Government.
This explicit and straightforward statement of=
Sir
Garnet's produced a great effect on the loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal,
which was heightened by the publication of the following telegram from the =
Secretary
of State:--"You may fully confirm explicit statements made from the ti=
me
to time as to inability of Her Majesty's Government to entertain any propos=
al
for withdrawal of the Queen's sovereignty."
On the faith of these declarations many Englis=
hmen
migrated to the Transvaal and settled there, whilst those who were in the
country now invested all their means, being confident that they would not l=
ose their
property through its being returned to the Boers. The excitement produced by
Mr. Gladstone's speeches began to quiet down and be forgotten for the time,
arrear taxes were paid up by the malcontents, and generally the aspect of
affairs was such, in Sir Garnet Wolseley's opinion, as justified him in
writing, in April 1880, to the Secretary of State expressing his belief that
the agitation was dying out.[*] Indeed, so sanguine was he on that point th=
at
he is reported to have advised the withdrawal of the cavalry regiment stati=
oned
in the territory, a piece of economy that was one of the immediate causes of
the revolt.
The reader will remember the financial conditi=
on
of the country at the time of the Annexation, which was one of utter
bankruptcy. After three years of British rule, however, we find,
notwithstanding the constant agitation that had been kept up, that the tota=
l revenue
receipts for the first quarter of 1879 and 1880 amounted to 22,773 pounds, =
and
44,982 pounds respectively. That is to say, that, during the last year of B=
ritish
rule, the revenue of the country more than doubled itself, and amounted to
about 160,000 pounds a-year, taking the quarterly returns at the low averag=
e of
40,000 pounds. It must, however, be remembered that this sum would have been
very largely increased in subsequent years, most probably doubled. At any r=
ate
the revenue would have been amply sufficient to make the province one of the
most prosperous in South Africa, and to have enabled it to shortly repay all
debts due to the British Government, and further to provide for its own
defence. Trade also, which in April 1877, was completely paralysed, had
increased enormously. So early as the middle of 1879, the Committee of the =
Transvaal
Chamber of Commerce pointed out, in a resolution adopted by them, that the
trade of the country had in two years, risen from almost nothing to the
considerable sum of two millions sterling per annum, and that it was entire=
ly
in the hands of those favourable to British rule. They also pointed out that
more than half the land tax was paid by Englishmen, or other Europeans adve=
rse
to Boer Government. Land, too, had risen greatly in value, of which I can g=
ive
the following instance. About a year after the Annexation I, together with a
friend, bought a little property on the outskirts of Pretoria, which, with a
cottage we put up on it, cost some 300 pounds. Just before the rebellion we=
fortunately
determined to sell it, and had no difficulty in getting 650 pounds for it. =
I do
not believe that it would now fetch a fifty pound note.
[=
*] In
Blue Book No. (C. 2866) of September 1881, which is descriptive of various events connec=
ted
with the Boer rising, is publi=
shed,
as an appendix, a despatch from Sir Garnet Wolseley, dated October 1879.=
This
despatch declares the writer's
opinion that the Boer discontent is on the increase. Its publication thus--apro=
pos
des bottes--nearly two years a=
fter
it was written, is rather an amusing incident. It certainly gives one the=
idea
that Sir Garnet Wolseley, fear=
ing
that his reputation for infallibility might be attacked by scoffers for no=
t having
foreseen the Boer rebellion, a=
nd
perhaps uneasily conscious of other despatches very different in tenor a=
nd
subsequent in date: and, mindf=
ul of
the withdrawal of the cavalry regiment by his advice, had caused it to be tack=
ed on
to the Blue Book as a document=
ary
"I told you so," and a proof that, whoever else was blinded, he foresaw. It con=
tains,
however, the following remarka=
ble
passage:--"Even were it not impossible, for many other reasons, to contempla=
te a
withdrawal of our authority fr=
om the
Transvaal, the position of insecurity in which we should leave this loyal and
important section of the commu=
nity
(the English inhabitants), by exposing them to the certain retaliation of the Boers,
would constitute, in my opinio=
n, an
insuperable obstacle to retrocession. Subjected to the same danger, moreov=
er,
would be those of the Boers, w=
hose
superior intelligence and courageous character has rendered them loyal to=
our
Government."
As the Government took the trouble to
publish the despatch, it is a =
pity
that they did not think fit to pay more attention to its contents.
I cannot conclude this chapter better than by
drawing attention to a charming specimen of the correspondence between the =
Boer
leaders and their friend Mr. Courtney. The letter in question, which is dat=
ed
26th June, purports to be written by Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, but it is =
obvious
that it owes its origin to some member or members of the Dutch party at the
Cape, from whence, indeed, it is written. This is rendered evident both by =
its
general style, and also by the use of such terms as "Satrap," and=
by
references to Napoleon III. and Cayenne, about whom Messrs. Kruger and Joub=
ert
know no more than they do of Peru and the Incas.
After alluding to former letters, the writers =
blow
a blast of triumph over the downfall of the Conservative Government, and th=
en
make a savage attack on the reputation of Sir Bartle Frere. The "stubb=
orn
Satrap" is throughout described as a liar, and every bad motive impute=
d to
him. Really, the fact that Mr. Courtney should encourage such epistles as t=
his
is enough to give colour to the boast made by some of the leading Boers, af=
ter
the war, that they had been encouraged to rebel by a member of the British
Government.
At the end of this letter, and on the same pag=
e of
the Blue Book, is printed the telegram recalling Sir Bartle Frere, dated 1st
August 1880. It really reads as though the second document was consequent to
the first. One thing is very clear, the feelings of Her Majesty's new Gover=
nment
towards Sir Bartle Frere differed only in the method of their expression, f=
rom
those set forth by the Boer leaders in their letter to Mr. Courtney, whilst
their object, namely, to be rid of him, was undoubtedly identical with that=
of
the Dutch party in South Africa.
Accession of Mr. Gladstone to power--His lette=
rs
to the Boer leaders and the loyals--His refusal to rescind the annexation--=
The
Boers encouraged by prominent members of the Radical party--The Bezuidenhou=
t incident--Despatch
of troops to Potchefstroom--Mass meeting of the 8th December 1880--Appointm=
ent
of the Triumvirate and declaration of the republic--Despatch of Boer
proclamation to Sir O. Lanyon--His reply--Outbreak of hostilities at
Potchefstroom--Defence of the court-house by Major Clarke--The massacre of =
the
detachment of the 94th under Colonel Anstruther--Dr. Ward--The Boer
rejoicings--The Transvaal placed under martial law--Abandonment of their ho=
mes
by the people of Pretoria--Sir Owen Lanyon's admirable defence
organisation--Second proclamation issued by the Boers--Its complete
falsehood--Life at Pretoria during the siege--Murders of natives by the
Boers--Loyal conduct of the native chiefs--Difficulty of preventing them fr=
om attacking
the Boers--Occupation of Lang's Nek by the Boers--Sir George Colley's depar=
ture
to Newcastle--The condition of that town--The attack on Lang's Nek--Its
desperate nature--Effect of victory on the Boers--The battle at the Ingogo-=
-Our
defeat--Sufferings of the wounded--Major Essex--Advance of the Boers into
Natal--Constant alarms--Expected attack on Newcastle--Its unorganised and
indefensible condition--Arrival of the reinforcements and retreat of the Bo=
ers
to the Nek--Despatch of General Wood to bring up more reinforcements--Majuba
Hill--Our disaster, and death of Sir George Colley--Cause of our defeat--A =
Boer
version of the disaster--Sir George Colley's tactics.
When the Liberal ministry became an accomplish=
ed fact
instead of a happy possibility, Mr. Gladstone did not find it convenient to
adopt the line of policy with reference to the Transvaal, that might have b=
een
expected from his utterances whilst leader of the Opposition. On the contra=
ry,
he declared in Parliament that the Annexation could not be cancelled, and on
the 8th June 1880 we find him, in answer to a Boer petition, written with t=
he
object of inducing him to act up to the spirit of his words and rescind the
Annexation, writing thus:--"Looking to all circumstances, both of the
Transvaal and the rest of South Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a
renewal of disorders which might lead to disastrous consequences, not only =
to
the Transvaal, but to the whole of South Africa, our judgment is, that the
Queen cannot be advised to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal; b=
ut,
consistently with the maintenance of that sovereignty, we desire that the w=
hite
inhabitants of the Transvaal should, without prejudice to the rest of the
population, enjoy the fullest liberty to manage their local affairs. We bel=
ieve
that this liberty may be most easily and promptly conceded to the Transvaal=
as
a member of a South African confederation."
Unless words have lost their signification, th=
is
passage certainly means that the Transvaal must remain a British colony, but
that England will be prepared to grant it responsible government, more
especially if it will consent to a confederation scheme. Mr. Gladstone,
however, in a communication dated 1st June 1881, and addressed to the
unfortunate Transvaal loyals, for whom he expresses "respect and
sympathy," interprets his meaning thus: "It is stated, as I obser=
ve,
that a promise was given to me that the Transvaal should never be given bac=
k.
There is no mention of the terms or date of this promise. If the reference =
be to
my letter, of 8th June 1880, to Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, I do not think =
the
language of that letter justifies the description given. Nor am I sure in w=
hat
manner or to what degree the fullest liberty to manage their local affairs,
which I then said Her Majesty's Government desired to confer on the white
population of the Transvaal, differs from the settlement now about being ma=
de
in its bearing on the interests of those whom your Committee represents.&qu=
ot;
Such twisting of the meaning of words would, i=
n a
private person, be called dishonest. It will also occur to most people that=
Mr.
Gladstone might have spared the deeply wronged and loyal subjects of Her
Majesty whom he was addressing, the taunt he levels at them in the second p=
aragraph
I have quoted. If asked, he would no doubt say that he had not the slightest
intention of laughing at them; but when he deliberately tells them that it
makes no difference to their interests whether they remain Her Majesty's su=
bjects
under a responsible Government, or become the servants of men who were but
lately in arms against them and Her Majesty's authority, he is either mocki=
ng
them, or offering an insult to their understandings.
By way of comment on his remarks, I may add th=
at
he had, in a letter replying to a petition from these same loyal inhabitant=
s,
addressed to him in May 1880, informed them that he had already told the Bo=
er representatives
that the Annexation could not be rescinded. Although Mr. Gladstone is undou=
btedly
the greatest living master of the art of getting two distinct and opposite =
sets
of meanings out of one set of words, it would try even his ingenuity to make
out, to the satisfaction of an impartial mind, that he never gave any pledge
about the retention of the Transvaal.
Indeed, it is from other considerations clear =
that
he had no intention of giving up the country to the Boers, whose cause he
appears to have taken up solely for electioneering purposes. Had he meant t=
o do
so, he would have carried out his intention on succeeding to office, and, i=
ndeed,
as things have turned out, it is deeply to be regretted that he did not; fo=
r,
bad as such a step would have been, it would at any rate have had a better
appearance than our ultimate surrender after three defeats. It would also h=
ave
then been possible to secure the repayment of some of the money owing to th=
is
country, and to provide for the proper treatment of the natives, and the
compensation of the loyal inhabitants who could no longer live there: since=
it
must naturally have been easier to make terms with the Boers before they had
defeated our troops.
On the other hand, we should have missed the
grandest and most soul-stirring display of radical theories, practically
applied, that has as yet lightened the darkness of this country. But althou=
gh
Mr. Gladstone gave his official decision against returning the country, the=
re
seems to be little doubt that communications on the subject were kept up wi=
th
the Boer leaders through some prominent members of the Radical party, whom,=
it
was said, went so far as to urge the Boers to take up arms against us. When=
Mr.
White came to this country on behalf of the loyalists, after the surrender,=
he
stated that this was so at a public meeting, and said further that he had i=
n his
possession proofs of his statements. He even went so far as to name the
gentleman he accused, and to challenge him to deny it. I have not been able=
to
gather that Mr. White's statements were contradicted.
However this may be, after a pause, agitation =
in
the Transvaal suddenly recommenced with redoubled vigour. It began through a
man named Bezuidenhout, who refused to pay his taxes. Thereupon a waggon wa=
s seized
in execution under the authority of the court and put up to auction, but its
sale was prevented by a crowd of rebel Boers, who kicked the auctioneer off=
the
waggon and dragged the vehicle away. This was on the 11th November 1880. Wh=
en
this intelligence reached Pretoria, Sir Owen Lanyon sent down a few compani=
es
of the 21st Regiment, under the command of Major Thornhill, to support the
Landdrost in arresting the rioters, and appointed Captain Raaf, C.M.G., to =
act
as special messenger to the Landdrost's Court at Potchefstroom, with author=
ity to
enrol special constables to assist him to carry out the arrests. On arrival=
at
Potchefstroom Captain Raaf found that, without an armed force, it was quite
impossible to effect any arrest. On the 26th November Sir Owen Lanyon,
realising the gravity of the situation, telegraphed to Sir George Colley,
asking that the 58th Regiment should be sent back to the Transvaal. Sir Geo=
rge
replied that he could ill spare it on account of "daily expected outbr=
eak
of Pondos and possible appeal for help from Cape Colony," and that the
Government must be supported by the loyal inhabitants.
It will be seen that the Boers had, with some
astuteness, chosen a very favourable time to commence operations. The hands=
of
the Cape Government were full with the Basutu war, so no help could be expe=
cted
from it. Sir G. Wolseley had sent away the only cavalry regiment that remai=
ned
in the country, and lastly, Sir Owen Lanyon had quite recently allowed a bo=
dy of
300 trained volunteers, mostly, if not altogether, drawn from among the
loyalists, to be raised for service in the Basutu war, a serious drain upon=
the
resources of a country so sparsely populated as the Transvaal.
Meanwhile a mass meeting had been convened by =
the
Boers for the 8th January to consider Mr. Gladstone's letter, but the
Bezuidenhout incident had the effect of putting forward the date of assembl=
y by
a month, and it was announced that it would be held on the 8th December. Su=
bsequently
the date was shifted to the 15th, and then back again to the 8th. Every eff=
ort
was made, by threats of future vengeance, to secure the presence of as many
burghers as possible; attempts were also made to persuade the native chiefs=
to
send representatives, and to promise to join in an attack on the English. T=
hese
entirely failed. The meeting was held at a place called Paarde Kraal, and
resulted in the sudden declaration of the Republic and the appointment of t=
he
famous triumvirate Kruger, Joubert, and Pretorius. It then moved into Heide=
lberg,
a little town about sixty miles from Pretoria, and on the 16th December the
Republic was formally proclaimed in a long proclamation, containing a summa=
ry
of the events of the few preceding years, and declaring the arrangements the
malcontents were willing to make with the English authorities. The terms
offered in this document are almost identical with those finally accepted by
Her Majesty's Government, with the exception that in the proclamation of the
16th December the Boer leaders declare their willingness to enter into conf=
ederation,
and to guide their native policy by general rules adopted in concurrence
"with the Colonies and States of South Africa." This was a more
liberal offer than that which we ultimately agreed to, but then the
circumstances had changed.
This proclamation was forwarded to Sir Owen La=
nyon
with a covering letter, in which the following words occur:--"We decla=
re
in the most solemn manner that we have no desire to spill blood, and that f=
rom
our side we do not wish war. It lies in your hands to force us to appeal to
arms in self-defence. . . . . We expect your answer within twice twenty-fou=
r hours."
I beg to direct particular attention to these paragraphs, as they have a considerable interest in view of what followed.<= o:p>
The letter and proclamation reached Government
House, Pretoria, at 10.30 on the evening of Friday the 17th December. Sir O=
wen
Lanyon's proclamation, written in reply, was handed to the messenger at noo=
n on
Sunday, 19th December, or within about thirty-six hours of his arrival, and
could hardly have reached the rebel camp, sixty miles off, before dawn the =
next
day, the 20th December, on which day, at about one o'clock, a detachment of=
the
94th was ambushed and destroyed on the road between Middelburg and Pretoria,
about eighty miles off, by a force despatched from Heidelburg for that purp=
ose
some days before. On the 16th December, or the same day on which the
Triumvirate had despatched the proclamation to Pretoria containing their te=
rms,
and expressing in the most solemn manner that they had no desire to shed bl=
ood,
a large Boer force was attacking Potchefstroom.
So much then for the sincerity of the professi=
ons
of their desire to avoid bloodshed.
The proclamation sent by Sir O. Lanyon in reply
recited in its preamble the various acts of which the rebels had been guilt=
y,
including that of having "wickedly sought to incite the said loyal nat=
ive
inhabitants throughout the province to take up arms against Her Majesty's G=
overnment,"
announced that matters had now been put into the hands of the officer
commanding Her Majesty's troops, and promised pardon to all who would dispe=
rse
to their homes.
It was at Potchefstroom, which town had all al=
ong
been the nursery of the rebellion, that actual hostilities first broke out.
Potchefstroom as a town is much more Boer in its sympathies than Pretoria,
which is, or rather was, almost purely English. Sir Owen Lanyon had, as sta=
ted before,
sent a small body of soldiers thither to support the civil authorities, and=
had
also appointed Major Clarke, C.M.G., an officer of noted coolness and abili=
ty,
to act as Special Commissioner for the district.
Major Clarke's first step was to try, in
conjunction with Captain Raaf, to raise a corps of volunteers, in which he
totally failed. Those of the townsfolk who were not Boers at heart had too =
many
business relations with the surrounding farmers, and perhaps too little fai=
th
in the stability of English rule after Mr. Gladstone's utterances, to allow=
them
to indulge in patriotism. At the time of the outbreak, between seventy and
eighty thousand sterling was owing to firms in Potchefstroom by neighbouring
Boers, a sum amply sufficient to account for their lukewarmness in the Engl=
ish
cause. Subsequent events have shown that the Potchefstroom shopkeepers were
wise in their generation.
On the 15th December a large number of Boers c=
ame
into the town and took possession of the printing-office in order to print =
the
proclamation already alluded to. Major Clarke made two attempts to enter the
office and see the leaders, but without success.
On the 16th a Boer patrol fired on some of the
mounted infantry, and the fire was returned. These were the first shots fir=
ed
during the war, and they were fired by Boers. Orders were thereupon signall=
ed
to Clarke by Lieutenant-Colonel Winsloe, 21st Regiment, now commanding at t=
he
fort which he afterwards defended so gallantly, that he was to commence fir=
ing.
Clarke was in the Landdrost's office on the Market Square with a force of a=
bout
twenty soldiers under Captain Falls and twenty civilians under Captain Raaf,
C.M.G., a position but ill-suited for defensive purposes, from whence fire =
was
accordingly opened, the Boers taking up positions in the surrounding houses
commanding the office. Shortly after the commencement of the fighting, Capt=
ain
Falls was shot dead whilst talking to Major Clarke, the latter having a nar=
row
escape, a bullet grazing his head just above the ear. The fighting continued
during the 17th and till the morning of the 18th, when the Boers succeeded =
in firing
the roof, which was of thatch, by throwing fire-balls on to it. Major Clarke
then addressed the men, telling them that, though personally he did not care
about his own life, he did not see that they could serve any useful purpose=
by
being burned alive, so he should surrender, which he did, with a loss of ab=
out
six killed and wounded. The camp meanwhile had repulsed with loss the attack
made on it, and was never again directly attacked.
Whilst these events were in progress at
Potchefstroom, a much more awful tragedy was in preparation on the road bet=
ween
Middelburg and Pretoria.
On the 23rd November Colonel Bellairs, at the
request of Sir Owen Lanyon, directed a concentration on Pretoria of most of=
the
few soldiers that there were in the territory, in view of the disturbed
condition of the country. In accordance with these orders, Colonel Anstruth=
er marched
from Lydenburg, a town about 180 miles from Pretoria, on the 5th December, =
with
the headquarters and two companies of the 94th Regiment, being a total of 2=
64
men, three women, and two children, and the disproportionately large train =
of
thirty-four ox-waggons, or an ox-waggon capable of carrying five thousand
pounds' weight to every eight persons. And here I may remark that it is this
enormous amount of baggage, without which it appears to be impossible to mo=
ve
the smallest body of men, that renders infantry regiments almost useless for
service in South Africa except for garrisoning purposes. Both Zulus and Boe=
rs can
get over the ground at thrice the pace possible to the unfortunate soldier,=
and
both races despise them accordingly. The Zulus call our infantry "pack
oxen." In this particular instance, Colonel Anstruther's defeat, or
rather, annihilation, is to a very great extent referable to his enormous
baggage train; since, in the first place, had he not lost valuable days in
collecting more waggons, he would have been safe in Pretoria before danger
arose. It must also be acknowledged that his arrangements on the line of ma=
rch
were somewhat reckless, though it can hardly be said that he was ignorant of
his danger. Thus we find that Colonel Bellairs wrote to Colonel Anstruther,
warning him of the probability of an attack, and impressing on him the
necessity of keeping a good look-out, the letter being received and
acknowledged by the latter on the 17th December.
To this warning was added a still more impress=
ive
one, that came to my knowledge privately. A gentleman well known to me
received, on the morning after the troops had passed through the town of
Middelburg on their way to Pretoria, a visit from an old Boer with whom he =
was
on friendly terms, who had purposely come to tell him that a large patrol w=
as
out to ambush the troops on the Pretoria road. My informant having convinced
himself of the truth of the statement, at once rode after the soldiers, and
catching them up some distance from Middelburg, told Colonel Anstruther wha=
t he
had heard, imploring him, he said, with all the energy he could command, to
take better precautions against surprise. The Colonel, however, laughed at =
his
fears, and told him that if the Boers came "he would frighten them away
with the big drum."
At one o'clock on Sunday, the 20th December, t=
he
column was marching along about a mile and a half from a place known as
Bronker's Spruit, and thirty-eight miles from Pretoria, when suddenly a lar=
ge
number of mounted Boers were seen in loose formation on the left side of the
road. The band was playing at the time, and the column was extended over mo=
re than
half a mile, the rear-guard being about a hundred yards behind the last wag=
gon.
The band stopped playing on seeing the Boers, and the troops halted, when a=
man
was seen advancing with a white flag, whom Colonel Anstruther went out to m=
eet,
accompanied by Conductor Egerton, a civilian. They met about one hundred and
fifty yards from the column, and the man gave Colonel Anstruther a letter,
which announced the establishment of the South African Republic, stated that
until they heard Lanyon's reply to their proclamation they did not know if =
they
were at war or not; that, consequently, they could not allow any movements =
of
troops which would be taken as a declaration of war. This letter was signed=
by
Joubert, one of the Triumvirate. Colonel Anstruther replied that he was ord=
ered
to Pretoria, and to Pretoria he must go.
Whilst this conference was going on, the Boers=
, of
whom there were quite five hundred, had gradually closed round the column, =
and
took up positions behind rocks and trees which afforded them excellent cove=
r, whilst
the troops were on a bare plain, and before Colonel Anstruther reached his =
men
a murderous fire was poured in upon them from all sides. The fire was hotly
returned by the soldiers. Most of the officers were struck down by the first
volley, having, no doubt, been picked out by the marksmen. The firing lasted
about fifteen minutes, and at the end of that time seven out of the nine of=
ficers
were down killed and wounded; an eighth (Captain Elliot), one of two who
escaped untouched, being reserved for an even more awful fate. The majority=
of
the men were also down, and had the hail of lead continued much longer it is
clear that nobody would have been left. Colonel Anstruther, who was lying b=
adly
wounded in five places, seeing what a hopeless state affairs were in, order=
ed
the bugler to sound the cease firing, and surrendered. One of the three
officers who were not much hurt was, most providentially, Dr. Ward, who had=
but
a slight wound in the thigh; all the others, except Captain Elliot and one
lieutenant, were either killed or died from the effects of their wounds. Th=
ere
were altogether 56 killed and 101 wounded, including a woman, Mrs. Fox. Twe=
nty
more afterwards died of their wounds. The Boer loss appears to have been ve=
ry
small.
After the fight Conductor Egerton, with a
sergeant, was allowed to walk into Pretoria to obtain medical assistance, t=
he
Boers refusing to give him a horse, or even to allow him to use his own. The
Boer leader also left Dr. Ward eighteen men and a few stores for the wounde=
d,
with which he made shift as best he could. Nobody can read this gentleman's
report without being much impressed with the way in which, though wounded h=
imself,
he got through his terrible task of, without assistance, attending to the w=
ants
of 101 sufferers. Beginning the task at two P.M., it took him till six the =
next
morning before he had seen the last man. It is to be hoped that his service=
s have
met with some recognition. Dr. Ward remained near the scene of the massacre
with his wounded men till the declaration of peace, when he brought them do=
wn
to Maritzburg, having experienced great difficulty in obtaining food for th=
em
during so many weeks.
This is a short account of what I must, with
reluctance, call a most cruel and carefully planned massacre. I may mention
that a Zulu driver, who was with the rear-guard, and escaped into Natal, st=
ated
that the Boers shot all the wounded men who formed that body. His statement=
was
to a certain extent borne out by the evidence of one of the survivors, who
stated that all the bodies found in that part of the field (nearly three-qu=
arters
of a mile away from the head of the column), had a bullet hole through the =
head
or breast in addition to their other wounds.
The Administrator in the Transvaal in council =
thus
comments on the occurrence in an official minute:--"The surrounding and
gradual hemming in under a flag of truce of a force, and the selection of s=
pots
from which to direct their fire, as in the case of the unprovoked attack by=
the
rebels upon Colonel Anstruther's force, is a proceeding of which very few l=
ike
incidents can be mentioned in the annals of civilised warfare."
The Boer leaders, however, were highly elated =
at
their success, and celebrated it in a proclamation of which the following i=
s an
extract:--"Inexpressible is the gratitude of the burghers for this ble=
ssing
conferred on them. Thankful to the brave General F. Joubert and his men who
have upheld the honour of the Republic on the battlefield. Bowed down in the
dust before Almighty God, who had thus stood by them, and, with a loss of o=
ver
a hundred of the enemy, only allowed two of ours to be killed."
In view of the circumstances of the treacherous
hemming in and destruction of this small body of unprepared men, most people
would think this language rather high-flown, not to say blasphemous.
On the news of this disaster reaching Pretoria,
Sir Owen Lanyon issued a proclamation placing the country under martial law=
. As
the town was large, straggling, and incapable of defence, all the inhabitan=
ts, amounting
to over four thousand souls, were ordered up to camp, where the best
arrangements possible were made for their convenience. In these quarters th=
ey
remained for three months, driven from their comfortable homes, and cheerfu=
lly
enduring all the hardships, want, and discomforts consequence on their
position, whilst they waited in patience for the appearance of that relievi=
ng
column that never came. People in England hardly understand what these men =
and
women went through because they chose to remain loyal. Let them suppose that
all the inhabitants of an ordinary English town, with the exception of the
class known as poor people, which can hardly be said to exist in a colony, =
were
at an hour's notice ordered--all, the aged, and the sick, delicate women, a=
nd
tiny children--to leave their homes to the mercy of the enemy, and crowd up=
in
a little space under shelter of a fort, with nothing but canvas tents or sh=
eds
to cover them from the fierce summer suns and rains, and the coarsest ratio=
ns
to feed them; whilst the husbands and brothers were daily engaged with a
cunning and dangerous enemy, and sometimes brought home wounded or dead. Th=
ey
will, then, have some idea of what was gone through by the loyal people of
Pretoria, in their weak confidence in the good faith of the English Governm=
ent.
The arrangements made for the defence of the t=
own
were so ably and energetically carried out by Sir Owen Lanyon, assisted by =
the
military officers, that no attack upon it was ever attempted. It seems to me
that the organisation that could provide for the penning up of four thousan=
d people
for months, and carry it out without the occurrence of a single unpleasantn=
ess or
expression of discontent, must have had something remarkable about it. Of
course, it would have been impossible without the most loyal co-operation on
the part of those concerned. Indeed, everybody in the town lent a helping h=
and;
judges served out rations, members of the Executive inspected nuisances, an=
d so
forth. There was only one instance of "striking;" and then, of all
people in the world, it was the five civil doctors who, thinking it a
favourable opportunity to fleece the Government, combined to demand five
guineas a-day each for their services. I am glad to say that they did not
succeed in their attempt at extortion.
On the 23d December, the Boer leaders issued a
second proclamation in reply to that of Sir O. Lanyon of the 18th, which is
characterised by an utter absence of regard for the truth, being, in fact,
nothing but a tissue of impudent falsehoods. It accuses Sir O. Lanyon of ha=
ving
bombarded women and children, of arming natives against the Boers, and of
firing on the Boers without declaring war. Not one of these accusations has=
any
foundation in fact, as the Boers well knew; but they also knew that Sir Owe=
n,
being shut up in Pretoria, was not in a position to rebut their charges, wh=
ich
they hoped might, to some extent, be believed, and create sympathy for them=
in
other parts of the world. This was the reason for the issue of the
proclamation, which well portrays the character of its framers.
Life at Pretoria was varied by occasional sort=
ies
against the Boer laagers, situated at different points in the neighbourhood,
generally about six or eight miles from the town. These expeditions were
carried out with considerable success, though with some loss, the heaviest =
incurred
being when the Boers, having treacherously hoisted the white flag, opened a
heavy fire on the Pretoria forces, as soon as they, beguiled into confidenc=
e,
emerged from their cover. In the course of the war, one in every four of the
Pretoria mounted volunteers was killed or wounded.
But perhaps the most serious of all the diffic=
ulties
the Government had to meet, was that of keeping the natives in check. As has
before been stated they were devotedly attached to our rule, and, during the
three years of its continuance, had undergone what was to them a strange ex=
perience,
they had neither been murdered, beaten, or enslaved. Naturally they were in=
no
hurry to return to the old order of things, in which murder, flogging, and
slavery were events of everyday occurrence. Nor did the behaviour of the Bo=
ers
on the outbreak of the war tend to reconcile them to any such idea. Thus we
find that the farmers had pressed a number of natives from Waterberg into o=
ne
of their laagers (Zwart Koppies); two of them tried to run away, a Boer saw
them and shot them both. Again, on the 7th January a native reported to the=
authorities
at Pretoria that he and some others were returning from the Diamond Fields
driving some sheep. A Boer came and asked them to sell the sheep. They refu=
sed,
whereupon he went away, but returning with some other Dutchmen fired on the
Kafirs, killing one.
On the 2d January information reached Pretoria
that on the 26th December some Boers fired on some natives who were resting
outside Potchefstroom and killed three; the rest fled, whereupon the Boers =
took
the cattle they had with them.
On the 11th January some men, who had been sent
from Pretoria with despatches for Standerton, were taken prisoners. Whilst
prisoners they saw ten men returning from the Fields stopped by the Boers a=
nd
ordered to come to the laager. They refused and ran away, were fired on, fi=
ve being
killed and one getting his arm broken.
These are a few instances of the treatment met=
ed
out to the unfortunate natives, taken at haphazard from the official report=
s.
There are plenty more of the same nature if anybody cares to read them.
As soon as the news of the rising reached them,
every chief of any importance sent in to offer aid to Government, and many =
of
them, especially Montsoia, our old ally in the Keate Award district, took t=
he loyals
of the neighbourhood under their protection. Several took charge of Governm=
ent
property and cattle during the disturbances, and one had four or five thous=
and
pounds in gold, the product of a recently collected tax given him to take c=
are
of by the Commissioner of his district, who was afraid that the money would=
be
seized by the Boers. In every instance the property entrusted to their char=
ge
was returned intact. The loyalty of all the native chiefs under very trying=
circumstances
(for the Boers were constantly attempting to cajole or frighten them into
joining them) is a remarkable proof of the great affection of the Kafirs, m=
ore
especially those of the Basutu tribes, who love peace better than war, for =
the
Queen's rule. The Government of Pretoria need only have spoken one word, to=
set
an enormous number of armed men in motion against the Boers, with the most
serious results to the latter. Any other Government in the world would, in =
its
extremity, have spoken that word, but, fortunately for the Boers, it is aga=
inst
English principles to set black against white under any circumstances.
Besides the main garrison at Pretoria there we=
re
forts defended by soldiery and loyals at the following places:--Potchefstro=
om,
Rustenburg, Lydenburg, Marabastad, and Wakkerstroom, none of which were tak=
en
by the Boers.[*]
[=
*]
Colonel Winsloe, however, being short of provisions, was beguiled by the fraudulent represent=
ations
and acts of the Boer commander=
into
surrendering the fort at Potchefstroom during the armistice.
One of the first acts of the Triumvirate was to
despatch a large force from Heidelberg with orders to advance into Natal
Territory, and seize the pass over the Drakensberg known as Lang's Nek, so =
as
to dispute the advance of any relieving column. This movement was promptly
executed, and strong Boer troops patrolled Natal country almost up to
Newcastle.
The news of the outbreak, followed as it was by
that of the Bronker's Spruit massacre, and Captain Elliot's murder, created=
a
great excitement in Natal. All available soldiers were at once despatched up
country, together with a naval brigade, who, on arrival at Newcastle, broug=
ht
up the strength of the Imperial troops of all arms to about a thousand men.=
On
the 10th January Sir George Colley left Maritzburg to join the force at
Newcastle, but at this time nobody dreamt that he meant to attack the Nek w=
ith
such an insignificant column. It was known that the loyals and troops who w=
ere
shut up in the various towns in the Transvaal had sufficient provisions to =
last
for some months, and that there was therefore nothing to necessitate a forl=
orn
hope. Indeed the possibility of Sir George Colley attempting to enter the
Transvaal was not even speculated upon until just before his advance, it be=
ing
generally considered as out of the question.
The best illustration I can give of the feeling
that existed about the matter is to quote my own case. I had been so
unfortunate as to land in Natal with my wife and servants just as the Trans=
vaal
troubles began, my intention being to proceed to a place I had near Newcast=
le.
For some weeks I remained in Maritzburg, but finding that the troops were t=
o concentrate
on Newcastle, and being besides heartily wearied of the great expense and
discomfort of hotel life in that town, I determined to go on up country,
looking on it as being as safe as any place in the Colony. Of course the
possibility of Sir George attacking the Nek before the arrival of the
reinforcements did not enter into my calculations, as I thought it a venture
that no sensible man would undertake. On the day of my start, however, there
was a rumour about the town that the General was going to attack the Boer
position. Though I did not believe it, I thought it as well to go and ask t=
he
Colonial Secretary, Colonel Mitchell, privately, if there was any truth in =
it,
adding that if there was, as I had a pretty intimate knowledge of the Boers=
and
their shooting powers, and what the inevitable result of such a move would =
be, I
should certainly prefer, as I had ladies with me, to remain where I was.
Colonel Mitchell told me frankly that he knew no more about Sir George's pl=
ans
than I did; but he added I might be sure that so able and prudent a soldier
would not do anything rash. His remark concurred with my own opinion; so I
started, and on arrival at Newcastle a week later was met by the intelligen=
ce
that Sir George had advanced that morning to attack the Nek. To return was
almost impossible, since both horses and travellers were pretty nearly knoc=
ked
up. Also, anybody who has travelled with his family in summer-time over the
awful track of alternate slough and boulders between Maritzburg and Newcast=
le,
known in the Colony as a road, will understand, that at the time, the
adventurous voyagers would far rather risk being shot than face a return jo=
urney.
The only thing to do under the circumstances w=
as
to await the course of events, which were now about to develop themselves w=
ith
startling rapidity. The little town of Newcastle was at this time an odd si=
ght,
and remained so all through the war. The hotels were crowded to overflowing
with refugees, and on every spare patch of land were erected tents, mud hut=
s,
canvas houses, and every kind of covering that could be utilised under the
pressure of necessity, to house the many homeless families who had succeede=
d in
effecting their escape from the Transvaal, many of whom were reduced to gre=
at
straits.
On the morning of the 28th January, anybody
listening attentively in the neighbourhood of Newcastle could hear the dist=
ant
boom of heavy guns. We were not kept long in suspense, for in the afternoon
news arrived that Sir George had attacked the Nek, and failed with heavy lo=
ss. The
excitement in the town was intense, for, in addition to other consideration=
s,
the 58th Regiment, which had suffered most, had been quartered there for so=
me
time, and both the officers and men were personally known to the inhabitant=
s.
The story of the fight is well known, and needs
little repetition, and a sad story it is. The Boers, who at that time were =
some
2000 strong, were posted and entrenched on steep hills, against which Sir
George Colley hurled a few hundred soldiers. It was a forlorn hope, but so
gallant was the charge, especially that of the mounted squadron led by Majo=
r Bronlow,
that at one time it nearly succeeded. But nothing could stand under the
withering fire from the Boer schanses, and as regards the foot soldiers, th=
ey
never had a chance. Colonel Deane tried to take them up the hill with a rus=
h,
with the result that by the time they reached the top, some of the men were
actually sick from exhaustion, and none could hold a rifle steady. There on=
the
bare hill-top, they crouched and lay, while the pitiless fire from redoubt =
and
rock lashed them like hail, till at last human nature could bear it no long=
er,
and what was left of them retired slowly down the slope. But for many, that
gallant charge was their last earthly action. As they charged they fell, and
where they fell they were afterwards buried. The casualties, killed and
wounded, amounted to 195, which, considering the small number of troops eng=
aged
in the actual attack, is enormously heavy, and shows more plainly than words
can tell, the desperate nature of the undertaking. Amongst the killed were
Colonel Deane, Major Poole, Major Hingeston, and Lieutenant Elwes. Major Es=
sex
was the only staff officer engaged who escaped, the same officer who was on=
e of
the fortunate four who lived through Isandhlwana. On this occasion his usual
good fortune attended him, for though his horse was killed and his helmet
knocked off, he was not touched. The Boer loss was very trivial.
Sir George Colley, in his admirably lucid desp=
atch
about this occurrence addressed to the Secretary of State for War, does not
enter much into the question as to the motives that prompted him to attack,=
simply
stating that his object was to relieve the besieged towns. He does not appe=
ar
to have taken into consideration, what was obvious to anybody who knew the
country and the Boers, that even if he had succeeded in forcing the Nek, in
itself almost an impossibility, he could never have operated with any succe=
ss
in the Transvaal with so small a column, without cavalry, and with an enorm=
ous
train of waggons. He would have been harassed day and night by the Boer
skirmishers, his supplies cut off, and his advance made practically impossi=
ble.
Also the Nek would have been re-occupied behind him, since he could not have
detached sufficient men to hold it, and in all probability Newcastle, his b=
ase
of supplies, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.
The moral effect of our defeat on the Boers was
very great. Up to this time there had been many secret doubts amongst a lar=
ge
section of them as to what the upshot of an encounter with the troops might=
be;
and with this party, in the same way that defeat, or even the anxiety of
waiting to be attacked, would have turned the scale one way, victory turned=
it the
other. It gave them unbounded confidence in their own superiority, and infu=
sed
a spirit of cohesion and mutual reliance into their ranks which had before =
been
wanting. Waverers wavered no longer, but gave a loyal adherence to the good
cause, and, what was still more acceptable, large numbers of
volunteers,--whatever President Brand may say to the contrary,--poured in f=
rom
the Orange Free State.
What Sir George Colley's motive was in making =
so
rash a move is, of course, quite inexplicable to the outside observer. It w=
as
said at the time in Natal that he was a man with a theory: namely, that sma=
ll
bodies of men properly handled were as useful and as likely to obtain the o=
bject
in view as a large force. Whether or no this was so, I am not prepared to s=
ay;
but it is undoubtedly the case that very clever men have sometimes very odd
theories, and it may be that he was a striking instance in point.
For some days after the battle at Lang's Nek
affairs were quiet, and it was hoped that they would remain so till the arr=
ival
of the reinforcements, which were on their way out. The hope proved a vain =
one.
On the 7th February it was reported that the escort proceeding from Newcast=
le
to the General's camp with the post, a distance of about eighteen miles, had
been fired on and forced to return.
On the 8th, about mid-day, we were all startle=
d by
the sound of fighting, proceeding apparently from a hill known as Scheins
Hoogte, about ten miles from Newcastle. It was not know that the General co=
ntemplated
any move, and everybody was entirely at a loss to know what was going on, t=
he
general idea being, however, that the camp near Lang's Nek had been abandon=
ed,
and that Sir George was retiring on Newcastle.
The firing grew hotter and hotter, till at las=
t it
was perfectly continuous, the cannon evidently being discharged as quickly =
as
they could be loaded, whilst their dull booming was accompanied by the unce=
asing
crash and roll of the musketry. Towards three o'clock the firing slackened,=
and
we thought it was all over, one way or the other, but about five o'clock it
broke out again with increased vigour. At dusk it finally ceased. About this
time some Kafirs came to my house and told us that an English force was hem=
med
in on a hill this side of the Ingogo River, that they were fighting bravely,
but that "their arms were tired," adding that they thought they w=
ould
be all killed at night.
Needless to say we spent that night with heavy=
hearts,
expecting every minute to hear the firing begin again, and ignorant of what
fate had befallen our poor soldiers on the hill. Morning put an end to our =
suspense,
and we then learnt that we had suffered what, under the circumstances, amou=
nted
to a crushing defeat. It appears that Sir George had moved out with a force=
of
five companies of the 60th Regiment, two guns, and a few mounted men, to, in
his own words, "patrol the road, and meet and escort some waggons expe=
cted
from Newcastle." As soon as he passed the Ingogo he was surrounded by a
body of Boers sent after him from Lang's Nek, on a small triangular plateau,
and sharply assailed on all sides. With a break of about two hours, from th=
ree
to five, the assault was kept up till nightfall, with very bad results so f=
ar
as we were concerned, seeing that out of a body of about 500 men, over 150 =
were
killed and wounded. The reinforcements sent for from the camp apparently did
not come into action. For some unexplained reason the Boers did not follow =
up
their attack that night, perhaps because they did not think it possible that
our troops could effect their escape back to the camp, and considered that =
the
next morning would be soon enough to return and finish the business. The
General, however, determined to get back, and scratch teams of such mules,
riding-horses, and oxen as had lived through the day being harnessed to the
guns, the dispirited and exhausted survivors of the force managed to ford t=
he
Ingogo, now swollen by rain which had fallen in the afternoon, poor Lieuten=
ant Wilkinson,
the Adjutant of the 60th, losing his life in the operation, and to struggle
through the dense darkness back to camp.
On the hill-top they had lately held, the dead=
lay
thick. There, too, exposed to the driving rain and bitter wind lay the woun=
ded,
many of whom would be dead before the rising of the morrow's sun. It must, =
indeed,
have been a sight never to be forgotten by those who saw it. The night--I
remember well--was cold and rainy, the great expanses of hill and plain bei=
ng
sometimes lit by the broken gleams of an uncertain moon, and sometimes plun=
ged
into intensest darkness by the passing of a heavy cloud. Now and again flas=
hes
of lightning threw every crag and outline into vivid relief, and the deep
muttering of distant thunder made the wild gloom more solemn. Then a gust of
icy wind would come tearing down the valleys to be followed by a pelting
thunder shower--and thus the night wore away.
When one reflects what discomfort, and even
danger, an ordinary healthy person would suffer if left after a hard day's =
work
to lie all night in the rain and wind on the top of a stony mountain, witho=
ut
food, or even water to assuage his thirst, it becomes to some degree possib=
le
to realise what the sufferings of our wounded after the battle of Ingogo mu=
st
have been. Those who survived were next day taken to the hospital at Newcas=
tle.
What Sir George Colley's real object was in
exposing himself to the attack has never transpired. It can hardly have bee=
n to
clear the road, as he says in his despatch, because the road was not held by
the enemy, but only visited occasionally by their patrols. The result of the
battle was to make the Boers, whose losses were trifling, more confident th=
an ever,
and to greatly depress our soldiers. Sir George had now lost between three =
and
four hundred men, out of his column of little over a thousand, which was
thereby entirely crippled. Of his staff Officers Major Essex now alone
survived, his usual good fortune having carried him safe through the battle=
of
Ingogo. What makes his repeated escapes the more remarkable is that he was
generally to be found in the heaviest firing. A man so fortunate as Major E=
ssex
ought to be rewarded for his good fortune if for no other reason, though, if
reports are true, there would be no need to fall back on that to find groun=
ds
on which to advance a soldier who has always borne himself so well.
Another result of the Ingogo battle was that t=
he
Boers, knowing that we had no force to cut them off, and always secure of a
retreat into the Free State, passed round Newcastle in Free State Territory,
and descended from fifteen hundred to two thousand strong into Natal for th=
e purpose
of destroying the reinforcements which were now on their way up under Gener=
al
Wood. This was on the 11th of February, and from that date till the 18th, t=
he
upper districts of Natal were in the hands of the enemy, who cut the telegr=
aph
wires, looted waggons, stole herds of cattle and horses, and otherwise amus=
ed
themselves at the expense of Her Majesty's subjects in Natal.
It was a very anxious time for those who knew =
what
Boers are capable of, and had women and children to protect, and who were n=
ever
sure if their houses would be left standing over their heads from one day to
another.
Every night we were obliged to place out Kafir=
s as
scouts to give us timely warning of the approach of marauding parties, and =
to
sleep with loaded rifles close to our hands, and sometimes, when things loo=
ked
very black, in our clothes, with horses ready saddled in the stable. Nor we=
re our
fears groundless, for one day a patrol of some five hundred Boers encamped =
on
the next place, which by the way belonged to a Dutchman, and stole all the
stock on it, the property of an Englishman. They also intercepted a train of
waggons, destroyed the contents, and burnt them. Numerous were the false al=
arms
it was our evil fortune to experience. For instance, one night I was sittin=
g in
the drawing-room reading, about eleven o'clock, with a door leading on to t=
he
verandah slightly ajar, for the night was warm, when suddenly I heard myself
called by name in a muffled voice, and asked if the place was in the posses=
sion
of the Boers. Looking towards the door I saw a full-cocked revolver coming =
round
the corner, and on opening it in some alarm, I could indistinctly discern a
line of armed figures in a crouching attitude stretching along the verandah
into the garden beyond. It turned out to be a patrol of the mounted police,=
who
had received information that a large number of Boers had seized the place =
and
had come to ascertain the truth of the report. As we gathered from them that
the Boers were certainly near, we did not pass a very comfortable night.
Meanwhile, we were daily expecting to hear that
the troops had been attacked along the line of march, and knowing the natur=
e of
the country and the many opportunities it affords for ambuscading and
destroying one of our straggling columns encumbered with innumerable waggon=
s,
we had the worst fears for the result. At length a report reached us to the=
effect
that the reinforcements were expected on the morrow, and that they were not
going to cross the Ingagaan at the ordinary drift, which was much commanded=
by
hills, but at a lower drift on our own place, about three miles from Newcas=
tle,
which was only slightly commanded. We also heard that it was the intention =
of
the Boers to attack them at this point and to fall back on my house and the
hills beyond. Accordingly, we thought it about time to retreat, and securin=
g a
few valuables such as plate, we made our way into the town, leaving the hou=
se
and its contents to take their chance. At Newcastle an attack was daily
expected, if for no other reason, to obtain possession of the stores collec=
ted
there.
The defences of the place were, however, in a
wretched condition, no proper outlook was kept, and there was an utter want=
of
effective organisation. The military element at the camp had enough to do to
look after itself, and did not concern itself with the safety of the town; =
and
the mounted police--a Colonial force paid by the Colony--had been withdrawn
from the little forts round Newcastle, as the General wanted them for other
purposes, and a message sent that the town must defend its own forts. There
were, it is true, a large number of able-bodied men in the place who were
willing to fight, but they had no organisation. The very laager was not
finished until the danger was past.
Then there was a large party who were for
surrendering the town to the Boers, because if they fought it might afterwa=
rds
injure their trade. With this section of the population the feeling of
patriotism was strong, no doubt, but that of pocket was stronger. I am
convinced that the Boers would have found the capture of Newcastle an easy
task, and I confess that what I then saw did not inspire me with great hope=
s of
the safety of the Colony when it gets responsible government, and has to de=
pend
for protection on burgher forces. Colonial volunteer forces are, I think, as
good troops as any in the world; but an unorganised colonial mob, pulled th=
is
way and that by different sentiments and interests, is as useless as any ot=
her
mob, with the difference that it is more impatient of control.
For some unknown reason the Boer leaders
providentially changed their minds about attacking the reinforcements, and
their men were withdrawn to the Nek as swiftly and silently as they had been
advanced, and on the 17th February the reinforcements marched into Newcastl=
e to
the very great relief of the inhabitants, who had been equally anxious for
their own safety and that of the troops. Personally, I was never in my life=
more
pleased to see Her Majesty's uniform; and we were equally rejoiced on retur=
ning
home to find that nothing had been injured. After this we had quiet for a
while.
On the 21st February, we heard that two fresh
regiments had been sent up to the camp at Lang's Nek, and that General Wood=
had
been ordered down country by Sir George Colley to bring up more reinforceme=
nts.
This item of news caused much surprise, as nobody could understand, why, now
that the road was clear, and that there was little chance of its being agai=
n blocked,
a General should be sent down to do work, which could, to all appearance, h=
ave
been equally well done by the Officers in command of the reinforcing regime=
nts,
with the assistance of their transport riders. It was, however, understood =
that
an agreement had been entered into between the two Generals, that no offens=
ive
operations should be undertaken till Wood returned.
With the exception of occasional scares, there=
was
no further excitement till Sunday the 27th February, when, whilst sitting on
the verandah after lunch, I thought I heard the sound of distant artillery.
Others present differed with me, thinking the sound was caused by thunder, =
but as
I adhered to my opinion, we determined to ride into town and see. On arrival
there, we found the place full of rumours, from which we gathered that some
fresh disaster had occurred: and that messages were pouring down the wires =
from
Mount Prospect camp. We then went on to camp, thinking that we should learn
more there, but they knew nothing about it, several officers asking us what=
new
"shave" we had got hold of. A considerable number of troops had b=
een
marched from Newcastle that morning to go to Mount Prospect, but when it wa=
s realised
that something had occurred, they were stopped, and marched back again. Bit=
by
bit we managed to gather the truth. At first we heard that our men had made=
a most
gallant resistance on the hill, mowing down the advancing enemy by hundreds,
till at last, their ammunition failing, they fought with their bayonets, us=
ing
stones and meat tins as missiles. I wish that our subsequent information had
been to the same effect.
It appears that on the evening of the 26th, Sir
George Colley, after mess, suddenly gave orders for a force of a little over
six hundred men, consisting of detachments from no less than three different
regiments, the 58th, 60th, 92d, and the Naval Brigade, to be got ready for =
an expedition,
without revealing his plans to anybody, until late in the afternoon: and th=
en
without more ado, marched them up to the top of Majuba--a great square-topp=
ed
mountain to the right of, and commanding the Boer position at Lang's Nek. T=
he
troops reached the top about three in the morning, after a somewhat exhaust=
ing
climb, and were stationed at different points of the plateau in a scientific
way. Whilst the darkness lasted, they could, by the glittering of the
watch-fires, trace from this point of vantage the position of the Boer laag=
ers
that lay 2000 yards beneath them, whilst the dawn of day revealed every det=
ail
of the defensive works, and showed the country lying at their feet like a m=
ap.
On arrival at the top, it was represented to t=
he
General that a rough entrenchment should be thrown up, but he would not all=
ow
it to be done on account of the men being wearied with their marching up. T=
his
was a fatal mistake. Behind an entrenchment, however slight, one would thin=
k that
600 English soldiers might have defied the whole Boer army, and much more t=
he
200 or 300 men by whom they were hunted down Majuba. It appears that about
10.15 A.M. Colonel Steward and Major Fraser again went to General Colley
"to arrange to start the sailors on an entrenchment" . . .
"Finding the ground so exposed, the General did not give orders to
entrench."
As soon as the Boers found out that the hill w=
as
in the occupation of the English, their first idea was to leave the Nek, and
they began to inspan with that object, but discovering that there were no g=
uns commanding
them, they changed their mind, and set to work to storm the hill instead. As
far as I have been able to gather, the number of Boers who took the mountain
was about 300, or possibly 400; I do not think there were more than that. T=
he
Boers themselves declare solemnly that they were only 100 strong, but this =
I do
not believe. They slowly advanced up the hill till about 11.30, when the re=
al
attack began, the Dutchmen coming on more rapidly and confidently, and shoo=
ting
with ever-increasing accuracy, as they found our fire quite ineffective.
About a quarter to one, our men retreated to t=
he
last ridge, and General Colley was shot through the head. After this, the
retreat became a rout, and the soldiers rushed pell-mell down the precipito=
us
sides of the hill, the Boers knocking them over by the score as they went, =
till
they were out of range. A few were also, I heard, killed by the shells from=
the
guns that were advanced from the camp to cover the retreat, but as this does
not appear in the reports, perhaps it is not true. Our loss was about 200
killed and wounded, including Sir George Colley, Drs. Landon and Cornish, a=
nd
Commander Romilly, who was shot with an explosive bullet, and died after so=
me
days' suffering. When the wounded Commander was being carried to a more
sheltered spot, it was with great difficulty that the Boers were prevented =
from
massacring him as he lay, they being under the impression that he was Sir
Garnet Wolseley. As was the case at Ingogo, the wounded were left on the
battlefield all night in very inclement weather, to which some of them
succumbed. It is worthy of note that after the fight was over, they were
treated with considerable kindness by the Boers.
Not being a soldier, of course I cannot ventur=
e to
give any military reasons as to how it was, that what was after all a
considerable force, was so easily driven from a position of great natural
strength; but I think I may, without presumption, state my opinion was to t=
he
real cause, which was the villanous shooting of the British soldier. Though=
the
troops did not, as was said at the time, run short of ammunition, it is cle=
ar
that they fired away a great many rounds at men who, in storming the hill, =
must
necessarily have exposed themselves more or less, of whom they managed to
hit--certainly not more than six or seven,--which was the outside of the Bo=
er
casualties. From this it is clear that they can neither judge distance nor =
hit
a moving object, nor did they probably know that when shooting down hill it=
is
necessary to aim low. Such shooting as the English soldier is capable of ma=
y be
very well when he has an army to aim at, but it is useless in guerilla warf=
are
against a foe skilled in the use of the rifle and the art of taking shelter=
.
A couple of months after the storming of Majub=
a,
I, together with a friend, had a conversation with a Boer, a volunteer from=
the
Free State in the late war, and one of the detachment that stormed Majuba, =
who
gave us a circumstantial account of the attack with the greatest willingnes=
s. He
said that when it was discovered that the English had possession of the
mountain, they thought that the game was up, but after a while bolder couns=
els
prevailed, and volunteers were called for to storm the hill. Only seventy m=
en
could be found to perform the duty, of whom he was one. They started up the
mountain in fear and trembling, but soon found that every shot passed over
their heads, and went on with greater boldness. Only three men, he declared,
were hit on the Boer side; one was killed, one was hit in the arm, and he
himself was the third, getting his face grazed by a bullet, of which he sho=
wed
us the scar. He stated that the first to reach the top ridge was a boy of
twelve, and that as soon as the troops saw them they fled, when, he said, he
paid them out for having nearly killed him, knocking them over one after an=
other
"like bucks" as they ran down the hill, adding that it was "=
alter
lecker" (very nice). He asked us how many men we had lost during the w=
ar,
and when we told him about seven hundred killed and wounded, laughed in our=
faces,
saying he knew that our dead amounted to several thousands. On our assuring=
him
that this was not the case, he replied, "Well, don't let's talk of it =
any
more, because we are good friends now, and if we go on you will lie, and I
shall lie, and then we shall get angry. The war is over now, and I don't wa=
nt
to quarrel with the English; if one of them takes off his hat to me I always
acknowledge it." He did not mean any harm in talking thus; it is what
Englishmen have to put up with now in South Africa; the Boers have beaten u=
s,
and act accordingly.
This man also told us that the majority of the
rifles they picked up were sighted for 400 yards, whereas the latter part of
the fighting had been carried on within 200.
Sir George Colley's death was much lamented in=
the
Colony, where he was deservedly popular; indeed, anybody who had the honour=
of
knowing that kind-hearted gentleman, could not do otherwise than deeply reg=
ret
his untimely end. What his motive was in occupying Majuba in the way he did=
, has
never, so far as I am aware, transpired. The move, in itself, would have be=
en
an excellent one, had it been made in force, or accompanied by a direct att=
ack
on the Nek--but, as undertaken, seems to have been objectless. There were, =
of
course, many rumours as to the motives that prompted his action, of which t=
he
most probable seems to be that, being aware of what the Home Government
intended to do with reference to the Transvaal, he determined to strike a b=
low
to try and establish British Supremacy first, knowing how mischievous any
apparent surrender would be. Whatever his faults may have been as a General=
, he
was a brave man, and had the honour of his country much at heart.
It was also said by soldiers who saw him the n=
ight
the troops marched up Majuba, that the General was "not himself,"=
and
it was hinted that continual anxiety and the chagrin of failure had told up=
on
his mind. As against this, however, must be set the fact that his telegrams=
to
the Secretary of State for War, the last of which he must have despatched o=
nly
about half-an-hour before he was shot, are cool and collected, and written =
in
the same unconcerned tone,--as though he were a critical spectator of an
interesting scene--that characterises all his communications, more especial=
ly
his despatches. They at any rate give no evidence of shaken nerve or unduly
excited brain, nor can I see that any action of his with reference to the
occupation of Majuba is out of keeping with the details of his generalship =
upon
other occasions. He was always confident to rashness, and possessed by the =
idea
that every man in the ranks was full of as high a spirit, and as brave as he
was himself. Indeed most people will think, that so far from its being a ra=
sher
action, the occupation of Majuba, bad generalship as it seems, was a wiser =
move
than either the attack on the Nek or the Ingogo fiasco.
But at the best, all his movements are difficu=
lt
to be understand by a civilian, though they may, for ought we know, have be=
en
part of an elaborate plan, perfected in accordance with the rules of milita=
ry science,
of which, it is said, he was a great student.
The Queen's Speech--President Brand and Lord
Kimberley--Sir Henry de Villiers--Sir George Colley's plan--Paul Kruger's
offer--Sir George Colley's remonstrance--Complimentary telegrams--Effect of
Majuba on the Boers and English Government--Collapse of the Government--Rea=
sons
of the Surrender--Professional sentimentalists--The Transvaal Independence =
Committee--Conclusion
of the armistice--The preliminary peace--Reception of the news in
Natal--Newcastle after the declaration of peace--Exodus of the loyal
inhabitants of the Transvaal--The value of property in Pretoria--The Transv=
aal
officials dismissed--The Royal Commission--Mode of trial of persons accused=
of
atrocities--Decision of the Commission and its results--The severance of
territory question--Arguments pro and con--Opinion of Sir E. Wood--Humility=
of
the Commissioners and its cause--Their decision on the Keate award question=
--The
Montsoia difficulty--The compensation and financial clauses of the report of
the Commission--The duties of the British Resident--Sir E. Wood's dissent f=
rom
the report of the Commission--Signing of the Convention--Burial of the Union
Jack--The native side of the question--Interview between the Commissioners =
and
the native chiefs--Their opinion of the surrender--Objections of the Boer
Volksraad to the Convention--Mr. Gladstone temporises--The ratification--Its
insolent tone--Mr. Hudson, the British Resident--The Boer festival--The res=
ults
of the Convention--The larger issue of the matter--Its effect on the Transv=
aal--Its
moral aspects--Its effect on the native mind.
When Parliament met in January 1881, the
Government announced, through the mediumship of the Queen's Speech, that it=
was
their intention to vindicate Her Majesty's authority in the Transvaal. I ha=
ve
already briefly described the somewhat unfortunate attempts to gain this en=
d by
force of arms: and I now propose to follow the course of the diplomatic neg=
otiations
entered into by the Ministry with the same object.
As soon as the hostilities in the Transvaal to=
ok a
positive form, causing great dismay among the Home authorities, whose paths=
, as
we all know, are the paths of peace--at any price; and whilst, in the first=
confusion
of calamity, they knew not where to turn, President Brand stepped upon the
scene in the character of "Our Mutual Friend," and, by the Govern=
ment
at any rate, was rapturously welcomed.
This gentleman has for many years been at the =
head
of the Government of the Orange Free State, whose fortunes he had directed =
with
considerable ability. He is a man of natural talent and kind-hearted
disposition, and has the advancement of the Boer cause in South Africa much=
at
heart. The rising in the Transvaal was an event that gave him a great and
threefold opportunity: first, of interfering with the genuinely benevolent
object of checking bloodshed; secondly, of advancing the Dutch cause throug=
hout
South Africa under the cloak of amiable neutrality, and striking a dangerous
blow at British supremacy over the Dutch and British prestige with the nati=
ves;
and, thirdly, of putting the English Government under a lasting obligation =
to
him. Of this opportunity he has availed himself to the utmost in each
particular.
So soon as things began to look serious, Mr. B=
rand
put himself into active telegraphic communication with the various British
authorities with the view of preventing bloodshed by inducing the English
Government to accede to the Boer demands. He was also earnest in his
declarations that the Free State was not supporting the Transvaal; which,
considering that it was practically the insurgent base of supplies, where t=
hey
had retired their women, children, and cattle, and that it furnished them w=
ith
a large number of volunteers, was perhaps straining the truth.
About this time also we find Lord Kimberley
telegraphing to Mr. Brand that "if only the Transvaal Boers will desist
from armed opposition to the Queen's authority," he thinks some arrang=
ement
might be made. This is the first indication made public of what was passing=
in
the minds of Her Majesty's Government, on whom its radical supporters were =
now beginning
to put the screw, to induce or threaten them into submitting to the Boer
demands.
Again, on the 11th January, the President
telegraphed to Lord Kimberley through the Orange Free State Consul in Londo=
n,
suggesting that Sir H. de Villiers, the Chief Justice at the Cape, should be
appointed a Commissioner to go to the Transvaal to settle matters. Oddly
enough, about the same time the same proposition emanated from the Dutch pa=
rty in
the Cape Colony, headed by Mr. Hofmeyer, a coincidence that inclines one to=
the
opinion that these friends of the Boers had some further reason for thus ur=
ging
Sir Henry de Villiers' appointment as Commissioner beyond his apparent fitn=
ess
for the post, of which his high reputation as a lawyer and in his private
capacity was a sufficient guarantee.
The explanation is not hard to find, the fact
being that, rightly or wrongly, Sir Henry de Villiers, who is himself of Du=
tch
descent, is noted throughout South Africa for his sympathies with the Boer
cause, and both President Brand and the Dutch party in the Cape shrewdly su=
spected,
that, if the settling of differences were left to his discretion, the Boers=
and
their interests would receive very gentle handling. The course of action
adopted by him, when he became a member of the Royal Commission, went far to
support this view, for it will be noticed in the Report of the Commissioners
that in every single point he appears to have taken the Boer side of the
contention. Indeed so blind was he to their faults, that he would not even
admit that the horrible Potchefstroom murders and atrocities, which are
condemned both by Sir H. Robinson and Sir Evelyn Wood in language as strong=
as
the formal terms of a report will allow, were acts contrary to the rules of
civilised warfare. If those acts had been perpetrated by Englishmen on Boer=
s,
or even on natives, I venture to think Sir Henry de Villiers would have loo=
ked
at them in a very different light.
In the same telegram in which President Brand
recommends the appointment of Sir Henry de Villiers, he states that the
allegations made by the Triumvirate in the proclamation in which they accus=
ed
Sir Owen Lanyon of committing various atrocities, deserve to be investigate=
d,
as they maintain that the collision was commenced by the authorities. Nobod=
y knew
better than Mr. Brand that any English official would be quite incapable of=
the
conduct ascribed to Sir Owen Lanyon, whilst, even if the collision had been
commenced by the authorities, which as it happened it was not, they would u=
nder
the circumstances have been amply justified in so commencing it. This remar=
k by
President Brand in his telegram was merely an attempt to throw an air of
probability over a series of slanderous falsehoods.
Messages of this nature continued to pour along
the wires from day to day, but the tone of those from the Colonial Office g=
rew
gradually humbler; thus we find Lord Kimberley telegraphing on the 8th
February, that if the Boers would desist from armed opposition all reasonab=
le guarantees
would be given as to their treatment after submission, and that a scheme wo=
uld
be framed for the "permanent friendly settlement of difficulties."=
; It
will be seen that the Government had already begun to water the meaning of
their declaration that they would vindicate Her Majesty's authority. No dou=
bt
Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. Courtney, and their followers, had given another turn =
to
the Radical screw.
It is, however, clear that at this time no ide=
a of
the real aims of the Government had entered into the mind of Sir George Col=
ley,
since on the 7th February he telegraphed home a plan which he proposed to a=
dopt
on entering the Transvaal, which included a suggestion that he should grant=
a
complete amnesty only to those Boers who would sign a declaration of loyalt=
y.
In answer to this he was ordered to do nothing=
of
the sort, but to promise protection to everybody and refer everything home.=
Then came the battle of Ingogo, which checked =
for
the time the flow of telegrams, or rather varied their nature, for those
despatched during the next few days deal with the question of reinforcement=
s.
On the 13th February, however, negotiations were reopened by Paul Kruger, o=
ne
of the Triumvirate, who offered, if all the troops were ordered to withdraw=
from
the Transvaal to give them a free passage through the Nek, to disperse the
Boers and to consent to the appointment of a Commission.
The offer was jumped at by Lord Kimberley, who,
without making reference to the question of withdrawing the soldiers, offer=
ed,
if only the Boers would disperse, to appoint a Commission with extensive po=
wers
to develop the "permanent friendly settlement" scheme. The telegr=
am
ends thus: "Add, that if this proposal is accepted, you now are author=
ised
to agree to suspension of hostilities on our part." This message was s=
ent
to General Wood, because the Boers had stopped the communications with Coll=
ey.
On the 19th, Sir George Colley replies in these words, which show his
astonishment at the policy adopted by the Home Government, and which, in the
opinion of most people, redound to his credit--
"Latter part of your telegram to Wood not
understood. There can be no hostilities if no resistance is made, but am I =
to
leave Lang's Nek in Natal territory in Boer occupation, and our garrisons
isolated and short of provisions, or occupy former and relieve latter?"
Lord Kimberley hastens to reply that the garrisons must be left free to pro=
vision
themselves, "but we do not mean that you should march to the relief of=
garrisons
or occupy Lang's Nek, if an arrangement proceeds."
It will be seen that the definition of what
vindication of Her Majesty's authority consisted grew broader and broader; =
it
now included the right of the Boers to continue to occupy their positions in
the Colony of Natal.
Meanwhile the daily fire of complimentary mess=
ages
was being kept up between President Brand and Lord Kimberley, who alternati=
vely
gave "sincere thanks to Lord Kimberley" and "fully appreciat=
ed
the friendly spirit" of President Brand, till on the 21st February the
latter telegraphs through Colley: "Hope of amicable settlement by
negotiation, but this will be greatly facilitated if somebody on spot and f=
riendly
disposed to both, could by personal communication with both endeavour to sm=
ooth
difficulties. Offers his services to Her Majesty's Government, and Kruger a=
nd
Pretorius and Joubert are willing." Needless to say his services were
accepted.
Presently, however, on 27th February, Sir Geor=
ge
Colley made his last move, and took possession of Majuba. His defeat and de=
ath
had the effect of causing another temporary check in the peace negotiations,
whilst Sir Frederick Roberts with ample reinforcements was despatched to Na=
tal.
It had the further effect of increasing the haughtiness of the Boer leaders,
and infusing a corresponding spirit of pliability or generosity into the
negotiations of Her Majesty's Government.
Thus on 2d March, the Boers, through President
Brand and Sir Evelyn Wood, inform the Secretary of State for the Colonies, =
that
they are willing to negotiate, but decline to submit or cease opposition. S=
ir Evelyn
Wood, who evidently did not at all like the line of policy adopted by the
Government, telegraphed that he thought the best thing to do would be for h=
im
to engage the Boers, and disperse them vi et armis, without any guarantees,
"considering the disasters we have sustained," and that he should,
"if absolutely necessary," be empowered to promise life and prope=
rty
to the leaders, but that they should be banished from the country. In answe=
r to
this telegram, Lord Kimberley informs him that Her Majesty's Government will
amnesty everybody except those who have committed acts contrary to the rule=
s of
civilised warfare, and that they will agree to anything, and appoint a
Commission to carry out the details, and "be ready for friendly
communications with any persons appointed by the Boers."
Thus was Her Majesty's authority finally
re-established in the Transvaal.
It was not a very grand climax, nor the kind of
arrangement to which Englishmen are accustomed, but perhaps, considering the
circumstances, and the well-known predilections of those who made the
settlement, it was as much as could be expected.
The action of the Government must not be
considered, as though they were unfettered in their judgment; it can never =
be
supposed that they acted as they did, because they thought such action righ=
t or
even wise, for that would be to set them down as men of a very low order of=
intelligence,
which they certainly are not.
It is clear that no set of sensible men, who h=
ad
after much consideration given their decision that under all the circumstan=
ces,
the Transvaal must remain British territory, and who, on a revolt subsequen=
tly
breaking out in that territory, had declared that Her Majesty's rule must be
upheld, would have, putting aside all other circumstances, deliberately
stultified themselves by almost unconditionally, and of their own free will,
abandoning the country, and all Her Majesty's subjects living in it. That w=
ould
be to pay a poor tribute to their understanding, since it is clear that if
reasons existed for retaining the Transvaal before the war, as they were sa=
tisfied
there did, those reasons would exist with still greater force after a war h=
ad
been undertaken and three crushing defeats sustained, which if left unaveng=
ed
must, as they knew, have a most disastrous effect on our prestige throughout
the South African continent.
I prefer to believe that the Government was
coerced into acting as it did by Radical pressure, both from outside, and f=
rom
its immediate supporters in the House, and that it had to choose between ma=
king
an unconventional surrender in the Transvaal and losing the support of a ve=
ry
powerful party. Under these circumstances it, being Liberal in politics,
naturally followed its instincts, and chose surrender.
If such a policy was bad in itself, and
necessarily mischievous in its consequences, so much the worse for those who
suffered by it; it was clear that the Government could not be expected to l=
ose
votes in order to forward the true interests of countries so far off as the
South African Colonies, which had had the misfortune to be made a party que=
stion
of, and must take the consequences.
There is no doubt that the interest brought to
bear on the Government was very considerable, for not only had they to deal
with their own supporters, and with the shadowy caucus that was ready to let
the lash of its displeasure descend even on the august person of Mr. Gladst=
one,
should he show signs of letting slip so rich an opportunity for the vindica=
tion
of the holiest principles of advanced Radicalism, but also with the
hydra-headed crowd of visionaries and professional sentimentalists who swar=
m in
this country, and who are always ready to take up any cause, from that of
Jumbo, or of a murderer, to that of oppressed peoples, such as the Bulgaria=
ns,
or the Transvaal Boers.
These gentlemen, burning with zeal, and filled
with that confidence which proverbially results from the hasty assimilation=
of
imperfect and erroneous information, found in the Transvaal question a grea=
t opportunity
of making a noise: and--as in a disturbed farmyard the bray of the domestic
donkey, ringing loud and clear among the utterances of more intelligent
animals, overwhelms and extinguishes them--so, and with like effect, amongst
the confused sound of various English opinions about the Boer rising, rose =
the
trumpet-note of the Transvaal Independence Committee and its supporters.
As we have seen, they did not sound in vain.
On the 6th of March an armistice with the Boers
had been entered into by Sir Evelyn Wood, which was several times prolonged=
, up
to the 21st March, when Sir Evelyn Wood concluded a preliminary peace with =
the
Boer leaders, which, under certain conditions, guaranteed the restoration o=
f the
country within six months, and left all other points to be decided by a Roy=
al
Commission.
The news of this peace was at first received in
the Colony in the silence of astonishment. Personally, I remember, I would =
not
believe that it was true. It seemed to us, who had been witnesses of what h=
ad passed,
and knew what it all meant, something so utterly incredible that we thought
there must be a mistake.
If there had been any one redeeming circumstan=
ce
about it, if the English arms had gained a single decisive victory, it might
have been so, but it was hard for Englishmen, just at first, to understand =
that
not only had the Transvaal been to all appearance wrested from them by forc=
e of
arms, but that they were henceforth to be subject, as they well knew would =
be
the case, to the coarse insults of victorious Boers, and the sarcasms of
keener-witted Kafirs.
People in England seem to fancy that when men =
go
to the Colonies they lose all sense of pride in their country, and think of
nothing but their own advantage. I do not think that this is the case, inde=
ed,
I believe that, individual for individual, there exists a greater sense of =
loyalty,
and a deeper pride in their nationality, and in the proud name of England,
among Colonists, than among Englishmen proper. Certainly the humiliation of=
the
Transvaal surrender was more keenly felt in South Africa than it was at hom=
e;
but, perhaps, the impossibility of imposing upon people in that country with
the farrago of nonsense about blood-guiltiness and national morality, which=
was
made such adroit use of at home, may have made the difference.
I know that personally I would not have believ=
ed
it possible that I could feel any public event so keenly as I did this; ind=
eed,
I quickly made up my mind that if the peace was confirmed, the neighbourhoo=
d of
the Transvaal would be no fit or comfortable residence for an Englishman, a=
nd
that I would, at any cost, leave the country,--which I accordingly did.
Newcastle was a curious sight the night after =
the
peace was declared, every hotel and bar was crowded with refugees, who were
trying to relieve their feelings, by cursing the name of Gladstone, with a
vigour, originality, and earnestness, that I have never heard equalled; and=
declaring
in ironical terms how proud they were to be citizens of England--a country =
that
always kept its word. Then they set to work with many demonstrations of
contempt to burn the effigy of the Right Honourable Gentleman at the head of
Her Majesty's Government, an example, by the way, that was followed through=
out
South Africa.
Even Sir Evelyn Wood, who is very popular in t=
he
Colony, was hissed as he walked through the town, and great surprise was
expressed that a soldier who came out expressly to fight the Boers, should
consent to become the medium of communication in such a dirty business. And=
, indeed,
there was some excuse for all this bitterness, for the news meant ruin to v=
ery
many.
But if people in Natal and at the Cape received
the news with astonishment, how shall I describe its effect upon the
unfortunate loyal
inhabitants in the Transvaal, on whom it burst
like a thunderbolt?
They did not say much however, and indeed, the=
re
was nothing to be said, they simply began to pack up such things as they co=
uld
carry with them, and to leave the country, which they well knew would
henceforth be utterly untenable for Englishmen or English sympathisers. In a
few weeks they came pouring down through Newcastle by hundreds; it was the =
most
melancholy exodus that can be imagined. There were people of all classes,
officials, gentlefolk, work-people, and loyal Boers, but they had a connect=
ing
link; they had all been loyal, and they were all ruined.
Most of these people had gone to the Transvaal
since it became a British Colony, and invested all they had in it, and now
their capital was lost and their labour rendered abortive; indeed, many of =
them
whom one had known as well to do in the Transvaal, came down to Natal hardly
knowing how they would feed their families next week.
It must be understood that so soon as the Quee=
n's
sovereignty was withdrawn the value of landed and house property in the
Transvaal went down to nothing, and has remained there ever since. Thus a
fair-sized house in Pretoria brought in a rental varying from ten to twenty
pounds a month during British occupation, but after the declaration of peac=
e, owners
of houses were glad to get people to live in them to keep them from falling
into ruin. Those who owned land or had invested money in businesses suffere=
d in
the same way; their property remains, neither profitable or saleable, and t=
hey
themselves are precluded by their nationality from living on it, the art of
"Boycotting" not being peculiar to Ireland.
Nor were they the only sufferers, the official=
s,
many of whom had taken to the Government service as a permanent profession,=
in
which they expected to pass their lives, were suddenly dismissed, mostly wi=
th a
small gratuity, which would about suffice to pay their debts, and told to f=
ind
their living as best they could. It was indeed a case of vae victis,--woe to
the conquered loyalists.[*]
[=
*] The
following extract is clipped from a recent issue of the "Transvaal Advertiser."=
; It
describes the present conditio=
n of
Pretoria:--
"The streets grown over with rank vegetation, the water- furrows uncleaned and unattended, em=
itting
offensive and unhealthy stench=
es,
the houses showing evident signs of dilapidation and decay, the side pat=
hs, in
many places, dangerous to
pedestrians; in fact, everything the eye can rest upon indicates the downfall whi=
ch has
overtaken this once prosperous=
city.
The visitor can, if he be so minded, betake himself to the outskirts and
suburbs, where he will perceiv=
e the
same sad evidences of neglect, public grounds unattended, roads uncared for, mills=
and
other public works crumbling i=
nto
ruin. These palpable signs of decay most strongly impress him. A blight seems=
to
have come over this lately fai=
r and
prosperous town. Rapidly it is becoming a 'deserted village,' a 'city of the
dead.'"
The Commission appointed by Her Majesty's
Government consisted of Sir Hercules Robinson, Sir Henry de Villiers, and S=
ir
Evelyn Wood, President Brand being also present in his capacity of friend of
both parties, and to their discretion were left the settlement of all
outstanding questions. Amongst these, were the mode of trial of those perso=
ns
who had been guilty of acts contrary to the rules of civilised warfare, the=
question
of severance of territory from the Transvaal on the Eastern boundary, the
settlement of the boundary in the Keate-Award districts, the compensation f=
or
losses sustained during the war, the functions of the British Resident, and
other matters. Their place of meeting was at Newcastle in Natal, and from
thence they proceeded to Pretoria.
The first question of importance that came bef=
ore
the Commission was the mode of trial to be adopted in the cases of those
persons accused of acts contrary to the usages of civilised warfare, such as
murder. The Attorney-General for the Transvaal strongly advised that a spec=
ial Tribunal
should be constituted to try these cases, principally because "after a
civil war in which all the inhabitants of a country, with very few exceptio=
ns,
have taken part, a jury of fair and impartial men, truly unbiassed, will be
very difficult to get together." It is satisfactory to know that the
Commissioners gave this somewhat obvious fact "their grave considerati=
on,"
which, according to their Report, resulted in their determining to let the
cases go before the ordinary court, and be tried by a jury, because in
referring them to a specially constituted court which would have done equal
justice without fear or favour, "the British Government would have made
for itself, among the Dutch population of South Africa, a name for vindicti=
ve
oppression, which no generosity in other affairs could efface."
There is more in this determination of the
Commissioners, or rather of the majority of them--for Sir E. Wood, to his
credit be it said, refused to agree in their decision--than meets the eye, =
the
fact of the matter being that it was privately well known to them, that, th=
ough
the Boer leaders might be willing to allow a few of the murderers to undergo
the form of a trial, neither they nor the Boers themselves, meant to permit=
the
farce to go any further. Had the men been tried by a special tribunal they
would in all probability have been condemned to death, and then would have =
come
the awkward question of carrying out the sentence on individuals whose deeds
were looked on, if not with general approval, at any rate without aversion =
by
the great mass of their countrymen. In short, it would probably have become
necessary either to reprieve them or to fight the Boers again, since it was
very certain that they would not have allowed them to be hung. Therefore the
majority of the Commissioners, finding themselves face to face with a dead
wall, determined to slip round it instead of boldly climbing it, by referri=
ng the
cases to the Transvaal High Court, cheerfully confident of what the result =
must
be.
After all, the matter was, much cry about litt=
le
wool, for of all the crimes committed by the Boers--a list of some of which
will be found in the Appendix to this book--in only three cases were a
proportion of the perpetrators produced and put through the form of trial.
Those three were, the dastardly murder of Captain Elliot, who was shot by h=
is
Boer escort while crossing the Vaal river on parole; the murder of a man na=
med
Malcolm, who was kicked to death in his own house by Boers, who afterwards =
put
a bullet through his head to make the job "look better;" and the
murder of a doctor named Barber, who was shot by his escort on the border of
the Free State. A few of the men concerned in the first two of these crimes
were tried in Pretoria: and it was currently reported at that time, that in
order to make their acquittal certain our Attorney-General received
instructions not to exercise his right of challenging jurors on behalf of t=
he
Crown. Whether or not this is true I am not prepared to say, but I believe =
it
is a fact that he did not exercise that right, though the counsel of the
prisoners availed themselves of it freely, with the result that in Elliot's
case, the jury was composed of eight Boers and one German, nine being the f=
ull
South African jury. The necessary result followed; in both cases the prison=
ers were
acquitted in the teeth of the evidence. Barber's murderers were tried in the
Free State, and were, as might be expected, acquitted.
Thus it will be seen that of all the perpetrat=
ors
of murder and other crimes during the course of the war not one was brought=
to
justice.
The offence for which their victims died was, =
in
nearly every case, that they had served, were serving, or were loyal to Her
Majesty the Queen. In no single case has England exacted retribution for the
murder of her servants and citizens; but nobody can read through the long l=
ist of
these dastardly slaughters without feeling that they will not go unavenged.=
The
innocent blood that has been shed on behalf of this country, and the tears =
of
children and widows now appeal to a higher tribunal than that of Mr.
Gladstone's Government, and assuredly they will not appeal in vain.
The next point of importance dealt with by the
Commission was the question whether or no any territory should be severed f=
rom
the Transvaal, and kept under English rule for the benefit of the native in=
habitants.
Lord Kimberley, acting under pressure put upon him by members of the Aborig=
ines
Protection Society, instructed the Commission to consider the advisability =
of
severing the districts of Lydenburg and Zoutpansberg, and also a strip of
territory bordering on Zululand and Swazieland from the Transvaal, so as to
place the inhabitants of the first two districts out of danger of maltreatm=
ent
by the Boers, and to interpose a buffer between Zulus, and Swazies, and Boer
aggression, and vice versa.
The Boer leaders had, it must be remembered,
acquiesced in the principle of such a separation in the preliminary peace
signed by Sir Evelyn Wood and themselves. The majority of the Commission,
however (Sir Evelyn Wood dissenting), finally decided against the retention=
of
either of these districts, a decision which I think was a wise one, though I
arrive at that conclusion on very different grounds to those adopted by the=
majority
of the Commission.
Personally, I cannot see that it is the duty of
England to play policeman to the whole world. To have retained these native
districts would have been to make ourselves responsible for their good
government, and to have guaranteed them against Boer encroachment, which I =
do
not think that we were called upon to do. It is surely not incumbent upon u=
s,
having given up the Transvaal to the Boers, to undertake the management of =
the
most troublesome part of it, the Zulu border. Besides, bad as the abandonme=
nt
of the Transvaal is, I think that if it was to be done at all, it was best =
to
do it thoroughly, since to have kept some natives under our protection, and=
to
have handed over the rest to the tender mercies of the Boers, would only be=
to
render our injustice more obvious, whilst weakening the power of the natives
themselves to combine in self-defence; since those under our protection wou=
ld
naturally have little sympathy with their more unfortunate brethren--their
interests and circumstances being different.
The Commission do not seem to have considered =
the
question from these points of view, but putting them on one side, there are
many other considerations connected with it, which are ably summed up in th=
eir Report.
Amongst these is the danger of disturbances commenced between Zulus or Swaz=
ies
and Boers, spreading into Natal, and the probability of the fomenting of di=
sturbances
amongst the Zulus by Boers. The great argument for the retention of some
territory, if only as a symbol that the English had not been driven out of =
the
country, is, however, set forth in the forty-sixth paragraph of the Report,
which runs as follows:--"The moral considerations that determine the
actions of civilised Governments are not easily understood by barbarians, in
whose eyes successful force is alone the sign of superiority, and it appear=
ed
possible that the surrender by the British Crown of one of its possessions =
to
those who had been in arms against it, might be looked upon by the natives =
in
no other way than as a token of the defeat and decay of the British Power, =
and
that thus a serious shock might be given to British authority in South Afri=
ca,
and the capacity of Great Britain to govern and direct the vast native
population within and without her South African dominions--a capacity resti=
ng
largely on the renown of her name--might be dangerously impaired."
These words coming from so unexpected a source=
do
not, though couched in such mild language, hide the startling importance of=
the
question discussed. On the contrary, they accurately and with double weight=
convey
the sense and gist of the most damning argument against the policy of the r=
etrocession
of the Transvaal in its entirety; and proceeding from their own carefully
chosen commissioners, can hardly have been pleasant reading to Lord Kimberl=
ey
and his colleagues.
The majority of the Commission then proceeds to
set forth the arguments advanced by the Boers against the retention of any
territory, which appear to have been chiefly of a sentimental character, si=
nce
we are informed that "the people, it seemed certain, would not have va=
lued
the restoration of a mutilated country. Sentiment in a great measure had led
them to insurrection, and the force of such it was impossible to disregard.=
"
Sir E. Wood in his dissent, states, that he cannot even agree with the prem=
ises
of his colleagues' argument, since he is convinced that it was not sentiment
that had led to the outbreak, but a "general and rooted aversion to
taxation." If he had added, and a hatred not only of English rule, but=
of
all rule, he would have stated the complete cause of the Transvaal rebellio=
n.
In the next paragraph of the Report, however, we find the real cause of the
pliability of the Commission in the matter, which is the same that influenc=
ed
them in their decision about the mode of trial of the murderers and other q=
uestions:--they
feared that the people would appeal to arms if they decided against their
wishes.
Discreditable and disgraceful as it may seem,
nobody can read this Report without plainly seeing that the Commissioners w=
ere,
in treating with the Boers on these points, in the position of ambassadors =
from
a beaten people getting the best terms they could. Of course, they well knew
that this was not the case, but whatever the Boer leaders may have said, the
Boers themselves did not know this, or even pretend to look at the matter in
any other light. When we asked for the country back, said they, we did not =
get
it; after we had three times defeated the English we did get it; the logical
conclusion from the facts being that we got it because we defeated the Engl=
ish.
This was their tone, and it is not therefore surprising that whenever the
Commission threatened to decide anything against them, they, with a smile, =
let
it know that if it did, they would be under the painful necessity of
re-occupying Lang's Nek. It was never necessary to repeat the threat, since=
the
majority of the Commission would thereupon speedily find a way to meet the
views of the Boer representatives.
Sir Evelyn Wood, in his dissent, thus correctly
sums up the matter:--"To contend that the Royal Commission ought not to
decide contrary to the wishes of the Boers, because such decision might not=
be
accepted, is to deny to the Commission the very power of decision that it w=
as
agreed should be left in its hands." Exactly so. But it is evident that
the Commission knew its place, and so far from attempting to exercise any &=
quot;power
of decision," it was quite content with such concessions as it could
obtain by means of bargaining. Thus, as an additional reason against the
retention of any territory, it is urged that if this territory was retained
"the majority of your Commissioners . . . would have found themselves =
in
no favourable position for obtaining the concurrence of the Boer leaders as=
to
other matters." In fact, Her Majesty's Commission appointed, or suppos=
ed
to be appointed, to do Her Majesty's will and pleasure, shook in its shoes
before men who had lately been rebels in arms against Her authority, and hu=
mbly
submitted itself to their dicta.
The majority of the Commission went on to expr=
ess
their opinion, that by giving away about the retention of territory they wo=
uld
be able to obtain better terms for the natives generally, and larger powers=
for
the British Resident. But, as Sir Evelyn Wood points out in his Report, the=
y did
nothing of the sort, the terms of the agreement about the Resident and other
native matters being all consequent on and included in the first agreement =
of
peace. Besides, they seem to have overlooked the fact that such concessions=
as
they did obtain are only on paper, and practically worthless, whilst all bo=
na
fide advantages remained with the Boers.
The decision of the Commissioners in the quest=
ion
of the Keate Award, which next came under their consideration, appears to h=
ave
been a judicious one, being founded on the very careful Report of Colonel M=
oysey,
R.E., who had been for many months collecting information on the spot. The
Keate Award Territory is a region lying to the south-west of the Transvaal,=
and
was, like many other districts in that country, originally in the possessio=
n of
natives, of the Baralong and Batlapin tribes. Individual Boers having, howe=
ver,
more suo taken possession of tracts of land in the district, difficulties
speedily arose between their Government and the native chiefs, and in 1871 =
Mr.
Keate, Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, was by mutual consent called in to arb=
itrate
on the matter. His decision was entirely in favour of the natives, and was
accordingly promptly and characteristically repudiated by the Boer Volksraa=
d.
From that time till the rebellion the question remained unsettled, and was
indeed a very thorny one to deal with. The Commission, acting on the princi=
ple
in medio tutissimus ibis, drew a line through the midst of the disputed
territory, or, in other words, set aside Mr. Keate's award and interpreted =
the
dispute in favour of the Boers.
This decision was accepted by all parties at t=
he
time, but it has not resulted in the maintenance of peace. The principal Ch=
ief,
Montsoia, is an old ally and staunch friend of the English, a fact which the
Boers were not able to forget or forgive, and they appear to have stirred up
rival Chiefs to attack him, and to have allowed volunteers from the Transva=
al
to assist them. Montsoia has also enlisted some white volunteers, and sever=
al
fights have taken place, in which the loss of life has been considerable.
Whether or no the Transvaal Government is directly concerned it is impossib=
le
to say, but from the fact that cannon are said to have been used against
Montsoia it would appear that it is, since private individuals do not, as a
rule, own Armstrong guns.[*]
[=
*] I
beg to refer any reader interested in this matter to the letter of "Transvaal" =
to the
"Standard," which I have republished in the Appendix to this =
book.
Amongst the questions remaining for the
consideration of the Commissioners was that of what compensation should be
given for losses during the war. Of course, the great bulk of the losses
sustained were of an indirect nature, resulting from the necessary and enor=
mous
depreciation in the value of land and other property, consequent on the ret=
rocession.
Into this matter the Home Government declined to enter, thereby saving its
pocket at the price of its honour, since it was upon English guarantees that
the country would remain a British possession, that the majority of the
unfortunate loyals invested their money in it. It was, however, agreed by t=
he
Commission (Sir H. de Villiers dissenting) that the Boers should be liable =
for
compensation in cases where loss had been sustained through commandeering
seizure, confiscation, destruction, or damage of property. The sums awarded
under these heads have already amounted to about 110,000 pounds, which sum =
has been
defrayed by the Imperial Government, the Boer authorities stating that they
were not in a position to pay it.
In connection with this matter, I will pass to=
the
Financial clauses of the Report. When the country was annexed, the public d=
ebt
amounted to 301,727 pounds. Under British rule this debt was liquidated to =
the
extent of 150,000 pounds, but the total was brought up by a Parliamentary
grant, a loan from the Standard Bank, and sundries to 390,404 pounds, which
represented the public debt of the Transvaal on the 31st December 1880. This
was further increased by moneys advanced by the Standard Bank and English
Exchequer during the war, and till the 8th August 1881, during which time t=
he
country yielded no revenue, to 457,393 pounds. To this must be added an
estimated sum of 200,000 pounds for compensation charges, pension allowance=
s,
&c., and a further sum of 383,000 pounds, the cost of the successful
expedition against Secocoeni, that of the unsuccessful one being left out of
account, bringing up the total public debt to over a million, of which about
800,000 pounds is owing to this country.
This sum, with the characteristic liberality t=
hat
distinguished them in their dealings with the Boers, but which was not so
marked where loyals were concerned, the Commissioners (Sir Evelyn Wood
dissenting) reduced by a stroke of the pen to 265,000 pounds, thus entirely
remitting an approximate sum of 500,000 pounds, or 600,000 pounds. To the s=
um
of 265,000 pounds still owing, must be added say another 150,000 pounds for
sums lately advanced to pay the compensation claims, bringing up the actual
amount now owing to England to something under half a million, of which I s=
ay
with confidence she will never see a single 10,000 pounds. As this continge=
ncy
was not contemplated, or if contemplated, not alluded to by the Royal
Commission, provision was made for a sinking fund, by means of which the de=
bt,
which is a second charge on the revenues of the States, is to be extinguish=
ed
in twenty-five years.
It is a strange instance of the proverbial iro=
ny
of fate, that whilst the representatives of the Imperial Government were th=
us
showering gifts of hundreds of thousands of pounds upon men who had spurned=
the
benefits of Her Majesty's rule, made war upon her forces, and murdered her =
subjects,
no such consideration was extended to those who had remained loyal to her
throne. Their claims for compensation were passed by unheeded; and looking =
from
the windows of the room in which they sat in Newcastle, the members of the
Commission might have seen them flocking down from a country that could no
longer be their home; those that were rich among them made poor, and those =
that
were poor reduced to destitution.
The only other point which it will be necessary
for me to touch on in connection with this Report is the duties of the Brit=
ish
Resident and his relations to the natives. He was to be invested as
representative of the Suzerain with functions for securing the execution of=
the
terms of peace as regards: (1.) The control of the foreign relations of the=
State;
(2.) The control of the frontier affairs of the State; and (3.) The protect=
ion
of the interests of the natives in the State.
As regards the first of these points, it was
arranged that the interests of subjects of the Transvaal should be left in =
the
hands of Her Majesty's representatives abroad. Since Boers are, of all peop=
le
in the world, the most stay-at-home, our ambassadors and consuls are not li=
kely
to be troubled much on their account. With reference to the second point, t=
he
Commission made stipulations that would be admirable if there were any
probability of their being acted up to. The Resident is to report any
encroachment on native territory by Boers to the High Commissioner, and when
the Resident and the Boer Government differ, the decision of the Suzerain i=
s to
be final. This is a charming way of settling difficulties, but the Commissi=
on
forgets to specify how the Suzerain's decision is to be enforced. After what
has happened, it can hardly have relied on awe of the name of England to br=
ing
about the desired obedience!
But besides thus using his beneficent authorit=
y to
prevent subjects of the Transvaal from trespassing on their neighbour's lan=
d,
the Resident is to exercise a general supervision over the interests of all=
the
natives in the country. Considering that they number about a million, and a=
re
scattered over a territory larger than France, one would think that this du=
ty
alone would have taken up the time of any ordinary man; and, indeed, Sir Ev=
elyn
Wood was in favour of the appointment of sub-residents to assist him. The
majority of the Commission refused, however, to listen to any such
suggestion--believing, they said, "that the least possible interference
with the independent Government of the State would be the wisest." Qui=
te
so, but I suppose it never occurred to them to ask the natives what their v=
iews
of the matter were! The Resident was also to be a member of a Native Locati=
on
Committee, which was at some future time, to provide land for natives to li=
ve
on.
In perusing this Report it is easy to follow w=
ith
more or less accuracy the individual bent of its framers. Sir Hercules Robi=
nson
figures throughout as a man who has got a disagreeable business to carry ou=
t, in
obedience to instructions that admit of no trifling with, and who has set
himself to do the best he can for his country, and those who suffer through=
his
country's policy, whilst obeying those instructions. He has evidently choked
down his feelings and opinions as an individual, and turned himself into an
official machine, merely registering in detail the will of Lord Kimberley. =
With
Sir Henry de Villiers the case is very different, one feels throughout that=
the
task is to him a congenial one, and that the Boer cause has in him an excel=
lent
friend. Indeed, had he been an advocate of their cause instead of a member =
of
the Commission, he could not have espoused their side on every occasion with
greater zeal. According to him they were always in the right, and in them h=
e could
find no guile. Mr. Hofmeyer and President Brand exercised a wise discretion
from their own point of view, when they urged his appointment as Special
Commissioner. I now come to Sir Evelyn Wood, who was in the position of an
independent Englishman, neither prejudiced in favour of the Boers, or the
reverse, and on whom, as a military man, Lord Kimberley would find it diffi=
cult
to put the official screw. The results of his happy position are obvious in=
the
paper attached to the end of the Report, and signed by him, in which he tot=
ally
and entirely differs from the majority of the Commission on every point of
importance. Most people will think that this very outspoke and forcible dis=
sent
deducts somewhat from the value of the Report, and throws a shadow of doubt=
on the
wisdom of its provisions.
The formal document of agreement between Her
Majesty's Government and the Boer leaders, commonly known as the Convention,
was signed by both parties at Pretoria on the afternoon of the 3d August 18=
81,
in the same room in which, nearly four years before, the Annexation
Proclamation was signed by Sir T. Shepstone.
Whilst this business was being transacted in
Government House, a curious ceremony was going on just outside, and within
sight of the windows. This was the ceremonious burial of the Union Jack, wh=
ich
was followed to the grave by a crowd of about 2000 loyalists and native chi=
efs.
On the outside of the coffin was written the word "Resurgam," and=
an
eloquent oration was delivered over the grave. Such demonstrations are, no =
doubt,
foolish enough, but they are not entirely without political significance.
But a more unpleasant duty awaited the
Commissioners than that of attaching their signatures to a
document,--consisting of the necessity of conveying Her Majesty's decision =
as
to the retrocession, to about a hundred native Chiefs, until now Her Majest=
y's
subjects, who had been gathered together to hear it. It must be borne in mi=
nd
that the natives had not been consulted as to the disposal of the country,
although they outnumber the white people in the proportion of twenty to one,
and that, beyond some worthless paper stipulations, nothing had been done f=
or their
interests.
Personally, I must plead guilty to what I know=
is
by many, especially by those who are attached to the Boer cause, considered=
as
folly if not worse, namely, a sufficient interest in the natives, and sympa=
thy
with their sufferings to bring me to the conclusion, that in acting thus we=
have
inflicted a cruel injustice upon them. It seems to me, that as they were the
original owners of the soil, they were entitled to some consideration in the
question of its disposal, and consequently and incidentally, of their own. =
I am
aware that it is generally considered that the white man has a right to the
black man's possessions and land, and that it is his high and holy mission =
to
exterminate the wretched native and take his place. But with this conclusio=
n I
venture to differ. So far as my own experience of natives has gone, I have
found that in all the essential qualities of mind and body, they very much
resemble white men, with the exception that they are, as a race,
quicker-witted, more honest, and braver, than the ordinary run of white men=
. Of
them might be aptly quoted the speech Shakespeare puts into Shylock's mouth=
: "Hath
not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affection=
s,
passions?" In the same way I ask, Has a native no feelings or affectio=
ns?
does he not suffer when his parents are shot, or his children stolen, or wh=
en
he is driven a wanderer from his home? Does he not know fear, feel pain,
affection, hate and gratitude? Most certainly he does; and this being so, I
cannot believe that the Almighty, who made both white and black, gave to the
one race the right or mission of exterminating, or even of robbing or
maltreating the other, and calling the process the advance of civilisation.=
It
seems to me, that on only one condition, if at all, have we the right to ta=
ke
the black man's land; and that is, that we provide them with an equal and a
just Government, and allow no maltreatment of them, either as individuals o=
r tribes:
but, on the contrary, do our best to elevate them, and wean them from savage
customs. Otherwise, the practice is surely undefensible.
I am aware, however, that with the exception o= f a small class, these are sentiments which are not shared by the great majorit= y of the public, either at home or abroad. Indeed, it can be plainly seen how li= ttle sympathy they command, from the fact that but scanty remonstrance was raise= d at the treatment meted out to our native subjects in the Transvaal, when they were, to the number of nearly a million, handed over from the peace, justic= e, and security, that on the whole characterise our rule, to a state of things, and possibilities of wrong and suffering which I will not try to describe.<= o:p>
To the chiefs thus assembled Sir Hercules
Robinson, as President of the Royal Commission, read a statement, and then
retired, refusing to allow them to speak in answer. The statement informed =
the
natives that "Her Majesty's Government, with that sense of justice whi=
ch
befits a great and powerful nation," had returned the country to the
Boers, "whose representatives, Messrs. Kruger, Pretorius, and Joubert,=
I
now," said Sir Hercules, "have much pleasure in introducing to
you." If reports are true, the native Chiefs had, many of them persona=
lly,
and all of them by reputation, already the advantage of a very intimate
acquaintance with all three of these gentlemen, so that an introduction was
somewhat superfluous.
Sir Hercules went on to explain to them that
locations would be allotted to them at some future time; that a British
Resident would be appointed, whose especial charge they would be, but that =
they
must bear in mind that he was not the ruler of the country, but the Governm=
ent,
"subject to Her Majesty's suzerain rights." Natives were, no doub=
t,
expected to know by intuition what suzerain rights are. The statement then =
goes
on to give them good advice as to the advantages of indulging in manual lab=
our
when asked to do so by the Boers, and generally to show them how bright and
happy is the future that lies before them. Lest they should be too elated by
such good tidings, they are, however, reminded that it will be necessary to
retain the law relating to passes, which is, in the hands of a people like =
the
Boers, about as unjust a regulation as a dominant race can invent for the
oppression of a subject people, and had, in the old days of the Republic, b=
een
productive of much hardship. The statement winds up by assuring them that t=
heir
"interests will never be forgotten or neglected by Her Majesty's
Government." Having read the document the Commission hastily withdrew,=
and
after their withdrawal the Chiefs were "allowed" to state their
opinions to the Secretary for Native Affairs.
In availing themselves of this permission, it =
is
noticeable that no allusion was made to all the advantages they were to reap
under the Convention, nor did they seem to attach much importance to the ap=
pointment
of the British Resident. On the contrary, all their attention was given to =
the
great fact that the country had been ceded to the Boers, and that they were=
no
longer the Queen's subjects. We are told, in Mr. Shepstone's Report, that t=
hey
"got very excited," and "asked whether it was thought that t=
hey
had no feelings or hearts, that they were thus treated as a stick or piece =
of
tobacco, which could be passed from hand to hand without question."
Umgombarie, a Zoutpansberg Chief, said, "I am Umgombarie. I have fought
with the Boers, and have many wounds, and they know that what I say is true=
. .
. . I will never consent to place myself under their rule. I belong to the
English Government. I am not a man who eats with both sides of his jaw at o=
nce;
I only use one side. I am English, I have said." Silamba said, "I
belong to the English. I will never return under the Boers. You see me, a m=
an of
my rank and position, is it right that such as I should be seized and laid =
on the
ground and flogged, as has been done to me and other chiefs?"
Sinkanhla said: "We hear and yet do not h=
ear,
we cannot understand. We are troubling you, Chief, by talking in this way; =
we
hear the Chiefs say that the Queen took the country because the people of t=
he
country wished it, and again that the majority of the owners of the country=
did
not wish their rule, and that therefore the country was given back. We shou=
ld
like to have the man pointed out from among us black people who objects to =
the
rule of the Queen. We are the real owners of the country; we were here when=
the
Boers came, and without asking leave, settled down and treated us in every =
way
badly. The English Government then came and took the country; we have now h=
ad
four years of rest and peaceful and just rule. We have been called here to-=
day,
and are told that the country, our country, has been given to the Boers by =
the
Queen. This is a thing which surprises us. Did the country, then, belong to=
the
Boers? Did it not belong to our fathers and forefathers before us, long bef=
ore the
Boers came here? We have heard that the Boers' country is at the Cape. If t=
he
Queen wishes to give them their land, why does she not give them back the
Cape?"
I have quoted this speech at length, because,
although made by a despised native, it sets forth their case more powerfully
and in happier language than I can do.
Umyethile said: "We have no heart for
talking. I have returned to the country from Sechelis, where I had to fly f=
rom
Boer oppression. Our hearts are black and heavy with grief to-day at the ne=
ws
told us, we are in agony, our intestines are twisting and writhing inside of
us, just as you see a snake do when it is struck on the head. . . . We do n=
ot
know what has become of us, but we feel dead; it may be that the Lord may c=
hange
the nature of the Boers, and that we will not be treated like dogs and beas=
ts
of burden as formerly, but we have no hope of such a change, and we leave y=
ou
with heavy hearts and great apprehension as to the future." In his Rep=
ort,
Mr. Shepstone (the Secretary for Native Affairs) says: "One chief, Jan
Sibilo, who has been, he informed me, personally threatened with death by t=
he
Boers after the English leave, could not restrain his feelings, but cried l=
ike
a child."
I have nothing to add to these extracts, which=
are
taken from many such statements. They are the very words of the persons most
concerned, and will speak for themselves.
The Convention was signed on the 3d August 188=
1,
and was to be formally ratified by a Volksraad or Parliament of the Burghers
within three months of that date, in default of which it was to fall to the
ground and become null and void.
Anybody who has followed the course of affairs
with reference to the retrocession of the Transvaal, or who has even taken =
the
trouble to read through this brief history, will probably come to the
conclusion that, under all the circumstances, the Boers had got more than t=
hey
could reasonably expect. Not so, however, the Boers themselves. On the 28th=
September
the newly-elected Volksraad referred the Convention to a General Committee =
to
report on, and on the 30th September the Report was presented. On the 3d
October a telegram was despatched through the British Resident to "His
Excellency W. E. Gladstone," in which the Volksraad states that the
Convention is not acceptable--
(1.) Because it is in conflict with the Sand R=
iver
Treaty of 1852.
(2.) Because it violates the peace agreement
entered into with Sir Evelyn Wood, in confidence of which the Boers laid do=
wn
their arms.
The Volksraad consequently declared that
modifications were desirable, and that certain articles must be altered.
To begin with, they declare that the "con=
duct
of foreign relations does not appertain to the Suzerain, only
supervision," and that the articles bearing on these points must
consequently be modified. They next attack the native question, stating that
"the Suzerain has not the right to interfere with our Legislature,&quo=
t;
and state that they cannot agree to Article 3, which gives the Suzerain a r=
ight
of veto on Legislation connected with the natives, to Article 13, by virtue=
of
which natives are to be allowed to acquire land, and to the last part of
Article 26, by which it is provided that whites of alien race living in the=
Transvaal
shall not be taxed in excess of the taxes imposed on Transvaal citizens.
They further declare that it is "infra
dignitatem" for the President of the Transvaal to be a member of a
Commission. This refers to the Native Location Commission, on which he is, =
in
the terms of the Convention, to sit, together with the British Resident, an=
d a
third person jointly appointed.
They next declare that the amount of the debt =
for
which the Commission has made them liable should be modified. Considering t=
hat
England had already made them a present of from 600,000 pounds to 800,000
pounds, this is a most barefaced demand. Finally, they state that
"Articles 15, 16, 26, and 27, are superfluous, and only calculated to
wound our sense of honour" (sic).
Article 15 enacts that no slavery or apprentic=
eship
shall be tolerated.
Article 16 provides for religious toleration.<= o:p>
Article 26 provides for the free movement,
trading, and residence of all persons, other than natives, conforming
themselves to the laws of the Transvaal.
Article 27 gives to all the right of free acce=
ss
to the Courts of Justice.
Putting the "sense of honour" of the
Transvaal Volksraad out of the question, past experience has but too plainly
proved that these Articles are by no means superfluous.
In reply to this message, Sir Hercules Robinson
telegraphs to the British Resident on the 21st October in the following
words:--
"Having forwarded Volksraad Resolution of
15th to Earl of Kimberley, I am desired to instruct you in reply to repeat =
to
the Triumvirate that Her Majesty's Government cannot entertain any proposals
for a modification of the Convention until after it has been ratified, and =
the
necessity for further concession proved by experience."
I wish to draw particular attention to the last
part of this message, which is extremely typical of the line of policy adop=
ted
throughout in the Transvaal business. The English Government dared not make=
any
further concession to the Boers, because they felt that they had already st=
rained
the temper of the country almost to breaking in the matter. On the other ha=
nd,
they were afraid that if they did not do something, the Boers would tear up=
the
Convention, and they would find themselves face to face with the old
difficulty. Under these circumstances, they have fallen back upon their tem=
porising
and un-English policy, which leaves them a back-door to escape through,
whatever turn things take. Should the Boers now suddenly turn round and
declare, which is extremely probable, that they repudiate their debt to us,=
or
that they are sick of the presence of a British Resident, the Government wi=
ll
be able to announce that "the necessity for further concession" h=
as
now been "proved by experience," and thus escape the difficulty. =
In
short, this telegram has deprived the Convention of whatever finality it may
have possessed, and made it, as a document, as worthless as it is as a prac=
tical
settlement. That this is the view taken of it by the Boers themselves, is
proved by the text of the Ratification which followed on the receipt of this
telegram.
The tone of this document throughout is, in my
opinion, considering from whom it came, and against whom it is directed, ve=
ry
insolent. And it amply confirms what I have previously said, that the Boers
looked upon themselves as a victorious people making terms with those they =
have
conquered. The Ratification leads off thus: "The Volksraad is not sati=
sfied
with this Convention, and considers that the members of the Triumvirate
performed a fervent act of love for the Fatherland when they upon their own
responsibility signed such an unsatisfactory state document." This is
damning with faint praise indeed. It then goes on to recite the various poi=
nts
of object, stating that the answers from the English Government proved that
they were well founded. "The English Government," it says,
"acknowledges indirectly by this answer (the telegram of 21st October,
quoted above) that the difficulties raised by the Volksraad are neither
fictitious nor unfounded, inasmuch as it desires from us the concession that
we, the Volksraad, shall submit it to a practical test." It will be
observed that English is here represented as begging the favour of a trial =
of
her conditions from the Volksraad of the Transvaal Boers. The Ratification =
is
in these words: "Therefore it is that the Raad here unanimously resolv=
es
not to go into further discussion of the Convention, and maintaining all
objections to the Convention as made before the Royal Commission or stated =
in
the Raad, and for the purpose of showing to everybody that the love of peac=
e and
unity inspires us, for the time and provisionally submitting the articles of
the Convention to a practical test, hereby complying with the request of the
English Government contained in the telegram of the 13th October 1881, proc=
eeds
to ratify the Convention."
It would have been interesting to have seen how
such a Ratification as this, which is no Ratification but an insult, would =
have
been accepted by Lord Beaconsfield. I think that within twenty-four hours of
its arrival in Downing Street, the Boer Volksraad would have received a sta=
rtling
answer. But Lord Beaconsfield is dead, and by his successor it was received
with all due thankfulness and humility. His words, however, on this subject
still remain to us, and even his great rival might have done well to listen=
to
them. It was in the course of what was, I believe, the last speech he made =
in
the House of Lords, that speaking about the Transvaal rising, he warned the
Government that it was a very dangerous thing to make peace with rebellious
subjects in arms against the authority of the Queen. The warning passed
unheeded, and the peace was made in the way I have described.
As regards the Convention itself, it will be
obvious to the reader that the Boers have not any intention of acting up to=
its
provisions, mild as they are, if they can possibly avoid them, whilst, on t=
he
other hand, there is no force at hand to punish their disregard or breach. =
It
is all very well to create a Resident with extensive powers; but how is he =
to enforce
his decisions? What is he to do if his awards are laughed at and made a moc=
kery
of, as they are and will be? The position of Mr. Hudson at Pretoria is even
worse than that of Mr. Osborn in Zululand. For instance, the Convention
specifies in the first article that the Transvaal is to be known as the
Transvaal State. The Boer Government have, however, thought fit to adopt the
name of "South African Republic" in all public documents. Mr. Hud=
son
was accordingly directed to remonstrate, which he did in a feeble way; his
remonstrance was politely acknowledged, but the country is still officially
called the South African Republic, the Convention and Mr. Hudson's
remonstrations notwithstanding. Mr. Hudson, however, appears to be better
suited to the position than would have been the case had an Englishman, pure
and simple, been appointed, since it is evident that things that would have
struck the latter as insults to the Queen he represented, and his country
generally, are not so understood by him. In fact, he admirably represents h=
is
official superiors in his capacity of swallowing rebuffs, and when smitten =
on
one cheek delightedly offering the other.
Thus we find him attending a Boer meeting of
thanksgiving for the success that had waited on their arms and the recognit=
ion
of their independence, where most people will consider he was out of place.=
To this
meeting, thus graced by his presence, an address was presented by a branch =
of
the Africander Bond, a powerful institution, having for its object the total
uprootal of English rule and English customs in South Africa, to which he m=
ust
have listened with pleasure. In it he, in common with other members of the
meeting, is informed that "you took up the sword and struck the Briton
with such force" that "the Britons through fear revived that sens=
e of
justice to which they could not be brought by petitions," and that the
"day will soon come that we shall enter with you on one arena for the
entire independence of South Africa," i.e., independence from English
rule.
On the following day the Government gave a din=
ner,
to which all those who had done good service during the late hostilities we=
re
invited, the British Resident being apparently the only Englishman asked.
Amongst the other celebrities present I notice the name of Buskes. This man,
who is an educated Hollander, was the moving spirit of the Potchefstroom at=
rocities;
indeed, so dark is his reputation that the Royal Commission refused to tran=
sact
business with him, or to admit him into their presence. Mr. Hudson was not =
so
particular. And now comes the most extraordinary part of the episode. At the
dinner it was necessary that the health of Her Majesty as Suzerain should be
proposed, and with studied insolence this was done last of all the leading
political toasts, and immediately after that of the Triumvirate.
Notwithstanding this fact, and that the toast was couched by Mr. Joubert, w=
ho
stated that "he would not attempt to explain what a Suzerain was,"=
; in
what appear to be semi-ironical terms, we find that Mr. Hudson "begged=
to tender
his thanks to the Honourable Mr. Joubert for the kind way in which he propo=
sed
the toast."
It may please Mr. Hudson to see the name of the
Queen thus metaphorically dragged in triumph at the chariot wheels of the T=
riumvirate,
but it is satisfactory to know that the spectacle is not appreciated in
England: since, on a question in the House of Lords, by the Earl of Carnarv=
on,
who characterised it as a deliberate insult, Lord Kimberley replied that the
British Resident had been instructed that in future he was not to attend pu=
blic
demonstrations unless he had previously informed himself that the name of H=
er
Majesty would be treated with proper respect. Let us hope that this official
reprimand will have its effect, and that Mr. Hudson will learn therefrom th=
at there
is such a thing as trop de zele--even in a good cause.
The Convention is now a thing of the past, the
appropriate rewards have been lavishly distributed to its framers, and
President Brand has at last prevailed upon the Volksraad of the Orange Free
State to allow him to become a Knight Grand Cross of Saint Michael and Saint
George,--the same prize looked forward to by our most distinguished public
servants at the close of the devotion of their life to the service of their=
country.
But its results are yet to come--though it would be difficult to forecast t=
he
details of their development. One thing, however, is clear: the signing of =
that
document signalised an entirely new departure in South African affairs, and
brought us within a measurable distance of the abandonment, for the present=
at
any rate, of the supremacy of English rule in South Africa.
This is the larger issue of the matter, and it=
is
already bearing fruit. Emboldened by their success in the Transvaal, the Du=
tch
party at the Cape are demanding, and the demand is to be granted, that the
Dutch tongue be admitted pari passu with English, as the official language =
in
the Law Courts and the House of Assembly. When a country thus consents to u=
se a
foreign tongue equally with its own, it is a sure sign that those who speak=
it
are rising to power. But "the Party" looks higher than this, and
openly aims at throwing off English rule altogether, and declaring South Af=
rica
a great Dutch republic. The course of events is favourable to their aspirat=
ion.
Responsible Government is to be granted to Natal, which country not being
strong enough to stand alone in the face of the many dangers that surround =
her,
will be driven into the arms of the Dutch party to save herself from destru=
ction.
It will be useless for her to look for help from England, and any feelings =
of
repugnance she may feel to Boer rule will soon be choked by necessity, and a
mutual interest. It is, however, possible that some unforeseen event, such =
as
the advent to power of a strong Conservative Ministry, may check the tide t=
hat
now sets so strongly in favour of Dutch supremacy.
It seems to me, however, to be a question wort=
hy
of the consideration of those who at present direct the destinies of the
Empire, whether it would not be wise, as they have gone so far, to go a lit=
tle
further and favour a scheme for the total abandonment of South Africa,
retaining only Table Bay. If they do not, it is now quite within the bounds=
of sober
possibility that they may one day have to face a fresh Transvaal rebellion,
only on a ten times larger scale, and might find it difficult to retain even
Table Bay. If, on the other hand, they do, I believe that all the White Sta=
tes
in South Africa will confederate of their own free-will, under the pressure=
of
the necessity for common action, and the Dutch element being preponderant, =
at
once set to work to exterminate the natives on general principles, in much =
the
same way, and from much the same motives that a cook exterminates black
beetles, because she thinks them ugly, and to clear the kitchen.
I need hardly say that such a policy is not one
that commands my sympathy, but Her Majesty's Government having put their ha=
nd
to the plough, it is worth their while to consider it. It would at any rate=
be
in perfect accordance with their declared sentiments, and command an enthus=
iastic
support from their followers.
As regards the smaller and more immediate issu=
e of
the retrocession, namely, its effect on the Transvaal itself, it cannot be
other than evil. The act is, I believe, quite without precedent in our hist=
ory,
and it is difficult to see, looking at it from those high grounds of nation=
al
morality assumed by the Government, what greater arguments can be advanced =
in
its favour, than could be found to support the abandonment of,--let us say,=
--Ireland.
Indeed a certain parallel undoubtedly exists between the circumstances of t=
he
two countries. Ireland was, like the Transvaal, annexed, though a long time
ago, and has continually agitated for its freedom. The Irish hate us, so did
the Boers. In Ireland, Englishmen are being shot, and England is running th=
e awful
risk of bloodguiltiness, as it did in the Transvaal. In Ireland, smouldering
revolution is being fanned into flame by Mr. Gladstone's speeches and acts,=
as
it was in the Transvaal. In Ireland, as in the Transvaal, there exists a st=
rong
loyal class that receives insults instead of support from the Government, a=
nd
whose property, as was the case there, is taken from them without compensat=
ion,
to be flung as a sop to stop the mouths of the Queen's enemies. And so I mi=
ght
go on, finding many such similarities of circumstances, but my parallel, li=
ke most
parallels, must break down at last. Thus--it mattered little to England whe=
ther
or no she let the Transvaal go, but to let Ireland go would be more than ev=
en
Mr. Gladstone dare attempt.
Somehow, if you follow these things far enough,
you always come to vulgar first principles. The difference between the case=
of
the Transvaal and that of Ireland is a difference not of justice but of cau=
se,
for both causes are equally unjust or just according as they are viewed, bu=
t of
mere common expediency. Judging from the elevated standpoint of the national
morality theory however, which, as we know, soars above such truisms as the
foolish statement that force is a remedy, or that if you wish to retain your
prestige you must not allow defeats to pass unavenged, I cannot see why, if=
it
was righteous to abandon the Transvaal, it would not be equally righteous to
abandon Ireland!
As for the Transvaal, that country is not to be
congratulated on its success, for it has destroyed all its hopes of permane=
nt
peace, has ruined its trade and credit, and has driven away the most useful=
and
productive class in the community. The Boers, elated by their success in ar=
ms,
will be little likely to settle down to peaceable occupations, and still le=
ss
likely to pay their taxes, which, indeed, I hear they are already refusing =
to
do. They have learnt how easily even a powerful Government can be upset, and
the lesson is not likely to be forgotten, for want of repetition to their o=
wn
weak one.
Already the Transvaal Government hardly knows
which way to turn for funds, and is, perhaps fortunately for itself, quite
unable to borrow, through want of credit.
As regards the native question, I agree with M=
r.
H. Shepstone, who, in his Report on this subject, says that he does not bel=
ieve
that the natives will inaugurate any action against the Boers, so long as t=
he latter
do not try to collect taxes, or otherwise interfere with them. But if the B=
oer
Government is to continue to exist, it will be bound to raise taxes from the
natives, since it cannot collect much from its white subjects. The first
general attempt of the sort will be the signal for active resistance on the
part of the natives, whom, if they act without concert, the Boers will be a=
ble
to crush in detail, though with considerable loss. If, on the other hand, t=
hey
should have happened, during the last few years, to have learnt the advanta=
ges
of combination, as is quite possible, perhaps they will crush the Boers.
The only thing that is at present certain about
the matter is that there will be bloodshed, and that before long. For insta=
nce,
the Montsoia difficulty in the Keate Award has in it the possibilities of a
serious war, and there are plenty such difficulties ready to spring into li=
fe within
and without the Transvaal.
In all human probability it will take but a sm=
all
lapse of time for the Transvaal to find itself in the identical position fr=
om
which we relieved it by the Annexation.
What course events will then take it is imposs=
ible
to say. It may be found desirable to re-annex the country, though, in my
opinion, that would be, after all that has passed, an unfortunate step; its=
inhabitants
may be cut up piecemeal by a combined movement of native tribes, as they wo=
uld
have been, had they not been rescued by the English Government in 1877, or =
it
is possible that the Orange Free State may consent to take the Transvaal un=
der
its wing: who can say? There is only one thing that our recently abandoned
possession can count on for certain, and that is trouble, both from its whi=
te
subjects, and the natives, who hate the Boers with a bitter and a well-earn=
ed
hatred.
The whole question, can, so far as its moral
aspect is concerned, be summed up in a few words.
Whether or no the Annexation was a necessity at
the moment of its execution,--which I certainly maintain it was--it received
the unreserved sanction of the Home Authorities, and the relations of Sover=
eign
and subject, with all the many and mutual obligations involved in that
connection, were established between the Queen of England and every individ=
ual
of the motley population of the Transvaal. Nor was this change an empty for=
m,
for, to the largest proportion of that population, this transfer of allegia=
nce
brought with it a priceless and a vital boon. To them it meant--freedom and
justice--for where, on any portion of this globe over which the British ens=
ign
floats, does the law even wink at cruelty or wrong?
A few years passed away, and a small number of=
the
Queen's subjects in the Transvaal rose in rebellion against Her authority, =
and
inflicted some reverses on Her arms. Thereupon, in spite of the reiterated
pledges given to the contrary--partly under stress of defeat, and partly in=
obedience
to the pressure of "advanced views"--the country was abandoned, a=
nd
the vast majority who had remained faithful to the Crown, was handed to the
cruel despotism of the minority who had rebelled against it.
Such an act of treachery to those to whom we w=
ere
bound with double chains--by the strong ties of a common citizenship, and by
those claims to England's protection from violence and wrong which have
hitherto been wont to command it, even where there was no duty to fulfil, a=
nd no
authority to vindicate--stands--I believe--without parallel on our records,=
and
marks a new departure in our history.
I cannot end these pages without expressing my
admiration of the extremely able way in which the Boers managed their revol=
t,
when once they felt that, having undertaken the thing, it was a question of=
life
and death with them. It shows that they have good stuff in them somewhere,
which, under the firm but just rule of Her Majesty, might have been much
developed, and it makes it the more sad that they should have been led to t=
hrow
off that rule, and have been allowed to do so by an English Government.
In conclusion, there is one point that I must
touch on, and that is the effect of the retrocession on the native mind, wh=
ich
I can only describe as most disastrous. The danger alluded to in the Report=
of
the Royal Commission has been most amply realised, and the prevailing belie=
f in
the steadfastness of our policy, and the inviolability of our plighted word,
which has hitherto been the great secret of our hold on the Kafirs, has been
rudely shaken. The motives that influenced, or are said to have influenced,=
the
Government in their act, are naturally quite unintelligible to savages, how=
ever
clever, who do believe that force is a remedy, and who have seen the inhabi=
tants
of a country ruled by England, defeat English soldiers and take possession =
of
it, whilst those who remained loyal to England were driven out of it. It wi=
ll
not be wonderful if some of them, say the natives of Natal, deduce therefro=
m conclusions
unfavourable to loyalty, and evince a desire to try the same experiment.
It is, however, unprofitable to speculate on t=
he
future, which must be left to unfold itself.
The curtain is, so far as this country is
concerned, down for the moment on the South African stage; when it rises ag=
ain,
there is but too much reason to fear that it will reveal a state of confusi=
on,
which, unless it is more wisely and consistently dealt with in the future t=
han
it has been in the past, may develop into chaos.
APPEN=
DIX
I
THE POTCHEFSTROOM ATROCITIES, &C.
There were more murders and acts of cruelty
committed during the war at Potchefstroom, where the behaviour of the Boers=
was
throughout both deceitful and savage, than at any other place.
When the fighting commenced a number of ladies=
and
children, the wives and children of English residents, took refuge in the f=
ort.
Shortly after it had been invested they applied to be allowed to return to
their homes in the town till the war was over. The request was refused by t=
he Boer
commander, who said that as they had gone there, they might stop and
"perish" there. One poor lady, the wife of a gentleman well known=
in the
Transvaal, was badly wounded by having the point of a stake, which had been=
cut
in two by a bullet, driven into her side. She was at the time in a state of
pregnancy, and died some days afterwards in great agony. Her little sister =
was
shot through the throat, and several other women and children suffered from
bullet wounds, and fever arising from their being obliged to live for months
exposed to rain and heat, with insufficient food.
The moving spirit of all the Potchefstroom
atrocities was a cruel wretch of the name of Buskes, a well-educated man, w=
ho,
as an advocate of the High Court, had taken the oath of allegiance to the
Queen.
One deponent swears that he saw this Buskes
wearing Captain Fall's diamond ring, which he had taken from Sergeant Ritch=
ie,
to whom it was handed to be sent to England, and also that he had possessed
himself of the carriages and other goods belonging to prisoners taken by th=
e Boers.[*]
Another deponent (whose name is omitted in the Blue Book for precautionary
reasons) swears, "That on the next night the patrol again came to my h=
ouse
accompanied by one Buskes, who was secretary of the Boer Committee, and aga=
in
asked where my wife and daughter were. I replied, in bed; and Buskes then s=
aid,
'I must see for myself.' I refused to allow him, and he forced me, with a
loaded gun held to my breast, to open the curtains of the bed, when he pull=
ed
the bedclothes half off my wife, and altogether off my daughter. I then told
him if I had a gun I would shoot him. He placed a loaded gun at my breast, =
when
my wife sprang out of bed and got between us."
[=
*]
Buskes was afterwards forced to deliver up the ring.
I remember hearing at the time that this Buskes
(who is a good musician) took one of his victims, who was on the way to
execution, into the chapel and played the "Dead March in Saul," or
some such piece, over him on the organ.
After the capture of the Court House a good ma=
ny
Englishmen fell into the hands of the Boers. Most of these were sentenced to
hard labour and deprivation of "civil rights." The sentence was
enforced by making them work in the trenches under a heavy fire from the fo=
rt.
One poor fellow, F. W. Finlay by name, got his head blown off by a shell fr=
om
his own friends in the fort, and several loyal Kafirs suffered the same fat=
e. After
these events the remaining prisoners refused to return to the trenches till
they had been "tamed" by being thrashed with the butt end of guns,
and by threats of receiving twenty-five lashes each.
But their fate, bad as it was, was not so awfu=
l as
that suffered by Dr. Woite and J. Van der Linden.
Dr. Woite had attended the Boer meeting which =
was
held before the outbreak, and written a letter from thence to Major Clarke,=
in
which he had described the talk of the Boers as silly bluster. He was not a
paid spy. This letter was, unfortunately for him, found in Major Clarke's p=
ocket-book,
and because of it he was put through a form of trial, taken out and shot de=
ad,
all on the same day. He left a wife and large family, who afterwards found
their way to Natal in a destitute condition.
The case of Van der Linden is somewhat similar=
. He
was one of Raaf's Volunteers, and as such had taken the oath of allegiance =
to
the Queen. In the execution of his duty he made a report to his commanding
officer about the Boer meeting, and which afterwards fell into the hands of=
the
Boers. On this he was put through the form of trial, and, though in the ser=
vice
of the Queen, was found guilty of treason and condemned to death. One of his
judges, a little less stony-hearted than the rest, pointed out that "w=
hen
the prisoner committed the crime martial law had not yet been proclaimed, n=
or
the State," but it availed him nothing. He was taken out and shot.
A Kafir named Carolus was also put through the
form of trial and shot, for no crime at all that I can discover.
Ten unarmed Kafir drivers, who had been sent a=
way
from the fort, were shot down in cold blood by a party of Boers. Several
witnesses depose to having seen their remains lying together close to
Potchefstroom.
Various other Kafirs were shot. None of the
perpetrators of these crimes were brought to justice. The Royal Commission =
comments
on these acts as follows:--
"In regard to the deaths of Woite, Van de
Linden, and Carolus, the Boer leaders do not deny the fact that those men h=
ad
been executed, but sought to justify it. The majority of your Commissioners
felt bound to record their opinion that the taking of the lives of these men
was an act contrary to the rules of civilised warfare. Sir H. de Villiers w=
as of
opinion that the executions in these cases, having been ordered by properly
constituted Court Martial of the Boers' forces after due trial, did not fall
under the cognisance of your Commissioners.
"Upon the case of William Finlay the majo=
rity
of your Commissioners felt bound to record the opinion that the sacrifice of
Finlay's life, through forced labour under fire in the trenches, was an act
contrary to the rules of civilised warfare. Sir H. de Villiers did not feel
justified by the facts of the case in joining in this expression of opinion=
(sic).
As to the case of the Kafir Andries, your Commissioners decided that, altho=
ugh
the shooting of this man appeared to them, from the information laid before
them, to be not in accordance with the rules of civilised warfare, under all
the circumstances of the case, it was not desirable to insist upon a
prosecution.
"The majority of your Commissioners, alth=
ough
feeling it a duty to record emphatically their disapproval of the acts that
resulted in the deaths of Woite, Van der Linden, Finlay, and Carolus, yet f=
ound
it impossible to bring to justice the persons guilty of these acts."
It will be observed that Sir H. de Villiers do=
es
not express any disapproval, emphatic or otherwise, of these wicked murders=
.
But Potchefstroom did not enjoy a monopoly of
murder.
In December 1880, Captain Elliot, who was a
survivor from the Bronker Spruit massacre, and Captain Lambart, who had been
taken prisoner by the Boers whilst bringing remounts from the Free State, w=
ere
released from Heidelberg on parole on condition that they left the country.=
An
escort of two men brought them to a drift of the Vaal river, where they ref=
used
to cross, because they could not get their cart through, the river being in
flood. The escort then returned to Heidelberg and reported that the officers
would not cross. A civil note was then sent back to Captains Elliot and Lam=
bart,
signed by P. J. Joubert, telling them "to pass the Vaal river immediat=
ely
by the road that will be shown to you." What secret orders, if any, we=
re
sent with this letter has never transpired; but I decline to believe that,
either in this or in Barber's case, the Boer escort took upon themselves the
responsibility of murdering their prisoners, without authority of some kind=
for
the deed.
The men despatched from Heidelberg with the le=
tter
found Lambert and Elliot wandering about and trying to find the way to
Standerton. They presented the letter, and took them towards a drift in the
Vaal. Shortly before they got there the prisoners noticed that their escort=
had
been reinforced. It would be interesting to know, if these extra men were n=
ot sent
to assist in the murder, how and why they turned up as they did and joined
themselves to the escort. The prisoners were taken to an old and disused dr=
ift
of the Vaal river and told to cross. It was now dark, and the river was much
swollen with rain; in fact, impassable for the cart and horses. Captains El=
liot
and Lambart begged to be allowed to outspan till the next morning, but were
told that they must cross, which they accordingly attempted to do. A few ya=
rds
from the bank the cart stuck on a rock, and whilst in this position the Boer
escort poured a volley into it. Poor Elliot was instantly killed, one bullet
fracturing his skull, another passing through the back, a third shattering =
the
right thigh, and a fourth breaking the left wrist. The cart was also riddle=
d,
but, strange to say, Captain Lambert was untouched, and succeeded in swimmi=
ng to
the further bank, the Boers firing at him whenever the flashes of lightning
revealed his whereabouts. After sticking some time in the mud of the bank he
managed to effect his escape, and next day reached the house of an Englishm=
an
called Groom, living in the Free State, and from thence made his way to Nat=
al.
Two of the murderers were put through a form of
trial, after the conclusion of peace, and acquitted.
The case of the murder of Dr. Barber is of a
somewhat similar character to that of Elliot, except that there is in this =
case
a curious piece of indirect evidence that seems to connect the murder direc=
tly
with Piet Joubert, one of the Triumvirate.
In the month of February 1881, two Englishmen =
came
to the Boer laager at Lang's Nek to offer their services as doctors. Their
names were Dr. Barber, who was well known to the Boers, and his assistant, =
Mr.
Walter Dyas, and they came, not from Natal, but the Orange Free State. On a=
rrival
at the Boer camp they were at first well received, but after a little while
seized, searched, and tied up all night to a disselboom (pole of a waggon).
Next morning they were told to mount their horses, and started from the camp
escorted by two men who were to take them over the Free State line.
When they reached the Free State line the Boers
told them to get off their horses, which they were ordered to bring back to=
the
camp. They did so, bade good-day to their escort, and started to walk on
towards their destination. When they had gone about forty yards Dyas heard =
the report
of a rifle, and Barber called out, "My God, I am shot!" and fell =
dead.
Dyas went down on his hands and knees and saw =
one
of the escort deliberately aim at him. He then jumped up, and ran dodging f=
rom
right to left, trying to avoid the bullet. Presently the man fired, and he =
felt
himself struck through the thigh. He fell with his face to the men, and saw=
his
would-be assassin put a fresh cartridge into his rifle and aim at him. Turn=
ing
his face to the ground he awaited his death, but the bullet whizzed past his
head. He then saw the men take the horses and go away, thinking they had
finished him. After waiting a while he managed to get up, and struggled to a
house not far off, where he was kindly treated and remained till he recover=
ed.
Some time after this occurrence a Hottentot, n=
amed
Allan Smith, made a statement at Newcastle, from which it appears that he h=
ad
been taken prisoner by the Boers and made to work for them. One night he saw
Barber and Dyas tied to the disselboom, and overheard the following, which =
I will
give in his own words:--
"I went to a fire where some Boers were
sitting; among them was a low-sized man, moderately stout, with a dark-brown
full beard, apparently about thirty-five years of age. I do not know his na=
me.
He was telling his comrades that he had brought an order from Piet Joubert =
to
Viljoen, to take the two prisoners to the Free State line and shoot them th=
ere.
He said, in the course of conversation, 'Piet Joubert het gevraacht waarom =
was
de mensche neet dood geschiet toen hulle bijde eerste laager gekom het.' ('=
Piet
Joubert asked why were the men not shot when they came to the first laager.=
')
They then saw me at the fire, and one of them said, 'You must not talk befo=
re
that fellow; he understands what you say, and will tell everybody.'
"Next morning Viljoen told me to go away,=
and
gave me a pass into the Free State. He said (in Dutch), 'you must not drive=
for
any Englishmen again. If we catch you doing so we will shoot you, and if yo=
u do
not go away quick, and we catch you hanging about when we bring the two men=
to the
line, we will shoot you too.'"
Dyas, who escaped, made an affidavit with
reference to this statement in which he says, "I have read the foregoi=
ng
affidavit of Allan Smith, and I say that the person described in the third
paragraph thereof as bringing orders from Piet Joubert to Viljoen, correspo=
nds
with one of the Boers who took Dr. Barber and myself to the Free State, and=
to
the best of my belief he is the man who shot Dr. Barber."
The actual murderers were put on their trial in
the Free State, and, of course, acquitted. In his examination at the trial,
Allan Smith says, "It was a young man who said that Joubert had given
orders that Barber had to be shot. . . . It was not at night, but in the
morning early, when the young man spoke about Piet Joubert's order."
Most people will gather, from what I have quot=
ed,
that there exists a certain connection between the dastardly murder of Dr.
Barber (and the attempted murder of Mr. Dyas), and Piet Joubert, one of that
"able" Triumvirate of which Mr. Gladstone speaks so highly.
I shall only allude to one more murder, though
more are reported to have occurred, amongst them--that of Mr. Malcolm, who =
was kicked
to death by Boers,--and that is Mr. Green's.
Mr. Green was an English gold-digger, and was
travelling along the main road to his home at Spitzcop. The road passed clo=
se
by the military camp at Lydenburg, into which he was called. On coming out =
he went
to a Boer patrol with a flag of truce, and whilst talking to them was shot
dead. The Rev. J. Thorne, the English clergyman at Lydenburg, describes thi=
s murder
in an affidavit in the following words:--
"That I was the clergyman who got togethe=
r a
party of Englishmen and brought down the body of Mr. Green who was murdered=
by
the Boers and buried it. I have ascertained the circumstances of the murder,
which were as follows:--Mr. Green was on his way to the gold-fields. As he =
was passing
the fort, he was called in by the officers, and sent out again with a messa=
ge
to the Boer commandant. Immediately on leaving the camp, he went to the Boer
guard opposite with a flag of truce in his hand; while parleying with the
Boers, who proposed to make a prisoner of him, he was shot through the
head."
No prosecution was instituted in this case. Mr.
Green left a wife and children in a destitute condition.
II
PLEDGES GIVEN BY MR. GLADSTONE'S GOVERNMENT AS=
TO
THE RETENTION OF THE TRANSVAAL AS A BRITISH COLONY
The following extracts from the speeches, despatches, and telegrams of members of the present Government, with refere= nce to the proposed retrocession of the Transvaal, are not without interest:--<= o:p>
During the month of May 1880, Lord Kimberley
despatched a telegram to Sir Bartle Frere, in which the following words occ=
ur:
"Under no circumstances can the Queen's authority in the Transvaal be =
relinquished."
In a despatch dated 20th May, and addressed to=
Sir
Bartle Frere, Lord Kimberley says, "That the sovereignty of the Queen =
in
the Transvaal could not be relinquished."
In a speech in the House of Lords on the 24th =
May
1880, Lord Kimberley said:--
"There was a still stronger reason than t=
hat
for not receding; it was impossible to say what calamities such a step as r=
eceding
might not cause. We had, at the cost of much blood and treasure, restored
peace, and the effect of our now reversing our policy would be to leave the=
province
in a state of anarchy, and possibly to cause an internecine war. For such a
risk he could not make himself responsible. The number of the natives in the
Transvaal was estimated at about 800,000, and that of the whites less than
50,0000. Difficulties with the Zulus and frontier tribes would again arise,
and, looking as they must to South Africa as a whole, the Government, after=
a
careful consideration of the question, came to the conclusion that we could=
not
relinquish the Transvaal. Nothing could be more unfortunate than uncertaint=
y in
respect to such a matter."
On the 8th June 1880, Mr. Gladstone, in reply =
to a
Boer memorial, wrote as follows:--
"It is undoubtedly a matter for much regr=
et
that it should, since the Annexation, have appeared that so large a number =
of
the population of Dutch origin in the Transvaal are opposed to the annexati=
on
of that territory, but it is impossible now to consider that question as if=
it were
presented for the first time. We have to do with a state of things which has
existed for a considerable period, during which obligations have been
contracted, especially, though not exclusively, towards the native populati=
on,
which cannot be set aside. Looking to all the circumstances, both of the
Transvaal and the rest of South Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a
renewal of disorders, which might lead to disastrous consequences, not only=
to
the Transvaal but to the whole of South Africa, our judgment is that the Qu=
een
cannot be advised to relinquish the Transvaal."
Her Majesty's Speech, delivered in Parliament =
on
the 6th January 1881, contains the following words: "A rising in the
Transvaal has recently imposed upon me the duty of vindicating my
authority."
These extracts are rather curious reading in f=
ace
of the policy adopted by the Government, after our troops had been defeated=
.
III
THE CASE OF INDABEZIMBI
This is a case which came under my own notice.=
The
complainant is now a tenant of my own. When Indabezimbi appeared before Mr.
Cochrane and myself, his appearance fully bore out his description of the
assault made upon him. We did everything in our power to help him to recover
his son and his property, but without effect. The matter was fully reported=
to
Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir E. Wood, and a question was asked on the subj=
ect
in the House of Commons. I append Mr. Courtney's answer. This case, which i=
s perfectly
authentic, will prove instructive reading, as showing the treatment the Kaf=
ir
must expect at the hands of the Boer, now that he is no longer protected by=
us.
It must be remembered that the vast majority of such incidents are never he=
ard
of. The Kafirs suffer, and are still. The assault and robbery of Indabezimbi
took place in Natal territory.
State=
ment
of Indabezimbi
"I used to work on Mr. Robson's son's pla=
ce,
and on his death I went to Meyer's (in the Utrecht district of the Transvaa=
l)
about a year ago. I took all my property with me. There lived on the farm o=
ld
Isaac Meyer, Solomon Meyer, who died during the war, young Isaac Meyer, Jan
Meyer, Martinus Meyer, also a man called Cornelius, a 'bijwooner,' who love=
d in
Solomon's place after he died.
"According to custom, I sent my son to wo=
rk
for old Isaac Meyer, as I lived on his place. When the war began all the Me=
yer
family moved further into the Transvaal, my son going with them as herd. I =
went
up to Klip River with them as driver, where the river forms the boundary be=
tween
the Free State and Transvaal. I returned at once, leaving my son with the
Meyers. He was a small boy about twelve years of age. At the termination of=
the
war the Meyers sent for me to drive them down. I met them a day's journey t=
his
side of Klip River. I asked them where my son was. Old Isaac Meyer told me =
he
had sent him to look for horses; he did not return; and another boy was sent
who brought the horses. The horses were found close by. No one went to look=
for
my son. I asked old Isaac Meyer for leave to go and offer a reward amongst =
the
Kafirs for my son. He refused, saying I must drive him home, and then he wo=
uld
give me a pass to come back and look for him. On our arrival at the farm I =
and
my wife again applied to old Isaac Meyer to be allowed to go and see about =
my
son. He refused, saying I must first shear the sheep. I replied that he well
knew that I could not shear sheep. I said, 'How can I work when my heart is
sore for my son?' Meyer said again that I must wait awhile as the rivers we=
re
full. I said how could that matter, seeing that both in coming and going wi=
th
the waggons we crossed no rivers? As he refused me a pass, I started without
one to seek my son. On arrival at Mavovo's kraal I met my brother, who told=
me
that I must go no further, or the Boers would shoot me. Having no pass I
returned. On my return my wives told me that the Meyers had come every morn=
ing
to look for me with guns to shoot me, telling them that 'it was now no long=
er
the days for sjamboking (flogging with hide whips) the natives, but the days
for shooting them.' On hearing this I collected my goods, and by morning had
everything on the Natal side of the Buffalo River--on Natal ground. About
mid-day Martinus Meyer overtook us by Degaza's kraal and asked me what I was
doing on the Natal side of the river. I told him I was leaving for Natal,
because I found it altogether too hot for me in the Transvaal. He said that=
if
I came back he would make everything comfortable. I refused. He then attack=
ed
me with a knobkerrie, and would have killed me had not one of my wives, see=
ing
that I was badly hurt, knocked him down with a piece of iron. Martinus then
mounted his horse and galloped off. I then got on my horse and fled. My wiv=
es hid
themselves. In the afternoon there came to the waggon Jan Meyer, Martinus
Meyer, young Isaac Meyer, and the man called Cornelius. They hunted all abo=
ut
for us with the object of shooting us, as they told Degaza's Kafirs. My wiv=
es
then saw them inspan the waggon and take everything away. I had a waggon,
twelve oxen, four cows, and a mare, also a box containing two hundred pound=
s in
gold, a telescope, clothes, and other things. My wives found the box broken=
on
the ground and all the contents gone. Forty sacks of grain belonging to me =
were
also taken. I was robbed of everything I had, with the exception of the hor=
se I
escaped on. The waggon was one I hired from my brother (a relation); the ox=
en
were my own brother's. Eighty pounds of the money I got from the Standard B=
ank
in Newcastle for oxen sold to the owner of the store on the Ingagane Drift.=
The
rest I had accumulated in fees from doctoring. I am a doctor amongst my own
people. I come now to ask you to allow me to settle on your land as a refug=
ee.
"(Signed) Indabezimbi, his X mark.
"This statement was made by Indabezimbi at
Hilldrop, Newcastle, Natal, on the Seventeenth of August, Eighteen hundred =
and
eighty-one, in the presence of the undersigned witnesses.
"(Signed) H. Rider Haggard. A. H. D.
Cochrane. J. H. Gay Roberts.
"N.B.--The outrage of which Indabezimbi h=
as
here given an account occurred within a week of the present date, August 17=
th,
1881."
State=
ment
of the woman Nongena, Wife of Indabezimbi
"My master's name is Isaac Meyer; he live=
s in
the Transvaal, south of Utrecht. We have lived on the farm about a year. On=
the
farm lived also Jan Meyer, Martinus Meyer, and young Isaac Meyer, sons of o=
ld
Isaac Meyer. There was also another man on the farm, whose name I do not kn=
ow. When
the waggon went up with the Meyers' family to the centre of the Transvaal, =
when
the late war broke out, my husband drove old Isaac Meyer's waggon, and my s=
on
Ungazaan also went to drive on stock. After my husband had driven the waggo=
n to
its destination in the Transvaal he returned to the kraal, leaving his son
Ungazaan with the Meyers. After the war was over my husband was sent for by=
the
Meyers to drive back the waggons. On arrival of the Meyers at the farm I fo=
und
my husband had returned, but my son was left behind. I asked my master wher=
e my
son was; my master replied, 'He did not know, he had sent to boy to bring u=
p horses,
but he had not brought them.' Another boy was sent who brought the horses. =
He
said he had not seen the boy Ungazaan since he left to look for the horses,=
as
they had left the place the morning after the boy was missing. My husband a=
sked
for a pass to go back and look for the boy; Meyer refused, and my husband w=
ent
without one to look for Ungazaan, my son. He returned without the boy, owin=
g,
he said, to the want of a pass. My husband dared not go into the country
without a pass. During my husband's absence, the three sons of old Isaac Me=
yer,
namely, Martinus, Jan, and Isaac, came every morning to search for my husba=
nd, saying,
'We will kill him, he leaves our work to go without our leave for look for =
the
boy.' They came once with sjamboks, but afterwards with guns, saying they w=
ould
kill him if they found him. On hearing this my husband said, 'We cannot then
stay here longer.' He then went at once and borrowed a waggon and twelve ox=
en,
and during the night we packed the waggon three times, and took three loads
across the Buffalo River to Degaza's kraal, which is on Natal ground, forty
sacks of grain, 200 pounds in a box, with clothes and other things, also ma=
ts
and skins, and four head of cattle and a horse. All these things were at
Degaza's kraal before sunrise the next morning. The Induna Kabane, at the
magistrate's office at Newcastle, knows of the money, and from whence it ca=
me.
All the money is our money.
"About mid-day on the day after the night=
we
moved, Martinus came on horseback to us at Degaza's kraal, and I saw him
beating my husband with a kerrie; he hit him also in the mouth with his fis=
t.
He hit my husband on the head with a kerrie; he beat my husband on the foot=
when
he was trying to creep away in a hut, and would have killed him had not one=
of his
wives named Camgagaan hit Martinus on the head with a piece of iron. Martin=
us,
on recovery, rode away; my husband also fled on a horse.
"I with the other wives fled, and hid
ourselves close by in the grass and stones. Presently we saw from our own
hiding-place three white men, armed with guns, seeking for us. Their names =
were
Martinus Meyer, Jan Meyer, and Isaac Meyer, all three sons of old Isaac Mey=
er.
They sought us in vain. From our hiding-place we heard the waggon driven aw=
ay;
and later, when we went back to Degaza's kraal, they told us that the Meyer=
s had
inspanned the waggon, and had returned with it to the Transvaal side of the
Buffalo River. The names of those who saw the Boers go away with the waggon=
are
Gangtovo, Capaches, Nomatonga, Nomamane, and others. The Boers took away on=
the
waggon that night all the last load we had brought over from the Transvaal,
together with all our clothes; and some of the sacks first brought over were
loaded up, all our cattle were taken, and our box was broken, and the 200
pounds taken away. We found the pieces of the box on the ground when we came
from our hiding-place. We then fled. The people at Degaza's kraal told us t=
hat
the Boers had said that they would return, and take away that which they we=
re
forced to leave behind when they took the first load. We have since heard f=
rom Degaza
that the Boers came back again and took what remained of our property at
Degaza's kraal. Degaza saw the Boers take the things himself.
"This is all I know of the facts. The
assaults and robbery took place, as near as I can say, about fourteen days
ago."
(Signed) Nongena, her X mark.
Gagaoola, also wife of Indabezimbi,
states:--"I have heard all that Nongena has told you. Her words are tr=
ue;
I was present when the assault and robbery took place."
(Signed) Gagaoola, her X mark.
These statements were made to us at Hilldrop,
Newcastle, Natal, on the Twenty-second of August, Eighteen hundred and eigh=
ty-one.
A. H. D. Cochrane.
H. Rider Haggard.
(Signed) Ayah, her X mark, Interpreter.
Indab=
ezimbi
"Mr. Alderman Fowler asked the Under
Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether the British Resident at Pretor=
ia
had brought under the notice of the Transvaal Government the circumstances =
of
an outrage committed in August last, by a party of Boers, on the person and=
property
of a Kafir named Indabezimbi, who was at that time residing in Natal; and
whether any steps had been taken by the authorities of the Transvaal either=
to
institute a judicial inquiry into the matter, or to surrender the offenders=
to
the Government of Natal.
"Mr. Courtney.--On the 13th of October the
British Resident reported that, according to promise, the Government has ca=
used
an investigation to be made at Utrecht, and informed him that the result was
somewhat to invalidate the statement of Indabezimbi; but that the documents=
connected
with the investigation at Utrecht would speedily be forwarded to him with a
view to correspondence through him with the Natal Government. No further
communication has been received. It must be observed that, in the absence of
any extradition convention, a judicial inquiry in this case is practically
impossible, the outrage, whatever it was, having been committed in Natal, a=
nd
the offenders being in the Transvaal. Her Majesty's Government are taking
active steps to re-establish a system of extradition, in pursuance of Artic=
le
29, of the Convention. The despatches on this subject will be given to
Parliament when the correspondence is completed."
IV
A BOER ADVERTISEMENT
It may be interesting to Englishmen to know wh=
at
treatment is meted out to such of their fellow-countrymen as have been bold
enough, or forced by necessity, to remain in the Transvaal since the
retrocession. The following is a translation of an advertisement recently
published in the "Volkstem," a Transvaal paper, and is a fair sam=
ple
of what "loyalists" have to expect.
"=
;WARNING
"We, the undersigned Burghers of the Ward
Aapies river, hereby warn all loyal persons who have registered themselves =
with
the British Resident, that they are not to come into our houses, or into our
farms, and still less to offer to shake hands. They can greet us at a dista=
nce
on the road like Kafirs, and those who act contrary to this notice can expe=
ct the
result."
Presu=
mably
"the result" that the Englishman who takes the liberty to offer to
shake hands with a Boer can expect, is to be beaten or murdered. This notic=
e is
signed by the Justice of the Peace or "Veld Cornet" of the distri=
ct.
Anybody who knows the estimation in which a Kafir is held by the Boers will
understand its peculiar insolence.
V
"TRANSVAAL'S" LETTER TO THE
"STANDARD"
The following letter appeared in the issue of =
the
"Standard" of the 31st May 1882, and is dated Pretoria, 27th Apri=
l.
It is signed "Transvaal," probably because the author, were he to=
put
his name at the foot of so candid a document, would find himself in much the
same position as that occupied at the present moment by an Irish landlord w=
ho
has outraged the susceptibilities of the Land League. He would be rigorously
"boycotted," and might, in the event of any disturbance, be made =
into
a target. The Transvaal Boers are very sensitive to criticism, especially w=
here
their native policy is concerned. I take the liberty to reprint the letter =
here,
partly because I feel sure that I will be forwarding the wishes of the writ=
er
by assisting to give publicity to his facts, and partly on account of the
striking and recent confirmation it affords, on every point, to my remarks =
on
the same subject:--
"Sir,--In calling your attention to what =
is
going on on the south-western border of the Transvaal, I may possibly tell =
you
of some things which you may already have heard of, for in the present isol=
ated
condition of the country, without telegraphs, and with a very imperfect pos=
tal
system, added to the jealousy of the Boer Government in keeping their actio=
ns
secret from the outside world, it is not only very difficult to get at the
truth of what is happening, but the people in one portion of the country ar=
e in
many cases totally ignorant of what is going on in another. Nevertheless, I
feel it incumbent on me to call the attention of the English people, through
your widely circulating journal, to what has come under my observation with
reference to the disgraceful native war which is, and has been, raging on t=
he
south-west border of this country.
"During the late Boer war, you may be awa=
re
of the fact that a very large number, if not all, of the natives, were stro=
ngly
in favour of the English Government, and only awaited the signal from it to
rush upon their old oppressors. But the natives, although forbidden by the
English Government from joining with them against the Boers (it is hardly n=
ecessary
to say that had it not been for this the war would have had a very different
ending), nevertheless afforded an asylum and protection to the lives and
property of refugee Englishmen and loyalists. Notable among these natives w=
as a
Chief named Montsiou, whose tribe is situated just outside the borders of t=
he
Transvaal to the south-west. This Chief and his people received numbers of
refugees who fled to them for protection from the rapacity of the Boers, and
watched over them and their property throughout the war. For this offence t=
he
Boers swore to be revenged on him, and hardly was the war finished when they
commenced commandeering in the Potchefstroom district, under the pretence o=
f protecting
their borders, but with the ostensible purpose of inflicting chastisement on
this loyal Chief; and, the better to effect their purpose, they allied
themselves with a neighbouring Chief, who had some old grudge against him, =
and,
by promises of assistance and hopes of plunder, induced him to commence a w=
ar,
under cover of which they could join, and thus effect the purpose they had =
in
view.
"The Chiefs whom the Boers had instigated=
to
harass Montsiou got the worst of it, and the action of the Boers, who were
actively commandeering in the Potchefstroom (district?), under Commandant
Cronge, was brought to the notice of the Royal Commission through complaint=
s made
by loyal Boers, and resulted in an inquiry into the subject, which showed t=
hat
his opponent was the aggressor, and was acting under the advice of and
assistance from the Boers. The Royal Commission managed to patch matters up,
but no sooner were their labours over, and the country fairly handed over to
the Boers, than Moshete and Masouw, instigated by the Boers, commenced again
harassing Montsiou, with the avowed purpose of bringing on a war, and so far
succeeded as to oblige Montsiou to take up arms in self-defence.
"From that time forward the war has gone =
on
increasing in dimensions, until other Chiefs have been drawn into it, and t=
he
Boer volunteers fighting against Montsiou and Monkoroane are almost equal in
numbers to the natives. The Boers, while doing all they can to crush Montsi=
ou
on account of the protection he afforded loyalists during the late war agai=
nst
the English Government, are careful not to do it in an official way, because
that might cause trouble with England, whereas, by aiding and assisting it
privately, they could do quite as much without incurring responsibility. You
may naturally ask how I know all this, and what proofs I can advance in sup=
port
of it. Some time after the Royal Commission had left the country, and the w=
ar
had commenced again, Piet Joubert, who is Commandant-General, went down to =
the
border with the object of putting an end to the war. This, I presume, he did
for the sake of appearances, for it is well known that he entertains a stro=
ng hatred
against those natives who in any way showed a partiality for British rule; =
and
when it is remembered that Piet Joubert's journey did not result in a cessa=
tion
of hostilities, but in an increase, and that ever since his journey the war=
has
increased in area and in numbers, and that in no single instance has a Boer
volunteer been prevented from crossing the border, or ammunition for use
against Montsiou been stopped, the sincerity of his intentions may well be
doubted.
"Then, again, officers in the Boer Jagers
went about Pretoria endeavouring to obtain volunteers to fight against
Montsiou, saying that they were to have some months' leave from the Governm=
ent,
and that subscriptions would be raised to assist those men who had no priva=
te means.
This took place almost immediately after Piet Joubert's return from the bor=
der,
and while he was in Pretoria, and the general opinion was that he was at the
bottom of it; but as it became rather more public than was intended, the
British Resident was obliged to take notice of it, and the result was that =
the
Boers, though in general treating the British Resident with little
consideration, thought it wisest to carry on their operations in a more pri=
vate
manner, more especially as their object could be attained quite as effectua=
lly
in this way.
"While the Boers are assisting Moshete and
Masouw by every means in their power, with the sole object of crushing Mont=
siou
and Monkoroane, another loyal Chief, the Colonial Government, no doubt unde=
r instructions
from home, are doing their best to prevent volunteers or ammunition reaching
them, and have already rested men in Kimberley, who have been trying to rai=
se
volunteers to go to their assistance.
"The result of this is, that the loyal Ch=
iefs
are suffering under a double disadvantage; for while their enemies are
receiving every assistance, they are blockaded on all sides, and, through t=
he
action of the English Government in preventing them obtaining assistance, a=
re rapidly
falling a prey to the Boers. Those only who know anything of the Boer metho=
d of
warfare against natives will know what this means; and in spite of the Boer
Government doing all they can to keep things secret, horrible tales of the
cruelties perpetrated by them leak out occasionally.
"It seems to me a disgraceful thing, and a
stain on the honour of England, that these loyal Chiefs and their tribes sh=
ould
be robbed, plundered, and shot down like dogs, simply because they afforded=
protection
to the lives and property of Englishmen during the late war, and yet these
things are going on and are being perpetrated on the border of England's
Colonies. If England will not step in and insist on the Boers putting a sto=
p to
this murderous war, then in God's name let her not prevent these poor nativ=
es
from obtaining ammunition and assistance to enable them to defend their
country. They succoured our countrymen, and if we cannot succour them, the
least we can do is not to interfere to prevent them from protecting themsel=
ves!
"Of course, it suits the Boer Government =
to
make out that they have nothing to do with the war, and cannot prevent Boer
Volunteers from fighting these Chiefs; and so long as the English Government
rests satisfied with these answers, so long will this disgraceful state of =
things
go on. Let the English Government be firm, however, and insist on the Boers
taking no part in this war, and it will cease--a sure proof that the Boer
Government have the power to stop it if they have the will.
"Not only are the Boers wreaking vengeance
upon Montsiou and Monkoroane, but a friend of theirs, a Chief of the name of
Kalafin, whose tribe is situated in the Zeerust district, Transvaal, has be=
en
robbed by them of everything he possessed. This Chief had English sympathie=
s;
and as he presumed to build a wall round his town he gave the Boers the exc=
use they
wanted. He was ordered to take the wall down, which he did, at the same time
proving that he only built it to prevent his cattle straying among the huts=
. He
was then ordered to come to Pretoria, which he did accordingly. He was then
ordered to pay a fine of three thousand cattle, which fine he paid. No soon=
er
was this done than the Boers, bent on his ruin, raised the fine to ten thou=
sand
head. The poor Chief in vain pleaded his inability to pay. It was the old s=
tory
of the wolf and the lamb. Because he couldn't pay, the Boers construed it i=
nto
an act of disobedience, and at once ordered their men to go in and take
everything he possessed. This tribe is small and weak, which the Boers well
knew. Eye-witnesses of what followed say it was a heartrending sight. The w=
omen,
with children in their arms, pleaded in vain to the Boers to leave them
something or they would starve, but the latter only jeered at them. What th=
ese
poor people will do God only knows, for the Boers stripped them of every li=
ving
thing they possessed, and with the proceeds of this robbery the Boer Govern=
ment
intend to replenish their coffers.
"The British Resident, Mr. Hudson, it is
believed, shuts his eyes to many things. No doubt his is a difficult positi=
on
to fill; and doubtless he is aware that, if he reports everything to the
English Government, the Boers have it in their power to make his position
anything but a pleasant one. In any case, the English portion of the commun=
ity
here, while admitting his good qualities socially, have little confidence i=
n him
officially.
"My object in writing this letter, howeve=
r,
is not so much to show what a disgraceful state the Government is in, as to=
try
and awaken sympathy in the breasts of my countrymen for the cause of these
loyal Chiefs. While the Government are writing despatches to the British
Resident, these Chiefs and their people are being ruined past remedying.&qu=
ot;
VI
A VISIT TO THE CHIEF SECOCOENI[*]
[=
*]
This paper was written just before the Annexation of the Transvaal in 1877.
Towards the end of March I had occasion to vis=
it
the Basuto chief Secocoeni, in his native stronghold beyond the Loolu Berg,=
a
range to the north-east of Pretoria, about 250 miles away; and as this jour=
ney was
typical of travelling in the wilds of South Africa, an account of it may pr=
ove
interesting.
It is perhaps necessary to explain, for the
benefit of those who are not acquainted with South African politics, that
Secocoeni is the chieftain who has been at war with the late Transvaal
Republic, who drove back its forces, capturing some 7000 head of cattle. It=
is
from this raid that the present state of affairs has arisen; so that this
obscure chief, with his 9000 warriors, has materially affected the future
destinies of South Africa. Negotiations of peace had been set on foot, and =
it
was in connection with these delicate matters that the journey was to be un=
dertaken.
"Going to Secocoeni at this time of year!
Ah!" said one gentleman. "Well, look here. I sent five natives
through that country in this same month (March) last year; out of those fiv=
e,
three died of the fever, and the other two just got through with their live=
s. I
only tell you, you know, that you may take precautions. This is a bad fever
year." However, fever or no fever, we had to go. As it was necessary to
travel rapidly, we could only take four riding-horses, three for ourselves =
and
the fourth for a Zulu named "Lankiboy," who also led a pack-horse=
, and
carried an enormous "knob-kerry," or shillelagh, stuck in his but=
ton-hole,
as though it were a wedding-bouquet.
Behind our saddles were fastened our saddle-ba=
gs,
containing a change of clothing, and in front we strapped a rug and a
mackintosh. Our commissariat consisted of four tins of potted ham, and our =
medicine-chest
of some quinine, Cockle's pills, and a roll of sticking-plaster, which, wit=
h a
revolver and a hunting-knife or two, completed our equipment.
We knew little of our route save that our
destination lay due east, so due east we steered. After riding for about tw=
enty
miles, and crossing the Mahaliesburg range, that stretches away north for
hundreds of miles, we came to a Boer's house, where we off-saddled to feed =
our
horses. It must be understood that the Boers were the one certain difficult=
y,
and one of the possible dangers, to be encountered on our road, for at no t=
ime
are they are pleasant people to deal with, and just now they are remarkably
unpleasant towards Englishmen.
For instance, at this first house, we managed =
to
get some forage for our horses, before our scowling host found out who we w=
ere,
but not a bit could we get to eat. "Have you no bread, myn Heer?"
"We have no bread to spare." "Have you any eggs?" "=
;We
have no eggs." "Can you let us have some milk?" "Susan,
have you got any milk to give these carles (fellows)?" Finally, we
succeeded in buying three cups of milk for a shilling, "as a favour,&q=
uot;
and that is all we got from sunrise to sunset.
Riding, on empty stomachs, for another sixty m=
iles
over the plains, we came to a Boer's house where we had to sleep. Just befo=
re
we reached the door, I noticed what I have often seen since, some graves in=
a
row, with heaps of stones piled over them. It appears that these people do =
not care
about bring buried in consecrated ground, their only anxiety being to be pu=
t in
a coffin, and they are generally laid to rest near to their doors. There is
neither railing nor headstone, and no trees or flowers, those green emblema=
tic
garments with which civilised people try to hide the ugliness of death. I
remember once seeing several graves within two or three yards of the public
road, so that in a year or so the waggons will be rumbling over the heads of
those who lie beneath.
When you ride up to a Boer's house, the etique=
tte
is to wait until some member of the family asks you to off-saddle, and then=
you
must go in and shake hands with every one, a most disagreeable custom. None=
of
the women--who are very plain--rise to meet one, they just hold out their h=
ands.
This house was a fair specimen of the sort of habitation indulged in by the
ordinary Boer. The main room was about eighteen feet square, with that kind=
of
door which allows the upper half to open whilst the lower remains shut, suc=
h as
is used in stables in England. The flooring is made of cow-dung, into which
peach stones are trodden at the threshold, in order to prevent its wearing
away. The furniture consists of a deal table and some chairs, rather nearly
made of strips of hide fastened to a wooden frame. There is no ceiling, but
only beams, to which are fastened strips of "biltong," or game's
flesh, dried in the sun. Out of this room open one or two more, in which the
whole family sleep, without much attempt at privacy.
Sitting about the room were two or three young
mothers, without stockings and nursing babies; in the corner, on a chair, m=
ade
twice as large as any of the others, reposed the mother of the family, a wo=
man
of large size. The whole house was pervaded by a sickly odour, like that of=
a
vault, whilst the grime and filth of it baffle description. And this was the
place we had to eat and sleep in. However, there was no help for it; the on=
ly
thing to do was to light one's pipe, and smoke. After an hour or so, supper=
was
put upon the table, consisting of a bowl full of boiled bones, a small stac=
k of
mealie cobs, and, be it added, some good bread-and-butter. The eating
arrangements of these people are certainly very trying. The other day we ha=
d to
eat our dinner in a Boer's house, with a reeking ox-hide, just torn from the
animal, lying on the floor beside us, together with portions of the poor
beast's head whose flesh we were eating. However, on this occasion we were
spared the ox-hide, and, being very hungry, managed to put up with the other
discomforts. After a long grace our suppers were served out to us. I rememb=
er I
got an enormous bone with but little flesh on it, which, if I may form an o=
pinion
from its great size and from a rapid anatomical survey, must have been the
tibia of an ox. A young Boer sat opposite to me--a wonderful fellow. He got
through several mealie cobs (and large ones too) whilst I was eating half a
one. His method was peculiar, and shows what practice can do. He shoved a
mealie cob into his mouth, gave it a bite and a wrench, just like one of th=
ose
patent American threshing machines, brought the cob out perfectly clear of
grain, and took another. After the supper was over, we had another long gra=
ce
ending with: "voor spijze en drunk de Heer ik dank" (for food and
drink the Lord I thank).
After supper we went outside in order to escape
the feet-washing ceremony (all in the same water) which this "simple
pastoral people" are said to indulge in, and which they might expect t=
he
"uitlander" (stranger) to enter into with enthusiasm. When we came
back, we found that the women--who, by-the-by, do not eat till the men have=
finished--had
done their meal, and gone to bed, having first made us up a luxurious couch=
on
the floor, consisting of a filthy feather-bed, and an equally filthy blanke=
t.
My heart misgave me when I looked at that bed. It may have been fancy, but =
once
or twice I thought it moved. However, there was no choice, unless we chose =
to
sit up all night; so in we got, looking for all the world like three big
sun-burned dolls put to bed by some little girl. I, as the youngest, blew o=
ut
the light, and then!--from every side they came. Up one's arms, up one's le=
gs, down
one's back they scampered, till life became a burden. Sleep was impossible;=
one
could only lie awake and calculate the bites per minute, and the quantity of
blood one would lose before daybreak. Cold as it was, I would have turned o=
ut
and slept in the veldt, only my rug was over my two companions as well as
myself, so I could not take it. I have slept in a good many different place=
s,
and in very fairly uncomfortable places, but I never had such a night befor=
e.
At the first grey dawn of morning the old
"frau" came stumbling out of the bedroom, and sat down without
ceremony in her big chair. Waiting till she thought that we had reached a
sufficiently advanced stage in our toilette--and her idea of what that was =
must
have been a strange one--she shouted out to her daughters that they could
"com," and in they all came. Very glad were we when we had paid o=
ur
bill, which was a heavy one, and were in the saddle once more, riding throu=
gh
the cold morning mist that lay in masses on all the ridges of the hills like
snow on mountains.
It was needful to start early, for we had more
than sixty miles to cover, and our ponies had done a good journey the day
before. The work that one can get out of these ponies is marvellous. There =
was
my pony, "Mettle," who had my eleven stone to carry, to say nothi=
ng
of the saddle, heavy saddle-bags, and a roll of rugs, who came in at the en=
d of
his journey as fresh as paint. We cantered easily over the great high-veldt
prairies, now and then passing clumps of trees, outposts of the bush-veldt.
These enormous plains, notwithstanding their dreary vastness, have a wild
beauty of their own. The grass is what is called sour grass, and has a pecu=
liar
blue tinge, but stock do not like it so well as the low-veldt grass, which =
is
sweeter, and fattens them more quickly, though it does not put them in such
good fettle. The rock here is all white sandstone, and thinly overlaps an
enormous bed of coal, cropping up from beneath the water-washed surface. At
this time of year there are very few beasts or birds of any sort to be seen,
though in the winter the veldt is one moving mass of "trek" or
migratory game.
Our destination that day was Botsabelo, the mo=
st
important mission-station, and one of the very few successful ones, in Sout=
h-Eastern
Africa. As we neared it, the country gradually broke into hills of peculiar=
and
beautiful formation, which rendered the last two hours of our ride, in the
dark, through an unknown country, rather a difficult job. However, we stumb=
led
through streams, and over boulders, and about nine o'clock were lucky enoug=
h to
come right upon the station, where we were most kindly received by Dr. Mere=
nsky.
The station itself stands on the brow of a hill surrounded by gardens and
orchards; beneath it lie slope and mountain, stream and valley, over which =
are
dotted numbers of kraals, to say nothing of three or four substantial house=
s occupied
by the assistant missionary and German artisans. Near Dr. Merensky's house
stands the church, by far the best I have seen in the Transvaal, and there =
is
also a store with some well-built workshops around it. All the neighbouring
country belongs to the station, which is, in fact, like a small independent
State, 40,000 acres in extent. On a hill-top overshadowing the station, are
placed the fortifications, consisting of thick walls running in a circle wi=
th
upstanding towers, in which stand one or two cannon; but it all reminds one
more of an old Norman keep, with its village clustered in its protecting
shadow, than of a modern mission establishment.
Dr. Merensky commenced his labours in Secocoen=
i's
country, but was forced to fly from thence by night, with his wife and new-=
born
baby, to escape being murdered by that Chief's orders, who, like most Kafir=
potentates,
has an intense aversion to missionaries. Twelve years ago he established th=
is
station, and, gathering his scattered converts around him, defied Secocoeni=
to
drive him thence. Twice that Chief has sent out a force to sweep him away, =
and
murder his people, and twice they have come and looked, and, like false Sex=
tus,
turned back again. The Boers, too, have more than once threatened to destroy
him, for it is unpleasant to them to have so intelligent a witness in their
midst, but they have never dared to try. The place is really impregnable to
Basutus and Boers; Zulus might carry it, with their grand steady rush, but =
it
would be at a terrible sacrifice of life. In fact, Dr. Merensky has been fo=
rced,
by the pressure of circumstances, to teach his men the use of a rifle, as w=
ell
as the truths of Christianity; to trust in God, but also to "keep their
powder dry." At a few minutes' notice he can turn out 200 well-armed
natives, ready for offence or defence; and the existence of such a strongho=
ld
is of great advantage to the few English in the neighbourhood, for the Boers
know well that should they attack them they might draw down the vengeance of
Dr. Merensky's formidable body of Christian soldiers.
We only passed one night at Botsabelo, and next
morning went on to Middelburg, or Nazareth, which is an hour's ride from the
station. Here, too, we met with a warm welcome from the handful of English
residents, but we were eager to push on as rapidly as possible, for our kin=
d friends
told us that it would be impossible to proceed to Secocoeni's on horseback,
because of the deadly nature of the country for horses. So we had to hire an
ox-waggon, which they provisioned for us, and, much to our disgust (as we w=
ere
pressed for time), were obliged to fall back on that dilatory method of
travelling.
We decided that we would take the three oldest=
and
least valuable horses with us, in order to proceed with them from Fort Weeb=
er,
which was our next point, to Secocoeni's town, whither waggons could not re=
ach.
Few English readers are aware that there is a mysterious disease among hors=
es
in South Africa, peculiar to the country, called "horse-sickness."
During the autumn season it carries off thousands of horses annually, though
some are good and others bad years--a bad fever year being generally a bad
horse-sickness year also, and vice versa. A curious feature about it is, th=
at
as the veldt gets "tamed," that is, fed off by domesticated anima=
ls, the
sickness gradually disappears. No cure has yet been discovered for it, and =
very
few horses pull through--perhaps, five per cent. These are called "sal=
ted
horses," and are very valuable; as, although they are not proof against
the disease, they are not so liable to take it. A salted horse may be known=
by
the peculiar looseness and roughness of his skin, and also by a certain
unmistakable air of depression, as though he felt that the responsibilities=
of
life pressed very heavily upon him. He is like a man who has dearly bought =
his
experience; he can never forget the terrible lesson taught in the buying.
On the fourth day from our start we left
Middelburg, and, taking a north-east course from this outpost of civilisati=
on,
overtook the waggon, and camped, after a twenty miles' trek, just on the ed=
ge
of the bush-veldt. We had two young Boers to drive our waggons--terrible lo=
uts.
However, they understood how to drive a waggon, and whilst one of them drov=
e,
the other would sit for hours, with a vacant stare on his face, thinking. I=
t is
a solemn fact that, from the time we left Middelburg till the time we retur=
ned,
neither of those fellows touched water, that is, to wash themselves. The on=
ly
luxury in the shape of comforts of the toilette which they allowed themselv=
es
was a comb with a brass back, carefully tied to the roof of the waggon with=
two
strips of ox-hide thick enough to have held a hundredweight of lead. I don't
think they ever used it--it was too great a luxury for general use--but they
would occasionally untie it and look at it. Our own outfit in the waggon wa=
s necessarily
scanty, consisting of a few iron pots and plates, a kettle, some green
blankets, a lantern, and an old anti-friction grease-can used for water, wh=
ich
gave it a fine flavour of waggon-wheels. We also had a "cartle," =
or
wooden frame, across which were stretched strips of hide fitted into the wa=
ggon
about two feet above the floor, and intended to sleep on; but the less said
about that the better.
After we left the great high-veldt plains, over
which the fresh breeze was sweeping, we dropped down into a beautiful bush-=
clad
valley with mountains on either side. It was like making a sudden descent i=
nto
the tropics. Not a breath of wind stirred the trees, and the sun shone with=
a
steady burning heat. Scarcely a sound broke the silence, save the murmur of=
the
river we crossed and recrossed, the occasional pipe of a bird, and the
melancholy cry, half sigh, half bark, of an old baboon, who was swinging
himself along, indignant at our presence.
If the sights and sounds were beautiful, the s= un was hot, and the road fearful, and we were indeed glad when we reached "Whitehead's Cobalt Mine," and were most kindly received by the gentlemen who superintend the works. The house used to belong to some Boer,= who had deserted the place, but left behind him a beautiful orchard of orange a= nd peach trees. The place is very feverish and unhealthy, and the white ants so troublesome that everything has to be stood in sardine tins full of ashes.<= o:p>
On our way from the house we went to see the
cobalt mine, which is on a hillside a mile away. It has only been establish=
ed
about three years, and has existed hitherto under the greatest difficulties=
as
regards labour, transport, machinery, danger from surrounding native tribes=
, &c.;
but it has already, the proprietor informed me, reduced the price of
cobalt--the blue dye used to colour such things as the willow-pattern plate=
s--by
one-half in the English market, bringing it down from somewhere about 140
pounds to 80 pounds a ton. We were very much astonished to see the amount of
work which had been done, as we expected to find a pit such as the Kafirs w=
ork
for copper, but instead of that there was a large slanting shaft quite a
hundred yards long, to say nothing of various openings out of it following
branch leads of ore. There is also a vertical shaft one hundred feet deep,
through which the ore comes up, and by which one can ascend and descend in a
bucket. After we emerged from this awful hole, we went into another, a driv=
e running
straight into the mountain for more than three hundred feet, following a ve=
in
of black oxide of cobalt, which is much more valuable than the ore; and, th=
ough
the vein is rarely more than a foot in thickness, pays very well. Leaving t=
he
mine, we rode on past some old Kafir copper-workings--circular pits--which =
must
have been abandoned, to judge from their appearance, a hundred years ago, t=
ill
we came to the banks of the great "Olifants'" or
"Elephants'" river. This magnificent stream, though it is unnavig=
able
owing to frequent rapids, has stretches miles long, down which a man-of-war
could steam, and after its junction with the Elands' River it grows larger =
and
larger till, pursuing a north-east course, it at length falls into the migh=
ty
Limpopo. It is a very majestic but somewhat sluggish stream, and its water =
is
not very good. You cannot see the river till you are right upon it, owing to
the great trees with which its steep banks are fringed, and in the early
morning it is quite hidden from bank to bank by a dense mass of billows of
white mist, indescribably strange to look upon.
But, beautiful as this country is, it is most
unhealthy for man and beast. The close odour, the long creeping lines of mi=
st,
the rich rank vegetation, the steady heat of day and night, all say one wor=
d,
"fever," and fever of the most virulent type. The traveller throu=
gh
this sort of country is conscious of a latent fear lest he should some day
begin to feel hot when he ought to be cold, and cold when he ought to be ho=
t,
and so be stricken down, to rise prematurely old, or perhaps to die, and be=
buried
in a lonely grave covered with stones to keep off the jackals. We were
travelling in the very worst fever-month, March, when the summer vegetation=
is
commencing to rot, and throw off its poisonous steam. What saved us here and
afterwards, at Secocoeni's, was our temperate living, hard exercise, and pl=
enty
of quinine and tobacco-smoke.
All the country through which we were passing =
is
good game-veldt, but we saw very little and killed nothing. This was chiefly
owing to the fact that we did not dare go out of hearing of the waggon-whee=
ls,
for fear of getting lost in the bush, a thing very easily done. A few years
back this veldt swarmed with big game, with elephants and giraffes, and they
are even now occasionally seen. We managed now and again to get a glimpse of
some of the beautiful "Impala" buck, or of a small lot of blue
wilderbeestes vanishing between the trees, like a troop of wild horses. The=
re
are still plenty of lions about, but we did not hear any: whether it was th=
at
they had gone to the high-veldt after the cattle, or that they do not roar =
so
much in summer, I do not know. Perhaps it is as well that we did not, for t=
he
roar of a lion is very generally followed by what the Dutch call a
"skrech." After roaring once or twice to wake the cattle up, and =
make
them generally uneasy, the lion stations himself about twenty yards to the
windward of the waggon. The oxen get wind of him and promptly
"skrech," that is, break their rims and run madly into the veldt.
This is just what the lion wants, for now he can pick out a fat ox and quie=
tly
approach him from the other side till he is within springing distance. He t=
hen
jumps upon him, crushes his neck with one bite, and eats him at his leisure=
.
And so we trekked on through the sunrise, thro=
ugh
the burning mid-day and glowing sunsets, steering by the sun and making our=
own
road; now through tambouki grass higher than the oxen, and now through dense
bush, till at length, one day, we said good-bye to the Olifants' just where=
the
Elands' River flows into it, and turned our faces eastward. This course soon
brought us on to higher ground and away from the mimosa, which loves the lo=
w,
hot valleys, into the region of the sugar bush, which thrives upon the
hill-sides. This sugar bush is a very handsome and peculiar plant, with soft
thick leaves, standing about twenty feet high. It bears a brush-like flower,
each of which in the Cape Colony contains half a teaspoonful of delicious
honey; but, curiously enough, though in other respects the tree is precisely
similar, this is not the case in the Transvaal or Natal. At the proper seas=
on
the Cape farmers go out with buckets and shake the flowers till they have
collected sufficient honey to last them for the winter, a honey more fragra=
nt
than that made by bees.
After a long ride over the open, which must on=
ce
have been thickly populated, to judge from the number of remains of kraals,=
we
came at length to Fort Weeber. The fort is very badly situated in the hollo=
w of
a plain, and so surrounded by fine hills that it is entirely commanded. It
consists of a single sod wall about two feet thick and five high, capped wi=
th
loose stones, whilst at two of the corners stand, on raised platforms, a
six-pounder and a three-pounder Whitworth gun. Inside the wall are built ro=
ws
of mud huts, which are occupied by the garrison, leaving an open square, in=
the
midst of which is placed the magazine. We found the garrison in a wretched
condition. They have not received any pay except Government
"good-fors" (promissory notes, generally known as "good-for-=
nothings"),
so they are in a state of abject poverty; whilst they are rendered harmless=
as
regards offensive operations, by the death, from horse-sickness, of eighty-=
two
of the ninety horses they owned. However, the officers and garrison gave us=
a
very grand reception. As we rode up, they fired a salute of twelve guns, and
then, after we had dismounted and been received by the officers, we were ta=
ken through
a lane made by the garrison drawn up in a double line, and, just as we got =
to
the middle, "bang" went the eighty rifles over our heads. Then an
address was read (the volunteers are great people for addresses), but a more
practical welcome soon followed in the shape of a good dinner.
Next morning we started, a party of seven,
including the interpreter, to ride over the Loolu Berg to Secocoeni's, a
distance of about thirty-eight miles.
For the first five miles we passed through the
most curious granite formation, a succession of small hills entirely compos=
ed
of rounded boulders of granite, weighing from five to 1000 tons, and lookin=
g exactly
like piles of gigantic snow-balls hurled together by some mighty hand. The
granite formation prevails in all this part of the country, and individual
boulders sometimes take very curious shapes; for instance, in the bush-veld=
t we
passed a great column towering high above the trees, composed of six boulde=
rs
getting smaller and smaller from the base up, and each accurately balanced =
on
the one beneath it. Then we crossed the range of hills which overlooks the
fort, and passing Secocoeni's old kraal where he used to live before he
retreated to his fastnesses, we arrived at a great alluvial valley nine mil=
es
broad, on the other side of which rises the Loolu. It was on this plain that
the only real fight between the volunteers and Secocoeni's men took place, =
when
the former managed to get between the Basutus and the hills, and shot them =
down
like game, killing over 200 men. Leaving the battle-field, where the skelet=
ons
still lie, a little to our right, we crossed the plain and came to the foot=
of
the Loolu, all along the base of which stand neat villages inhabited by
Secocoeni's people. Some of these villages have been burnt by the volunteer=
s,
and the remainder are entirely deserted, their inhabitants having built fre=
sh
huts among the rocks in almost inaccessible places. The appearance of these
white huts peeping out all over the black rocks was very curious, and remin=
ded
one of the Swiss chalets.
By the stream that runs along past the village=
s we
off-saddled, as both ourselves and our horses were nearly exhausted by the
burning heat; but as there was not much time to lose, after a short rest we
started off again, and rode on over a bed of magnetic iron lying on the gro=
und
in great lumps of almost pure metal, until we came to a stretch of what loo=
ked
remarkably like gold-bearing quartz, and then to a limestone formation. The
whole country is evidently rich beyond measure in minerals. All this time we
were passing through scenery inexpressibly wild and grand, and when we had
arrived at the highest spot of the pass, it reached a climax of savage beau=
ty.
About forty miles in front of us towered up another magnificent range of
blue-tinged mountains known as the Blue Berg, whilst all around us rose gre=
at
bush-clad hills, opening away in every direction towards gorgeous-coloured
valleys. The scene was so grand and solemn that I do not think it lies in t=
he
power of words to describe it.
Here we had to dismount to descend a most fear=
ful
precipitous path consisting of boulders piled together in the wildest
confusion, from one to another of which we had to jump, driving the horses
before us. Half-way down we off-saddled to rest ourselves, and as we did so=
we noticed
that the gall was running from one of the horses' noses. We knew too well w=
hat
was the matter, and so left him there to die during the night. This horse w=
as
by far the finest we had with us, and his owner used to boast that the poor
beast had often carried him, a heavy man, from his house to Pretoria, a
distance of nearly ninety miles, in one day. He was also a "salted&quo=
t;
horse. It is a curious thing that the sickness generally kills the best hor=
ses
first.
After a short rest we started on again, and at=
the
end of another hour reached the bottom of the pass. From thence we rode alo=
ng a
gulley, that alternately narrowed and widened, till at length it brought us
right on to Secocoeni's beautiful, fever-stricken home.
All three of us had seen a good deal of scener=
y in
different parts of the world, and one of the party was intimately acquainted
with the finest spots in South Africa, but we were forced to admit that we =
had never
seen anything half so lovely as Secocoeni's valley. We had seen grander vie=
ws,
indeed the scene from the top of the pass was grander, but never anything t=
hat
so nearly approached perfection in detail. Beautiful it was, beautiful beyo=
nd
measure, but it was the sort of beauty under whose veil are hidden fever and
death. And so we pushed on, through the still hot eventide, till at length =
we
came to the gates of the town, where we found "Makurupiji,"
Secocoeni's "mouth" or prime minister, who had evidently been
informed of our coming by his spies waiting to receive us.[*]
[*] Makurupiji committed suicide after the town
had been stormed, preferring death to imprisonment.
Conducted by this grandee, we went on past the
Chief's kraals, down to the town, whence flocked men, women, and children, =
to
look on the white lords; all in a primitive state of dress, consisting of a
strip of skin tied round the middle, and the women with their hair powdered
with some preparation of iron, which gave it a metallic blue tinge.
At length we stopped just opposite a beautiful
fortified kopje[*] perforated by secret caves where the ammunition of the t=
ribe
is hidden. No stranger is allowed to enter these caves, or even to ascend t=
he kopje,
though they do not object to one's inspecting some of the other fortificati=
ons.
Dismounting from our wearied horses, we passed through a cattle kraal and c=
ame
into the presence of "Swasi," Secocoeni's uncle, a fat old fellow=
who
was busily engaged in braying a skin. Nearly every male Basutu one meets, b=
e he
high or low, is braying a hide of some sort, either by rubbing or by mastic=
ating
it. It is a curious sight to come across some twenty of these fellows, every
one of them twisting or chewing away.
[=
*]
Afterwards stormed in the attack on Secocoeni's town by Sir Garnet Wolseley.
Swasi was a sort of master of the household; h=
is
duty it was to receive strangers and see that they were properly looked aft=
er;
so, after shaking hands with us furiously (he was a wonderful fellow to sha=
ke hands),
he conducted us to our hut. It stood in a good-sized courtyard beautifully
paved with a sort of concrete of limestone which looked very clean and whit=
e,
and surrounded by a hedge of reeds and sticks tightly tied together, inside
which ran a slightly raised bench, also made of limestone. The hut itself w=
as
neatly thatched, the thatch projecting several feet, so as to form a coveri=
ng
to a narrow verandah that ran all round it. Inside it was commodious, and
ornamented after the Egyptian style with straight and spiral lines, painted=
on
with some kind of red ochre, and floored with a polished substance. Certain=
ly
these huts are as much superior to those of the Zulus as those who dwell in
them are inferior to that fine race. What the Basutus gain in art and handi=
ness
they lose in manliness and gentlemanly feeling.
We had just laid ourselves down on the grass m=
ats
in the courtyard--for it was too hot to go into the hut--thoroughly exhaust=
ed
with our day's work and the heat, when in came two men, each of them draggi=
ng a
fine indigenous sheep. They were accompanied by Makurupiji, who brought us =
a message
from Secocoeni to the effect that he, the Chief, sent to greet us, the great
Chiefs; that he sent us also a morsel to eat, lest we should be hungry in h=
is
house. It was but a morsel--it should have been an ox, for great Chiefs sho=
uld
eat much meat--but he himself was pinched with hunger, his belt was drawn v=
ery
tight by the Boers. He was poor, and so his gift was poor; still, he would =
see
if to-morrow he could find a beast that had something besides the skin on i=
ts
bones, that he might offer it to us. After this magniloquent address the po=
or
animals were trundled out by the other gate to have their throats cut.
After getting some supper and taking our quini=
ne,
we turned in and slept that night in the best way that the heat would let u=
s,
rising next morning with the vain hope of getting a bathe. Of all the
discomforts we experienced at Secocoeni's, the scarcity and badness of the
water was the worst. Bad water, when you are in a hotbed of fever, is a
terrible privation. And so we had to go unwashed, with the exception of hav=
ing
a little water poured over our hands out of gourds. We must have presented a
curious sight at breakfast that morning. Before us knelt a sturdy Kafir,
holding a stick in each hand, on which were respectively speared a leg and a
side of mutton, from which we cut off great hunks with our hunting-knives, =
and,
taking them in our fingers, devoured them like beasts of prey. If we got a =
bit
we did not like, our mode of dispensing of it was simple and effective. We
threw it to one of the natives standing round us, among whom was the
heir-apparent, who promptly gobbled it up.
Breakfast finished, a message came from Secoco=
eni
asking for spirits to drink. But we were not to be taken in in this way, fo=
r we
knew well that if we sent the Chief spirits we should get no business done =
that
day, and we did not care to run the risk of fever by stopping longer than w=
e could
help; so we sent back a message to the effect that business must come first=
and
spirits afterwards. The head men, who brought this message, said that they
could perfectly understand our objection, as far as Secocoeni and ourselves
were concerned, since we had to talk, but as they had only to sit still and
listen there could be no possible objection to their having something to dr=
ink.
This argument was ingenious, but we did not see the force of it, as our sto=
ck
of spirits, which we had brought more for medicine than anything else, was =
very
limited. Still, we were obliged to promise them a "tot" after the=
talking
was over, in order to keep them civil.
Our message had the desired effect, for presen=
tly
Secocoeni sent to say that it was now time to talk, and that his head men w=
ould
lead us to him. So we started up, accompanied by "Makurupiji,"
"Swasi," and "Galook," the general of his forces, a fat
fellow with a face exactly like a pig. The sun beat down with such tremendo=
us
force that, though we had only three-quarters of a mile to walk, we felt qu=
ite
tired by the time we reached the Chief's kraals. Passing through several ca=
ttle
kraals, we came to a shed under which sat the heir-apparent dressed in a
gorgeous blanket with his court around him. Leaving him, we entered an inner
cattle kraal, where, in one corner, stood a large, roughly-built shed, under
the shade of which squatted over a hundred of the head men of the tribe,
gathered together by Secocoeni to "witness."[*]
[=
*] As
each chief came up to the meeting-place he would pass before the enclosure where Secocoeni=
was
sitting and salute him, by sof=
tly
striking the hands together, and saying something that sounded like
"Marema."
Opening out of this kraal was the chief's priv=
ate
enclosure, where stood his huts. As we drew near, Secocoeni, who had inspir=
ed
such terror into the bold Burghers of the Republic, the chief of nine thous=
and
warriors, the husband of sixty-four wives, the father of a hundred children,
rose from the ox-hide on which he was seated, under the shade of a tree, an=
d came
to the gate to meet us. And a queer sight this potentate was as he stood th=
ere
shaking hands through the gate. Of middle age, about forty-five years of ag=
e,
rather fat, with a flat nose, and small, twinkling, black eyes, he presente=
d an
entirely hideous and semi-repulsive appearance. His dress consisted of a co=
tton
blanket over which was thrown a tiger-skin kaross, and on his head was stuc=
k an
enormous old white felt hat, such as the Boers wear, and known as a "w=
ilderbeeste
chaser."
After we had been duly introduced, he retreate=
d to
his ox-hide, and we went and squatted down among the head men. Secocoeni to=
ok
no active part in the proceedings that followed; he sat in his enclosure an=
d occasionally
shouted out some instructions to Makurupiji, who was literally his
"mouth," speaking for him and making use of the pronoun "I.&=
quot;
During the four hours or so that we were there Secocoeni never stopped chew=
ing
an intoxicating green leaf, very much resembling that of the pomegranate, of
which he occasionally sent us some.
After the business of the Commission had come =
to
an end, and some of our party started on their homeward journey, we were
detained by Secocoeni, who wished to see us privately. He sent for us to his
private enclosure, and we sat down on his ox-hide with him and one or two h=
ead
men. It was very curious to see this wily old savage shoving a handful of
leaves into his mouth, and giving his head a shake, and then making some sh=
rewd
remark which went straight to the bottom of whatever question was in hand. =
At
length we bade Secocoeni good-bye, having promised to deliver all his
respectful messages to our chief, and, thoroughly wearied, arrived at our o=
wn
hut. Tired as we were, we thought it would be better to start for the fort =
at
once, rather than risk the fever for another night. So we made up our minds=
to
a long moonlight ride, and, saddling up, got out of Secocoeni's town about =
3.30
P.M., having looked our last upon this beautiful fever-trap, which only wan=
ts
water scenery to make it absolutely perfect. Half-way up, we saw the poor h=
orse
we had left sick the day before, lying dead, with dry foam all round his mo=
uth,
and half his skin taken off by some passing Basutu. A couple of hundred yar=
ds
farther on we found another dying, left by the party who had started before=
us.
It was in truth a valley of the shadow of death. Luckily our horses lasted =
us
back to the fort, but one died there, and the other two are dead since.
Beautiful as was the scene by day, in the ligh=
t of
the full moon it was yet more surpassingly lovely. It was solemn, weird. Ev=
ery
valley became a mysterious deep, and every hill, stone, and tree shone with
that cold pale lustre which the moon alone can throw. Silence reigned, the
silence of the dead, broken only once or twice by the wild whistling challe=
nge
of one of Secocoeni's warriors as he came boun=
ding
down the rocks, to see who we were that passed. The effect of the fires by =
the
huts, perched among the rocks at the entrance to the pass, was very strange=
and
beautiful, reminding one of the midnight fires of the Gnomes in the fairy
tales.
And so we rode on, hour after hour, through the
night, till we well-nigh fell asleep in our saddles, and at length, about t=
wo
o'clock in the morning, we reached the waggons to find the young Boers fast
asleep in our bed. We kicked them out, and, after swallowing some biscuits,=
tumbled
in ourselves for the few hours' rest which we so sadly needed.
On the following morning, Thursday, two of the
party bade farewell to our hosts at the fort and started on one of the quic=
kest
possible treks, leaving our companion to proceed across country to the fort
established by President Burgers, or "Porocororo," as the Basutus
call him, at Steelport.
We returned to Middelburg by an entirely diffe=
rent
route from that by which we came. Leaving the valley of the Olifants to our
right, we trekked along the high-veldt, and thus avoided all the fever coun=
try.
Roughly speaking, we had about 120 miles of country to get over to reach Mi=
ddelburg,
and we determined to do this in three days and two nights, so as to get in =
on
the Saturday night, as we were much pressed for time. Now, according to Eng=
lish
ideas, it is no great thing to travel 120 miles in three days; but it is six
days' journey in an ox-waggon over bad country, and we were going to do it =
in
half that time by doubling the speed.
Of course, to do this we had to trek night and
day. For instance, on the first day we inspanned at 10.30 A.M. and trekked =
till
within an hour of sundown; at sundown we inspanned, and with one outspan
trekked till sunrise; outspanned for two hours, and on again, being sevente=
en
and a half hours under the yoke out of the twenty-four, and covering fifty-=
five
miles. Of course, one cannot do this sort of travelling for more than two or
three days without killing the oxen; as it was, towards the end, as soon as=
the
yokes were lifted off, the poor beasts dropped down as though they were sho=
t,
and most of them went lame. Another great disadvantage is that one suffers =
very
much from want of sleep. The jolting of the springless machine, as it lumbe=
red
over rocks a foot high and through deep spruits or streams, brought our hea=
ds
down with such a fearful jar on the saddle-bags that we used for pillows, t=
hat
all sleep was soon knocked out of them; or, even if we were lucky enough to=
be crossing
a stretch of tolerably smooth ground, there was a swaying motion that rubbed
one's face up and down till the skin was nearly worn through, polishing the
saddle-bags to such an extent that we might almost have used them for
looking-glasses as well as pillows.
At Secocoeni's kraal we had engaged two boys to
carry our packs as far as the fort, who, on their arrival, were so well
satisfied with the way in which we treated them that they requested to be
allowed to proceed with us. These young barbarians, who went respectively by
the names of "Nojoke" and "Scowl," as being the nearest
approach in English to their Sisutu names, were the greatest possible sourc=
e of
amusement to us, with their curious ways.[*] I never saw such fellows to sl=
eep;
it is a positive fact that Nojoke used frequently to take his rest coiled u=
p like
a boa constrictor in a box at the end of the waggon, in which box stood thr=
ee
iron pots with their sharp legs sticking up. On those legs he peacefully
slumbered when the waggon was going over ground that prohibited our even
stopping in it. "Scowl" was not a nice boy to look at, for his na=
ked
back was simply cut to pieces and covered with huge weals, of which everybo=
dy,
doubtless, thought we were the cause. On inquiring how he came to get such a
tremendous thrashing, it turned out that these Basutus have a custom of sen=
ding
young men of a certain age[+] out in couples, each armed with a good
"sjambok" (a whip cut from
the hide of a sea-cow), to thrash one another =
till
one gives in, and that it was in one of these encounters that the intellige=
nt
Scowl got so lacerated; but, as he remarked with a grin, "My back is
nothing, the chiefs should see that of the other boy."
[=
*] Of
these two lads, Nojoke subsequently turned out worthless, and went to the Diamond F=
ields,
whilst Scowl became an excelle=
nt
servant, until he took to wearing a black coat, and turned Christian, wh=
en he
shortly afterwards developed i=
nto a
drunkard and a thief.
[=
+] The
age of puberty.
We spent one night at Middelburg, and next
morning, bidding adieu to our kind English friends, started for Pretoria,
taking care to end our first day's journey at a house where an Englishman
lived, so as to ensure a clean shakedown. Here we discovered that the horse=
I
was riding (the sole survivor of the five we had started with) had got the
sickness, and so we had to leave him and hire another. This horse, by the b=
y, recovered,
which is the only instance of an animal's conquering the disease which has =
yet
come under my observation. We hired the new horse from a Boer, who charged =
us
exactly three times its proper price, and then preached us a sermon quite a
quarter of an hour long on his hospitality, his kindness of heart, and his
willingness to help strangers. I must tell you that, just as we were going =
to
sleep the night before, a stranger had come and asked for a shakedown, which
was given to him in the same room. We had risen before daybreak, and my com=
panion
was expatiating to me, in clear and forcible language, on the hypocrisy and
scoundrelism of this Boer, when suddenly a sleepy voice out of the darkness
murmured thickly, "I say, stranger, guess you shouldn't lose your temp=
er;
guess that 'ere Boer is acting after the manner of human natur'." And =
then
the owner of the voice turned over and went to sleep again.
We had over sixty miles to ride that day, and =
it
must have been about eight o'clock at night, on the sixteenth day of our
journey, when we reached Pretoria and rode straight up to our camp, where we
were heartily greeted. I am sure that some of our friends must have felt a =
little
disappointed at seeing us arrive healthy and fat, without a sign of fever,
after all their melancholy predictions. It would not have been "human
natur'" if they had not. When we got to the camp, I called out to Maso=
oku,
my Zulu servant, to come and take the horses. Next moment I heard a rush an=
d a
scuttle in the tent like the scrimmage in a rabbit-burrow when one puts in =
the
ferrets, and Masooku shouted out in Zulu, "He has come back! by Chaka's
head, I swear it! It is his voice, his own voice, that calls me; my father'=
s,
my chief's!"
And so ended one of the hardest and most
interesting journeys imaginable--a journey in which the risk only added to =
the
pleasure. Still, I should not care to make it again at the same time of yea=
r.
VII
A ZULU WAR-DANCE
In all that world-wide empire which the spirit=
of
the English colonisation has conquered from out of the realms of the distant
and unknown, and added year by year to the English dominions, it is doubtfu=
l whether
there be any one spot of corresponding area, presenting so many large
questions, social and political, as the colony of Natal. Wrested some thirty
years ago from the patriarchal Boers, and peopled by a few scattered scores=
of
adventurous emigrants, Natal has with hard toil gained for itself a precari=
ous
foothold hardly yet to be called an existence. Known chiefly to the outside
world as the sudden birthplace of those tremendous polemical missiles which
battered so fiercely, some few years ago, against the walls of the English
Church, it is now attracting attention to the shape and proportion of that
unsolved riddle of the future, the Native Question. In those former days of
rude and hand-to-mouth legislation, when the certain evil of the day had to=
be met
and dealt with before the possible evil of the morrow, the seeds of great
political trouble were planted in the young colony, seeds whose fruit is fa=
st
ripening before our eyes.
When the strong aggressive hand of England has
grasped some fresh portion of the earth's surface, there is yet a spirit of
justice in her heart and head which prompts the question, among the first of
such demands, as to how best and most fairly to deal by the natives of the
newly-acquired land. In earlier times, when steam was not, and telegraphs a=
nd
special correspondents were equally unknown agencies for getting at the tru=
th
of things, this question was more easily answered across a width of dividing
ocean or continent. Then distant action might be prompt and sharp on emerge=
ncy,
and no one would be the wiser. But of late years, owing to these results of
civilisation, harsh measures have, by the mere pressure of public opinion, =
and
without consideration of their necessity in the eyes of the colonists, been=
set
aside as impracticable and inhuman. In the case of Natal, most of the early=
questions
of possession and right were settled, sword in hand, by the pioneer Dutch, =
who,
after a space of terrible warfare, drove back the Zulus over the Tugela, and
finally took possession of the land. But they did not hold it long. The same
hateful invading Englishman, with his new ideas and his higher forms of
civilisation, who had caused them to quit the "Old Colony," the l=
and
of their birth, came and drove them, vi et armis, from the land of their
adoption. And it was not long before these same English became lords of this
red African soil, from the coast up to the Drakensberg. Still there were
difficulties; for although the new-comers might be lords of the soil, there
remained yet a remnant, and a very troublesome remnant, of its original and
natural masters: shattered fragments of the Zulu power in Natal, men who had
once swept over the country in the army of Chaka the Terrible, Chaka of the
Short Spear, but who had remained behind in the fair new land, when Chaka's=
raids
had been checked by the white man and his deadly weapons. Remnants, too, of
conquered aboriginal tribes, who had found even Chaka's rule easier than th=
at
of their own chieftains, swelled the amount to a total of some 100,000 soul=
s.
One of the first acts of the English Governmen=
t,
when it took up the reins, was to allot to each of these constituent fragme=
nts
a large portion of the land. This might perhaps have been short-sighted leg=
islation,
but it arose from the necessity of the moment. According to even the then r=
eceived
ideas of colonisation and its duties, it was hardly possible--danger apart-=
-to
drive all the natives over the frontier, so they were allowed to stay and s=
hare
the rights and privileges of British subjects. But the evil did not stop th=
ere.
Ere long some political refugees, defeated in battle, fled before the aveng=
ing
hand of the conqueror, and craved place and protection from the Government =
of
Natal. It was granted; and the principle once established, body after body =
of
men poured in: for, in stepping over the boundary line, they left the regio=
ns
of ruin and terrible death, and entered those of peace, security, and plent=
y.
Thus it is that the native population of Natal,
fed from within and without, has in thirty years increased enormously in
number. Secluded from the outside world in his location, the native has liv=
ed
in peace and watched his cattle grow upon a thousand hills. His wealth has
become great and his wives many. He no longer dreads swift "death by o=
rder
of the king," or by word of the witch-doctor. No "impi," or
native regiment, can now sweep down on him and "eat him up," that=
is,
carry off his cattle, put his kraal to the flames, and himself, his people,=
his
wives, and children to the assegai. For the first time in the story of the
great Kafir race, he can, when he rises in the morning, be sure that he will
not sleep that night, stiff, in a bloody grave. He has tasted the blessings=
of
peace and security, and what is the consequence? He has increased and
multiplied until his numbers are as grains of sand on the sea-shore.
Overlapping the borders of his location, he squats on private lands, he
advances like a great tidal wave, he cries aloud for room, more room. This =
is
the trouble which stares us in the face, looming larger and more distinct y=
ear
by year; the great over-growing problem which thoughtful men fear must one =
day
find a sudden and violent solution. Thus it comes to pass that there hangs =
low
on the horizon of South Africa the dark cloud of the Native Question. How a=
nd
when it will burst no man can pretend to say, but some time and in some way
burst it must, unless means of dispersing it can be found.
There is now at work among the Kafir population
the same motive power which has raised in turn all white nations, and, havi=
ng
built them up to a certain height, has then set to work to sap them until t=
hey
have fallen--the power of civilisation. Hand in hand the missionary and the=
trader
have penetrated the locations. The efforts of the teacher have met with but=
a
partial success. "A Christian may be a good man in his way, but he is a
Zulu spoiled," said Cetywayo, King of the Zulus, when arguing the ques=
tion
of Christianity with the Secretary for Native Affairs; and such is, not
altogether wrongly, the general feeling of the natives. With the traders it=
has
been different. Some have dealt honestly--and more, it is to be feared,
dishonestly--not only with those with whom they have had dealings, but with
their fellow-subjects and their Government. It is these men chiefly who hav=
e,
in defiance of the law, supplied the natives with those two great modern
elements of danger and destruction, the gin-bottle and the rifle. The first=
is
as yet injurious only to the recipients, but it will surely react on those =
who have
taught them its use; the danger of possessing the rifle may come home to us=
any
day and at any moment.
Civilisation, it would seem, when applied to b=
lack
races, produces effects diametrically opposite to those we are accustomed to
observe in white nations: it debases before it can elevate; and as regards =
the Kafirs
it is doubtful, and remains to be proved, whether it has much power to elev=
ate
them at all. Take the average Zulu warrior, and it will be found that, in h=
is
natural state, his vices are largely counter-balanced by his good qualities=
. In
times of peace he is a simple, pastoral man, leading a good-humoured easy l=
ife
with his wives and his cattle, perfectly indolent and perfectly happy. He i=
s a
kind husband and a kinder father; he never disowns his poor relations; his =
hospitality
is extended alike to white and black; he is open in his dealings and faithf=
ul
to his word, and his honesty is a proverb in the land. True, if war breaks =
out
and the thirst for slaughter comes upon him, he turns into a different man.
When the fierce savage spirit is once aroused, blood alone will cool it. But
even then he has virtues. If he is cruel, he is brave in the battle; if he =
is
reckless of the lives of others, he regards not his own; and when death com=
es,
he meets it without fear, and goes to the spirits of his fathers boldly, as=
a warrior
should. And now reverse the picture, and see him in the dawning light of th=
at
civilisation which, by intellect and by nature, he is some five centuries
behind. See him, ignoring its hidden virtues, eagerly seize and graft its m=
ost
prominent vices on to his own besetting sins. Behold him by degrees adding
cunning to his cruelty, avarice to his love of possession, replacing his
bravery by coarse bombast and insolence, and his truth by lies. Behold him
inflaming all his passions with the maddening drink of the white man, and t=
hen
follow him through many degrees of degradation until he falls into crime and
ends in a jail. Such are, in only too many instances, the consequences of t=
his partial
civilisation, and they are not even counterbalanced, except in individual
cases, by the attempt to learn the truths of a creed which he cannot, does =
not,
pretend to understand. And if this be the result in the comparatively few
individuals who have been brought under these influences, it may be fair to
argue that it will differ only in degree, not in kind, when the same influe=
nces
are brought to bear on the same material in corresponding proportions. What=
ever
may or may not be the effects of our partial civilisation when imperfectly =
and spasmodically
applied to the vast native population of South Africa, one thing must, in
course of time, result from it. The old customs, the old forms, the old
feelings, must each in turn die away. The outer expression of these will die
first, and it will not be long before the very memory of them will fade out=
of
the barbaric heart. The rifle must replace, and, indeed, actually has repla=
ced,
the assegai and the shield, and portions of the cast-off uniforms of all the
armies of Europe are to be seen where, until lately, the bronze-like form of
the Kafir warrior went naked as on the day he was born. But so long as nati=
ve
customs and ceremonies still linger in some of the more distant locations, =
so
long will they exercise a certain attraction for dwellers amid tamer scenes=
. It
is therefore from a belief in the magnetism of contrast that the highly-civ=
ilised
reader is invited to come to where he can still meet the barbarian face to =
face
and witness that wild ceremony, half jest, half grim earnest--a Zulu war da=
nce.
It was the good fortune of the writer of this
sketch to find himself, some years ago, travelling through the up-country
districts of Natal, in the company of certain high officials of the English
Government. The journey dragged slowly enough by waggon, and some monotonous
weeks had passed before we pitched our camp, one drizzling gusty night, on a
high plateau, surrounded by still loftier hills. A wild and dismal place it
looked in the growing dusk of an autumn evening, nor was it more suggestive=
ly
cheerful when we rode away from it next morning in the sunshine, leaving the
waggons to follow slowly. Our faces were set towards a great mountain, towe=
ring
high above its fellows, called Pagadi's Kop--Pagadi being a powerful chief =
who
had fled from the Zulus in the early days of the colony, and had ever since
dwelt loyally and peacefully here in this wild place, beneath the protectio=
n of
the Crown. Messengers had been duly sent to inform him that he was to recei=
ve the
honour of a visit, for your true savage never likes to be taken by surprise.
Other swift-footed runners had come back with the present of a goat, and the
respectful answer, so Oriental in its phraseology, that "Pagadi was ol=
d,
he was infirm, yet he would arise and come to greet his lords." Every =
mile
or so of our slow progress a fresh messenger would spring up before us
suddenly, as though he had started out of the earth at our feet, and prefix=
ing
his greeting with the royal salute, given with up-raised arm, "Bayete!
Bayete!"--a salutation only accorded to Zulu royalty, to the governors=
of
the different provinces, and to Sir T. Shepstone, the Secretary for Native
Affairs--he would deliver his message or his news and fall into the rear.
Presently came one saying, "Pagadi is very old and weak; Pagadi is wea=
ry;
let his lords forgive him if he meet them not this day. To-morrow, when the=
sun
is high, he will come to their place of encampment and greet his lords and =
hold
festival before them. But let his lords, the white lords of all the land fr=
om
the Great Mountain to the Black Water, go up to his kraal, and let them take
the biggest hut and drink of the strongest beer. There his son, the chief t=
hat
is to be, and all his wives, shall greet them; let his lords be honoured by
Pagadi, through them." An acknowledgment was sent, and we still rode o=
n,
beginning the ascent of the formidable stronghold, on the flat top of which=
was
placed the chief's kraal. A hard and stiff climb it was, up a bridle path w=
ith
far more resemblance to a staircase than a road. But if the road was bad, t=
he
scenery and the vegetation were wild and beautiful in the extreme. Now we c=
ame
to a deep "kloof" or cleft in the steep mountain-side, at the bot=
tom
of which, half hidden by the masses of ferns and rich rank greenery, trickl=
ed a
little stream; now to an open space of rough ground, covered only with huge,
weather-washed boulders. A little further on lay a Kafir mealie-garden, whe=
re
the tall green stalks were fairly bent to the ground by the weight of the c=
orn-laden
heads, and beyond that, again, a park-like slope of grassy veldt. And ever,
when we looked behind us, the vast undulating plain over which we had come
stretched away in its mysterious silence, till it blended at length with the
soft blue horizon.
At last, after much hard and steady climbing, =
we
reached the top and stood upon a perfectly level space ten or twelve acres =
in
extent, exactly in the centre of which was placed the chief's kraal. Before=
we dismounted
we rode to the extreme western edge of the plateau, to look at one of the m=
ost
perfectly lovely views it is possible to imagine. It was like coming face to
face with great primeval Nature, not Nature as we civilised people know her,
smiling in corn-fields, waving in well-ordered woods, but Nature as she was=
on
the morrow of the Creation. There, to our left, cold and grey and grand, ro=
se
the great peak, flinging its dark shadow far beyond its base. Two thousand =
feet
and more beneath us lay the valley of the Mooi river, with the broad tranqu=
il stream
flashing silver through its midst. Over against us rose another range of
towering hills, with sudden openings in their blue depths through which cou=
ld
be seen the splendid distances of a champaign country. Immediately at our f=
eet,
and seeming to girdle the great gaunt peak, lay a deep valley, through which
the Little Bushman's River forced its shining way. All around rose the great
bush-clad hills, so green, so bright in the glorious streaming sunlight, and
yet so awfully devoid of life, so solemnly silent. It was indeed a sight ne=
ver
to be forgotten, this wide panoramic out-look, with its towering hills, its
smiling valleys, its flashing streams, its all-pervading sunlight, and its =
deep
sad silence. But it was not always so lifeless and so still. Some few years=
ago
those hills, those plains, those rivers were teeming each with their various
creatures. But a short time since, and standing here at eventide, the trave=
ller
could have seen herds of elephants cooling themselves yonder after their da=
y's
travel, whilst the black-headed white-tusked sea-cow rose and plunged in the
pool below. That bush-clad hill was the favourite haunt of droves of buffal=
oes
and elands, and on that plain swarmed thousands upon thousands of springbok=
and
of quagga, of hartebeest and of oribi. All alien life must cease before the
white man, and so these wild denizens of forest, stream, and plain have pas=
sed away
never to return.
Turning at length from the contemplation of a
scene so new and so surprising, we entered the stockade of the kraal. These
kraals consist of a stout outer palisade, and then, at some distance from t=
he
first, a second enclosure, between which the cattle are driven at night, or=
in case
of danger. At the outer entrance we were met by the chief's eldest son, a
finely-built man, who greeted us with much respect and conducted us through
rows of huts to the dwelling-places of the chief's family, fenced off from =
the
rest by a hedge of Tambouki grass. In the centre of these stood Pagadi's hu=
t,
which was larger and more finely woven and thatched than the rest. It is
impossible to describe these huts better than by saying that they resemble
enormous straw beehives of the old-fashioned pattern. In front of the hut w=
ere
grouped a dozen or so of women clad in that airiest of costumes, a string of
beads. They were Pagadi's wives, and ranged from the first shrivelled-up wi=
fe
of his youth to the plump young damsel bought last month. The spokeswoman of
the party, however, was not one of the wives, but a daughter of Pagadi's, a
handsome girl, tall, and splendidly formed, with a finely-cut face. This
prepossessing young lady entreated her lords to enter, which they did, in a
very unlordly way, on their hands and knees. So soon as the eye became
accustomed to the cool darkness of the hut, it was sufficiently interesting=
to
notice the rude attempts at comfort with which it was set forth. The floori=
ng,
of a mixture of clay and cow-dung, looked exactly like black marble, so smo=
oth
and polished had it been made, and on its shining, level surface couches of
buckskin and gay blankets were spread in an orderly fashion. Some little
three-legged wooden sleeping-pillows and a few cooking-pots made up its sol=
e furniture
besides. In one corner rested a bundle of assegais and war-shields, and
opposite the door were ranged several large calabashes full of
"twala" or native beer. The chief's son and all the women followe=
d us
into the hut. The ladies sat themselves down demurely in a double row oppos=
ite
to us, but the young chieftain crouched in a distant corner apart and playe=
d with
his assegais. We partook of the beer and exchanged compliments, almost Orie=
ntal
in their dignified courtesy, in the soft and liquid Zulu language, but not =
for
long, for we still had far to ride. The stars were shining in southern glory
before we reached the place of our night's encampment, and supper and bed w=
ere
even more than usually welcome. There is a pleasure in the canvas-sheltered
meal, in the after-pipe and evening talk of the things of the day that has =
been
and those of the day to come, here, amid these wild surroundings, which is
unfelt and unknown in scenes of greater comfort and higher civilisation. Th=
ere
is a sense of freshness and freedom in the wind-swept waggon-bed that is no=
t to
be exchanged for the softest couch in the most luxurious chamber. And when =
at
length the morning comes, sweet in the scent of flowers, and glad in the vo=
ice
of birds, it finds us ready to greet it, not hiding it from us with canopy =
and
blind, as is the way of cities.
The scene of the coming spectacle of this brig=
ht
new day lies spread before us, and certainly no spot could have been better
chosen for dramatic effect. In front of the waggons is a large, flat, open
space, backed by bold rising ground with jutting crags and dotted clumps of=
luxuriant
vegetation. All around spreads the dense thorn-bush, allowing but of one wa=
y of
approach, from the left. During the morning we could hear snatches of dista=
nt
chants growing louder and louder as time wore on, and could catch glimpses =
of
wild figures threading the thorns, warriors hastening to the meeting-place.=
All
through the past night the farmers for miles around had been aroused by the
loud insistent cries of the chief's messengers as they flitted far and wide,
stopping but a moment wherever one of their tribe sojourned, and bidding him
come, and bring plume and shield, for Pagadi had need of him. This day, we =
may
be sure, the herds are left untended, the mealie-heads ungathered, for the =
herdsmen
and the reapers have come hither to answer to the summons of their chief. L=
ittle
reck they whether it be for festival or war; he needs them, and has called
them, and that is enough. Higher and higher rose the fitful distant chant, =
but
no one could be seen. Suddenly there stood before us a creature, a woman, w=
ho,
save for the colour of her skin, might have been the original of any one of
Macbeth's "weird sisters." Little, withered, and bent nearly doub=
le
by age, her activity was yet past comprehension. Clad in a strange jumble of
snake-skins, feathers, furs, and bones, a forked wand in her outstretched h=
and,
she rushed to and fro before the little group of white men. Her eyes gleame=
d like
those of a hawk through her matted hair, and the genuineness of her frantic
excitement was evident by the quivering flesh and working face, and the wil=
d,
spasmodic words she spoke. The spirit at least of her rapid utterances may =
thus
be rendered:--
"Ou, ou, ou, ai, ai, ai. Oh, ye warriors =
that
shall dance before the great ones of the earth, come! Oh, ye dyers of spear=
s,
ye plumed suckers of blood, come! I, the Isanusi, I, the witch-finder, I, t=
he
wise woman, I, the seer of strange sights, I, the reader of dark thoughts, =
call
ye! Come, ye fierce ones; come, ye brave ones, come, and do honour to the w=
hite
lords! Ah, I hear ye! Ah, I smell ye! Ah, I see ye; ye come, ye come!"=
Hardly had her invocation trailed off into the
"Ou, ou, ou, ai, ai, ai," with which it had opened, when there ru=
shed
over the edge of the hill, hard by, another figure scarcely less wild, but =
not
so repulsive in appearance. This last was a finely-built warrior arrayed in=
the
full panoply of savage war. With his right hand he grasped his spears, and =
on
his left hung his large black ox-hide shield, lined on its inner side with
spare assegais. From the "man's" ring round his head arose a sing=
le tall
grey plume, robbed from the Kafir crane. His broad shoulders were bare, and
beneath the arm-pits was fastened a short garment of strips of skin, interm=
ixed
with ox-tails of different colours. From his waist hung a rude kilt made
chiefly of goat's hair, whilst round the calf of the right leg was fixed a
short fringe of black ox-tails. As he stood before us with lifted weapon and
outstretched shield, his plume bending to the breeze, and his savage aspect
made more savage still by the graceful, statuesque pose, the dilated eye and
warlike mould of the set features, as he stood there, an emblem and a type =
of
the times and the things which are passing away, his feet resting on ground
which he held on sufferance, and his hands grasping weapons impotent as a
child's toy against those of the white man,--he who was the rightful lord o=
f all,--what
reflections did he not induce, what a moral did he not teach!
The warrior left us little time, however, for
either reflections or deductions, for, striking his shield with his assegai=
, he
rapidly poured forth this salutation:--
"Bayete, Bayete, O chief from the olden
times, O lords and chief of chiefs! Pagadi, the son of Masingorano, the gre=
at
chief, the leader of brave ones, the son of Ulubako, greets you. Pagadi is
humble before you; he comes with warrior and with shield, but he comes to l=
ay
them at your feet. O father of chiefs, son of the great Queen over the wate=
r,
is it permitted that Pagad' approach you? Ou, I see it is, your face is ple=
asant;
Bayete, Bayete!"
He ends, and, saluting again, springs forward,
and, flying hither and thither, chants the praises of his chief.
"Pagadi," he says, "Pagad', chief and father of the Amocuna,=
is
coming. Pagad', the brave in battle, the wise in council, the slayer of war=
riors;
Pagad' who slew the tiger in the night time; Pagadi, the rich in cattle, the
husband of many wives, the father of many children. Pagad' is coming, but n=
ot
alone; he comes surrounded with his children, his warriors. He comes like a
king at the head of his brave children. Pagadi's soldiers are coming; his s=
oldiers
who know well how to fight; his soldiers and his captains who make the hear=
ts
of brave men to sink down; his shakers of spears; his quaffers of blood. Pa=
gad'
and his soldiers are coming; tremble all ye, ou, ou, ou!"
As the last words die on his lips the air is
filled with a deep, murmuring sound like distant thunder; it swells and rol=
ls,
and finally passes away to give place to the noise of the rushing of many f=
eet.
Over the brow of the hill dashes a compact body of warriors, running swiftl=
y in
lines of four, with their captain at their head, all clad in the same wild =
garb
as the herald. Each bears a snow-white shield carried on the slant, and abo=
ve
each warrior's head rises a grey heron's plume. These are the advance-guard,
formed of the "greys" or veteran troops. As they come into full v=
iew
the shields heave and fall, and then from every throat bursts the war-song =
of
the Zulus. Passing us swiftly, they take up their position in a double line=
on
our right, and stand there solemnly chanting all the while. Another rush of
feet, and another company flits over the hill towards us, but they bear
coal-black shields, and the drooping plumes are black as night; they fall i=
nto position
next the firstcomers, and take up the chant. Now they come faster and faste=
r,
but all through the same gap in the bush. The red shields, the dun shields,=
the
mottled shields, the yellow shields, follow each other in quick but regular
succession, till at length there stands before us a body of some five hundr=
ed
men, presenting, in their savage dress, their various shields and flashing
spears, as wild a spectacle as it is possible to conceive.
But it is not our eyes only that are astonishe=
d,
for from each of those five hundred throats there swells a chant never to be
forgotten. From company to company it passes, that wild, characteristic son=
g,
so touching in its simple grandeur, so expressive in its deep, pathetic vol=
ume.
The white men who listened had heard the song of choirs ringing down resoun=
ding
aisles, they had been thrilled by the roll of oratorios pealing in melody,
beautiful and complex, through the grandest of man's theatres, but never ti=
ll
now had they heard music of voices so weird, so soft and yet so savage, so
simple and yet so all-expressive of the fiercest passions known to the human
heart. Hark! now it dies; lower and lower it sinks, it grows faint, despair=
ing:
"Why does he not come, our chief, our lord? Why does he not welcome his
singers? Ah! see, they come, the heralds of our lord! our chief is coming to
cheer his praisers, our chief is coming to lead his warriors." Again it
rises and swells louder and louder, a song of victory and triumph. It rolls=
against
the mountains, it beats against the ground: "He is coming, he is here,
attended by his chosen. Now we shall go forth to slay; now shall we taste of
the battle." Higher yet and higher, till at length the chief, Pagadi,
swathed in war-garments of splendid furs, preceded by runners and accompani=
ed
by picked warriors, creeps slowly up. He is old and tottering, and of an
unwieldy bulk. Two attendants support him, whilst a third bears his shield,=
and
a fourth (oh bathos!) a cane-bottomed chair. One moment the old man stands =
and
surveys his warriors and listens to the familiar war-cry. As he stands, his
face is lit with the light of battle, the light of remembered days. The tot=
tering
figure straightens itself, the feeble hand becomes strong once more. With a
shout, the old man shakes off his supporters and grasps his shield, and the=
n,
forgetting his weakness and his years, he rushes to his chieftain's place in
the centre of his men. And as he comes the chant grows yet louder, the time=
yet
faster, till it rises, and rings, and rolls, no longer a chant, but a war-c=
ry,
a paean of power. Pagadi stops and raises his hand, and the place is filled
with a silence that may be felt. But not for long. The next moment five hun=
dred
shields are tossed aloft, five hundred spears flash in the sunshine, and wi=
th a
sudden roar, forth springs the royal salute, "Bayete!"
The chief draws back and gives directions to h=
is
indunas, his thinkers, his wise ones, men distinguished from their fellows =
by
the absence of shield and plume; the indunas pass on the orders to the capt=
ains,
and at once the so-called dance begins. First they manoeuvre a little in
absolute silence, and changing their position with wonderful precision and
rapidity; but as their blood warms there comes a sound as of the hissing of=
ten
thousand snakes, and they charge and charge again. A pause, and the company=
of
"greys" on our right, throwing itself into open order, flits past=
us
like so many vultures to precipitate itself with a wild, whistling cry on an
opposing body which rushed to meet it. They join issue, they grapple; on th=
em
swoops another company, then another and another, until nothing is to be
distinguished except a mass of wild faces heaving; of changing forms rolling
and writhing, twisting and turning, and, to all appearances, killing and be=
ing
killed, whilst the whole air is pervaded with a shrill, savage sibillation.=
It
is not always the same cry; now it is the snorting of a troop of buffaloes,=
now
the shriek of the eagle as he seizes his prey, anon the terrible cry of the
"night-prowler," the lion, and now--more thrilling than all--the =
piercing
wail of a woman. But whatever the cry, the cadence rises and falls in perfe=
ct
time and unanimity; no two mix with one another so as to mar the effect of
each.
Again the combatants draw back and pause, and =
then
forth from the ranks springs a chosen warrior, and hurls himself on an
imaginary foe. He darts hither and thither with wild activity, he bounds fi=
ve
feet into the air like a panther, he twists through the grass like a snake,
and, finally, making a tremendous effort, he seems to slay his airy opponen=
t, and
sinks exhausted to the ground. The onlookers mark their approval or disappr=
oval
of the dancer's feats by the rising and falling of the strange whistling no=
ise
which, without the slightest apparent movement of face or lip, issues from =
each
mouth. Warrior after warrior comes forth in turn from the ranks and does ba=
ttle
with his invisible foe, and receives his meed of applause. The last warrior=
to
spring forward with a wild yell is the future chief, Pagadi's son and succe=
ssor,
our friend of yesterday. He stands, with his shield in one hand and his lif=
ted battle-axe--borne
by him alone--in the other, looking proudly around, and rattling his lion-c=
law
necklets, whilst from every side bursts forth a storm of sibillating applau=
se,
not from the soldiers only, but from the old men, women, and children. Thro=
ugh
all his fierce pantomimic dance it continues, and when he has ended it
redoubles, then dies away, but only to burst out again and again with
unquenchable enthusiasm.
In order, probably, to give the warriors a bri=
ef
breathing space, another song is now set up, and it is marvellous the accur=
acy
and knowledge of melody with which the parts are sung, like a glee of catch=
, the
time being kept by a conductor, who rushes from rank to rank beating time w=
ith
a wand. Yet it is hardly like chanting, rather like a weird, sobbing melody,
with tones in it which range from the deepest bass to the shrillest treble.=
It
ends in a long sigh, and then follows a scene, a tumult, a melee, which har=
dly
admits of a description in words. The warriors engage in a mimic combat, on=
ce
more they charge, retreat, conquer, and are defeated, all in turns. In fron=
t of
them, exciting them to new exertions, with word and gesture, undulate in a
graceful dance of their own the "intombis," the young beauties of=
the
tribe, with green branches in their hands, and all their store of savage fi=
nery
glittering on their shapely limbs. Some of these maidens are really handsom=
e, and
round them again dance the children, armed with mimic spears and shields. W=
ild
as seems the confusion, through it all, even the moments of highest excitem=
ent,
some sort of rough order is maintained; more, it would seem, by mutual soun=
ds
than by word of command or sense of discipline.
Even a Zulu warrior must, sooner or later, grow
weary, and at length the signal is given for the dance to end. The companies
are drawn up in order again, and receive the praise and thanks of those in
whose honour they had been called together. To these compliments they reply=
in
a novel and imposing fashion. At a given signal each man begins to softly t=
ap
his ox-hide shield with the handle of his spear, producing a sound somewhat
resembling the murmur of the distant sea. By slow degrees it grows louder a=
nd
louder, till at length it rolls and re-echoes from the hills like thunder, =
and
comes to its conclusion with a fierce, quick rattle. This is the royal
war-salute of the Zulus, and is but rarely to be heard. One more sonorous
salute with voice and hand, and then the warriors disappear as they came,
dropping swiftly and silently over the brow of the hill in companies. In a =
few
moments no sign or vestige of dance or dancers remained, save, before our e=
yes,
the well-trodden ground, a few lingering girls laden with large calabashes =
of
beer, and in our ears some distant dying snatches of chants. The singers we=
re
on their joyful way to slay and devour the oxen provided as a stimulus and =
reward
for them by their chief's liberality.
When the last dusky figure had topped the risi=
ng
ground over which the homeward path lay, and had stood out for an instant
against the flaming background of the western sun, and then dropped, as it
were, back into its native darkness beyond those gates of fire, the old chi=
ef
drew near. He had divested himself of his heavy war-dress, and sat down
amicably amongst us.
"Ah," he said, taking the hand of Sir
Theophilus Shepstone, and addressing him by his native name, "Ah!
t'Sompseu, t'Sompseu, the seasons are many since first I held this your han=
d.
Then we two were young, and life lay bright before us, and now you have gro=
wn
great, and are growing grey, and I have grown very old! I have eaten the co=
rn
of my time, till only the cob is left for me to suck, and, ow, it is bitter=
. But
it is well that I should grasp this your hand once more, oh, holder of the
Spirit of Chaka,[*] before I sit down and sleep with my fathers. Ow, I am
glad."
[=
*] The
reader must bear in mind that the Zulu warrior is buried sitting and in full war-dress.
Chaka, or T'chaka, was the fou=
nder
of the Zulu power.
Imposing as was this old-time war-dance, it is=
not
difficult to imagine the heights to which its savage grandeur must have swe=
lled
when it was held--as was the custom at each new year--at the kraal of Cetyw=
ayo,
King of the Zulus. Then 30,000 warriors took part in it, and a tragic inter=
est
was added to the fierce spectacle by the slaughter of many men. It was, in
fact, a great political opportunity for getting rid of the "irreconcil=
able"
element from council and field. Then, in the moment of wildest enthusiasm, =
the
witch-finder darted forward and lightly touched with a switch some doomed m=
an,
sitting, it may be, quietly among the spectators, or capering with his
fellow-soldiers. Instantly he was led away, and his place knew him no more.=
Throughout the whole performance there was one
remarkable and genuine feature, the strong personal attachment of each memb=
er
of the tribe to its chief--not only to the fine old chief, Pagadi, their le=
ader
in former years, but to the head and leader for the years to come.
It must be remembered that this system of
chieftainship and its attendant law is, to all the social bearings of South
African native life, what the tree is to its branches; it has grown through
long, long ages amid a people slow to forget old traditions, and equally sl=
ow
to receive new ideas; dependent on it are all the native's customs, all his=
keen
ideas of right and justice; in it lies embodied his history of the past, and
from it springs his hope for the future. Surely even the most uncompromisin=
g of
those marching under the banner of civilisation must hesitate before they
condemn this deep-rooted system to instant uprootal.[*] The various influen=
ces
of the white man have eaten into the native system as rust into iron, and t=
heir
action will never cease till all be destroyed. The bulwarks of barbarism, i=
ts
minor customs and minor laws, are gone, or exist only in name; but its two
great principles, polygamy and chieftainship, yet flourish and are strong. =
Time
will undo his work, and find for these also a place among forgotten things.=
And
it is the undoubted duty of us English, who absorb people and territories in
the high name of civilisation, to be true to our principles and our aim, and
aid the great destroyer by any and every safe and justifiable means. But
between the legitimate means and the rash, miscalculating uprootal of custo=
ms
and principles, which are not the less venerable and good in their way beca=
use
they do not accord with our own present ideas, there is a great gulf fixed.
Such an uprootal might precipitate an outburst of the very evils it aims at
destroying.
[=
*] I
do not wish the remarks in this paper, which was written some years ago, to be taken =
as
representing my present views =
on the
Natal native question, formed after a longer and more intimate acquaintanc=
e with
its peculiarities, for which I=
beg
to refer the reader to the cha=
pter
on Natal.--Author.
What the ultimate effect of our policy will be,
when the leaven has leavened the whole, when the floodgates are lifted, and
this vast native population (which, contrary to all ordinary precedent, does
not melt away before the sun of the white man's power) is let loose in its =
indolent
thousands, unrestrained, save by the bonds of civilised law, who can presum=
e to
say? But this is not for present consideration. Subject to due precautions,=
the
path of progress must of necessity be followed, and the results of such
following left in the balancing hands of Fate and the future.